Swamy RAMA\textit{nuja}'s
\textit{Sri Bh\textit{ashyam}}
(\textit{Chapters 1 and 2})

\textit{By Srimathy SarOja RAMA\textit{nujam}}
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In the systems of VedAnta, Brahma SUTrAs of Sage BaadarAyaNa occupy the loftiest position. These SUTrAs known also as SaarIraka SUTrAs distill the essence of Upanishadic teaching in a crisp, aphoristic manner. Sage BaadarAyaNa is none other than Sage VyAsa, an amsAvathAram of Sriman NaarAyaNan Himself.

The importance of these SUTrAs bequeathed to us by Sage BaadarAyaNaa has been pointed out to us by none other than GithAchAryan in the thirteenth chapter of Bhagavath Gita (KshEtra-KshEtrajna bhEdham).

While differentiating the Known (KshEtra/Body) from the knower (KshEtrajna/the knower of the Body) and discussing the means of deliverance from the manifested Prakruthi to attain the Supreme,

Bhagavan says (XIII.4):

Rishibhir-Bahudhaa geetham chandhObhir vividhai: pruTak
BrahmaSUTrA padahscchaiva hEthumadhbhir-viniscchithai:

(Meaning): “The truth about the KshEtra/body and KshEtrajna/Soul has been sung by seers in various ways, in various distinctive hymns, and also in the well reasoned and conclusive words of the Brahma SUTrAs”.

The SUTrAs have a magnificent crescendo and pattern as they move from the first to the fourth and final chapter. “The first chapter brings out the coherent import of the Upanishads by elucidating the apparently doubtful import of certain pronouncements. The second chapter works out a philosophical defence of the VedAntic standpoint in the context of adverse systems of thought. The third chapter outlines the spiritual pathway to the supreme goal of life, while the fourth chapter discusses the nature of that goal itself”.

It has been suggested that the first two chapters of Brahma SUTrAs formulate the Tattva or the nature of Reality and the third deals with Hitha/means or Saadhana and the fourth chapter dwells on the PurushArTa or the Ultimate goal of life.

The Tattva or Reality here is the Supreme Soul, the Brahman. The Hitha or the Means is for the bhaddha Jeevan to recognize the ParamAthman (indweller of the Jeevan) as “the One with infinite perfections inspite of its immanence”. The Supreme Brahman is recognized in the third chapter as the ultimate goal by the striving Jeevan and the different types of upAsanaas (means) to be practised for winning the grace of the Supreme Brahman are described. The fourth chapter elucidates the fruits of the Saadhana covered in the third chapter. The fourth chapter evaluates the doctrine of Moksha and affirms that Moksha is “the direct experience of Brahman, with all the plentitude and eternity which only that experience can bring to the individual personality. It is the supreme ecstasy of LIFE in GOD”.

The Brahma Sūtras known also as the Vedānta Sūtras deal with the five fundamental doctrines of Vedānta according to Dr. S.M.S Chary, the scholarly author of "The Philosophy of the Vedānta Sūtras". These five topics are:

(1) The Nature of Brahman
(2) the Nature of individual Soul (Jeevan) and its relation to Brahman
(3) the Nature of the Universe and its relation to Brahman
(4) the nature of the means to attain Brahman
(5) the Nature of the Supreme Goal.

Many prominent Vedāntins including Sankara, RaamAnuja and Maadhva have written commentaries on the Vedānta Sūtras to support their darsanams dealing with Advaitam, VisishtAdhvaitham and Dhvaitham respectively. Sankara's Bhāshyam is the earliest commentary on Vedānta Sūtras and establishes the philosophy of Advaita or AbhvAdha according to which (1) the undifferentiated Brahman (nirvisEsha Brahman) alone is Real (2) Jeevan is identical with that Brahman and (3) Jagath or the universe is unreal (illusory). Ramanuja arrived at different conclusions from Sankara by studying the same Brahma Sūtras and established that Brahman is endowed with attributes (SavisEsha Brahman) and it is the only reality as organically related to both the sentient souls (chith) and the non-sentient matter (achith) both of which are very real. In this view, the Brahman of RaamAnuja as established in his commentary known as Sri BhAshyam is a “chith-achith - visishta Brahman”. RaamAnuja rejected the views of Sankara (nirvisEsha Brahman and illusory nature of Universe) and established that the Brahma Sūtras of Sage BaadarAyaNa advocates SavisEsha Brahman and that the Jeevan is different from Brahman and is real as much as the Universe (Jagath) is real. The oneness of a SavisEsha Brahman with anantha KalyANa guNams and organically related to the Jeevans and the Universe are the central tenets of the magnificent commentary of AchArya RaamAnuja (Sri BhAshyam) following the way shown by his poorvAchAryAs like Yaamuna Muni.

There are many outstanding commentaries on Sri BhAshyam starting from Srutha PrakAsikaa of Sri Sudarsana Suri, which Swamy Desikan protected with great care during the Muslim invasion of Srirangam. The importance of Sri BhAshyam is recognized, when we reflect on AchArya RaamAnuja's own commandment for VaishNavites to read Sri BhAshyam. Swamy Desikan studied it and taught to others 30 times in his lifetime. The reason for AchArya RaamAnuja's commandment to study Sri BhAshyam was not motivated by any thought of self-adoration. AchArya RaamAnuja felt that we have to know “the true inner spirit of the Upanishads” so that we can pursue the proper means to gain Moksha Sukham. The difficulties faced by not having adequate knowledge of Sanskrit and Saasthrams can handicap us from studying Sri BhAshyam in its original language. Fortunately for us, who may not be able to benefit from Understanding of Sri BhAshyam through the classical KaalakshEpam route, masterly commentaries in Tamil and English are available to gain a degree of appreciation of the grandeur and depth of Sri BhAshyam. In the Sundara Simham series on PoorvAchArya granthams, the Naayaka Mani will be missing if we did not have an essay on Sri BhAshyam. We are delighted that we could persuade Dr. Saroja Ramanujam, an eminent Teacher and scholar to share with us her knowledge of Sri BhAshyam acquired through the traditional KaalakshEpam route form her AchAryan, U.Ve. ArasaaNippAlai Sri GopAlacchAr Swamy, a
sishyar of Abhinava Desika Sri UtthamUr Swamy, the author of BhAvA PrakAsika. We are grateful to Dr. Saroja RaamAnujam for her clear commentaries on the individual Suthrams of BadarAyaana following the path laid out by AchArya RaamAnuja in Sri BhAshyam.

There will be two releases on Sri BhAshyam under the authorship of Dr. Saroja RaamAnujam. Today we release the commentaries on the first two chapters of Brahma SUtrAms and will follow it up in a month’s time on the remaining two chapters.

Our sincere thanks to Dr. Saroja RaamAnujam for her much appreciated Kaimkaryam to the VaishNava communities served by the Sundara Simham GhOshti.

RaamAnuja Daasan, Oppiliappan Koil V. Sadagopan
The name of Veda vyAsA is one of the most celebrated names among the great sages of India. He is the author of Mahabharata and the purANAs. It is this great sage, who classified the vast vEdic lore into several sections according to their content and purpose. He is also the author of the VEdAntha SUtrAs (Brahma SUtrAs). He is considered as an incarnation of Lord VishNu Himself on account of these stupendous achievements.

Sri KrishNa DvIpAyana VyAsA (as he is known) was born in an illustrious family of great sages. He was the great grandson of the famous Brahmarishi, VasishTA and the grand son of the sage Shakthi and the son of the eminent sage ParAsarA; latter was blessed by VasishTA and PulashthyA and on account of their blessings, ParAsarA was endowed with the true knowledge of the Supreme Reality. ParAsarA became the author of VishNu PurANam. VyAsA was born of this great ParAsarA and Sathyavathi. VyAsA was called “DhvaipAyanA” since he was born on an island. He was also called 'KrishNa Dhvai- pAyanA' since his complexion was dark. As he had his hermitage in Badari kshEthram, he was also referred to as BAdarAyaNA. There is vEdic reference to him as “SahOvaacha vyAasah pArAsaryah”.

The Skanda purANam refers to Veda VyAsA and his achievements and affirms that he alone was the author of the VedAntha SUtrAs. According to our tradition, it is an undisputed fact that Veda VyAsA was the classifier of the VedAs, author of the PurANAs and the composer of MahA Bhaaratham and VedAntha SUtrAs.

Sri vEdha VyAsA was a genius by birth. It is said that the great sages Yaj~nyavalkyA initiated him into the study of the sacred lore and the other branches of knowledge. VyAsA resorted to the quiet realms of the HimAlayAs (BAdarikAsramam) and by performance of rigorous penance and austerities, he realized the Supreme Truth eulogized in the VedAs and Upanishads.

The VishNu purANam describes (3.3) elaborately how Lord MahA VishNu incarnates Himself in the form of VyAsA and classifies the vEdhAs during each DhvApara Yugam. The vEdhA was all in one mass, &people were not able to imbibe the teachings of the vEdhAs. For the good of the people, VyAsA classified the vEdhic lore. The VishNu purANA mentions that this kind of classification was effected 28 times by the Lord in the form of VyAsA. ParAsarA's son, Sri KrishNa Dhva- ipAyanA is one of those VyAsAs and it is believed that the son of DhrONA
would become the next VyAsA. The status of VyAsA is thus a very exalted one.

Sri KrishNa DhvaipAyana VyAsA took an active part in the events of MahA BhAratham (MB). The heroes of MB such as BhIshmA, DhritharAsh-trA, Sri KrishNA, DharmarAyA & others held VyAsA in great esteem. VyAsA advised the scions of the Kuru race to follow the path of DharmA. The MB was authored by VyAsA for the good of humanity. VyAsA taught the truth in MB that glory and honour could be achieved by the One imbibing and practising the cardinal virtues of life. He has illustrated this truth by means of the stories of VidhurA, DharmavyAdhe, TulAdharA and others.

The greatest achievement of Veda VyAsA was the collection, consolidation and classification of the Vedic lore. It was VyAsA, who brought about the different divisions of the Vedic lore as the four SamhithAs, the BrahmaNAs, the AraNyakAs and the Upanishads. The different texts required for the different classes of priests, such as the Riks, the Yajus, the SAmans and the Atharvans were separately codified by this great Master. VishNu PurANam says that VyAsA accepted 4 disciples & taught each one of them a particular VedhA. He taught Rig VedhA to PailA, Yajur vEdhA to VaismpAyanA, SAMA vEdhA to Jaimini & the Atharva vEdhA to Sumanthu; further, he taught the PurANAs to RomaharshaNA. The classification of the VedhA was accomplished by VyAsA and later the different branches and sub branches (SAkhAs) evolved for each VedhA over the course of time.

Srimadh BhAgavatham (SB) describes that the Lord was born as VyAsA as the seventeenth avathArA for the purpose of dividing the tree of VedAs into its many branches.

SB describes how Veda VyAsA was overcome by frustration inspite of the fact that he had engaged himself whole heartedly for advancing the good of the people for years and years. He felt uneasy at heart and when he began to reflect with discomfort that his work was not completed, sage NAradhA called on him and advised VyAsA to sing solely on the glory of the Lord to overcome this mood of depression. Following Sage NAradhA's counsel, VyAsA composed Sri- madh BhAgavatham and taught it to his son, Sukha Brahmam.

The MahA BharathA describes how at one time even this great VyAsA felt that his words of wisdom (upadEsams) were not heeded by anyone. He said “I am shouting at the top of my voice, with both my arms lifted up, that DahrmA alone leads one to all auspiciousness here and in the hereafter. But alas! no one listens to me!”.

Sri vEdha VyAsA is an illustrious seer and a great exponent of the cultural heritage of India. We depend on him for gaining the wisdom from the VedAs, IthihAsAs and PurANAs and the knowledge about the Supreme Reality. VyAsA is the author of this eternal message: “Victory is there, where there is DharmA”. The foundation of the Indian culture rooted in the VedAs has been laid firmly by him for the entire world to follow.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

“Smt Saroja Ramanujam with her Guru Sri Arasanippalai Gopala Desikan Swamy”

Dr Saroja Ramanujam is a retired teacher and an active contributor to a number of web discussions on various topics related to our sampradayam. She has also numerous web blogs on Bhagavad Gita, Dasavathara, Sri Vishnu Sahasramaamam, Ramanuja Philosophy, Sankhya etc. She has a rich educational background with degrees in Mathematics, Statistics, Economics and Philosophy. She earned her Doctorate in Philosophy (Vishishtadvaita) from Madras University and is a Siromani in Sanskrit.

She had traditional KaalakshEpam of Sri BhAshyam with Sri Arasanippalai Gopala Desikan Swamy, who is a 92 years young Sri VaishNavite Scholar; He is a disciple of Abhivava Desika UtthamUr Sri Veeraraghavachar Swamy. He is the author of many commentaries of AchArya Sri Sookthis in Sanskrit and Tamil. He is proficient in Jyothisham and has been a Teacher of Sanskrit for many decades. His commentaries on Sri Lakshminarayana Hrudhayam, Sri Sooktham and Lakshmi Sahasra NaamaavaLi are awaiting publication.
INTRODUCTION

The principles of the philosophy of visishtadvaita are expounded in the interpretation of the Brahmasutra by Ramanuja. His commentary on Brahmasthra, otherwise known as Vedanta sutra, is his monumental work, the Sribhaashya. Ramanuja establishes the tenets of visishtadvaita firmly in Sribhaashya while refuting the views of other schools of philosophy effectively.

Ramanuja opens Sribhashya his commentary on the Brahmasthra with an invocational verse,

Akhilabhuvanajanmasthembhangaadhileele
Vinathavidhithabhootha vratharakshaikadhikshe
Sruthisirasi Vidheepthe brahmani sreenivaase
bhavathu mama parasmin semushee bhakthirupaa

‘May my intellect, semushi, be engrossed in devotion, bhakthirupa bhavathu, on Lord Srinivasa, the Supreme Brahman, brahmani sreenivaase, who is shining on the crown of the vedas, sruthisirasi Vidheepthe, who has vowed to protect all beings who bow down to Him and follow His path vinathavidhitha bhothavraathaka dhikshe, and for whom the acts like creation sustenance and annihilation are mere sport, akhilabhuvanajanmasthembhangaadhileele.’

As in vedharthasangraha here also Ramanuja uses the name Srinivasa as a synonym for Parabrahman. Srinivasa could be taken to have reference to the Lord of Thirumala, but considering the subject matter dealt with in this work Srinivasa can be construed as sriyah nivasah, the abode of Sri, that is Lord Narayana, Paravasudeva, the Brahman of visishtadvaita.

Bhavathu mama semushi bhakthirupaa implies that bhakthi is the sole means of salvation. Jnana as a result of bhakthi is stressed in visishtadvaita. Srinivasa or Brahman crowns the sruthi, Veda, as its chief import Srutisirasividheepte. Veda is the only source of knowledge about Brahman and Brahman is the only purport of the Veda. Brahman or Narayana is described as having taken the diksha, vow of protecting His bhakthas, vinatha vidhitha bhoothavraatharakshaikadhikshe. Bhootha, all beings, who are Vinatha, surrender to Him andvidhitha, follow the path of devotion. May it be man bird or beast, as can be seen in the case of Vibheeshana, Gajendhra and Jatayu? It is His only vow as Rama says when Vibheeshana surrenders to Him,

Sakrdheva prapannaanaam thavaasmi ithi vadhinaam abhayam sarvabhoothanaanam
dhadhaami ithi vratham mama

‘It is my vow to give protection to all beings whoever surrenders to me saying, “I am yours”.’

As Sudharsana Suri puts it His vow to protect is, to give them Mukthi ultimately.

The reason for this vow is denoted by akhila bhuvanjanmasthemabhangadhiileele. The
creation, janma, the sustenance, sthema and the annihilation, bhanga all are His leela, done without effort, and hence He feels responsible for the beings He Himself created when they turn to Him for protection. He not only creates sustains and annihilates but also enters into the beings as their Self. This is implied by aadhi padha, bhangaadhi, and annihilation and so on. The word akhila is used instead of any other word of the same meaning, like sarva or nikhila because the letter ‘a’, akaara denotes auspiciousness and represents the Lord Himself. Khila means sesh, remnant, while akhila is asesa, all inclusive.

**Sribhashya- Paadha 1-adhikarana-1**

**Jijnasa-AdhikaranaNam**

**Suthra-1**  'ATHAATHO BRAHMA JIJNAASA'—THEN, THEREFORE THE INQUIRY OF BRAHMAN

Sri Ramanuja starts his Sribhashya with the words 'athra ayam aTHa shabdah AnanthyaaryE bhavathi.'

Before we examine the meaning of these words we have to understand a little of the structure of the vedas, each of which basically consists of two parts.

The purva bhaga, deals with the Ritualistic portion while

The uttarabhaga, known as Vedanta consists of upanishads.

The interpretation of the ritualistic texts and clarification of the doubts therein is called PurvamimAmsa or karmamimamsa and it was prepounded by Jaimini in the form of suthras

While the study of the nature of Brahman and other concepts of Vedanta are called UththaramimAmsa consisting of the Brahmasuthras of BAdharAyaNa. Brahmasuthras have been interpreted by Sankara and Madhwa according to their siddhanatha while tha commentary of Ramanuja is based on Bhodhaayana vritthi and is in accordance with Visishtadvaita.

Now coming to the sentence' athra ayam aTHa sabdhah AnanthryE bhavathi,' means that the word 'aTHa' is used here in the sense of 'then', that is, 'after something.' The cryptic suthra should be understood as follows.

Then, aTHa-after the study of purvamimamsa, therefore, athah-knowing that the result of the rituals done for specific purpose are finite and transitory, inquiry of Brahman, brahmajijnAsA-to be taken up because the knowledge of the real nature of Brahman secures infinite and eternal result, that is moksha. So the Ananthrya referred to there is after the study of karmamimamsa.

Then ramanuja explains the word 'athah' thus:

'Atha sabdhah vrtthasyahethubhAve'
Vrttha refers to the meaning of 'aTHA' which is 'then' and the word 'atha' explains the reason for the previous word-meaning. If the word 'atha' is removed, the suthra would mean that the inquiry of Brahman is to be taken then, but it would not justify the action of taking up the inquiry without the word athah, meaning 'therefore', which implies the need of the knowledge of Brahman because the knowledge rituals alone will not secure the release from bondage.

Ramanuja explains as to why the study of Brahman comes after that of karmakanda of the vedas. When the vedas are learned along with their angas, the karmajnana acquired thereby produces results which are of alpa, trivial and asthira, transitory. So to one who is desirous of attaining moksha, sanjAta mokshAbhilAshah, the inquiry of Brahman, brahmajijnAsa, is ananhtarabhAvinee, subsequent to vedhAdhyayana.

Next Ramanuja analyses the word 'brahmajijnAsA.' It is jijnAsA, desire to know Brahman, 'brahmaNah jijnAsA.' he word brahmaNah is in genitive case denoting sambandha, connection or relationship as in 'rAjnah puthrah,' the son of the king. But here the rule 'karmaNi shashati' is applied and the word brahmaNah is used in the sense of an object. It is because the act of knowing requires an object and by knowing what is Brahman includes knowing about Brahman also.

A bhashya must have five requisites, namely,

PadhacchEdha, splitting the words like separating the suthra as aTHa, atha, etc.

PadhArthkthivigrahah, etymological meaning of the words as in brahmNah jijnAsA, vAkyayojanA, it must consist of full sentences,

Akshepasya samAdhAnam, reply to any possible objection and vyAkhyAnam, commentary on the text.

In Sribhashya also we see that according to the above lakshana Ramanuja presupposes the possible objection from the opponentand answers them after explaining about the word 'brahma.'

The adjectives anavadhika and asankhyeya with reference to His wonderful, athisaya and infinite, anantha kalyANa gunagana, auspicious qualities, show that they are inconceivable by vAk and manas. Avadhi is limit and Sankhya is number. His qualities are anavadhika, not limited by words or thught and asankhyEya, countless, as Desika says in YadhvAbhyudhaya,

Ramanuja outlines the basic concept of visishtadvaita by his explanation of the word ‘brahma.’ He says

BrahmasabdheNacha svabhAvathah nirasthanikhiladhoshah anavadhika athisaya asankhyEya kalyANagunaganaNah Purushothmahah abhidheeyathE

The word ‘brahma’ refers to the supreme Purusha, NArAyaNa, who is naturally devoid of all defects, (this eliminates other realized, muktha, everfree, nitya, souls), and possesses infinite, wonderful, inconceivable auspicious qualities. These words serve to deny the concept of nirguNabrahman. By this statement he declares without any ambiguity that the word brahma
is synonymous with NArAyaNa, removing any doubt to the contrary.
(devathAntharavyAvrtrthyarTHah-Sudarsanasuri)

The adjectives anavadhika and asankhyeya with reference to His wonderful, athisaya and infinite, anatha kalyANa gunagana, auspicious qualities, show that they are inconceivable by vAk and manas. Avadhi is limit and Sankhya is number. His qualities are anavadhika, not limited by words or thought and asankhyEya, countless, as Desika says in YadhvAbhyudhaya, ‘yadhEkaikaguNaprAnthE shrAnthAh nigamavandhinah yathAvath VarNaE asya,’ the vedas Proceeding to describe Him as He is, become exhausted by the time they finish relating about even one of His qualities.

Ramanuja then proceeds to show that the word Brahman can only mean nothing but sarvesvara. Brahma sabda is derived from the root ‘brh’ to mean greatness and though it can be applied to anything which is great, the mukhyArTha of the word can only be that which is by nature possesses the greatness to an infinite degree, as in the case of the word ‘bhagavat’ which denotes only the Lord. The implication here is that the word, great being, brahma, is not meant in the adjectival sense but as the mukhyArTHa, in its denotation of something which is great by nature.

Another reason for the word ‘brahma’ denoting sarvesvara is given by Ramanuja as ‘thApathrayAthuraih amrthathvAya sa Eva jijnAsyah.’

As the Lord is the sole resort for those who are affected by thApathraya, the three afflictions of samsara, namely Adhibhouthika, Adhidhaivika and AdhyaAthmika, He alone becomes the object of jijnAsA. The ills of samsara are due to the three thApaas, Suffering due to fate due to no reason, Adhidhaivika, Due to other beings and natural elements, Adhiboutika and Due to our own physical and mental conflicts for which our own actions are responsible, AdhyaAthmika. Even though these may be remedied by other means they are not permanent and permanent remedy is possible only by the grace of the Lord, who alone can release us from the samsara. So ‘sa Eva jijnAsYaH, ’ He alone has to be inquired.

After examining the implications of the word ‘brahma’ and explaining it to mean Narayana the last word of the suthra jijnAsA is examined. The word is a compound meaning jnAthum icchA, desire to know. The one who has studied the PurvamimaAmsA comes to know of its alpa asthiraphalathva and turns to Utthara mimAms A with the desire to attain the permanent bliss of moksha.

The PurvamimAmsa sastram discusses the purusharthas beginning with the suthra 'aTHatho dharmajijnasA,' and it is precedent to the UttharamimAmsa in as much as, in order to understand the asthiraphalathva one has to study the sastra and follow the injunctions. So the UttharamimAmsa forms the latter part of study of vedas and hence forms one whole with the purvamimAmsa.

Ramanuja elaborates on the krama, the order of study of the vedas by saying, ' thaTHA hi-praTHamam thaavath “svaaDHyaayo adhyEthyayah” ithi adhyayanEvaivasvADHyAya SabdhavAchyavedhAkyAkshararAsEh grahaNamviDHeeyathE' First the vedas are learnt after
upanayanam by word of mouth, that is chanting with svaras. The proper time of aDHyayana is denoted by “ashtavarsham brAhmaNam upanayeetha; tham aDhyApayEth." A brahmin should be sanctified with upanayana at eight years of age and should start the aDHyayana. So aDHyayana means learning the chanting of the vedas from the acharya. The result of the vedaDHyayana is self evident as given by the manthras japas etc. The meanings of the Vedic texts are learnt in due course along with the vedaAngas.

The next step is to realise that the results of the ritualistic karma are transient and the aspirant turns to the Upanishads for attaining permanent well-being through the enquiry of UttaramimAmsA, also known as sAreerakamimAmsa

The Vedanta texts such as

“thadyathEha karmachitho lokah ksheeyathE EvamEva amuthra punyachithah lokah ksheeyathe”(chandogya-8-1-6),

Just as this world entered through one's karma is transitory so also are the worlds attained through punyaphala, affirm the transient and finite nature of the karmaphala. In the Baghavatgita the Lord says, 'ksheenE punyE martyalokam visanthi,' when the acquired merit through karma enjoined in the vedas is exausted the jiva returns to the earth, the karmaloka. Only by brahmajnana the cycle of birth and death can be got rid off. The texts

"brahmavid aApnothi param", (Taitt.Ana.1)"napunarmrthyavE thdhEkam pasyathi" (chan.7-26-2)

and the like are asserting that one who knows brahman reaches the ultimate and after the perception of the one ultimate reality never resorts back to mortality.

Here the objection of the advaitin that since the study of the vedas makes one realise that the result of karma is transient and finite, the study of UttaramimAmsA could be pursued straight away without following the course of karmakanda. Ramanuja answers that it is not so. The mere knowledge of brahman by study of vedanta is not enough to secure liberation. The inquiry into the nature of brahman, after clearing the doubts and misconceptions through deep study and practice and contemplation alone can result in brahmajnana. So too mere study of the karmakanda of the vedas will not result in the knowledge of the ephemeral and limited nature of the karmaphala. That is, one has to learn through experience as otherwise mere teaching will make one realise the impermanence of the world. But we see that it is not so in practice. To know whether something is conducive to welfare or not, one has to know what it is in order to get convinced beyond doubt.

LAGHUPURVAPAKSHAH- THE ARGUMENTS OF ADVAITIN

Advaitin argues further that the word aTha explained in the meaning of Anantharya, 'after that' thus referring to the study of purvamimAmsa being the forerunner to the study of UttaramimAmsA is not tenable. One can attain the knowledge of Brahman through the study of UttaramimAmsA which alone can destroy the avidya, the cause of the perception of manifoldness of the universe. Hence the study of PurvamimAmsA helps in no way towards
enlightenment, on the contrary is detrimental to it because the study of PurvamimAmsA makes one get involved in the manifold world and may as a consequence turn him away from brahmajijnAsA. The study of the vedas itself can give the idea of the transitory nature of karmaphala and there is no necessity for the inquiry into purvamimAmsA.

But it remains to be explained as to what does the word aTHa means if it is not used with the implication of Anantharya to purvamimAmsA. Advaitin comes with the answer that though the word is used in the sense of Anantharya, 'after something,' it really means that the brahmajijnAsA follows after the saDHana chathushtaya, namely nithyAnithyavasthuvivekah, discrimination between what is permanent and what is not, samadhamAdhi sAdhanasampath, the acquirement of inner and outer control, ihamAthrapyabhogaviraAgah, detachment towards the karmaphala in this world and the next and mumukshuthvam, an intense desire for moksha. If one is endowed with these as a result of his merits in purvajanma he has no need of enquiry into the karmakanda.

Advaitin presupposes the counter argument that the injunctions about Udgita etc found in UththaramimAmsA with reference to upasanA requires the knowledge of purvamimAmsA and says' anabhijno bhavAn sAreerakasasthravijnaAnasya.' Sudarsana suri explains this as, 'sasthre pradhAnathayA prathipAdhyam jnAnam idham ihi thvayaA na jnAtham ithyarthah'. This means "You do not seem to understand the main idea explicit in the sAreerakasAsthra.

We should remember when reading the arguments of the opponents that it is Ramanuja's words and not that of the opponent as it is the practice to supply the counter arguments and establish one's own siddhAnta by answering them.

The upasana texts in Uththara mimAmsa though connected with karamkanda are not actually so, because, the karma expounded in purvamimAmsA has no connection whatsoever with the subjectmatter of UththaramimAmsA, namely, Brahman.

Besides the sruti texts like

'thath yatTHEha karmachithah lokah ksheeyathE EvameEva amuthra puNyachithah lokah ksheeyathe' (ch.8-1-6)
also denote karma as an obstacle to the attainment of brahmajnana. Even the texts like 'yajnEna dhAnEna thapasA anAsanEna brAhmaNAh vividhishanthi' (Brhad.-6-4-22)
enjoin only anthahkaraNa nirnalya, purity of inner equipment, and not for the sake of result or moksha.

Work done without desire for fruit purifies anthahkaraNa and creates desire for knowledge when the anthahkaraNa is pure then knowledge is acquired through sravaNa, manana and niidhiDhyAsana.

Sravana consists in hearing or learning the meaning of the vedantavakyas affirming the unity of Atman with Brahman, such as 'satyam jnanam anantham brahma, '(tait.ana.1), Brahman is existence, knowledge and infinity, 'ayam Athsma brahma, (brhd.6.4.5), this atman is brahman, 'thathvamasi' (chan.6.8.7), 'that thou art,' from an acharya.
Assimilating the teaching of the acharya and making its one's own is manana.

Continuous contemplation of the same in order to get rid of the beginningless vAsana is nidhiDhyAsana. Therefore the prerequisite of brahmajijnAsaA is only the sADHana chthushhtayam and not the inquiry into work.

**LAGHUSIDDHANTHAH - ANSWER TO LAGHUPURVAPAKSHA**

Brahmavijnana may arise when avidhya is dispelled, 'avidhyA nivrtthirEva mokshah sA cha brhmavijanAdhEva bhavathi,' as professed by the advatin, but the concept of avidhya, brahman and vijnana are different in every system of philosophy. Avidhya is bhAvarupa or existent independent entity in advaita and anAdhi, beginningless. In VisishtaAdhvaita however, it is the result of karma in the form of puNya and pApa. To the advaitin brahman is nirguNa, without attributes while for visishtadvaitin Brahma synonymous with NArAyNa is saguna, possessing of innumerable, infinite auspicious qualities, ananthakalyANguNa visishta. The difference in the concept of vijAna will be examined here.

Ramanuja here questions the concept of jnAna saying,

'jnAnam kim rupam iti vivechaneeyam-kim vAkyAth vAkyArTHa jnaAnamAthram, utha thanmoolamupAsanAthmakam jnAnam iti.'

Does it arises by the mere study of vedantavakyas or through meditation on the knowledge obtained by that study? If the knowledge of Brahma can be had by the mere study of the texts like 'thathvamasi', 'ayam AthmA brahma,' there would be no sense in the words like 'brahma vidhyAth, know brahman,' and 'upAseetha, meditate.' Experience also disproves this. On the other hand as in the case Suka, Sanakaa and others it is seen that the meditation on Brahma has given the brahmajnAna with which the sruthivakhyas are easily comprehended.

Advaitin may contend that even after acquiring the jnAna the bhedhavAsana, the experience of duality due to avidhya may remain though avidhya does not, as in the case of one who sees two moons due to some defect in the eyes, the knowledge that there is only one moon does not make the illusion disappear. But even if it remains it does not cause bondage because the root cause of the illusion of duality, namely, avidhya is removed by brahmajnAna. Sudarsana suri gives two more examples and says that a cloth burnt, though retains its shape, will not serve the purpose of covering and will be destroyed in due course. Similarly the wheel of a potter may keep revolving for some tiime even after the operation of making the pot is over.

Ramanuja says 'sathyAmapi sAmagryAm jnAna anuthpattthi anupapatthEh.' When there is the necessary requisite of the rise of jnAna, the absence of it is not acceptable. Avidhya is like darkness which should immediately vanish when the light of jnAna dawns and when there is no avidhya, the cause, its effect, namely, the perception of duality should also vanish.

Sudarsanasuri explains this further that the darkness of a cave vanishes the moment a bright lamp is brought inside and when one is frightened that there is a snake, learns from a reliable Wellwisher that there is no snake there but only a rope, the bhramajnAna, illusory notion of a
snake vanishes. Similarly if the brahmajna should result from the vedavakyas about brahman being the only reality there should be no more perception of duality. But it is not so.

Ramanuja disagrees with the statement of the advaitin that inspite of the knowledge that has risen from the study of the vedantavakyas the perception of duality will remain due to the beginningless vAsana, mental impressions, by saying 'bhedhajnAna sAmagryA api vAsanAyAh miTHyA rupathvena jaNothptthyA Eva nivrtthathvAth, ' the bhedhajnAna, perception of duality itself is miTHyA, illusion according to the advaitin to whom everything other than brahman is unreal. So being illusionary the rise of brahmajnana should remove it as otherwise there is nothing else that can cause its destruction. If it is claimed that it vanishes by itself, it is absurd as a thing cannot destroy itself. To say that the cause of vAsana, which is avidhya, is destroyed by jnAna and hence the illusion will remain for sometime and then vanish is a statement of ignorance, says Ramanuja,

'vAsanAkAryam bhedhajnAnam cchinnamoolam aTHa cha anuvarthathE' ithi bAlisbhAshitham.

Ramanuja explains the perception of two moons which continues even though there is the knowledge to the contrary, thus: The illusion is due to defect in the eye which is real and not illusory and hence will cease to exist only when the defect is removed and not by the knowledge that there is only one moon. But in the case of a man being frightened of the illusory snake, the fear vanishes by the knowledge that it is only a rope. 'PrabalapramANA bhAdhithathvENA BhayAdhi kAryam thu nivarthathe.' By valid means of cognition, namely ApthavAkyam, words of a reliable person or prathyaksha, by own perception, the fear of snake which is the effect of illusion is removed. The avidhya, nescience, being anAdhi, beginningless and powerful according to the advaitin, the perception of duality cannot be removed by the mere knowledge of Brahman through the vedantavAkyas.

The avidhya, nescience, being anAdhi, beginningless and powerful according to the advaitin, the perception of duality cannot be removed by the mere knowledge of Brahman through the vedantavAkyas.

Therefore besides the study of the vedantavakyas dhyAna and upaAsanA have been prescribed by the vedntavakyas themselves which can be seen in the texts like 'omithyEva AtmAAnam dhyAyA THa, meditate on the Self as OM, '(Mund. 2-2-6) 'AthmAAnamEva lokam upAseetha, one should meditate on the Self alone,'(Brhd.3-4-15) 'AthmA vA are drashtavyah manthavyah nidhiDHyasithavyah, the Self is to be seen, thought and meditated' (Brhd.6-5-6). The word 'knowing, vinjAna' is also to be taken in the sense of meditation.

Now what is meditation? Ramanuja defines it as 'dhyAna cha thailadhArAvath avicchinna smrthisanthAna roopam,' continuous flow of remembrance like the stream of continuously dripping of oil. 'DhruvA smrthih; smrthiambhe sarvagranTheenAm vipramokshah,'(Chan.7-26-2) when the constant, (dhruva) remembrance, (smrthih) is attained all knots are rent asunder. Thus DHruvAsmrthi is prescribed as the means of liberation. Here remembering is synonymous with seeing. As shown by the text,

'bhidhyathE hrdhayagrantTHih cchidhyanthE sarvasamsayAh ksheeyante asya karmANi
when that, (Brahman) is seen all knots are broken, all doubts vanish and all karma are destroyed. Similarly the word nidhiDHyAsithavyah also refers to BrahmaSAlshAtkAra only.

Remembrance when become intent, Dhruvasmrthih, is the same as seeing. Sruthi says, 'nAyamAsthmA pravachanena labhyah na meDhayA na bahunA sruthEna yamaivEsha vrnuthe theEna labBhyah thasyaisha AthmAdhE vivrNuthE thanoom svAm,'(Mund.3-2-3)

the self cannot be attained through talk or contemplation or by hearing. Only to him whom the Self chooses to manifest, the Self reveals itself. From this statement of the sruthi, says Ramanuja, it is obvious that self cannot be realised by sravaNa, manana and nidhiDhyAsana, as professed by the advaitin. 'YamaivEsha vrnutE THeNA labhyah,' means the one whom the Athman chooses to reveal itself must be priyathama, most loved, implying, to him also the Athman is priyathama, most dear,

‘priyathama Eva varaNeeyo bhavathi, yasya ayam nirathisayapriyah sa Eva asya priyathamo bhavathi.’

This has been proclaimed by the Lord Himself in Bhagavatgita,

'nAyam vedair na thapasA na dhAnEna na chEjyA sakyA Evam vidho dhrashtum dhrstavAnasi mAm yathA bhakthyAthvananyayA sakyah,'(BG11-53-54).

Iam not to be seen as you see me now, through knowledge of the vedas nor penance nor gifts nor by sacrifice except through singleminded devotion.' And

'purushah sa parah pArtha bhakthyA labhyasthananyayA', the Supreme being can be attained only by devotion.

The Lord says that He will give jnaAna only to those who ever united with Him through avicchinnasmaranNa, unbroken flow of meditation and love,

'thEshAm sathathayukthANam bhajAm preethi purvakam dhadhAmi buddhiyogam tham yEna mAm upayAnthi thE,'

thus enabling them to attain liberation. This constant remembranca with love is bhakthi.

Let the meditation with bhakthi be instrumental for the true knowledge of Brahman, that is, brahmasAkshAtkAra, perception of Brahman, but where is the necessity for the karma enjoined in the karmakAndA of the vedas?

Ramanuja answers that the karmas like yajna are the sAdhana or means for such dhruvasmrthi, constant remembrance with love. The efficacy of karma in securing brahmajnana has been stressed by the suthrakara himself in the third pAdha by the suthra

'yajnAdhisruthe asvavath,'(BS3-4-26)

There is need for all karma, because the scriptures prescribe yajna etc,

‘ThamEtham vedhAnuvachanEna brAhmaNA vividhishanthi yajnEna dhAnena thapasA
anAsakEna,’(Brhd.4-4-22)

The seekers of Brahman wish to realise it (Brahman) by study of the vedas, by sacrifices, by charity, by austerity which does not cause destruction, meaning, when done in moderation, thus asserting the instrumentality of vaidika karma for dhruvasmrthi. As the constant remembrance, dhruvasmrthi which continues till death, is the only means of realisation, the various karma prescribed for the varnasrama have to be followed throughout life.

Nevertheless the samadhamAdhi are enjoined as subsidiaries to meditation and have to be practised by the householder while doing his duties. The view that performance of work and practice of samadhamAdhi are mutually contradicting is refuted by the suthrakaRa himself.

'SamadhAdhyupethahasYAth thaTHApi thu thadviDHeh

thadhangathayA theshaAm avasyAnushTHE yathvAth,' (BS3-4-27)

they have to be practised because they are enjoined as subsidiaries to meditation.

Ramanuja then explains what are viveka and other spiritual disciplines

1. Viveka-

Discrimination between what is right and what is wrong is needed for physical purity. There are three kinds of food to be avoided, as enjoined in the sruthi. They are known as jAthicdhushtam, that belonging to prohibited class of food, like eating garlic,
Asrayadhushtam, prohibited on account of asraya, source like chAndAlAdhidhravya, coming from impure houses and

Nimittha dhushtam, contaminated food like remains of food eaten by someone else, ucchishtam, or polluted by hair etc.

Omitting these kinds of foods is viveka with reference to body, resulting in kAyasuddhi, physical purity. The purity observed in eating helps one to attain satthvasuddhi which in its turn helps to attain dhruvasmrthi,

'AhArasuddhou satthvasuddhih satthva suddhou dhruvA smrthih' (Chand.7-26)

2. Vimoka

Vimoka is to be free from desire, kAma. As shown in the Gita,

dhyAyatho vihsayAn pumsah sangasthEshoopajAyathe
sangAth sanjAyathe kAmah kAmAth krodhOpajAyathe,'

When one thinks about the sense objects longingly there comes attachment which gives rise to desire which, when thwarted, becomes krOdha thus leading him to ruin. The text 'shAntha upAseetha,'(Chand.3-14-1) implies the control of kAma krOdhAdhi, resulting in mental purity.

3. AbhyAsah

Gita defines abhyAsa as

'sadhA thadbhAvabhAvithah,'(BG8-6)

Being ever absorbed in the thought of Brahman

4. KriyA

“PanchamahAyajnAdhyanushthAnam shakthithah kriyA”

The observance of the five mahayajnas, namely

Brahmayajna, study and teaching of scriptural texts,
Devayajna, worship and other ritualistic offerings
Pitryajna, srAddha, tarpaNa etc. to pitrs,
Manushya yajna, service to humanity like charity, hospitality etc.,
Bhoothayajna, service to all creatures through kindness and ahimsa

Mundaka Upanishad says,

'KriyAvAnEsha brahmavidhAm varishtah,' (Mund.3-1-4)

The performer of the devotional practices is the foremost among the knowers of the Self.
5. KalyANAni

Possession of good qualities which are specified as follows:

Satya, truthfulness, Arjavan, uprightness of thought word and deed,

DayA, unselfish attitude of kindness, dhAnam, generosity,

AnabhidhyA, devoid of desire to possess what belongs to others or to take revenge.

6. AnavasAdhah, without sorrow for the past and fear for the future, in short, dhainyam, diffidence, which stands in the way of Self realisation, as made out by the sruthi

'nAyam AthmA balaheenEna labhyah,' The Self cannot be attained by weakminded, and

7. Anuddharshah, absence of uddharsha, feeling of elation, which is the opposite of avasAdha, despair.

Ramanuja further illustrates his point by taking another sruti text, namely

'vidhyAm cha avidhyAm cha yah thath vedha uBHayam

saha avidhyayA mṛthyum theerthvaa vidhyayA amrtham asnuthe,'(Isa.11)

He who knows both vidhya and avidhya, having conquered death by avidhya attains immortality through vidhya. Here the word avidhya, says Ramanuja, means the duties of the varnaAsrama laid out in the vedas. If it is ignorance that is meant, one could not conquer death with it.

'karmaNA mṛthyum jnAnothpatthiviroDhi prAcheenam karma

TheerthvA apohya vidhyayAamrtham brahma asnutE ithyarThah'

By performing karma without attachment the past karma which is obstructing the rise of jnAna is exhausted and then by jnAna Brahman is attained.

The karma which is jnAna virodhi, opposed to jnAna denotes both merit and demerit, puNyaApA rupa. PuNya is also termed as jnAna virodhi as it results in birth in order to enjoy the fruit of puNya. Rajas and thamas conceal the knowledge of Reality, yaThArTha jnAna

Avarana while the satthva is yaTHArThajnAna hethu causes the rise of the knowledge of Reality. 'sAthvAth sanJayathE jnAnam,'(BG.14-17)

So to attain Brahman the activities of the respective Varna and Asrama are to be undertaken in order to understand the nature of karma and the transitoriness of the fruits of karma. So the study of purvamimAmsA is precedent to that of UttaramimAmsA.

MAHAPURVAPKSHA- THE VOLUMINOUS ARGUMENTS OF THE OPPONENT

The main tenet of advaita, namely 'brahma sathyam jaganmiTHyA jeevO brahmaiva nAparah is taken up next for examination and the argument of the opponent, that is, advaitin, is given. 'AsEsha visEsha prathyaneeka chinmathra brahmaiva paramArThah; thadhathireki
Brahman, which is devoid of differences and which is pure consciousness alone is real and the diversities like knower, known and the knowledge of the known are all superimposed on Brahman and therefore unreal. They quote the sruthi, 'sadhEva soumya idhamagra Aseeth EkamEva avidheeyam.(chan.6-2-1)

Asesha visesha, all differences, refer to sajtheeya vijtheeya svagatha bhEdha. Sajaatheeya bhEdha is the difference within a class, jAthi, of objects, like the difference between one cow and another.

VijAtheeya, on the other hand, is the difference between classes, like that between a cow and a horse.

Svagatha bhedha is the difference within the object like the different limbs of the cow. As per the text 'sadhEva---advitheeyam, ' Brahman alone existed in the beginning one only and without a second, there could not be any difference of the three kinds since Brahman alone existed, (hence no vijAtheeya bhedha), one only, (so no sajAtheeya bhEdha) and avidheeyam, without a second, meaning one whole. (So no svagatha bhedha)

There are several texts like

'YaththadhrEsyam agrAhyam agothram avarNam achakshussrothram thadhapANipAdham nithyam vibhum sarvagatham susookshmam thadhavyayam yathbhooothayonim paripasyanthi DHeerAh,' (Mund.1-1-5),

What is invisible ungraspable unoriginated and attributeless, what has neither eyes nor ears nor hands nor feet, what is eternal, all pervading, and most subtle, that imperishable being is what the wise perceive as a source of creation 'Sathyam jnAnam anantham brahma,' (Tait. Ana, 1) Brahman is existence, knowledge and infinity, 'neha nAnasthi kimchana',(Brhd.6-4-19) there is no diversity, etc.

Advaitin may even quote from VishNupurana to support his view.

'ParmArthasthvamEvaiko nAnyoasthi jagathah pathE,

you are the only reality there is none else, oh Lord of the world,(VP. 1-4-38), yathEthadhrsyalE moortham Ethath jnAnAthmanasthava bhrAnthiijnAnEna pasyangthi jagadroopam ayOginah,(VP. 1-4-39) those who are devoid of yoga see the illusory world which is only the form of You, who is jnAnasvaroop.

To prove that only the undifferentiated Brahman is real and everything else is unreal they may even quote smrthi like Bhagavatgita where we find statements like

'ahamAthmAgudakesa sarvabhooohAsayasthithah,(BG19-20)

I am the Self in all beings, and 'na thadhasthivinA yath syAthey mayAbhoootham
What is miThyAthvam, illusion? It is that knowledge which is sublated later by real perception like the perception of snake in a rope due to some fault in vision which vanishes later when the defective vision is removed by the real knowledge of the rope. Similarly this world of beings from devas to plants is an illusory perception which is removed by the knowledge of Brahman.

Now what is the defect that produces this illusory perception of the world? It is the sadhasatanirvachaneeyA anAdhi avidhyA, according to the advaitin. The term sadasat anirvachaniyam must be understood in order to comprehend the advaItic point of view. Sat is that which exists, like the rope and asat is that which does not exist, like the horn of a hare. Now if a thing is asat it would not be seen like the horn of the hare. The illusory perception of the snake in a rope appears to exist and is seen by one who is under the illusion. So it cannot be defined, anirvachaneeyam, as either sat or asat, because the snake exists till the knowledge of the rope dawns which sublates the previous knowledge. So also the illusory perception of the world of diversities persists till it is sublated by the knowledge of Brahman. Hence it is sadasadvilakshaNa, neither sat nor asat. This is the basis of the concept of adhyaAsa, superimposition of advaita. The world is superimposed on Brahman by anAdhi avidhyA.

How can there be an illusion when the Brahman which is self-illumined is always present like the Sun? Advaitin contends that avidhya has two functions, through its AvaraNashakthi and vikshepashakthi.

Avarana is concealing what is real and vikshepa is showing it as something else. The nonapprehension of the Absolute reality, ie. Brahman, is due to the AvaraNashakthi and the misapprehension, the illusion of Brahman as the world, is due to vikshepashakthi. One sees the rope as some object, the real characteristics being obscured due to some defect like dim light etc. and the observer, not knowing what it is, imagines it to be a snake. Similarly the awareness of Brahman or Athman as a permanent entity is there for everyone but it is not known as such due to ignorance, anaAdhi avidhyA, and hence it is wrongly perceived as the world.

There are various sruti texts quoted by the advaitin to substantiate this like 'mAyAm thu prakrthim vidhyAth mAyaInam thu mahesvaram,'(svet.4-10), the prkrthi, primordial nature is the mAya which is wielded by Isvara,' indro mAyaAbhihi pururoopa eeyathE,' the Lord on account of His mAya is perceived manifold,(Brhd.4-5-19)'anrthEna hi prathyoodaah,'(Chan.8-3-2) these are covered with falsehood. 'JnAna svarupO bhagAvAn yahO asou aseshamurthih na thu vasthubhoothah,' Isvara is jnAnsvarupa and all beings of all forms are He alone and not different.(VP.2-12-39), thasmAth na vijnAmrthE asthi kimchith kvachith kadhAchith dhvija vasthujAtham,' (VP.2-12-43) therefore there is no entity other than the consciousness ever anywhere. This avidhyA will become extinct only through the knowledge of Self as Brahman, the undifferentiated consciousness.

How could this avidhya be eradicated?

AsyAscha avidhyAyAthin mAtr brahmAthmaikathva vijnAEna nivrththim vadhanthi,' says Ramanuja. The nivrththi, removal of avidhya has been postulated by the
advaitin to be caused by the knowledge of the identity of the Atman with the Brahman, the undifferentiated consciousness. Sruthi texts like 'na punarmrthyavE thadhEkam pasyathi,'(Chan.7-26-2), he who sees the One is not subject to death, meaning that he attains immortality,

'bhrma vedha brahmaiva bhavathi,'(Mund.3-2-9)

One who knows Brahman becomes Brahman, 'thameEva vidhithvA athimrthyum Ethi,' Knowing Brahman thus one transcends death. Here the word mrthyu means refers to avidhyA. The knowledge that Brahman is nirvisEsha chinmAthra is attained by the texts like ' sathyam jnAnam anantham brahma,'(tait.Ana.1-1) Brahman is existence, knowledge and infinity,'vijnAnam Anandham brahma,' Brahman is consciousness and bliss. The identity of Atman with Brahman is declared by the texts like 'thathvamasi.'

The suthrakAra also says 'AtmEthithoopagacchanthigrAhayanthicha,',

the texts acknowledge Brahman as the self and teach others also to realise it as such.

After citing the testimony of the vedas the advaitin can establish the destruction of avidhya by the knowledge of the identity of the individual self with Brahman through yukthi argument. It may be argued that the direct perception of the diversity of the world cannot be sublated by the scriptural texts. In the illusion of the rope as a snake mere knowledge that it is only a snake is enough to destroy the illusion. But it is a case of one perception being sublated by another whereas here perception is said to be sublated by sasthra which is a different pramANa, means of knowledge, altogether.

One pramANa can be sublated by another if the latter is stronger. For instance when you hear that there is a fire this knowledge through inference may be sublated by perception that there is no fire which becomes the stronger means of knowledge. But here it could be objected that sruthi is weaker than perception because it needs to be validated by perception.

Advaitin in answer to this argument says that the flame of the lamp appears to be one through perception but by inference it is understood to be not so. The flame is continuously produced and hence gives the appearance of one single flame. So here the prathyaksha which is stronger is sublated by the weaker pramANa. The criterion is not whether the pramANa is weak or strong but only whether it is contaminated by defect. In the case of the flame perception is affected by the defect of the eye in being unable to see the different flames. Similarly when there is conflicting evidence through different means of knowledge the one which can be explained otherwise, anyathA siddham, that it is due to some defect, is sublated by the one which cannot be explained away like that, ananyathA siddham. Hence the perception of diversity of the universe which is due to dosha of avidhya is sublated by the knowledge arising out of sasthra, of the undifferentiated Brahman.

An objection may be raised against this stand of the advaitin that if the sasthras were free of defects how can the injunctions on karma like 'jyothishtomEna svargakAmo yajEtha,' one who wishes to attain svarga should perform jyothishtoma sacrifice, can be dismissed by those prescribing the spiritual practices for Moksha? Advaitin says that the texts about karma are
sublated by those about Brahman not because they are defective but because they are anyathAsiddha, that is, they can be shown to have results that are transitory while the latter are not so, ananyathAsiddha. Even among the vedantavakyas, those about SaguNaBrahman are sublated by those about Nirgunabrahman. The sanguNa texts serve the purpose of attributing qualities to Brahman so that it could be sublated by the nirguNa texts, which are stronger. The argument given for proving that the NirguNa texts are stronger is that, if they are not, then after attributing qualities to Brahman there will not be any meaning for the NirguNa texts. Therefore Brahman is in reality undifferentiated consciousness.

Granted that the injunctive texts are sublated by the Vedanta texts but how can the texts like 'parAsya shakthir viviDhaiva srooyathE svAbhAvikee jnAnbalakriyAcha,' (svet.6-8) His supreme power is heard of as being diverse and His knowledge, power and action are svAbhAvikee, His nature, He is 'sathyakAmah, sathya sankalpah,' (Chan.8-1-5) He is of true wish and true will, which means that whatever is His wish or will, it comes to be true, it will be sublated?

Advaitin replies 'nirguNavAkya sAmarthyAth,' on the strength of the nirguNa texts like 'asthoolam anaNu, ahrasvam adheerGHam,' (Brhd.5-8-8) Brahman is described as neither gross nor atomic, neither short nor long etc. by which the Brahman is denied having any qualities, which are affirmed by the epithets 'nirguNam, niranjanam,' attributeless and colourless(formless). By the rule of sublation the stronger texts sublate the weaker ones. In order to deny the existence first, that which is denied is postulated as the prathiyogi, countercorrelate to its abhAva, nonexistence. That is, only something shown as existent can be denied and not something never been existent likes the horn of the hare.

But the texts, 'Sathyam jnAnam anantham brahma,' quoted by the adwaitin to substantiate his view that Brahman is nirvisesha chinmAthra do attribute the qualities of truth, existence and infinity to Brahman and how can these be explained to mean nirgunathva of Brahman?

Advaitin explains this by means of the precept of sAmAnADHIkaraNya. Sathyam, jnAnam, and anantham are not attributes of brahman because these terms stand in co-ordination and have oneness of meaning—that is, they all mean the same thing and not used as adjectives. The principle of sAmAnADHIkaraNya is defined as as 'BHinnapravrtthinimitthAnAm sabdhAnAm Ekasmin arTHe vrtthih,' when words of different meaning when put in apposition, denote the same object, so that there is EkArTHathvam, oneness of meaning.

To say that attributes having different meanings can still denote EkArTHathva is, says adwaitin, an ignorant statement of one who does not understand what is meant by denotation, 'anaBhiDHAnajnO devANAmpriyah.' Oneness of meaning is identity of meaning of different words. Here the different words satyam etc. mean Brahman only and not the qualities as in the case of 'neelothpalam, 'blue lotus 'syAmo yuVa lohithAkshah dEvadathah,' the dark young red-eyed Devadatha etc., where the different epithets mean the same thing, namely, lotus and Devadatha. For this, they would not be symonyms because they refer to one thing.

Advaitin explains this as follows. The sruti says 'brahmavidhApnothi param,' the one who knows Brahman attains the supreme reality. This gives rise to the enquiry 'which is Brahman'? Brahman is
defined, distinguishing it from what is not Brahman and for this purpose only the texts like 'sathyam jnAnam anantham brahma' are given. The terms are not taken in their denotative meaning, mukhyArTha but in their connotative meaning, lakshyArtha. Thus the term sathyam is not the quality of Brahman but its svarupa, as being the opposite of all that is not real, asathyam. Similarly jnAnam is to differentiate Brahman from ajnAna and anantham is used to distinguish Brahman from what is finite. Thus truth, knowledge and infinity are its nature and not attributes even as whiteness as distinguished from blackness. Therefore the texts like 'sathyam jnAnam anantham brahma' describe Brahman only as a self-illumined attributeless consciousness. This interpretation only justifies the purport of the declaration

'SadhEva soumya idham agra Aseeth EkamEva adhvitheeyam'

Abandoning the direct meaning and resorting to the implied meaning is no defect because the purport of the sentence is to be given preference to the direct meaning of the words. For instance to prevent one from eating food in the house of an enemy another says.'visham bhunkshva, eat poison.' Here the muKHYarTha is not what is meant but the lakshanArTHa, that to eat in enemy's house is like eating poison. In the present context the purport of the sAmAnaDHikaranya of the words sathyam etc.is oneness and hence direct meanings of the terms cannot be taken.

Advaitin claims that the implied meaning can be seen in both injunctive and imperative sentences. In the injunction ‘jyothishtomEna svargakAmO yajEthA’, one who aspires for heaven should perform jyothishtoma sacrifice, the sacrifice does not give the result of svarga but the apoorva, unseen power created by the sacrifice. So here the lakshyArTha is adopted. Similarly in the imperative sentence 'gAm Anaya, bring the cow,' the words have meaning only connected with the action. So in order to arrive at the import of the sentence all the words can be taken in the implied sense.

When there is a contradiction, virodha, between perception and sruthithe latter is claimed to be stronger. But here there is no virodha and hence there is no need to prove that one is stronger than the other, says the advaitin. Even through in perception only attributeless Brahman is perceived, according to Advaita it is only the unity through the existence, satthA, that is perceived and not difference.

But how can the perception that ‘this is a pot, this is a cloth etc., ’ be shown as sanmAthragrAhi, that of the existence alone? Only when the knowledge is continuously of one object, like that of a pot alone, this can be true. Advaitn says, ‘Yes it is true and we wish to prove only that here, namely the perception of all objects is that of one only.

If the difference is perceived it cannot be simultaneous with the object at hand. That is, when we see a pot its difference from a cloth is not seen because the knowledge of the cloth is in the memory. Probably what is meant here is that even if we see the pot and the cloth at the same place when we look at the pot we do not see the cloth. In the perception that the pot exists the ‘isness’ of the pot does not give the knowledge of its difference from the cloth because the knowledge of difference belongs to a different time other than that of perception, which belongs to that moment only.
So as in the case of seeing nacre as silver, sukthirajatham, what is perceived is only the attributeless Brahman which appears as a different object because of bhrAnthi, illusion due to anAdhi avidhya.

Moreover the difference, bhedhah, cannot be defined, says the Advaitin. The difference is not of the nature of the object in which case only the difference will be perceived. That when we see the pot we would also see its difference from the cloth which is not the case. This sounds a bit confusing but it is not so. If ghata, pot and its bhedha, difference from other objects, say, pata, cloth, is its svsrupa then the two terms ghata and bhedha will be synonymous like hastha and kara, both of which mean hand. So the object and its difference are not the same.

On the other hand if it is said that the difference is the attribute of the object, it must be assumed to be different from the object. That is, the difference will be different from the essential nature of the thing. Then the difference of the difference will be its attribute and the same argument follows leading to anavasThA. Also this difference of the object from others will be observed only when the object belonging to the particular class as distinct from others is observed. But the distinctness to be perceived requires the knowledge of its difference from the others. So there is the defect of anyonya AsrayaNam, mutual dependence and hence becomes untenable. Therefore advaitin concludes that since the difference cannot be proved the perception is of sanmmAthra, existence only.

Even in the perception of ‘the pot exists, the cloth exists’ etc what persists is the existence alone and not the forms which are perceived to disappear after a while. In the perception this is pot etc. the ‘this’ element persists in all and the forms change. So the existence signified by ‘this’ alone is paramArTHa, real, and the others are unreal like rajjusarpa, snake in the rope. In the illusion of the rope as snake, crack in the ground, stream of water etc., the rope is the substratum of the illusion and hence is real whereas the other illusory objects are unreal being separate, vyAvrtthi, from the rope. So too the existence, ‘sat,’ alone is the substratum and is therefore real.

But the reality of the rope is not due to persistence but due to the fact that it is not sublated by any other knowledge as in the case of snake etc. which again not unreal due to their being separate from the rope but because they are sublated by the subsequent knowledge. To this advaitin answers that in the perception that this is a pot there is sublation of the perception of other objects like cloth and vice versa. So there is sublation as a result of distinctness, vyAvrtthi.

Thus everything else than satthA, existence is apparmArTha, unreal. Advaitin clinches the argument by a syllogism-

sath paramArThah, anuvarthmAṇatyaḥvāth, rajjusarpAdhousvājvAdhivath; ghatAdhayah
aparamArThah, vyAvarthamAṇathvāth, rajjvAdgyaDHisṭhaṇasarpAdhivath.

The existence is real because it persists (in all perceptions) like the rope in the illusion of snake in a rope and the objects like pot etc. are unreal because they are separate, vyAvartha, like the snake in the substratum of the rope. Thus consciousness is identical with existence because it is real and persists in all cognitions. But the sanmAthra, existence, being perceived becomes an object of consciousness and hence cannot be identical with it and only different from it.
Advaitin meets this objection by saying that it has already been shown that the difference cannot be the object of perception nor can it be defined by any pramāṇa. Hence existence cannot be proved as an object of consciousness as it is not experienced through any pramāṇa and hence it is identical with it.

Existence is svatthassiddha, self-proved, being consciousness. If it depends on any other proof it will become an object of experience like a pot. It is always manifest while it exists and does not need any other consciousness to reveal it except itself. A thing by which everything else is illumined does not require an external agent for its own manifestation, like a lamp.

But at the time of perception of a pot, there is only the knowledge that this is a pot. The cognition of the pot, anubhuthi, comes later. The pot is illumined by the indriyaArtha sannikarsha, the contact of the indriya, eye, with the object, pot. The anubhuthi, ‘I know the pot,’ follows later and according to the school of Mimamsakas, the Bhāttās, (followers of Kumārila Bhatta) this cognition is not through perception but by anumāṇa, inference. Thus the anubhuthi, being the object of anumāṇa, becomes jada, insentient and not self-illuminating, and ajada, as claimed by the advaitin.

Advaitin contends that this ajadatvam pointed out by the opponent is not in any way a violation, vyabhichāra, of the self-illumination of the sattha. That is, the cognition ‘I know the pot,’ is also illumined by the consciousness which is identical with the sattha. Hence its jadathvā is not the criterion. For instance the experience of sukha is also not cognised at the first moment but only when the consciousness that ‘I am experiencing sukha’ arises. Moreover the sattha, consciousness is the cause of all jnāna, cognition, it cannot cognize itself as the tip of the finger cannot touch itself. Therefore anubhuthi cannot be known through inference or through any other cognition. Hence anubhuthi, consciousness which is the cause of all cognitions is self-proved. Consciousness is eternal and so has neither beginning nor end. There can be no prior or posterior nonexistence as that could be cognized only by consciousness which would have been nonexistent at that time. Consciousness is devoid of all plurality, being unoriginated. That which is eternal must be one only and not many. All that is non-self is excluded from the self and hence the Self, that is consciousness, cannot have any other knower but itself.

Neither the concept of knower as ‘aham jñānīmi, I know’, can said to be the attribute of consciousness because knower is an object of consciousness, in the form of awareness that ‘I know.’ The concept of knower, jñātṛthā is bhūtānthimoolā, illusory like the silver in nacre. Every cognition like ‘I am a man’ etc. is the product of the ego, which itself is unreal and hence cannot be the attribute of consciousness. In sushupthi, deep sleep or murcchā, swoon when the ego is absent, the consciousness is present, as otherwise there would not have been the awareness ‘maamapi aham na jñātavar, I did not know even myself, and hence the ego functions only through body, mind and intellect. Therefore the witness-self, sākshī is different from the ego. Even though it is jada, insentient, the ahamkara, ego, reflects the consciousness which is changeless, and creates an appearance as though it is the ego. This is just like the moon being reflected in the water, mirror etc. and creates an illusion that it is in them. It may be doubted as to how the self illumined consciousness can be illumined by insentient objects.
like ego. In actual practice we see that the rays of the Sun or of a gem falling on the hand manifest the light which is not existent there.

THE MAHAPURVAPAKSHA IS CONCLUDED WITH THE WORDS,
‘thasmAth paramArTHathah nirasthasamasthabhedhavikalpa-
nirviseshachinmAthraikarasakutasTHanithyasamvid Eva bhrAnthyA
jnAthrjnEyajnAnarupaviviDHavichithrabhedhA vivarthatha ithi
thanmoolabhoothAvidhyAnibarhaNAya nithya
suddhabuddhamukthasvabhAvabrahmAthmAikathvavidhyAprathipatthayE sarve
vEdaAnthAh Arabhyantha.’

Therefore in reality, only the consciousness which is devoid of all differences, changes and attributes, which is the permanent Reality, appears as the manifold differences of knower, known and knowledge. So to remove the avidhya which is the cause of the appearance of diversity the study of Vedanta should be started to get the knowledge of Brahman which is by nature suddha, purity itself, buddha, intelligence and muktha, everfree.

MAHASIDDHANATHA-
THE GREAT FINAL DECISION
1. The argument that Brahman is nirvisesha is criticised.

Ramanuja dismisses the whole purvaksha argument as ‘anAdharaneeyam, unsupported by any pramaANa. Brahman, NarAyaNA, is the oupanishadhaparamapurusha, the Supreme being, described by the upanishads, which say ‘yamaivEsha vrNuthE thEna labhyathE, the Self is attained only by those who are chosen by Him. The arguments of those who are devoid of the guNavisesha, that is, bhakthi, by which they become qualified to be chosen, who lack

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the knowledge of the purport of the sruthivaAkyas and the implication of the means of knowledge, pramANas, is kutharka, illogical and hence to be dismissed.

All pramANas have saviseshavasthu, something with attributes only as their object. So there can be no valid means of cognition for perception without attributes, nirvisesha prathyaksham. Visesha is what separates a thing from other things. In the example of blue lotus, blueness is what separates the lotus from red lotus for instance. Similarly the lotus separates its blueness from others like that of the sea or sky. So when a thing is perceived, it is the attribute which causes its perception as distinct from other things and which is exclusive to that object. Actually attributelessness itself becomes an attribute because there can be no valid knowledge otherwise. All perceptions are in the form ‘I saw this ’ which necessitates a perceiver and an object perceived. Both being visheshas the perception is savisesha only

If the perception which is savisesha is to be proved to be nirvivesha by any syllogism, the hetu must be something which is found only in brahman. As in the syllogism ‘the mountain is fiery because it has smoke,’ the smoke is the hetu which is associated with fire only and always. In Brahman therefore there must be some hetu which is present in Brahman only and always. If the advaitin can supply such a hetu it becomes an attribute and not identical with Brahman. It cannot be said that when the Brahman is proved with this attribute to be nirvivesha, this vishesa ceases to exist along with the other visheshas as it is not tenable. If this attribute disappears Brahman cannot be proved to be nirvivesha. Hence the existence of an attributeless entity cannot be proved.

Perception cannot be separated from the perceiver and the perceived. It shines only by making the thing perceived by the perceiver. Anubhuthi as maintained by the advaitin to be self illumined not dependent on anything else, is thus disproved. Ramanuja says that he will prove that even in sleep and swoon there is only savisesha anubhuthi. When it is said that the anubhuthi is eternal, it becomes savisesha having eternity as its attribute. Thus it is proved that anumana or inference through arguments, cannot be the pranANa to prove nirviveshathva of Brahman. It remains however to examine the other pramANas, namely sabda and prathyaksha to prove that all perception is only savisesha.

Sabda, verbal testimony likewise cannot be the pramANA for nirvivesha brahman. Verbal testimony here means sruthi texts quoted by the advaitin to prove his point. Verbal testimony consists of words and sentences. Words have two parts, prakrthi, root and prathyaya, termination which, having different meanings join to denote only a savisesha object. (All named things, abhidheya, are savisesha only as a nirvivesha vasthu cannot be denoted by words or sentences without giving it a definition in which case it becomes savisesha.) Therefore nirvivesha Brahman cannot be proved by sabda.

Ramanuja dismisses prathyaksham also as a means of knowledge of nirvivesha vasthu. All perception reveals only an object which is savisesha. Advaitin may say that this is so only in savikalpakaprathyaksham, determinate perception, but in nirvikalpaprakathyaksham, indeterminate perception show only the object as nirvivesha. Ramanuja disagrees and says that even that can show only object with vishesa. The opposite has never been experienced. Any
perception is only of the nature ‘idham ittham, this is such and such.’ When a cow is perceived it is perceived with its form, dewlap etc. to differentiate it from other objects like horse. No perception is experienced otherwise.

Then, adwaitin may question, what is the meaning of the term nirvikalpaka prathyaksham?

Ramanuja answers thus: Nirvikalpakaprathyaksham occurs when there is the first perception of the object, say, cow. When another cow is seen the knowledge of jati, class is known with a knowledge that any object belonging to the ‘Go’ jati will look like this and then the form of a cow, having triangular face, dewlap etc. are known to belong to the class of cows. Even though the form is perceived at first it is not known to be common to all objects of that class and hence it is called nirvikalpaka, indeterminate perception. With the perception of the jati and visheshas like triangular face, dewlap etc it becomes savisesha. Hence only the subsequent perceptions are savisesha and the first one is nirvisesha. Therefore attributelessness can never be the object of perception.

Ramanuja here proceeds to show that even the bhedAbhedhAvAdha of Bhaskara is untenable. The latter professes that the jati and other attributes are both separate and not separate. When the cow is seen as belonging to the class of cows, the jati is not viewed as separate from the vyakthi, cow, but is different when the cow is seen as an object by itself. Ramanuja refutes this saying:

‘Sarvathra visheshaNvisheshayabhAva prathipatthou thayoh athyanthabhEhdhah prtheethyaiva suvyakthah’

The visheshaNvisheshayabhAva, the relation of attribute and substance makes it clear that there is absolute difference between the two, which is explicit from their perception itself. When an object is perceived as ‘idham ittham’, this is such and such, the idham aspect denotes the object and the ittham aspect exhibits its attributes. So the two are undoubtedly different and cannot be claimed to be identical.

The followers of Bhaskara may argue that in which case there will not be any difference between the attributes denoting possession like dhandee, one with a staff, kundalee, one wearing kundala and those denoting jati etc. Ramanuja replies that the attributes adhering through possession have a separate existence whereas the dewlap etc. do not exist separately from the entity, cow.

Hence nirvisesha cannot be proved by perception, inference or verbal testimony. Trying to prove nirvisesha through proving that all visheshas are not perceived, is like the statement that one’s mother is a barren woman.

The argument that sense perception shows only ‘sat’ is criticised.

Sense perception does not show mere existence in which case all perceptions will be of the same thing. But we see things differently as ‘this is a pot, ‘this is a cloth,’ etc. When a thing is perceived its jati is also perceived so that there is no doubt about either the entity or its jati. If only the existence is perceived how can one proceeding to buy a buffalo returns empty handed
on seeing only a cow there, asks Ramanuja. Moreover, seeing a horse the cognition that this is not an elephant arises out of the memory of having seen an elephant to be different from a horse. Besides if all perceptions see only the existence then a man who is blind can see with his ear and the deaf can hear with his eye etc. Because the sense perception is the same and there is no bhedha between that of the eye and the ear. Then Ramanuja proceeds to show that ‘sat,’ that is, existence alone does not become the object of any sense organ. The eye sees an object possessing colour, rupa, the ear hears the sound as being the attribute of the object heard, the skin cognizes the particular touch of the object. If Brahman, nirvisesha chimmathra, can be perceived as ‘sat,’ it becomes an object of perception that belies the declaration of the vedas that Brahman is athindriya, beyond cognition by senses. Sruthi says,

‘YathO vAchO nivarthanThE aprApya mansA saha,’ (Kena.)

Brahman will then cease to be self-proved and will become prameya, known, which makes it jada, insentient and nAsya, perishable as according to advaitin that which is prameya, object of cognition, is so. Therefore, says Ramanuja:

‘vasthusamsTHAnarupajAthyAdhilakshaNabhedhavishtavishayameEva pratyaksham.’

That is, the perception is of a thing distinguished by the attributes like jati, form, colour etc. only.

Advaitin’s contention that since ‘sat’ alone is perceived as being common to all objects, the vissesha, difference, being not perceived as we go from one object to another and hence apAramArthya, not real, is criticized by Ramanuja. We say that one knowledge is sublated by the subsequent knowledge when there is conflict between the two as in the case of rope and the snake. But in seeing one object after another there is no conflict. The bheda, difference between the rope and the snake vanishes when the knowledge of the rope arises because both cannot exist at the same place and time. But when we see a pot and a cloth subsequently the presence of one does not exclude that of the other. So the difference of a pot from a cloth and vice versa still persists. If ‘sat’ is said to be real because it is found in every perception, and by ‘sat’ the advaitin means the sattha, existence in general, such inference requires no proof as in the case ‘I exist because I live.’ If ‘sat refers to the existence of the particular thing perceived then the hetu, reason given, that it is found in all perceptions is not tenable because the existence found in a pot is not that of a cloth.

The advaitin says that the perception, anubhuthi is real because it is found in all experiences and hence there can be no vishayavishyibhava, object-subject relationship between anubhuthi and ‘sat’. Therefore anubhuthi is ‘sat.’ Here it should be remembered that the term ‘sat’ and Brahman, are synonymous and denote attributeless consciousness in advaita. The two terms, ‘sat’ and perception are used by the advaitin in the abstract sense, meaning the absolute existence and absolute perception and not that of objects in general. Since both are real because of their persistence they should be identical as there cannot be two reals in advaita philosophy. But Ramanuja summarily dismisses this saying that ‘sat’ is the object of anubhuthi and hence cannot be identical.
ANUBHUTHI AS SELF PROVED

Advaitin say that anubhuthi is svayamprakasa, self-proved. The reason given for this is that if anubhuthi is not self proved it has to depend on another to prove its existence, like a pot. This means, as perceptions reveal an object like pot it does not need any other means to reveal itself. If it is not self-proved it ceases to be perception.

Ramanuja disagrees with this argument saying that in that case past perceptions known through memory and the perceptions of others known through inference will not be termed as perceptions. Unless the perception of others are admitted to be known the meaning of words and their connections will not be perceived and one will not be able to infer the knowledge of the acharya and approach him for learning.

‘Anubhuthithvam nAma,’ says Ramanuja, ‘varthamAnadhasAyAm svasatthayA Eva svAsrayam prathi prakAsamAnathvam,‘

Perception is that which illumines its object by its very existence when it is present. The objects like pot lack this attribute hence they are not perceptions. So to say that, if perception depends on another to prove its existence, it will not be different from objects of perception like pot, is not correct. Even if the perception needs no proof for its existence it’s ceasing to be perception could result as in the case of skyflower of which there is no perception, ananubhuthithva, the nonexistence of it does not need any other proof. If it is said that in the case of skyflower the ananubhuthithva, nonperception, is due to its being ‘asat’, nonexistent, whereas in the case of pot the nonperception is due to ajnAnaavirodhithvam, not inimical to ignorance, which means that the lack of knowledge about the pot, is the cause. But Ramanuja says that it is not agreeable to cite two different causes for the two nonperceptions and the same reason ajnAnaavirodhithvam is the cause in both cases.

THE VIEW THAT ANUBHUTI IS ETERNAL IS CRITICISED.

The argument of the advaitin that there is no prior nonexistence, prAgabhAva of anubhuthi and hence it is anaAdhi, has no beginning, is refuted by Ramanuja saying,

‘yatthu svthassisddhAyAh samvidhah prAgabhAvAdhyabhAvAth uthpatthih nirasyathE – thaddhandhasya jAthyandhEnayashtih pradheeyathE,’

It is like one blind man giving staffs to one who is born-blind, that is blind leading the blind. Just because there is no one to perceive the prior nonexistence it cannot be negated. The prior nonexistence of anubhuthi is perceived by anubhuthi itself because perception is not restricted to the present but extends to the past and future, except when the perception is caused by the contact of sense organs with the sense objects, that is, when we see a pot, the perception of it is with reference to that particular object at that particular time and place. In the case of memory, inference, Vedic and yogic perception, what belongs to the times other than the present is perceived.

Advaitin says that prAgabhAva, prior nonexistence of anubhuthi cannot be proved by any
pramANa since it cannot be cognized by sense perception being nonexistent, nor by inference because the hetu, like the smoke which is the reason for the inference of fire, is not there. And there is no vedic text can be quoted in this matter. So on the basis of the absence of any pramANa the prior nonexistence of perception cannot be proved.

Ramanuja says,

‘YadhyEvam svathssiddhathva vibhavam parithyaiya pramANAbhAve avaroodascheth yOgyAnupalabdhya Eva abhAvah samarTHithah iti upasAmyathu bhavAn’

If the advaitin strives to prove that perception is eternal having recourse to the absence of pramAna rather than on the ground that perception is self-proved, the reply would be in reference to yOgyAnupalDhi. That is, if a thing exists it must be capable, yOgya, of cognition. So anubhuthi if ever existed prior to its cognition it would have been cognised. Hence it did not exist.

The perception of a pot for instance shows its existence only at the time of perception and not always. So perception is limited by time. If it is eternal the object of cognition will also become eternal. which is not the case. Similar is the case of cognition through any other means of knowledge like anumAna, inference.

Advaitin may argue that what is meant by perception being eternal has no reference to that of objects but anubhuthi in general, nirvishaya samvid. (samvid and anubhuthi are synonymous here.)

Advaitin says that an objectless perception is found in deep sleep, intoxication and swoon but this is refuted by Ramanuja on the basis of yOgyAnupalDhi. If there is such perception it would have been remembered when awakened from such states. Since it is not the case there is no such thing as objectless perception, nirvishayasamvid.

It cannot be argued that just because it is not remembered you cannot say that there was no perception because we do not remember everything previously experienced even in the waking state. Ramanuja replies that only when there is a strong reason like leaving this body, all experience is forgotten. So when there was no remembrance of any experience whatsoever denotes only the absence of it.

Advaitin might argue that the reason for the lapse of memory of the experience of perception is sleep is due to the absence of objects and the ‘I’ factor in sleep. Presence of objects and the notion of ‘I’ is necessary for the remembrance and they are also necessary for having an experience in the absence of which there can be no perception. It will be explained later that even in the state of sleep the ‘I’ continues to exist. But that experience is of the Self which will be shown to be savisesha. Here the absolute perception devoid of all objects is only refuted. If it is said that the experience of the Self is the absolute perception it is not acceptable because even that is an attribute of the Self as will be shown later.

So the argument that since anubhuthi cannot prove its own prAgabhAva it should be eternal is
wrong. Moreover what is eternal must have no end. Advaitin says that since anubhuthi is not originated it suffers no change and hence it has no end. This is not tenable says Ramanuja, because there is vyabhichAra in prior nonexistence, prAgabhAva, of things produced, like pot, their prior non existence has no beginning but it ends when the thing is produced.

To evade this difficulty advaitin may define the term change as being that of a bhAvapadhArTha, a positive entity. That is, the changes that occur in positive object like pot is denied to be present in anubhuthi. The changes which result in the destruction or end of the positive entity like pot is not present in prior nonexistence, which, though having no beginning, has an end. Ramanuja overrules this by saying that avidhya according to advita is a bhAva padharTHa which has no origination being anAdhi but it ends when the knowledge of Brahman arises. But to the argument that the changes in avidhya are said to be mitThyAbhootta, unreal, Ramanuja says that even the changes in objects like pot are unreal according to advaita. Hence anubhuthi cannot be proved to be eternal.

**CRITICISM OF THE CLAIM THAT ANUBHUTHI IS ATMAN**

Anubhuthi being devoid of all differences it has no separate perceiver and hence it is the atman, says the advaitin.

Ramanuja asks him whether the perception, samvith shines or not. If it does there will only be saddharmathA, that is, shining itself will be a dharma, attribute, of the perception. If it does not, it will be nonexistent like a skyflower. Here the word prakasa, shining, is used in the sense of being available for practical purposes, vyavahAra anuguNyam. A thing shines for someone on something. That is, the cognition of puthrathva, having a son, is the cognition of the son for the father. Advaitin may say that samvideva athma, perception is nothing but the self because they do not accept a viewer apart from the samvid, but Ramanuja asks him ‘who is this AthmA? Has there been any perception ever experienced apart from that of an object to a knower? In reality perception is the attribute of the Athma because of the nature of perception such as, ‘ghatamaham jAnAmi,’ I know the pot, ‘idham arTHam avagacchAmi,’ I comprehend this, ‘patam aham samvedhmi’ I cognise the cloth etc. This is because any action like knowing which has an object must necessarily have a subject too.

Now the recollection in the form of ‘I have experienced this already’ proves the sthirathva, permanency of the knower and also the origination, sustenance and the disappearance of the object experienced, as in the case of sukha and duhkha, says Ramanuja,

**ThaTHAhyasyakaruthuh sTHirathvam karthrdharmasya**

**samvEdhanAkhyasyasukhaduhkhAdhiriva utpatthi sTThitanirOdhAtcha**

**prathyakshmeekshyanthe’**

That samvid is not permanent is shown from the cognitions like ‘I know, I do not know, ‘this knowledge known before by me is lost now’ etc. If this samvid is identified with Athman the memory of having seen a thing before will not arise. Therefore anbhuthi is anubhuthi only and not the Self as claimed by the advaitin.

Advaitin tries to prove that in the perception ‘I know’ the ‘I’ element is not athma but the ego
because it is not proved by itself, does not shine by itself and requires another proof for its existence. Since anubhuthi is self proved, shines by itself and does not depend on another for proving its existence it is the AthmA. What is meant here is that the ‘I’ element in perception is also the object of perception since in the perception ‘I know this,’ aham’, ‘I’, is perceived to have the perception of ‘this. ‘But Ramnuja does not agree with this and says that in the perception ‘I know,’ anubhuthi appears as an attribute, dharma, and the ‘I’ is the owner of the attribute, dharmi. This is the prathyaksha, sense perception and any anumAna, inference to prove the contrary cannot be accepted, prathyaksha being a more valid pramANa than inference.

The ‘I’ in the cognition ‘I know’ is the self, says Ramanuja, because it is prathyak, internal apart from everything else, which becomes the object of perception and hence external, parAk, of the ‘I.’ The one who is mOksArThee, desirous of mOksA, expects the unalloyed bliss devoid of duhkha and hence tries for mOksA. If mOksA is said to result in the destruction of the ‘I’, no one will try for it. There can be no knowledge without a knower. When the cutter and the axe are absent there can be no cutting operation. Therefore the ‘I’ who is the knower is the Athma. It is said in Bhagavatgita

‘EthadyovEttih thi prAhuh kshEtrajna ithi thadvidha,’ (BG-13-1)

The Athman is said to be the knower of the field which consists of all that is not Athma. This idea will be made clear later by the suthras ‘nAthmA sruthEh’ the self is not born (2-3-17) and ‘jnO atha Eva’, (2-3-18) therefore he is an eternal knower. Hence Anubhuthi is not Athma.

RAMANUJA QUOTES THE SRUTHI TEXTS TO PROVE THIS POINT.
‘Sa yaThA sainDHavaghanah anantharah abAhyah krtsnah rasaghana Eva, Evam vA arE ayam AthmA anantharah krtsnah prajnAna ghana Eva,

as a piece of salt has no inner parts and outer parts but the whole of it is of salt only, similarly this Athma has no inner and outer parts but the whole of it is pure intelligence, meaning a sentient principle only. ‘Athra ayam purushah svayamjyothirbhavathi,’ The Self, Purusha is self illuminated. Suthtrakara also shows that AthmA is the knower by the suthra ‘jnOatha Eva.’ Therefore the AthmA who is svayamprakAsa is the knower. Perception cannot be AthmA. The words samvid, anubhuthi and jnAnam are relative terms and there can be no perception without an object which is proved by experience.

Advaitin then says that anubhuthi is AthmA because it is ajada, sentient. Ajadathva means it is cognised by its own existence and does not need another to illuminate it as in the case of things which are jada, sentient like a pot. This luminosity being the substance itself and not an attribute is found even in a lamp which is not the AthmA. If on the other hand an ajadthva mean that which is always manifest, this characteristic is found in mental impressions like sukha and duhkha because when the feeling of happiness or sorrow arises it is always manifest. That is, one cannot say “I did not know that I am happy”.

It may be argued that the sukha and duhkha do not manifest to themselves but to the Self only,
and hence they are jada, but Ramanuja asks,

‘jnAm vA kim svasmA prAKAsAtE? Thadhapi hyanyaasaiva ahAmrTHasyA jnAtyuh avabhAsAthE, ahAm sukhee ithivath, jAnAmyaham ithi.’

Even the knowledge does not manifest to itself but only to the knower and the perception that ‘I know’ is similar to that which is of the form ‘I am happy.’ Therefore ajadathvam does not imply svasmA prAKAsAnathvam, shining for it. If ajada means what shines by itself by its mere existence it refers only to AthmA which is not mere knowledge as claimed by the advaitin but is the knower.

**PRESENCE OF ‘I’ IN DEEP SLEEP AND RELEASE**

The advaitin says that the knowership belongs to the ego and not the self and this is proved by the fact that in deep sleep and in realisation the ahAmkAra, ego, is absent.

**BUT RAMANUJA REFUTES THIS VIEW AND SAYS THAT**

‘thamO guna abhibhavAthparAgarTHa anubhavaabhAvAccha ahAmrTHasyA vivikthasphutapraithibhAsa abhAvE api AprabhOdhAth ahAmithyEkAkrENA Athmanh sphuraNAth sushupthou api nAhambhAvigamah.’

In sleep one is pervaded by thamas in the form of ignorance and hence there is no distinct experience of anything because there is no external manifestation to the ego. But when awakened one remembers his identity and therefore the concept of ‘I’ must have been present in sleep. On rising from sleep one does not remember having been only a witness of a perception with no experience but always recollects that he has slept well. So there has been a knower who experienced the sukha of deep sleep. Also because one has a recollection of his actions done before he went to sleep. To the objection that when awakened from sleep one also has the feeling ‘I did not know anything during the time of sleep,’ Ramanuja replies that it is not a denial of all experiences as otherwise even the anubhuthi will be denied in sleep. The words ‘I did not know’ proves the existence of ‘I’ who did not know by which the perception alone was denied. Sensible persons will not accept that the ‘I’ also was absent at the time of sleep. Even the expression ‘I did not know myself implies only the absence of the awareness of the identity of oneself as so and so as in wakeful state but does not denote the absence of ‘I’ itself. Moreover the advatin proclaims that the Self continues to exist as a sAkshi, the witness consciousness. SAKshitva is not possible without being a knower. It cannot be pure consciousness. One who knows can only be a sAkshi according to the great grammarian PANini who defines the word sAkshi as ‘sAKshAth dhraStti samjnAyAm,’ the one, who sees, that is, one who knows, is the sAkshi. The Self by its very existence shines for itself and as the I. ‘Hence the Atma that shines even in deep sleep does so as the real I. ’ similarly it can be shown that the ‘I’ shines even in release. Otherwise it will result in AthmanAsa, says Ramanuja. It cannot be said that ahAmrThah, the concept of ‘I’ is only an attribute wrongly superimposed on the athman which alone disappears in release while the athman remains. On the contrary the ahAmrTha is not a mere attribute but the very substance of the Self. Only the jnana is the
attribute of the Self. One aspires for moksha, relief, in order to get rid of the thapathraya, the
three kinds of sufferings due to samsara, which are AdhyAthmika, caused by one's own body
and mind, Adhidhaivika, due to destiny and Adhibhouthika caused by other by the elements of
nature, respectively. If there is the destruction of the 'I,' the experiencer in release no one will
strive for it. Hence the 'I', who shines as a knower, is the inner self, prathyagathma This can be
proved through inference also. The syllogism is stated thus:

‘Sa cha prathyagAthma mukthou api ahampriyeyava prakAsathE svasmapi prakasamanathvath;
Yo yah svasmapi prakasathE sah sarvo aham ithyeva prakasathe; YaTHA thaTHA
avabhasathvena ubhayavAdhi sammathah samsaryAthma'
The Self shines only as the real 'I' even in release because it shines for its own benefit.
Whatever shines for its own benefit shines as the 'I' as the samsAryAthma, the transmigratory
self.

“Yah punah ahamithi na chakAsthi, nAsou svasmapi prakAsathE yaTHA ghatAdhih”,
That which is not shining as ahampriy, 'I', does not shines for itself but requires another to
manifest it, like the pot. Advaitin objects to this saying that if the Self shines as 'I' in mukthi it
will not be different from the ego which is the product of ignorance. Ramanuja replies that
ignorance could be of three kinds. It could be svrupaajnana, ignorance of the real nature, or
anyaTHAjnAna, misapprehension or viprithajnAna, wrong apprehension. To understand the
real nature of Athma as the real 'I' is not ignorance.

NEXT RAMANUJA PROVES HIS POINT BY CITING THE EXAMPLE OF SEERS LIKE
VAMADEVA WHO HAVE HAD THE BRAHMAASAKSHATHKARA, BY REMOVAL OF AVIDHYA,
PERCEIVED THEMSELVES AS 'I' ONLY, AND NOT AS PURE CONSCIOUSNESS.

“BhavishyadAchAryan sannidhi”
‘Thdvaithathpasyan rshirAvamAbEvah prathipEdhe aham manurabhavam suryascha iti’ (Brhd. 3-4-10)

The seer VAmadEva seeing that (Brahman) observed ‘I was Manu and the Sun. ‘Ahmekah praTHamam Asam varthAmi cha bhavishyAmicha’. I alone existed, exist and will exist”. Such is the mode of expression even about Brahman, ‘hanthAham imAh thisrAh devathah’ (Chan. 6-3-2), ‘I will enter these three devathas’, ‘bahusyAm prajAyEya’, ‘I will become many’ ‘aa eekshatha lokAnnusrjA iti’, ‘He willed; I will create the worlds.’ In bhagavatgita the IOrd says, ‘I am the Self of all’, and several similar expressions are found in Gita. The svarupa of the Self is the only real ‘I’ and the ahamkAra normally understood as’aham’ is only a product of matter as mentioned by the Lord Himself

‘MahAbhoothAnyahamkArO buddhiravyakthamEvacha,’

The elements, buddhi and ahamkAra are the products of the unmanifest prakrthi. The word ahamkAra means that it makes one regard as ‘I’ that which is not ‘I’. The word is used in gita to denote pride; ‘ahamkAram balam dharpam’ (BG18-53) and hence ahamkAra is only the product of ignorance, which gives the impression of ‘aham’ in body, mind and intellect.

ParAsara has mentioned this in vishnupurana :

‘srooyathAm chApyavidhyAyAh svarupam kulanandana; anAthmani AthmabuddhirYA’ (VP. 6-7-10)

“Hear the nature of avidhyA; it is the notion of athma in anAthma”.

Ramanuja says:

‘yadhi jnapthimAthramEva AthmA thadhAanAthmani AthmAbhimAne
 jnapthimAthraprathibhAsah syAth; na jnAthrthvaprathibhasah.’

If anubhuthi is the self then in the perception of ‘I’ in the body etc. will be mere anubhuthi and not as a knower. Therefore ‘I’, the knower alone is Athma.

To quote YAmunAchArya

‘athah prathyaksha siddhatvAthukthanyAyAgamAnvayAth
 avidhyA yogathaschAthmA jnAthAham iti bhAsathE. (Athmasiddhi)

The Athma, knower, shines as ‘I’ and this is proved by perception inference and sruthi and the effect of ignorance as pointed out.

‘Dehendhiya manaAparAnadheebhyOanyOanayasAdhanah nithyO vyApee
 prathikshetramAthmA bhinnah svathah sukhee’(Athmasiddhi)

The Athma is other than body, senses, mind, prAna and intellect and is self- proved, eternal all pervading, separate in each body and happy by nature. Here vyApee means the most subtle nature capable of entering into all beings.

Criticism of the view that sense perception is nullified by the sruthi Advaitin says that the sense perception which shows diversity is due to a defect and can be explained otherwise,
Ramanuja asks him to explain what this defect is. If this defect is due to an AdhibedhavAsana, the beginningless avidhyā, causing the perception of difference, by the reason that it is an Adhi there could not have been any experience to the contrary. So one cannot be sure that it is a defect. If it is argued that the bhedhavAsana is sublated by the sruthi texts denying all differences, Ramanuja says that it is a case of anyOnya AsrayaNA, and therefore cannot be valid proof. That is, the sruthi texts deny difference because the perception is defective and the perception is defective because the sruthi denies it. Moreover if sense perception is wrong because of an Adhi vAsana, the sasthra is also affected by the same defect because it is made up of words which are in their turn made up of root and prefixes etc. which denote bhedha only. Advaitin may come up with the reply that sruthi sublates prathyaksha, sense perception, as it is later. That is, at first one sees the difference and then by reading the sruthi text, understands that it is unreal. But merely because it is later, knowledge cannot be taken as defectless. A person experiencing fear on mistaking a rope as a snake will not become fearless by mere words unless he experiences that it is only a rope. So too mere sravaNa of sruthi texts is not enough to sublate the experience of the difference as the texts themselves are contaminated by the same defect, being based on difference. That is why manana and nidhidhyAsana is prescribed.

Then Ramanuja questions the basis for the conclusion that sasthra is not afflicted by any defect but sense perception has a defect. He says that there can be no proof for this statement. Anubhuthi which is self-proved and devoid of differences cannot cognise this because it is said to be unconnected with any object of perception and hence not connected with sastra either. Sense perception proving the point is of course ruled out as claimed to be defective and for this reason no other pramAna can provide proof as they all depend on prathyaksha.

Advaitin accepts that the sasthra is also under the realm of ignorance based on difference, but the bhedha cognised in prathyakshais sublated by the veda while the Brahman, the ‘sat’ and adhvitheeya, ’ without a second, is not found to be sublated. Hence the difference is unreal and Brahman alone is real.

But Ramanuja says ‘abhAdhithasyApi doshamoolasya apaAramArthyanischayAth’. Just because knowledge is not sublated it cannot be assumed as real. One who is affected by eye defect and sees two moons and has never encountered another without defect will continue to have the defective vision. Just because his knowledge is not sublated it cannot be taken as real.

Ramanuja says that it could be argued thus: brahmajnAna arising from the sasthra, which is itself unreal, being under the influence of avidhyā must also be unreal Hence it is possible to forward a syllogism in the form

‘Brahma miThyA asathyahethujanyajnAnavishayathvAth, prapanchavath,’

Brahman is unreal being the subject of the knowledge rising out of unreal cause. Advaitin gives a reply that as in the example of elephant seen in the dream, even though the knowledge may be unreal being under the realm of avidhyā, it may lead to the real knowledge of Brahman as
the dream elephant signifies some real event that is going to happen. Ramanuja refutes this saying that the knowledge in the dream is not unreal but only the object experienced is. No one denies their experience and the knowledge of the dream but only that ‘darsanam thu vidhyaarthaa na santhi’, the perception was real but only the objects seen were unreal. The experience of fear or joy on seeing a magic show is real though the objects that caused the feelings are unreal. So are the effects experienced in the illusion of a serpent in a rope real, such as being bitten and the possible death due to suspected venom. Similarly the face reflected on water is seen as being in it though it is not. In all these instances the perception is real because it originates and does the work expected but the objects are not real for the same reason. Moreover the objects are only sublated by subsequent perception but not the experiences.

Advaitin comes up with yet another example of unreal giving rise to real knowledge. The symbols denoting letters give rise to the knowledge of the sound even though the symbols are not real. That is, the symbol ‘ka’ represents the letter ‘ka’ and gives rise to the respective sound. Advaitin says that the symbol representing the particular sound is not real but it gives rise to a real sound.

But Ramanuja says that the symbol is real, which gives rise to real sound and hence the cause of the sound is the symbol only and hence real. In the case of a word say, gavaya giving rise to the knowledge of the entity called gavaya is due to its similarity to the cow and hence it is the sadrsya, likeness that produces the knowledge and not the word and the sadrsya is real. Here it needs explanation as to what is meant by the reference to gavaya. It is usually found in the work on epistemology. One sees an animal in the forest similar to a cow and he has heard that such an animal is called gavaya and that it is similar to a cow. So on the basis of the sadrsya the knowledge about gavaya arises through the perception of that entity. This is what is referred to here and upamAna which depends on sadrsya is a valid means of knowledge in advaita but in visishtadvaita there are only three pramANas, namely, perception, inference and verbal testimony, that is, prathyaksha, anumana and sabda. Therefore if the unreality of the scriptures is accepted, as it is under the realm of avidhya as claimed by the advaitin, it cannot produce real knowledge of Brahman.

SRUTHI TEXTS QUOTED TO PROVE THAT BRAHMAN IS NIRVISESHA EXAMINED

1. ‘Sadheva soumya idham agra aseth, ekameva adhvitheeyam’ (Chan. 6-2-1)

Before, my dear, this was ‘sat’ only, one only without a second. This is taken as implying that the ‘sat’, Brahman is alone real, denying the existence of anything else other than Brahman.

But Ramanuja gives a different interpretation. The context in which this sentence is found contains the promissory statement about that knowledge, by which everything else will be known, ekavijnEna sarvajijnAnam, because the father asks the son whether he has learnt that, by knowing which everything else becomes known. Therefore the word ‘Sat’ denotes Brahman, the material and efficient cause of the world, who is omniscient and omnipotent, whose will never fails, who is within everything and supports everything and possesses innumerable auspicious qualities,

‘EkavijnEna sarvajijnAnaprathipadhanamukhenasacchabdayAchyasya Parasya brahmaNah
The import of the sentence is to show to Svethakethu, the son by the father that Brahman described as such is the inner self of all by the statement ‘thatthvamasi that thou art’.

2. ‘Sathyam jnAnam anantham brahma’

Brahman is existence, knowledge and infinity. This is explained by advaitin that sathya etc are not attributes because Brahman is attributeless consciousness. He says that the different epithets mean the same entity and not its different attributes. Satyam differentiates Brahman from all that is unreal, jnAnam from ignorance and anantham from all that is finite.

Ramanuja refutes this explanation. By the rule of sAmAnADHikaraNya set out by the grammarian PANini

‘bhinnapravrththi nimirthAm sabdhAnAmEkasminnarTHE vṛtthih sAmAnADHi karaNyaṁ’

which means that when different words of different connotations are placed in a position to denote the same entity it is coordination, sAmAnADHikaraNya. For instance in the sentence ‘syamO yuvA devadattah’, the words syama, da rk and yuva, young both denote one entity Devadattha who is having these attributes. Similarly the words satyam etc denote the attributes of Brahman, which is savisEsha only and not nirvisEsha, as claimed by the advaitin. The argument that many adjectives will make the entity qualified to appear as many is not correct. Only when the attributes are inconsistent with one another as in the sentence ‘broken horned, hornless and full horned is the ox’ it indicates more than one animal because the attributes cannot be found in one ox.

Advaitin says that the text ‘ekameva advitheeyam’ cannot suffer a second even in the form of an attribute because Brhaman is changeless being sathyam, pure existence, which can have no attribute. Hence other texts such as ‘satyam jnAnam anantham brahma’ should be interpreted to mean only a nirvisEsha vasthu, attributeless entity. Otherwise other texts defining Brahman as ‘nirguNam, niranjanam’ etc will not be meaningful.

Ramanuaja replies that the word adhvitheeyam only implies that there is no material cause other than Brahman. That Brahman has unique power, being both the material and efficient cause is denoted by the text ‘thadhaikshatha bahu syAm prajAyEya, thatthEjO asrjatha’, it willed to become many and created fire. ‘Sadheva sowmya idham agra Aseeth EkamEva’ denotes that there can be no material cause other than Brahman and the word ‘adhitheeyam’ shows that it is the efficient cause as well. (note: material cause is upAdhAna kAraNam, like the mud in the creation of pot and efficient cause is the nimiththa kAranam like the potter) It cannot be argued that this interpretation will conflict with the texts denying attributes to brahman such as ‘nirguNam, nishkalam, nishkriyam, shAntham etc., says Ramanuja, because these deny only
the undesirable attitudes, as found in the world of beings, in Brahman. Therefore there is no conflict between the sguNa and nirguNa texts so that neither of them need be ignored. Even the texts that describe Brahman as jnAna, state jnaNa as his svarupa He is jnAthA, knower and jnAnasvarupa. Ramanuja quotes the texts such as ‘yah sarvajnah sarvavith’, (Mund. 1-1-10) who knows everything and about everything,

‘na thasya kAryam karaNam cha vidhyathE na thatsamschAbhyadDHikascha dhrsyathE parAscha shakthirviviDHaiva srooyathE svAbhavikee jnanabalakriya cha,’ (Svet. 6-8.)

He has neither a body nor any organ; there is no one superior or equal to Him; His power is supreme and many and His knowledge, power and action is spontaneous. There is evidence in the sruthi itself that Brahman is free from undesirable qualities and possesses auspicious qualities, says Ramanuja.

‘Esha AthmA apahathapApma vijarO vimrthyuh vishOkO vijIghso apipAsah satyhakamah sathya sankalpah’, (Chan. 8-1-5)

AtmA is free from karma, old age, death, sorrow, hunger and thirst; He has infallible desire and unfailing will. Thus sruthi itself shows that there is no conflict between nirguNa and sguNa texts. The texts like ‘bheeshAsmAth vAthah pa vathE’, (Tait. anand. 8) the wind blows out of fear from Him, (because He is the ruler of the elements) show his divine attributes and describe the bliss of brahman, brahmananda, experienced in mukthi, ‘thE ye satham’, begin from the worldly joy and multiplies hundredfold each kind of bliss in different worlds to indicate the extreme joy of Brahman and emphasizes the infinite nature of the auspicious qualities of Brahman by

‘yathO vAchO nivarthanthE aprApya manasA saha Anandam brahmanO vidvAn, ‘

he who knows the bliss of Brahman from where all speech turn away without reaching it along with the mind. That Brahman has attributes is also known from the texts like

‘so asnute he sarvAn kAmAn saha brahmaNA vipascithA,’

he realizes all his wishes along with the omniscient Brahman. Ramanuja interprets the word kamAh as desire for the kalyAnagunAh which are enjoyed in mukthi along with Brahman implying that one has to meditate on the auspicious attributes of Brahman.

Brahman can be known and is also a knower. Brahman is said to be jnAna avishaya, not an object of knowledge by citing the sruthi text,

‘yasya amatham thasya matham yasya na veda sah; avijnAtham vijnAnathAm vijnAtham avijnAnAthAm. ‘(Kena. 2-3)

This means that he understands it (Brahman) who comprehends it not; and he who feels that he has comprehended it understands it not because it is beyond the instruments of cognition, namely indhriyas, manas and buddhi. Ramanuja objects that this interpretation would contradict the texts like ’ brahmavidhApOthi param’, (Taitt. 2- 1) ‘brahmaNA brahmaiva bhavathi’, (Mund. 3-2-9) the knower of Brahman attains the highest, he who knows Brahman
becomes Brahman, which shows that Brahman is realized as an object of knowledge. All sruthis mention the apavarga, release, to be the result of brahmajna, the knowledge of brahman. Ramanuja clinches the argument by saying ‘jnAnam cha upAsanAthmakam, upAsyam cha brahma saguNam ithyuktham’, it is said in the sruthi that brahman with attributes is the object of meditation in the form of knowledge. Further Ramanuja points out that the text ‘yathO vaiChO nivarththE’ implies that brahman possessing innumerable auspicious qualities cannot be fully described by words or thought of by the mind both of which have their limitations, ‘brahmaNah ananthasya aparicchinna guNasya vAngmansayOh EthAvath ithi paricchedhya auyogyathva sravaNEha brahma EthAvath ithi brahmaParicchEdha jnAnavathAm brahma avijnAtham anatham ithyuktham’.

So in view of this the Kena text ‘yasya amatham matham’ means that Brahman cannot be known by those who try to limit it as ‘this much. Desika expresses the same idea in his YadhavAbhyudhayam thus:

Desika portrays the Vedas as the bards trying to sing about His merits and he says that when they start extolling even one of His infinite auspicious attributes, they become tired.

Ekaika gunapraanthe sranthaah nigamavandhinaah

The text

‘na dhṛṣṭEh dhṛṣṭAram pasyeh; na sṛṇuḥ sṛṇuyAth; na maṇṭAram maṇveeTHAḥ; na vijnAthEh vijnAthAram vijaneeyAḥ’,

Meaning: ‘you cannot see the seer of sight, hear the hearer of hearing, thinker of thought and knower of knowledge, ’ does not deny the seer, knower etc says Ramanuja. It only refutes the view of the vaisesikas that knowledge is the attribute of the Self and stresses that knowing and thinking etc. are the essential nature of the Self. It dismisses the individual self as the knower etc. and shows the Brahm, the real Self as the knower. Similarly ‘AnandO brahma’, (Tait. brg.) does not denote Brahm as purely bliss but also as the Anandee, possessor of bliss, says Ramanuja. ‘VijnAnam Anandam brahma’, consciousness, bliss is Brahma (Brhd. 3-9-28) shows that the knowledge and bliss is Brahman. Bliss is the nature of knowledge that is Brahm, who is knower as well. ‘AnandambrahmanO vidvAn’, the knower of the bliss of Brahm (Tait. 2-9) and the text that says that hundredfold bliss of prajApathi is a unit measure of Brahm, clearly indicate that Brahm is not only Ananda but Anandee as well and knowership, jnAthrthvam is itself blissfulness, Anandithvam. Ramanuja then proceeds to the denial texts that deny plurality of the world as being unreal, to show that they do not actually negate the manifoldness of the world. They are, ‘yathra hi dvAithamiva bhavathī’, (Brhd. 2-4-14) when there is duality as it were,

‘Neha nAnAsth kimchana; mṛthyoḥ sa mṛthyoṃapnothi ya iha nAnEva pasyathi’,

Here there is no separateness whatever; he attains mortality successively who sees separateness. Since the manifoldness is established by texts such as

‘Thadhaikshatha bahusyam prajayeya, ’ (Brhad. 4-4-19)

It willed to become many, what is denied is the separate existence of the world apart from
Brahman, who is its real Self and inner ruler. The last text taken by Ramanuja to refute the denial of plurality is

‘yadhā hyEvasha Ethasmin udharam antharam kurutheatha thasya bhayam bhavathi’, (Tait. 2-7)

There is fear for him who makes the least differentiation in it, that is, Brahman. This is interpreted as there would be fear for one who sees diversity in the world which is nothing but Brahman. Ramanuja says that this interpretation would contradict the Chandogya text

‘Sarvam khalu idham brahma thajjalAn ithi shAntha upAseetha, ‘(Chan. 3-14-1)

All this is Brahman as it originates from, sustained by and absorbed in Brahman and thus one should meditate to attain calmness of mind. The word ‘tajjalAn’ is made up of ‘thath, ja, la, an’. ‘ja stands for janana, origination, ‘la’ for laya or annihilation and ‘an’ means to live, that is sustenance. So what the Taittiriya text means is that there is no fear for one who sees Brahman as the Self of all and meditates on Brahman as such and the fear comes only when he does not. If there is a break in this steady meditation there is fear which has been also mentioned by the great rishis.

‘yanmuhurthamkshaNam vApi vAsudevO na chinthyathe sA hanih than mahath chidhram sa brAnthih sa cha vikriya, ‘

In that duration of time or a moment when there is no thought on Vasudeva there is harm created by a great opening to let all illusions and wrong actions. The suthras quoted by advaitin to prove that Brahman is nirvisesha, namely,

‘na sthAnathO api parasya ubhayalingam sarvathra hi’, (BS. 3-2- 11) and

‘mAyAmAthram thu kArthsnyEnaanabhivyaktha svarupahvAth’, (BS. 3- 2-3)

are in fact prove only the savisheshtha of Brahman, says, Ramanuja. The first one is translated as ‘not even according to place can Brahman have a twofold characteristic, for everywhere (it is taught to be without attributes.)’ by the advaitin which means that Brahman cannot be with and without attributes and even when connected with the body etc. it does not therefore has attributes. But Ramanuja interprets this differently. He gives the following explanation. Not even on account of place, being in the body, for instance, can there be imperfection in Brahman because through out (the scripture it is described) as having a twofold characteristics, namely, being free from all imperfections and having auspicious qualities. The second suthra is translated as ‘but the dream creation is mere maya because of its true nature of not being a complete manifestation’ by the advaitin.

Ramanuja on the other hand explains it thus: but it is mere maya on account of its true nature not being manifest fully. It is called maya because the dream world is something wonderful but it is not illusion. Brahman who is awake in us even in our sleep creates the experience in the dream and He is pure. So this establishes Brahman only as savisesha. Next Ramanuja quotes profusely from the smrithis like Gita and vishnupurANa to prove that Brahman is not a non-dual consciousness but possesses infinite auspicious attributes. Brahman is savisesha and the
world of sentient and insentient beings is also real and forms the body of Brahman who is its inner Self. The Ramanuja proceeds with his criticism of the main tenet of advaita, namely the avidhya-maya.

**AVIDHYA, NESCIENCE, CANNOT BE PROVED.**

As stated in Mahapurvapaksha the absolute reality, Brahman is nirvivesha and self-illumined and the world is a superimposition on Brahman due to avidhya according to the theory of advaita philosophy. This avidhya has two fold functions, namely, avaraNa, and vikshepa. The first causes nonapprehension which leads to the second, namely misapprehension. As in the case of rope-snake illusion when the ignorance conceals (AvaraNa) the real object, rope, and projects (vikshepa) a different object, snake to the view, the avidhya acts as an AvaraNa to conceal brahman and produces an illusion, vikshepa, of the world of diversities. This avidhya is said to be beginningless. It is described as sadasat anirvachaneeya, cannot be termed as either sat or asat and hence inexplicable, anirvachaneeya. This avidhya can be removed by the knowledge of certain vedic texts such as ‘anrthEna hi prathyooDaah’, (chan. 8-3-2) which means that even though they are constantly in contact with Brahman no one understands it because they are covered with untruth. The knowledge of Brahman can also be acquired by comprehending the unity of Brahman and the individual self through the mahAvAkys like ‘thatthvamasi’.

Ramanuja proceeds to prove that this theory is untenable on grounds of inapplicability, anupapathi, of seven kinds.

1. **Asraya anupapaththi**- Brahman cannot be the substratum of avidhya.
2. **TirODHAna anupapaththi**- tirODHAna or concealment of Brahman means its destruction.
3. **Svrupa anupapaththi**- avidhya cannot be real.
4. **Anirvachniya anupapaththi**- avidhya is not inexplicable.
5. **PramANa anupapaththi**- There is no pramANa for avidhya.
6. **nivarthaka anupapaytthi**- Sruthi texts cited as capable of removing avidhya are not so.
7. **nivrtthyanupapaththi**- avidhya cannot be completely removed by mere knowledge.

**THE SEVEN ANUPAPTTHIS**

1. **ASRAYA ANUPAPATTHI**

It is said that avidhya creates illusion. Ramanuja asks, ‘sA hi kimAsrithya bhramam janayathi? na thAvath jeevamAsrithya, avidhyAparikalpithvAth jeevabhAvasya; nApi brahmAsrithya; thasya svayamprakAsajnanasvarupathvena avidhyAvirODHithvAth; sA hi jnanabhadhyA abhimatha’.

What is the substratum of avidhya? It cannot be the jeeva, individual self which itself is the
product of avidhyya. Neither could it abide in Brahman which is jnAna svarupa and self-illumined nor hence contrary to avidhyya which is said to be removed by jnAna’.

Advaitin contends that it is the knowledge of brahman as jnAna svarupa which removes avidhyya and not the jnAna which is svarupa of Brahman. That is, avidhyya exists in the absence of the jnAna that Brahman is jnAnasvarupa. At the rise of this jnAna avidhyya is removed and hence the jnAna which is the svarupa of Brahman can coexist with avidhyya as it is not opposed to avidhyya, not being the subject of knowledge. The subject of jnAna is Brahman as the jnAnasvarupa and not the jnAna, which is His svarupa.

But Ramanuja refutes this saying ‘jnAnasvarupam brahma ithyanEna jnanEnabrahmNi yah svabhAvah avagamyathE sa brhmaNah svayamprakAsathvena svaymEva prakAsatha ithi avidhyAvirOdhithve na kaschithviseshahsvarupathadvishayajnAnayoh ithi,’

As Brahman is svayamprakAsa, self proved, the knowledge of Brahman as He is appears by itself. That is it does not require another to reveal it like a pot. Hence the knowledge that is the nature of Brahman, svabhAva and the knowledge of Brahman are of the same nature and it cannot be said that while one is opposed to avidhyya the other is not.

Further this knowledge of Brahman as jnAnasvarupa cannot be experienced as Brahman is anubhuthi according to the theory of advaita and does not need another anubhuthi, perception, as in the case of shell-silver, to reveal itself. So the jnAna which is the svarupa of Brahman is opposed to avidhyya and hence avidhyya cannot rest on Brahman.

Advaitin next comes up with the argument that the knowledge which is opposed to avidhyya has not Brahman as its subject but the unreality of everything other than Brahman.

Ramanuja asks whether the avidhyya to which this knowledge is opposed is about the real knowledge of Brahman or about the reality of the universe. It cannot be the former, says Ramanuja, ‘na thAvath brahmayATHAthmyajnAna virodhi athadvishayathvAth,’ because it is said that Brahman is not the subject of knowledge which removes avidhyya. ‘PrapanchamithyAthvajnAnam thatsathyathva rupa ajnanEva vrudhyathE’,

The knowledge that the world is unreal is opposed to the ignorance that the world is real in which case the ajnAna about the nature of Brahman will persist.

It may be argued that the ignorance of Brahman is due to the non-perception of Brahman as adhvitheeya, one without a second and when the knowledge that everything else except Brahman is unreal arises, avidhyya being removed, the svarupa of Brahman shines itself. Ramanuja says that if this svarupa refers to the svarupajnAna then its being ever present, the notion that Brahman has a second, sadhviteeya, will not arise at all and there is no need for its being removed. If on the other hand being adhviteeya is not the svarupa of Brahman but its attribute which is not known due to avidhyya it goes against the advaidic contention that Brahman is attributeless. Therefore Brahman being jnAna, is opposed to avidhyya which cannot abide in Him.
2. **THIRODHAANA ANUPAPATTHI**

even assuming that avidhya rests on Brahman asks Ramanuja, what will be its action? Advaitin says that it obscures Brahman who is svayampракAsa or of nature of light. Thirodhaana, obscurcation must be of two kinds. Either it should prevent the light from appearing or it should destroy the light that appeared. The first is not possible because the light that is Brahman does not appear but always present. So avidhya must destroy the light but Brahman is not a substance with light as its attribute, in which case it can remain even after its light is destroyed. As Brahman is Himself the prakAsa, the thirOdhanA can only mean the destruction of Brahman.

3. **SVARUPA ANUPAPATTHI**

According to advaita theory Brahman is pure perception, anubhuthimAṭhra, not connected with any perceiver or thing perceived. As such if avidhya conceals Brahman, assuming that it rests in Brahman, that is, svAsrayadosha, Ramanuja asks whether it is real or unreal. It cannot be real as everything other than Brahman is unreal in advaita. If it is unreal, it should be identified with seer, seen or another perception. It cannot be identical with anubhuthi, perception, for Brahman alone is the perception unconnected with things and as avidhya is unreal Brahman will also be unreal which will land advaita in the portals of mAdhyamika, nihilism. If it is identified with seer or seen, both of which are unreal, avidhya itself being unreal, and another dosha must be found for the appearance of the avidhya. That is, as the avidhya is said to be the cause of the unreal perception of things and the unreal seer, there should be a cause for the unreal avidhya which in its turn will require another and so on, resulting in ad infinitum, and anavastha. If on the other hand avidhya is identified with Brahman it becomes real and there can be no removal of it.

4. **ANIRVACHNEeya ANUPAPATTHI**

avidhya can be proved as positive entity by perception. Anirvachneyatva is explained as being neither sat, existent, nor asath, nonexistent, but different from both, sadasatvilakṣaNama. This uniqueness, says Ramanuja, is itself unique, because it cannot be proved by any pramāṇa. All cognitions are of things either existing or not existing.

But advaitin contends that avidhya is perceptible as a positive entity and not as a mere absence of knowledge, or mere antecedent non existence of knowledge, that is, the ignorance before the rise of knowledge. In the cognition ‘I do not know’ it is the perception of aṇṇa whereas the cognition ‘I do not know myself or another’, as in deep sleep, denotes the function of avidhya.
Avidhya conceals the true nature of Brahman as being self-proved, undifferentiated, and unchanging entity with jnAna as his svarupa. This is the thirodhAna shakthi of avidhya. The other function of avidhya is that it makes Brahman appear as the manifold universe by its vikshepa shakthi. Hence this is sense perception only, though unreal because it is caused by avidhya which is also not real. But since it is a positive entity it cannot be unreal like the horn of a rabbit or a sky flower and hence it is classified as neither real nor unreal.

Avidhya is not the antecedent nonexistence of knowledge jnAna prAgabhAva vishayah, which can be cognized by anupalabdhi, non-perception, which is the sixth pramANa of in advaita.

[The means of cognition are six in advaita, namely, perception, prathyaksha, inference, anumAna, sabdha, verbal testimony, arThApatthi, presumption, and anupalabDhi, non-perception. The non-existence of a thing as in the knowledge that ‘bhoothale ghato nAsthi’, there is no pot on the ground, is cognized by anupalabDHi. Other schools do not accept the last two pramANas of advaita which are said to be included under inference and perception respectively.]

The reason for saying that avidhya is not the absence of knowledge is that it is cognised while being experienced like that of ‘aham sukhee, I am happy’. In the cognition ‘I do not know’, there is a perception of ajnAna which requires the knowledge of ‘myself’ and the jnAna which is absent. So the cognition is that of ajnAna and therefore it is positive and not opposed to knowledge of ‘myself’ or its knowledge.

Ramanuja here interrupts and says that avidhya may be a positive thing, that, is, not a mere absence, but even if so, it conflicts with Brahman who has jnAna as his nature, ‘bhAvarupamapi ajnAnamvasthu yATHAthmya avabhAsa rupENa sAkshichaithanyEna viruDHyathE.’

Advaitin replies that avidhya is not opposed to Brahman but only to the knowledge of Brahman which removes it. In the case of nacre perceived as silver, the ajnAna is not opposed to nacre but only to the knowledge of it.

If ajnAna is perceived by sense perception then on its removal Brahman must be perceived by sense perception which is denied by the advaitin. Reply to this is that all things, sentient and insentient are perceived by Brahman, the witness- self, sAkshichaithanya, as being existent or non-existent. So when the ajnAna is removed by jnana Brahman shines of its own accord but before that the witness- self manifests itself as the world, due to ajnAna.

Next the advaitin shows that the avidhya is positive through inference avidhya a positive entity is argued through inference. Next the advaitin shows that the avidhya is positive through inference. The knowledge that is valid is preceded by a substance. This substance is other than the previous non-existence of the knowledge and covers the subject of the knowledge. This substance which is in the same place as the knowledge is removable by the knowledge. This is the positive ajnana. Hence avidhya is a positive substance removed by jnAna rising from vedanthavAkyas such as ‘thathvamasi’ like the darkness is removed when a brilliant light is brought in.
The advaitin proceeds to show that darkness, thamas, is a positive substance to counter the objection.

AlokaabhAva mAThram cA rupadarsana abhAvamathram va thamah;na dravyAntharam, thath katHam bhAvarupa ajnAna sADHanE nidarsanathayA upanyasyatha,

The darkness is the absence of light or non-perception of rupa and how can that be cited as an example to prove the positive avidhya. Thamas is a substance which is sometimes thin and sometimes thick and it is perceived and lends itself to expressions like ‘thamah chalathi, the darkness moves and neelam thamah, darkness is blue’ etc. Also because it cannot be included among other substances, namely, the five elements, time soul, mind and direction. [This has been refuted by the school of logicians already].

Ramanuja objects that positive ajnAna is not perceived by sense perception in the experience ‘aham ajnah, mam anyam cha na janami,’ nor it can be proved by argument. AjnAna must be of someone or some thing. If ‘I ’ is known then the knowledge of svarupa of ‘I’ will remove the ajnAna ‘I do not know myself and others.’ If the ‘I’ is not known, then it cannot be perceived because it will not be known as to whom or of whom or what it is about. Advaitin may reply that only the vivid knowledge is opposed to avidhya but the knowledge of the person to whom and of whom the avidhya exists is not vivid and hence it can co exist with such knowledge.

This can be understood as follows: In the perception ‘aham ajnah, mAm anyam cha na AnAmi’ there is a knowledge of ‘I’ but it is not vivid. In the case of rajjusarpa, the rope seen as a snake, the rope is vivid knowledge but it is seen as ‘idham, this’ which can coexist with ignorance of the rope. This ignorance projects an illusory perception of a snake. The knowledge of the serpent or ‘this’ is not opposed to ignorance, avidhya, of the knowledge of the rope.

Ramanuja says that this explanation applies to jnanapragabhAva, prior non-existence of knowledge also. Before the knowledge arises there is the absence of knowledge which is jnAnaprAgabhAva. Only the vivid knowledge of the real nature is opposed to it and not the knowledge of that where it abides and the subject of the knowledge.

To explain this we can again resort to the rope-snake example. Before the rope is known there is the absence of the knowledge that it is rope, which is removed when the knowledge or the rope dawns. So the prAgabhAva of the jnAna that it is rope is opposed to the jnAna of the rope. But the knowledge of the abode of jnana, namely the rope, is not vivid but seen as ‘this, which is the subject of the knowledge which has not yet arisen. So, says Ramanuja, ajnAna is not a positive entity but only the absence of jnAna.

AjnAna must mean either the absence of jnAna or other than jnAna or opposed to jnAna. In all these cases it requires that the nature if jnAna should be known, says Ramanuja.

‘ajnAnamithi jnAnAbhAvah;thadhanyah;thadvirOdhi vA, thrayANAm api thatsvarupajnAnApeksshA avasyAsrayaNeeyA.’

Advaitin contends citing the example of darkness that it can be seen even without knowing about light at all. But Ramanuja insists that when thamas, darkness is known as the absence of light the knowledge of light is a prerequisite. Moreover ajnAna is acknowledged as the absence
of knowledge by advaitin also when it is said to be removed by jnAna. Hence avidhya is not a positive entity.

**AJNANA CANNOT PREVENT THE SVRUPA OF BRAHMAN FROM APPEARING.**

Nescience, that is, ajnAna is said to prevent Brahman form appearing and it is experienced, being positive entity. Ramanuja asks whether ajnAna is first experienced, anubhutham and then prevents the appearance of Brahman, thirODHAnam or first it prevents the appearance and then is experienced. This is subjected to anyOnyAsraya dosha, interdependence, that is, thirODHAnam occurs because avidhya is experienced and vice versa. It should be remembered here that all the arguments are forwarded under the assumption that avidhya abides in Brahma as it could not abide in the individual self which is also a product of avidhya.

Brahman perceives His own svarupa as He is. If that is prevented from appearing by ajnAna Brahman should experience ajnAna. If the svarupa is prevented from appearance by something other than Him then avidhya being anadhi there will always be thirOdhaAna. If avidhya is not different from Brahman it becomes His nature and no removal of it will be possible, in which case Brahman Himself will disappear like the silver in the illusion of nacre perceived as silver.

Ramanuja asks, ‘avidhyayA brahma thirOhithE thath brahma na kimchidhapi prakAsathe utha
kimchith prakAsathE,’ when Brahman is prevented from appearing does He not shine at all or shine a little? If He does not shine, being the nature of light, prakAsasvrupa, Brahman will cease to exist. Brahman must be consisted of parts to enable shining and not shining at the same time. Or He must have attributes some of which shine while others do not. Both alternatives are unacceptable to the advaitin. Brahman cannot be said to shine dimly because the parts that shine cannot be dim while those that do not are not seen. Brahman being vivid in His svarupa, dimness caused by ajnAna cannot result and there is no need for its removal.

Avidhya itself is unreal and the misapprehension is thus due to an unreal cause. If Brahman is not the base of avidhya it means that the misapprehension comes about in the absence of real base which will make advaita non-different from nihilism of Madhyamaikas.

AVIDHYA CANNOT BE PROVED POSITIVE BY INFERENCE.

In the argument to show that ajnana is a positive entity the sadhya or the thing to be proved is given as ‘jnAna should be preceded by a substance which prevents it from appearing and which is removable by jnAna.’ The hethu or reason for such an inference is that the jnAna shows what is not seen earlier. The example given is that of light which removes the darkness and shows the objects which were not seen before. Now, Ramanuja says that this inference is faulty. The hethu viz. showing something not previously seen, is sadhana vikala, absent in the example because the light does not show an object without the rise of knowledge about the object. That is, when a pot, not previously seen due to darkness is made visible by the light, the knowledge of the pot is necessary to cognise it as such. Similarly indriyas are also not capable of showing the objects but only aid the knowledge that does it. For instance the light only helps the eye that helps the knowledge by removing the darkness that prevents perception. The removal of that alone which obscures, does not bring perception but it is only the showing of the object as such.

Brahman is jnAnamAthra, pure knowledge and cannot be the abode of avidhya. The ignorance of the shell in the shell-silver illusion does not reside in the shell but only in the perceiver. For the same reason the avidhya cannot conceal Brahman. And it cannot be removed by jnAna because it does not conceal Brahman. Only when the ignorance conceals the subject of knowledge as in the case of shell-silver, it could be sublated by that knowledge.

Brahman is not the knower as per advaita and hence it could not be the abode of avidhya which can exist only in the knower. Avidhya cannot cover brahman who is of the nature of knowledge as it can cover only an object that is seen and not the knowledge. Brahman is not the subject of knowledge either because He is not known or if Brahman can be covered by avidhya He ceases to be mere knowledge but becomes a known subject. Since avidhya does not conceals what can be known, as in shell-silver, it cannot be removed by knowledge. Lastly knowledge cannot destroy an existing thing like the positive avidhya. Further avidhya being thus not positive entity its definition needs not exclude its previous non-existence. Thus positive avidhya is not proved even by inference.

THERE IS NO AUTHORITY FOR A THING BEING PERCEIVED AS ANIRVACHNIYA

Advaitin explains anirvachniya as follows: When shell-silver is perceived as silver there is no
presence of silver even at the time of the perception in the shell. So what appears as silver is not real and as one thing cannot appear as another, it is neither ‘sat’ nor ‘asat’. Owing to the defect in the vision a new thing is created which is not there.

Ramanuja says that even then one thing appearing as another cannot be ruled out. It cannot be assumed that a new thing which is not seen before that moment has come into existence. The thing is not perceived as neither ‘sat’ or ‘asat’ but only as real silver. If it is perceived as anirvachaniya there will not be any misapprehension. It is to be accepted that it is shell-silver appeared in the form of real silver, that is, one thing is perceived as another thing.

Here it is relevant to examine the different theories on erroneous perception as in shell-silver. MADHyamika Buddhists are of the view that it is asatkhyAthi where nonexisting silver appears in the nonexisting shell.

YogAchara Buddhists hold the view that there is nothing but streams of perceptions where the silver in the shell is the result of past impression mixed up with the external object perceived and they call it AthmakhyAthi.

According to MimAmsakas the memory of silver existing elsewhere and the perception of shell as ‘this’ are two cognitions the difference between the two being not perceived and hence appears as one. They call it akhyAthi.

Nyayavaiseshikas uphold the theory of anyaTHaAkhyAthi according to which the object in front is seen as ‘this’ and the mind, not satisfied with the vagueness of perception, sees the silver in the shell due to the similarity of appearance.

NOW IN ALL THESE VIEWS, SAYS RAMANUJA, THE OBJECT (SILVER) IS SEEN AS EXISTING ONLY.

Before accepting the creation of an object which is inexplicable, anirvachaniya, the cause of the origination of a new substance should be stated, says Ramanuja. It could not be the perception because it is not possible to perceive a thing before it comes into existence. Nor can the sense organs be the cause as they generate only knowledge and not objects. Nor the defect in the sense organs can be the cause because they only affect the knowledge of the person and not create anything. The unreal avidhya also cannot create a thing.

When a unique thing is created why is it perceived as silver and not anything else like a pot. If similarity is the reason then the object will only be seen as being similar to silver and not as silver. If it is perceived as real silver it is only anyathAkhyAthi or one thing appearing as another and not anirvachaniya khyAthi. It cannot also be argued that it is the silver jati, genus which is present in both unique silver created and the real silver because if the jati that is seen is real it cannot exist in shell-silver and if unreal it cannot exist in the real silver. So all knowledge is real.

YATHArTHaKHYATHI

It is affirmed by the sruthi itself that all knowledge is real. Chandhogyya text begins with
‘bahusyAm prajEya’, (Chan. 6-2-3)

Brahman willed to become many and created the three elements, tejas, fire, Apah, water and annam, earth. Then it further says

‘thAsAm thrvrtam thevrthamekaikam karavaNi, (chan. 6-3-3)

Of them I will make each a compound of three elements. ’ Ramanuja says that this fact can be verified by perception. For instance the red colour of the fire is due to tejas, the white colour due to water and the black colour is due to earth. This has been shown by sruthi itself,

‘yadhgnE rOhitham rupam thejasah yacchuklam thadhapAm yathkrshnam thadhannasya, ‘

Further it is given that the the quality of fire vanishes from fire for, all modifications is but a name based upon words, only the three forms are real

‘apAgAdhagnEh agnithvam vacharambhaNam vikArah nAmadhEyam threeNi rupAneethyEva sathyam. ’ (Chan. 6-4-1)

The same is found in vishnupurana which describes creation as the products of prakrthi being unable to create the world until they combined with each other. The suthrakAra also substantiates this by the suthra

‘thryathmakathvAtthubhooyasthvAth’, (BS 3-1-2)

Because water consists of the three elements and because in the compound water predominates.

Thus it is shown by the sruthi itself that every object contains every other object that substance which contains a part of another substance only bears resemblance to the other. Hence the shell contains silver which is why it is similar and when there is defect in perception the silver part alone is seen and when the defect is removed the shell which is predominant is perceived. Hence all knowledge is real.

Ramanuja next examines the dream perceptions and says that they are created by Isvara Himself according to the past deeds of the individual. This is why dreams are different for different individuals. It is not the creation of jiva because in dreams there are perceptions never experienced or known to the individual.

Other examples given by advaitin to explain illusion are examined by Ramanuja to establish that all experiences are real.

The white conch seen as yellow by a jaundiced eye is similar to that of shell-silver in as much as the whiteness of the conch is predominant and hence perceived by others whereas the yellow colour which is the part of whiteness is differentiated by the jaundiced eye.

In the case of a crystal appearing as red due to the nearness of red flower because the natural colour of the crystal is overpowered by that of the flower.
In the perception of a mirage the water element present in the fire and earth is present and not the others due to the defect of the eye. In the firebrand being swirled the interval between the sparks are not seen due to the inability of the eye to grasp it because of the rapid motion.

The face seen in the mirror appears to be in it because the distance between the face and the mirror is not perceived.

Even the perception of two moons is real, says Ramanuja. The eye is not able to see the moon as present in one place due to defect and lack of coordination of both the eyes and each eye has a separate vision which is real as long as the defect lasts.

Therefore all knowledge is real only.

5. PRAMANA ANUPAPATTHI.
SCRIPTURES DO NOT PROVE AVIDHYA

Advaitin quotes the text ‘anrthena hi prthyoodAh, (chan. 8-3-2) these which are true are covered by what is untrue,’ to prove the existence of avidhya. But Ramanuja refutes the view that the word anrtha means what is unreal or undefinable, that is avidhya. He says that the word only denotes what is opposite of rtha which means such actions which are done to attain the supreme, without a desire for fruit. This is made clear by the text ‘rtham pibanthou sukrthasyalokE, two enjoyers of the inevitable results of work’, (katO. 1-3-1) and hence the opposite karma which results in samsara is anrtham,

‘rtham-karmaphalAbhisanDhirahithamparamapurusha aradhanavesham thathprapthiphalam; athra thadvythirthiktham samsarika phalam anrtham, brahmaprapthivirodhi’

This is the meaning of the chandogya text quoted, says Ramanuja, viz.

‘sarvAh prajAh aharahrgacchanthyah Etham brahmalokam na vindhanthi anrthEna hi prathyoodAh,

All these beings here, though they go daily into the world of brahman, (brahman in the form of the world) yet do not find Him, for they are carried away by the untrue’. (chan. 8-3-1)

The next text from Yajurveda

‘nAsadhAseeth no sadhAseeh’ (yajur. 2-8-9)

asath did not exist; sath did not exist, goes on to say that thamas existed and by thamas it (brahman) was concealed before and could not be well known. Advaitin takes the word thamas to mean avidhya which was neither sath nor asath but Ramanuja questions it saying that if this were accepted then the word ‘before ’ would be meaningless as Brahman is concealed even now. Moreover the neither expression neither sath existed nor asath could very well refer to Brahman also. So, says Ramanuja, the text actually describes the cosmic rest, apyaya. The word ‘before ’ means before creation when thamas is the state when the sath that is jiva and asath, the matter were in subtle condition and did not exist as such.

This is proved by another text

‘avyaktham akshare leeyathE; aksharam thamasi leeyathe, (subAla up. 2)
The unmanifest is dissolved in the immutable, akshara and the akshara dissolves in thamas. Hence the word thamas denotes ‘achithsamashtirupAyAh prakrtheh sukshmAavastha uchyathE’, the subtle matter in the form of prakrthi from which the world evolves.

The text

‘mAyAm thu prakrthim vdhyAth mAyinam thu mahesvaram,’ (svet. 4-10)
does not refer to anirvachniya avidhya but the prakrthi is referred to as mAya from which this wonderful world has come out. The owner of mAya is isvara who controls it but is not under its influence. this is evident from the previous sentence of the sametext ‘asmAnmAyw prajathE visvamEthath, from this the owner of mAya creates this world.

It is the jiva who is bound by mAya as proved by the text

‘anAdhi mAya supthah yadhA jivah prabudhyathE, (MAnd. 11-29)
When the jiva who sleeps due to beginningless mAya wakes up. The Lord Himself says in the Gita ‘mama mAya dhurathyayA’, my mAya is difficult to transcend. Thus there is no support for the anirvachneeya avidhya from the sruthi texts nor for its being a positive entity.

The text ‘thathvamasi ’ is explained by the advaitin to mean the identity of the jiva with Brahman and due to the incongruity between the two, namely, the limited knowledge and power of a jiva, who is in bondage as compared with the infinite, omniscient and omnipresent and omnipotent Brahman, it is necessary to postulate the existence of avidhya which conceals Brahman so that the identity is not seen. Ramanuja refutes this and says

‘aikya upadesasthu “thvam” sabdEnApi jivasarirakasya bramaNa Eva abhiDHAnAth uppannthara.’
The expression of identity between jiva and Brahman suffers no inconsistency because the word ‘thou’ also implies Brahman only who is the inner controller of the jiva being the inner self of the jiva who forms the saria of Brahman. This is denoted by the text

‘anEna jivena AthmanA anupravisya namarupe vyakaravani’, (can. 6-3-2)
I will enter this jiva as its Athma and make name and form.

Advaitin cites passages from VishnupuraNa which claim that Brahman alone is the reality and the world is only empirically real.

But Ramanuja says that the real import of the passage is that in the world made up of sentient and insentient beings, the jivas are not affected by the changes in the insentient and they are eternal and hence they are termed as existent while the insentient which is different and destructible are said to be nonexistent. But both have Vasudeva as their inner self. It is shown to be thus in the passage

‘thAnisarvANi thdvapuh; thatsarvam vai harervapuh,; (VP. 1-22-86-38)
all that is His sarira, ’ and by the words

‘sa Eva sarvabhoothAthmA visvarupO yathO avyayah, (VP1-2-69)
He alone is the Self of all beings, with cosmic for and immutable.’

In all the passages in the VishnupurANa, says Ramanuja, there is no evidence of Brahman being nirvisesha or for the avidhya which is neither aSath nor asath abiding in Brahman. The terms nAsthi and asathya indicate nonexistence but not anirvachniya. These two words denote sentient objects not because they are nonexistent, tuccha or unreal, mithya but only because they are perishable.

To sum up, Athma is adhimadhyAntahrahitha, without beginning, middle and end and always of the same nature and hence it is referred to as existent. The sentient, achethanam is the object of enjoyment for the jiva and is transformed according to the karma of the jiva and perishable. Therefore it is termed as nonexistent. The objects which are existent or nonexistent with reference to time, place or action are aparamArTHa, unreal and the Athma alone is fit to be cognised as asthi, existent and hence paramArTHa, real. The same view is expressed in vishnupurANa by MaittrEya-

‘VishNvADHaram yaTha chaithath thrailoOkyam samavasTHinam; paramArTHascha me prOktho yaTHAjnAna praDHAnathah,
You have taught me how these worlds are supported by vishNu and how Athma, jnana as his svarupa is paramArTha, real, being important.’

6. NIVARTHAKA ANUPAPATTHI
Ramanuja says

‘ThathvamasyAdhi vAkyEshu sAmAnAdhi karaNyam na nirvisesha vasthvaiykaparam’

The texts like ‘that thou art’ do not denote attributeless Brahman. As already pointed out by Ramanuja in explaining the principle of sAmAnAdhirakaNya referring to the purport of the vedic text ‘satyam jnAnam anantham brahma,’ there is no need of dismissing the attributes in explaining the identity. According to him the words ‘that’ and ‘thou’ both denote Brahman only that too as savisesha. The contention that the removal of avidhya is effected by the knowledge of Brahman as nirvisesha is not tenable.

Advaitin cites the statement ‘sOayam devadatthah, this is that Devadattha’, to prove his point that the primary meaning of the terms cannot be taken as the person qualified by different time and place is being spoken of as one. So the identity will be established only if the reference to time and place are given up. So too as ‘that’ denotes Brahman who is infinite and attributeless and ‘thou’ refers to jiva who is finite with limited knowledge and power the identity can be established only by not considering the limitations of the jiva and the infinite nature etc. of Brahman in which case both will be identical in essence. This can be accomplished only by the removal of avidhya through the real knowledge of the Brahman as attributeless which serves as the nivarthaka of avidhya.
Ramanuja refutes this saying

‘thatthpadham hi sarvajnam sathyasankalpam jajagathkArNam brahma parAmrsathi;
thdhaikshatha bahusyAm ithi thasyaivapracrthathvAth,’

the word ‘that’ in ‘that thou art’ refers only to Brahman omniscient and omnipotent, who is the cause of te world as denoted by the sentence ‘it willed to become many’.

Even in the example ‘sO ayam devadatthah’ there is no necessity for adopting secondary meaning, lakshaNA of the words because the person connected with the past and the present times is one only. If the word ‘that’ is taken to mean pure attributeless Brahman then it will conflict with the sentence ‘it willed to become many and the promissory statement EkavijnAnEna sarvavijnAnam, by knowing the one, everything becomes known. Hence the word ‘that’ denotes Brahman who is savisesha and the word ‘thou’ refers to the Brahman who is the real self of the jiva which alone is meant by ‘that thou art’.

Ramanuja further proceeds to show that there is no sublation here as in the case of shell-silver. The word ‘that’ does not bring up any attribute that sublates the first perception of ‘thou’ as in the case of shell-silver as according to advaita Brahman is attributeless. What is meant here is this. When the shell is seen as silver the attribute of silver, that is silverness, is seen in the shell which is sublated when the shell becomes known as such due to the perception of the attribute shellness. In the explanation of ‘thatthvamasi’ by the advaitin there can be no attribute of Brahman which becomes known to cause the sublation of the perception of the jiva as such, because Brahman is said to be attributeless.

Advaitin may contend that it is not necessary to perceive some attribute in the substantive entity in order to remove the first erroneous impression. It is enough to show that svarupa, the real nature of the substance is hidden from view by some defect, comes to view when the defect is removed.

Ramanuja says that if svarupa of Brahman is concealed, there can be no misapprehension and if not concealed there is no need for removal of misconception. Unless an attribute which is real and hidden is admitted there can be no sublation. Ramanuja explains this by the analogy of a prince, getting lost while very young, did not know his identity on account of being brought up by hunters. His misconception will not be removed by merely stating that he is not a hunter but only buy the knowledge that he is a prince.

Ramanuja interprets the text ‘thatthvamasi,’ in such a manner that both the words ‘thath’ and ‘thvam’ retain their primary meaning and need no recourse to lakshanA, secondary meaning, as the advatin claims. The sAmAnAdhikaraNya, apposition, is achieved by the two words meaning the same Brahman, qualified with two attributes, namely, possessing infinite number of auspicious attributes and being the cause of the world on one hand and being the indwelling Self of all on the other. This explanation is consistent with the beginning of the passage ‘it willed to become many,’ and also the promissory statement of ‘EkavijnANena sarvavijnAnAm,’ as the gross world consisting of sentient and insentient beings, which form His body in their subtle state, is the effect of Brahman, being ensouled by Him. This is brought up by the previous sentence to ‘thatthvamasi’ that all this is ensouled by Brahman. ‘EthadhAthmyam
idham sarvam’. The reason for this is stated in ‘sanmoolAhsoumya imAh sarvAhprajAh sadhAyathnAh sathprathishTAh, all these beings have their root in sath, rest in sath and dissolved in Sath. ‘(chan. 6-8-4)

Ramanuja quoting other texts also to show that Brahman is the Self of all the sentient and the insentient and the identity of Brahman with jiva is established through the sarirAthma bhAva, the body-soul relationship.

1. ‘anthafpravishtah sasthA janAnAm sarvAthmA, ‘(Taitt. AraNyaka. 3-11-21)
The inner Self is the controller of all.

2. ‘Yah Athmani thishTanAthmanah antharah yam AthmA na vedha yasya AthmA sariram ya AthmAnam antharO yamayathi sa tha AthmA anthryAmyamrthah, (Brhd. 5-7-4)
He, the immortal, inner ruler, is the inner Self, situated inside the AthmA whom AthmA did not
know and who controls the Athma from within to whom the AthmA is the sarira.’

3. ‘anEna jeevena AthmA anupravisya nAmarupe vyakaravANi, (CHAN. 6-3-2)
I will enter into the jiva as its inner self and will make nama and rupa. ‘

Therefore, says Ramanuja, the identity of all beings, sentient and insentient with Brahman can be established only through the sarira sariri bhAva. And as all that is other than Brahman is His sarira the denotation of everything terminates only in Brahman.

‘athahchidhachidhAthmakasya sarvasya vasthujathasya brahmathAdhAthmyam Athma
sarirabhAvAdhEva iti avagamyathE; thasmAth brahmavyathirikthasya krtsnasya
thaccharirathvEnaiva vasthuthvath thasya prathipAdhaKOpi sabdah thathparyanthyM Eva
svArTHam abhidhaDHathi. ‘

Ramanuja refutes likewise the theory of bhEdhAbhEdha and kevalabhEdha saying that the texts stating the doctrine of universal identity cannot be explained by their theories. According to bhEdhAbhEdha either the difference is due to limiting adjuncts (Bhaskaramatha) or belongs to Brahman who himself assumes the state of jiva, (yadhavaprakAsamatha) Brahman being the self of everything will be contaminated by the imperfections of the world and jiva. The kevalabhEdhavAdhins those who claim absolute difference between the jiva and Brahman (could either mean nyAyavaisEshikas or dvaitins) the texts that proclaim identity have to be abandoned.

Ramanuja proclaims:

‘nikhilOpanishadhprasiddham krthsnasya brahma sarirabhAvam AthishTamAnaih krthsnasya
brahmAthmabhAvOpadhEsAh sarvE samyak upapAdhithA bhavanthi.’

That is, by those who accept the sarira-sariri bhava between all beings and Brahman the texts that speak of identity are well explainable because this concept is known through all the upanishads.

To the objection that jathi and qualities can be the attributes of substances but a substance cannot be the attribute of another substance, Ramanuja answers that it is quite proper as in the sentence ‘gourasvo manushyo devO jathah purushah karmabih, the purusha (athman) is born as a cow, as a horse, as a man as a deva according to his karma. The words in apposition (sAmAnAdhikaraNya) all qualify one entity, namely the purusha.

It cannot be said that only the words denoting jati or guNa as in the expressions ‘khando gouh, shuklapatatah, broken- horned cow, white cloth, can be put in apposition and the words denoting substances should have termination of possession (mathvarTHEeyaprathyayah) as in dhandee, one with staff, kundali, one who is wearing eardrops etc. The words dhandha and kundala are capable of existing independently and hence used in the possessive sense. But this condition is not necessary when the substances that qualify are unable to exist separately to be perceived separately.

Advaitin objects to this saying that while the jati and guna are perceived along with the
substance which qualifies the Athma is not so.

Ramanuja says:

‘NaithdhEvam; manushyAdhi sarirANAm api AthmaikAsraYthvam,
thdhEkaprayojanathvam, thathprakArathvam cha jAthyAdhi thulyam.’

The bodies of all beings have only Athma as their substratum; they exist only for the use of the Athma, and exist as its aspects. This is proved by the fact that they do not have a separate existence apart from the Athma, they enable the Atma to have experience the karmaphala as karma can be exhausted only through embodiment and they become qualifying epithets of the Atma as in the expression man, cow etc.

The Atma is not perceived because it is atheendriya. Even in sense perception what is perceived by the eye is not cognised by the other indriyas. Since Athma is not cognied by the indriyas it is not perceived along with the body. As the word cow not only shows the jati but also the individual entity with all its characteristics, the words like man denote the Athma in their ultimate connotation which further extended denotes Brahman who is the Self of the self.

Ramanuja has made this clear in VedhArTha sangraha thus: Brahman in the causal state has the sentient and the insentient in their subtle state as its body and the same Brahman having the beings sentient and insentient as its body in their gross manifestation is the effect.

‘thasmath isvaraprAkArabhoothasarbAvasTHapprakrthipurushavAcinah sadbhAh thathprakAra visishtathaya avastithe paramAthmani mukhyathayA varthanthe, jivAthyAchi
devamanushyadhi sabdhavath.’

That is, the terms denoting prakrthi and purusha are the aspects of Brahman and denote only Brahman in their primary sense as in the case of the words, manushya deva etc. which have connotation in the Athma only. This is the only sense of identity implied by the sarirathmabhAva.

7. NIVRTTHYANUPAPATTHI

The view of the advaitin that the avidhya can be removed only through the knowledge of identity is refuted by Ramanuja, who says,

‘brahmathmaikathvavijnAnEna avidhya nivrtthih yuktha ithi thadayuktham, banDHasya pAramArTikathvena jnAAnanivarthyathva abhAvAth.’

That is, the bondage being not illusory but real it cannot be removed by mere knowledge. Ramanuja explains bondage as:

‘PuNyApuNyarupakarmanimmitthadevAdhisarirapravEsa-thathprayuktha sukhaduhkh-
anubhavarupah banDHah,’

the experience of pleasure and pain by entering into the bodies of deva etc. according to the result of meritorious and sinful actions. This cannot be illusory and can be removed only through the grace of the Lord by means of devotional worship. This can be destroyed only by
the knowledge of brahman as the inner self and controller and not of identity with brahman. Moreover, says Ramanuja, the knowledge that is said to remove avidhya is also unreal as everything except brahman is miTHyA for advaItin and hence another knowledge that removes this one should be sought. This second knowledge also being miTHyA it will lead to ad-infatrum, anavasTHA. If the removing knowledge is said to perish after removing avidhya cannot be accepted. This knowledge which removes everything that is not brahman is said to be mere cit, consciousness. If so, Ramanuja asks, who is the knower? It cannot be the ’I’ the object of avidhya which is removed with the avidhya. It cannot be brahman either, since brahman is not a knower but pure consciousness according to advaIta. If the knower and the knowledge is said to disappear along with the rest, being other than brahman, it is absurd, says Ramanuja, like one cutting down everything other than the ground, which includes cutting down himself and the act of cutting down itself.

‘bhoothalavyathiriktham krthsnam devadatthEna cchinnam’ ithyasyAm Eva chedhanakriyAyam cchetthuh asyAh cchedhanakriyAyAscha chEdhyAnupravesanavachanavath upahAsyam.

Ramanuja concludes the mahasiddhantha by saying

‘thasmAth anAdhikarmapravAharupAjnAnamoolathvAth banDhasya thannibarhaNam ukthalakshaNajnAnAdhEva.’

That is, as bondage is due to the result of beginningless flow of karma, its removal can be only through the knowledge that brahman is the inner Self and ruler different from souls and matter. this knowledge can arise only through the grace of the Lord, by following the varnasrama dharma and duties enjoined in the veda, not desiring result but as an offering to the Lord which culminates in intense devotion and meditation leading to moksha. As this requires the knowledge of vedas the study of the purvamimAmsa is the prerequisite to the study of vedantha.

JIJNASADHIKARANA CONTINUED- OBJECTION BY MIMAMSAKAA

The mimamsakas are of the opinion that the significance of the words is only through their connection with action. They cite the example of vrddhavyavahara, the use by elders, where a sentence spoken by an elder or experienced person such as ’gAm Anaya, bring the cow,’ and an inexperienced or younger person understands the meaning of the words by seeing a cow being brought up. Hence they say that the sruthi texts have meaning only through action and as study of brahman does not result in action it need not be taken up.

The vedantin may mention the sentence ’a son is born’ which does not result in action but produces result, namely joy and hence meaningful, but the mimAmsaka objects, saying that even in such cases due to the reference to sukhaprasava etc. resulting in action like brightening of face etc they cannot be the exception. Therefore the purport of word should denote action and not an existing thing. Since the Vedanta texts have reference to brahman which is an established thing they cannot be authoritative. Ramanuja refutes the view that the meaning of the words must be grasped only in connection with action. The meaning can be made clear even otherwise. The children understand the meaning of words father, uncle etc. and also other
things when indicated by the forefinger pronouncing the words.

Ramanuja cites another example also. Suppose a man tells another by gestures to inform Devadattha that his father is alright. When it is conveyed to Devadattha by words, a person who has been a witness to all the happenings understands the words spoken to be the meaning of the gestures. Even assuming that the vedantha texts relate only to established entity the inquiry into brahman must be taken up, says Ramanuja. The action of meditation is enjoined by the sruthi texts like

'\textit{AthmA vA arE drahstavyah srothavyah manthavyah nidhiDHYasithavah, (Brhd.2-4-5)},
the Self has to be seen, heard, thought of and meditated upon.'

'sO anvEshtavyah vijinAsithavyah,' chan.8-7-1)

it has to be sought after and understood.(As an action must have a result, vedantic passages have texts which can be termed as arTHa vadha, laudatory, such as

'\textit{brahmavidhApnothi param,' (Taitt.2-1) }

One who knows Brahman attains the highest.

These types of texts are found in purvamimAmsa also in relation to vedic injunctions. The text that enjoins horse sacrifice for instance for the one who desires to go to heaven does not describe the nature of heaven which is known only through other texts describing it as a place free from grief. Hence even the texts referring to an established entity are purposeful. Mimamsaka hold the view that meaning of words lies in what ought to be done, says Ramanuja, 'krthibhavabhAvi krthyuddhesyam hi bhavathah kAryam'

In which case they have to define what is krthyuddesym, what ought to be done and if it is krthikarmathvam, what is desired to be achieved by the action. But what ought to be done need not be agreeable always unless it achieves the fulfillment of some desire conducive to pleasure as in the injunction \textit{\'jyothishtomena svargakamo yajetha}, one desirous of heaven should perform jyothishtoma sacrifice. Neither is the obligatory work can be termed as seshi to which other things are subsidiary. But Ramanuja says that a work done as an injunction,that is, what ought to be done does not qualify to be a seshi. The real sesha- seshi bhava is when an entity acting through a desire to serve another. Finally the words of injunction also present their meaning only in connection with other words such as the devathas like agni through which the indweller of all the parampurusha is being propitiated. Therefore, says Ramanuja,

kEva\textit{lAnAm karmaNAm alpa asthiraphalathvA\textit{th}}, brahmaji\textit{nAnasyacha anantha sthiraphalathvath thannirNayaphalah brahmavichara Arambhahuktha ithi s\textit{THitham},

considering the meager transitory nature of the results of karam and the infinite and everlasting fruit of brahmajnana the inquiry into Brahman has to be pursued.

\textit{Thus ends the jijnasADHikaraNa of sribhashya.}
'Yathah' from whom, means Brahma, sarvesvara, who is nikhila hEya prathyanika svarupa, whose nature is free from all impurities (that are found in the universe), satyasankalpa, of infallible will, jnAnAdhyanEka kalyANa guna, who possesses infinite auspicious qualities such as jnAna, who is omniscient, omnipotent and the Supreme Purusha. The word 'Adhi' in 'janmadhi' includes janma, srshti (creation), stithi (sustenance) and pralayam. (annihilation) and 'asya', of this, means this wonderful variegated universe of beings starting from the four-faced creator, Brahma till the common blade of grass, ordained to experience the fruit of their respective karmas. This is how Ramanuja explains the suthra.

The basis of this interpretation is the sruthi text

'yathO vA imAni bhoothani jayanthe, yena jAthAni jeevanthi, yathprayanthyabhisanvisanthi, thathvijijnAsasva thath brahma.'(taitt.brg.1)

This means, from whom all these beings originate, by whom they are sustained and into whom they merge back at the time of pralaya, know that to be Brahman.

Here an objection is encountered by Ramanuja that the word janmAdhi denoting the creation etc. does not define Brahman. The arguments given to substantiate this are:

1. More than one attributes may denote more than one entity. The example shown by the siddhanthin, namely, 'syamo yuva lohithAksh ah devadatthah', Devadattha is young, dark and red-eyed, is not applicable because the person is seen to be one by the valid means of knowledge, perception. Here there is only scripture that says so but no other direct means of knowledge. It cannot be said that since the word Brahman denotes one entity only the attributes also denote the same entity because a person who has never seen a cow, on hearing, the cow is that which is 'khanda munda purNa sringah gouh,' broken -horned, hornless or fully horned, understands it to denote different entities.

2. neither the characteristics can be upalakshana, by implication as in the case where a field is pointed out to be that of Devadattha, saying 'the field where the crane sits belongs to Devadattha', yathra ayam sarasah sa devadattha kedarah, because such characteristics, different from the object are used to denote only the entity already known through other source. if it is said that to the Brahman already denoted by the text

'sathyam jnAnam anantham'

These characteristics could be the upalakshana because both are characteristics only and the same objection holds good for both. Therefore Brahman cannot be defined at all.

Ramanuja counters this objection thus:

Brahman is already known through the etymological meaning of the word brhat meaning great or big, since there is none greater or bigger than Brahman the word denotes Brahman only in its ultimate sense. To such Brahman, known already, the origination etc are cited as the characteristics and hence there is no contradiction of their being upalakshaNa. Moreover the
Brahman is described as the material an efficient cause of the world by the Chandogya text,
'sadhEva soumyaidham agra Aseeth-----'
Where 'sadeva Aseeth' denotes the material causation, 'adhvitheeyam ' implies efficient causation by dismissing the existence of any other agent, and 'it willed to become many and created fire' ascribes the creation to Brahman only, who is mentioned as 'sath.thath ' etc. The characteristics denote different entities only when there is conflict in their meaning as in the case of 'khanda, munda, poorNasringa gouh.' In this context there is no conflict in the characteristics of being creator, sustainer and annihilator attributed to Brahman due to the difference in time of the respective functions.

Ramanuja clinches the argument by saying

'yathO vA imAni bhoothAni jAyanthe' ithyAdhi kAraNa vAkyeEna prathipannasya jagrajannAdhi kAranasya brahmanah sakalaitharavyAvrtthamam svarupam abhiDHeeyathe-sathyam jnAnam anantham brahma iti.'

That is, while the Brahman is defined as that, from which all these beings are born etc., by the words 'existence, knowledge and infinity, the svarupa, nature of Brahman, is described as being other than the world of sentient and insentient, the latter being subject to changes and the former on account of the association with it. The released souls are also excluded because of their limited knowledge that existed while in bondage. In the statement 'sathyam jnanam anantham brahma,' the word jnAna denotes the eternal, complete knowledge of Brahman, the word sathya is to show that Brahman is the absolute unconditional existence and the word anantha refers to the characteristic of not being limited by time, place or entity, 'dEsakAla vasthu paricchEdha rahithathvam.' Hence the three words that show the nature of Brahman are the svarupanirupaka dharmas, inseparable attributes of Brahman. Defining the nature of Brahman. So the objection that Brahman cannot be defined is refuted by Ramanuja.

SUTHRA-3-SASTHRAYONITHVATH: OF WHOM THE SCRIPTURES ARE THE SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE

sAsthryOnih=sAsthram yasya yOnih;kAraNam pramAnam; of whom the scriptures are the source of knowledge

'Thasya bhAvah sAsthrayonothvam. thasmAth=sAsthrayonithvAth, therefore scripture is the proof of Brahman.

The scriptures being the source of right knowledge of Brahman the scriptural text 'yathO vA imAni bhoothAni jAyanthE' is the proof of Brahman.

Ramanuja considers the objection that scripture is not the only source of knowledge of Brahman as there are other means of knowledge through which Brahman can be known.

Ramanuja asks 'kim tharhi thava pramANam?' What exactly is the proof of Brahman other than the sasthra?

It cannot be prathyaksha, perception, which can only be of two kinds, namely, sense perception
or perception through yogic powers. Sense perception through sense organs is not possible in this case. Even mental perception like sukha and duhkha is possible only from the experience through sense-contact. Yogic prathyaksha also happens only about things experienced already. Inference is also out of question, says Ramanuja, due to the absence of sign, linga, which is necessary for creating inferential knowledge.

Inference can arise in two ways, namely, viseEshathOdhrshta and samanyathOdhrshta. When the fire is inferred in a hill through the perception of smoke coming out, the smoke is the linga, sign by which inference arises considering the vyApthi, the invariable concomitance between fire and smoke. This kind of inference is visEshathOdhrshtam.

SAmAnyathodhrshtam is the inference based on general observation as in the inference of the fragrance of the sandalwood seen afar. The former kind of inference is not possible with reference to Brahman because it is a subject incomprehensible by the indriyas. The second kind is also eliminated due to the absence of any sign that indicates vyapthi, invariable concomitance.

The opponent, possibly Naiyayika, the logician, gives two reasons for inferring that the world must have a sentient being as its creator.

First is that anything which is an effect is seen to have a maker who has the knowledge of the material cause, instrumental cause and the use to which it is put to and the user. The example of this is things like pot, the maker, namely the potter has the knowledge of mud, the material cause and potter’s wheel, the efficient cause and the practical utility of the pot etc.

Secondly all the insentient products are dependent on and ruled by a sentient being. This is illustrated by the example of a healthy body which is dependent on the sentient soul. As in seeing the sprout we infer the presence of the seed, which is not perceivable, seeing this world we can infer its creator, namely Brahman.

Ramanuja refutes this. He asks, ‘what is meant by EkachEthanADHeenathvam, dependence on one sentient being?’ The example quoted, namely, that of a healthy body being dependent on sentient soul is sADhya vikala, fails to prove the point because the origination of the body and sustenance of it does not depend on the sentient soul only but it on the karmaphala of the individual self and of the wife, parents etc. Moreover the world consists of inanimate things like mountains etc which are included in the effects which are not seen to be dependent on a sentient entity.

The argument that the agency of the world cannot belong to any mortal being on account of their limited intelligence etc. also cannot be proved. It is not necessary that the agent of creation like that of a pot should have full knowledge of the causes and their potency, uses of the product etc. It is enough if the potter knows that he can create a pot from the mud and with the help of the potter’s wheel without being knowledgeable about the power and potency of the materials and instruments of creation. In the case of sacrifices productive of results the doer of sacrifice need not know the unseen power, apurva, which arises out of the sacrifice producing the result but it is enough if he knows as to what will be the result of the sacrifice. So the lack of
complete knowledge about the creation does not preclude an agent other than Brahman and therefore the knowledge of Brahman can be proved only through scriptures.

The opponent now comes up with an argument that the world is an effect because it consists of things made up of parts. 'sAvayathvAdhEva jAgathah kAryathvam.' Whatever is made up of parts and capable of action and has form, is an effect which presupposes a sentient agent. Hence an omniscient and omnipotent principle, that is, Brahman can be inferred from the effect, the world. From the nature of the effect the knowledge and power of the cause is inferred. On seeing the products like pots or even big palaces the power and knowledge of the maker is inferred. Similarly since pleasure and pain are effects and insentient, an intelligent cause can be inferred which cannot be the individual soul but should have to be one who is the dispenser of the results of merits and sins. Moreover the individual souls lack the subtle knowledge necessary for the construction of the world.

The opponent here presupposes the objection (possibly from the advaitin) that since all the agents of creation are seemed to possess bodies it is inappropriate to ascribe agency to Brahman who is said to have no form. He cites the instance of effects of demonical spirits on the bodies and of poison being counteracted by will. So by mere sankalpa Brahman creates the world. It cannot be argued that will or mental power can only exist in the embodiment because when the soul leaves the body the mind and other faculties are found in tact and till they enter another body.

So the conclusion is that since the individual souls with their limited knowledge and power are incalculable to produce this wonderful and variegated world of sentient and insentient beings the inference points out to a omniscient, omnipotent supreme being who, though without form, creates this world through his will. Hence scripture is not the sole proof of Brahman.

Ramanuja replies-

'YathokthalakshaNam brahma janmAdhivAkyam
bhOdhayathyEva; kuthah; sAsthraikapramANathvAth brahmaNah.'

Brahman is as described in the vedantha vaky 'yatho va imAni bhoothAni jAyanthe----' ascribing the creation, sustenance and annihilation to Brahman because scripture is the only pramAna of Brahman. The argument that the world being an effect must have an intelligent agent as its creator only points out to such an agent but not Brahman. Moreover no evidence can be shown through inference that the world was produced in one whole or at one time to infer one neither creator nor the things in the world are of uniform nature like pots but have different characteristics. Nor it can be assumed that individual souls are incapable of such powers, which can be attained by them through exceptional austerities and merit. (That is, it cannot be proved through inference.) Perception shows that the things produced in succession, that is, not at the same time, have different causes.

Ramanuja asks the opponent who tries to prove Isvara as the creator through inference,
Whether Isvara creates the world possessing a body or without a body. Saying that He acts without a body is not acceptable as even mental activities require a sarira to work through. It cannot be argued that the mind is eternal because there is no activity on its part can be seen in the state of disembodiment or release. If Isvara works having a body, it should either be eternal, in which case its product, the world is also eternal, and there is no need for Isvara, or creation. The sarira of Isvara cannot be non-eternal since there will be a contingency to cite another cause for the body of Isvara which in turn requires another thus ending up in infinite regress. If Isvara works without a body and creates through His will, there could be no examples cited to prove the validity of the inference as all the effects such as pot are not created by will.

So, says Ramanuja,

'athah dharsanAnuguNyEna isvarAnumAnam
dharsanAnuguNya parAhatham ithi sAsthraikapramAnah
parabrahmabhoothahsavrEsvarapurushoththamah'

Therefore it is to be concluded that based on observation the inference is refuted and the sastra alone is the pramAna for the existence of the supreme Brahman,Lord of all and the supreme self. The scripture speaks of the supreme being who is different from all the rest known through other means of knowledge, who possesses infinite auspicious qualities such as omniscience, infallible will etc. and who is devoid of all imperfections.

Ramanuja concludes by saying

'athah prmAnanthara agocharathvena sAsthrai vishayathvAth,- yathO vA imani bhoothAni
ithyAdhi vAkyam- ukthalakshaNam brahma prathipAdhayathi ithi siddham'.

Since Brahman cannot be proved by any other means of knowledge and scripture being the only source, the texts such as 'from whom all this originate' etc. give authoritative knowledge of Brahman.

The next suthra takes up the question whether scriptures are authoritative regarding Brahman as it is siddha vasthu, already established entity, and does not have any activity or cessation of it as its purport.

SamanvayADHikaraNam

Suthra-4 Thatthu samanvayAth

Thatth thu- but that (the scriptures alone are the pramAna for establishing Brahman) is samanvayAth because it is the main purport (of the sruthi.)

The aim of the vedas is the paramapurushArTha, the final goal of life which is the attainment of release, moksha. Since the subject of the upanishads is Brahman, the knowledge of which
leads one to Moksha, Brahman is connected with the parampurushArTHa through the vedas. Therefore Brahman is known only through the vedas being its main purport.

Brahman is understood by the texts like 'yathO vA imAniboothAni jAyanthe' from whom all the beings emerge and 'sadhEva sowmya idhamagraAseeth,' sath alone was in the beginning and 'thadhaikshathaB bahusyAm prajAyEya,' it willed to become many, and the like, to be the origin of everything and defined as 'sathyam jnAnamanantham brahma,' Brahman is existence, knowledge and infinity, denoting the Supreme Being as the one possessed of infinite auspicious attributes and devoid of all imperfections. The validity of the texts about Brahman as above cannot be questioned on the basis of their not being connected with activity or the cessation of it. There can be no denial of validity in the case of statements like 'your son is born', or 'this is not a serpent' because there also is some activity like the joy or fear respectively.

The opponent here is the mimAmsaka, according to whom sruthi texts that do not deal with some activity, initiating or prohibiting, are not valid. Hence the texts about Brahman are not authoritative. The opponent argues that perception and other pramANas can deal with things already established but sruthi texts must always be purposeful like 'svargakAmO yajEtha,' one who desires heaven should perform sacrifice, which is an injunction or 'na kalanjam bhakshayeth,' one should not eat garlic etc. Even in daily life we only hear sentences such as 'arTArthee rAjakulam vrajEth', 'one who needs wealth should go to the king,' etc., which indicate some activity or like "mandhAgnirnA mbu pibEth," one with weak digestion should not drink water, which prohibits activity.

The opponent, mimAmsaka, asks whether in the case of statements like 'a son is born to you, or this is not a serpent' the joy or removal of fear occurs by the event itself or the knowledge of the fact conveyed through the sentence. If it is said that the action of joy etc. Cannot happen unless there is the knowledge about it, then by the mere knowledge of a thing even without its existence can produce an effect. So scripture too need not refer to things actually existing and hence need not be the valid means of knowledge unless it refers to action injunctive or prohibitive. Therefore vedanta texts cannot be taken as the authoritative proof of Brahman.

Next the purvapakshin, the mimAmsaka, considers the view of the advaitin who says that vedantavakyas are valid even in the sense of denoting an injunction. Brahman who is perceived as being connected with the world through avidhya has to be freed from the illusion and this is the injunction which is denoted by the sruthi texts which have the knowledge of Brahman as their purport. They quote the texts such as 'na dhrshtEh dhrshtAram pasyEh;na mathErmAthAram manveeThAh', you cannot see the seer of sight, you cannot think the thinker of thought,' meaning that Brahman is the pure perception and pure knowledge.

MimAmsaka asks the advaitin to specify the qualification of the person to whom the injunction is addressed. For instance it is said that agnIhothra should be performed as long as one lives where the life of the person to whom it refers to is the qualification. But in the case of Brahman -knowledge it can only be directed to a person who already has the perception of the real nature of Brahman in order to negate the world. Again Brahman cannot be a phala, fruit of action like
heaven in which case it would become transient. Moreover Brahman cannot be the object of the injunction since it is not a kriya.

Another argument forwarded by some (called dhyAnanyogAvAdin) who say that vedanta passages are nevertheless authoritative as they enjoin dhyAna, meditation as shown by the texts such as 'nidhiDH aAthmA vA are dhrashtavyah srOthavyah manthavyah nidhiDHyA sithavyah, (Brhd.2-4-5) the self is to be seen, heard, thought of and contemplated,' and 'AthmAithyEva upAseetha, (Brhd.1-4-7) Let one meditate upon himself as the Self.' The passages such as

'sathyam jnAnam anantham brahma, sadeva soumya idham agra AseethekamEva adhvitheeyam

define the nature of Brahman in answer to the question "What is the nature of the Self to be meditated?"

But this is objected by the mAyAvadin (advaita) who says that Brahman cannot be realized through injunctions on meditation but only through knowledge gained by texts such as 'thathvamasi,thou art that.' But the former argues that mere knowledge cannot secure release as by merely being told that this is not a snake will not dispel the fear until one actually sees the rope. If the avidhya comes to an end by mere knowledge from vedic texts then the injunctions on sravana manana and nidhiDhyAsana become meaningless. Therefore bondage can only be terminated through the injunctions on meditation which results in direct intuitive knowledge of Brahman.

VedAntha vakyas enjoining meditation lead to the knowledge of Brahman as one only without a second and of the nature of existence, knowledge and bliss, sacchidhAnadham, speak of the unity while the karma portion of the vedas relate to the difference. As difference and no difference are mutually exclusive, Brahman is proved only by the vedantha vAkyAs that contain injunction on meditation as a means of securing the knowledge.

Now mimamsaka refutes all this by saying

'dhyAnavidhi seshathvE api vEdhAntha vAkyanAm arThasathyathve prAmANya ayOgAth.'

That is, it should be made clear whether the texts that refer to Brahman do so in connection with the injunctive texts or independently. If it is the first, they become a part of the injunctive texts and will not be authoritative with respect to Brahman. If they do so independently they cannot be authoritative since they are devoid of any reference to action.

It cannot be said that the dhyana involving continuous remembrance requires an object of meditation which is given by texts like

‘idham sarvam yadhayam Athma, sathyam jnAnam anantham brahma''

all this is that Self and Brahman is existence knowledge and bliss,' and hence these texts are connected with injunctive texts, to form one whole and hence they are referring to existing thing because meditative texts are found to deal with unreal things also as 'nAma brahma ithyupAseetha, meditate on the name as Brahman. Hence, concludes mimAmsaka, the
scripture is not the valid authority on Brahman.

Ramanuja meets the arguments of the mimAmsaka by saying, 'thatthu samanvayAth, but that because it is the main purport,' is the reply of suthrakara to the view of mimAmsaka that the texts on Brahman are not authoritative because they do not deal with injunction or prohibition relating to activity. The word 'thu' meaning 'but' refutes the view of the opponent. Ramanuja derives the word samanvaya as samyak anva ya, well connected. VedAntha texts denote Brahman as the highest purushArTha, the ultimate goal of man, the infinite bliss free from all imperfections. To say that they are without purpose because they do not denote any activity is, says Ramanuja, is absurd like the statement denying any purpose to a descendent of royal family because he does not belong to the family of low-born.

All beings from devas down to a blade of grass, empowered with beginning less avidhya in the form of karma, are ignorant of the true reality and get involved in different kinds of activities and enjoyment. The purpose of the vedantha texts is to impart knowledge to them about the highest purushArTha, Brahman, with whom in the state of release they merge and, who imparts infinite bliss to them by His infinitive auspicious qualities.

On enquiring as to how this knowledge is brought about, the texts like 'brahmavid ApnOthi param, the knower of Brahman attains the Supreme,'(Brhd.2-1-1) and 'AthmAnam Eva lokam upAseetha,(Brhd.1-4-15)let one meditate the world as his Self,' enjoin meditation as the means of attaining Brahman. The attainment is compared to that of a man who is told that there is a treasure under the grounds of his house or to the situation where a prince getting lost and being brought up by a brahmin, instructed in all the sasthras is told " your father, endowed with all the kingly qualities, is waiting for you at the door step." The implication here is that the treasure which is our birth right, that is, moksha, is just waiting to be found and we are like the prince who lost his identity.

Ramanuja further answers the objection of the mimamsaka that the sentences which teach about an already existent thing without reference to any activity is like the stories told to children because they serve no purpose. Even the stories, says Ramanuja, will be believed only as long as they appear to be true and the moment they are known to be unreal they cease to give pleasure to the children. The texts relating to Brahman serve the purpose of being the highest purushArTha only because the Brahman is known to be real.

Ramanuja ends the samanvayADHikaraNa saying that the texts like 'yathO vA imAni bhoothAni jAyanthE' etc. teach the existence of Brahman as being the cause of the world, free from all imperfections and endowed with infinite auspicious qualities and of the nature of unparalleled bliss.

EEKSHATHYADHIKARANAM

EEKSHTHER NASABDHAM 1-1-5

It is not, not being found in the scriptures asabdham because of the word 'eekshathe' etc, eekshatheh. After establishing that Brahman shown as the cause of the world by sruthi texts
like 'yatho vA imAni bhoothAni jaayanthe,' the enquiry of Brahman, who is omniscient, possessing of infinite auspicious qualities has been affirmed by the first four suthras. Now the view of the sAnkhya school of philosophy who ascribe, the causality of the world through inference, to the inanimate pradhana, the primordial nature, is taken up for refutation.

In the Chandogya text, 'sadhEva soumya idham agra Aseeth ekamEva adhvitheeyam, thadhikaikshatha bahusyam prajAyEya,thattejo asrjatha, 'sath', 'Being,' alone was in the beginning, one only without a second; it willed to become many and created fire,' the word 'Being' is defined as Brahman by the vedantic schools. But here the opponent, sAnkhyan raises a doubt as to whether the word 'sath' refers to the pradhAna, inferred as the cause of the world.

The view of the sankhya is as follows:

All this world except the sentient self is made up of prakrthi which is constituted of three guNas satthva, rajas and thamas. When the three gunas are in equilibrium, sAmayAvastha there is no creation but the primordial prakrthi exists in its unmanifest state. This is denoted by the word 'sath' in the Chandogya passage. Then, (in the proximity of purusha, the individual self) the gunas start combining and the evolution when, from mahat or buddhi till the gross elements takes place. This is indicated by the sentence 'it willed to become many.'

Sankhyan justifies his stand by saying 'karaN abhootha dravyasya avstTHAnthara ApatthirEva kAryatha.' The effect is non-different from the cause, being another state of existence of the cause. The fact that the world came from prkrthi is proved by the subsequent text,'vachArambhaNam vikarah namaDHEyam mṛthikEthyEva sathyam, that is, the mud alone is true and the various forms like pot etc are only modifications like the gold ornaments or articles made of iron in which only the gold and iron are the real essence. Further the opponent argues that the promissory statement of 'ekavjnAnEna sarva vijnAnam' will be meaningful only if the material cause of the world is prakrthi made up of three gunas, the modifications of which, is everything in this world. Therefore the text referring to the origination of the world from 'sath,' points out only to pradhAna, the primordial nature, that is the unmanifest prakrthi, to be the cause of the world.

This view, says Ramanuja, is refuted by this suthra 'eekshathErmAsabdhAth.' PradhAna which is AnumAnikam, established through inference, and not a valid testimony, is not mentioned by the sruthi as the cause of the world because of the use of the verb 'eeksh, to will' in the passage in connection with the activity of 'sath,' the 'Being.' The action of willing can be ascribed only to a sentient entity, which the pradhAna is not. Therefore the term 'sath' can denote only the omniscient omnipotent Supreme Person, the Brahman. Thus in all places where creation is mentioned we find texts like 'sa eekshatha IOkAnnu srjAa ithi,sa imAn lo kAn asrjatha,(Aitr.Aran.II-4-1-2) and 'sa eekshAm chakre sa prANam asrjatha,(pras.6-3) He created them and He willed to create the worlds and He willed and created the vital air.'

It is true, says Ramanuja, that the effect must be of the nature of the cause. That is why the omniscient, omnipotent Supreme Being of infallible will, the inner Self of all is cited as the cause with the sentient and insentient beings in their subtle state forming His sarira. This is
illustrated by the texts such as

'parAsya sakthiH ViviDHAiva srooyathe svAbhAvikee jnanabalkriya cha,(svet.6-8)

His supreme power is manifold and His action, power and knowledge is His inherent nature.'

and

'yasya avyaktham sariram yasya aksharam sariram yasya mṛthyussariram Esha sarvabhoothAnthartham,(subal.VII)

of whom the unmanifest is the body, of whom the imperishable is the body, of whom death is the body, He is the inner self of all.'

The argument that the promissory statement and the example given point out only to pradhAna as the cause of the world through inference is refuted by Ramanuja saying that there is no reason given for the inference to make it valid. The example given is only to confirm the possibility of 'EkavijANena sarva vijnAnam,' the knowledge of everything by knowing about one thing, which is the effect of the cause like everything else.

The next suthra is in answer to the argument of the opponent that the word 'eekshatha, willed' can be taken, not in the primary sense, but in the secondary sense, gouNA, as in the case of the expressions like 'thathEja aikshatha, thA Apah aikshantha', 'the fire willed and the water willed,' in which the activity of the sentient being is ascribed to the nonsentient figuratively. Thus the action of willing can refer to pradhAna also.

SUTHRA- 6- GOUNASCHETH NA ATMASABDHATH

It is not secondary due to the word Atman being used. This suthra refutes the argument that the 'eekshaNa' the act of seeing can refer to pradhAna, taken in the secondary sense. The later text 'aithadhAthmyam idham sarvam, sa athmA, all this is ensouled by that, which is the Self of everything' refers to 'that' which is denoted by the word 'sath.' As the insentient pradhAna cannot be termed as the sentient self it means only Brahman. This meaning is further strengthened by the text

'hanthAham imAh thisrah devatha anena AthmanA anupravisya namarupe vyAkaravaNi,

Let me enter into these three deities as their self and give them name and form.' So the eekshaNam cannot be contrived as being figurative but is only in the primary sense

SUTHRA-7- THANNISHTASYA mOksHOpadhesATH-1-1-7

Because release is the teaching here to one who is desirous of it. In the passage referred to here, the student svEtha kEthu is being instructed by his father about salvation. After imparting the knowledge 'that thou art,' he is told that there will be delay only till this body is discarded. This will not be appropriate if pradhAna is the subject matter of the passage. Even to Sankhya, pradhAna is not instrumental to release.

SUTHRA-8-HEYATHVA AVACHANACCHA-1-1-8

Also because there is no mention of discarding it (sath)
This means that if pradhAna is the meaning of 'sath,' since it is not conducive to moksha the mumukshu, aspirant for release would be advised to give it up. But here it is not so. On the contrary, he is instructed 'thou art that'.

SUTHRA-9 PRATHIJNAVIRODHATH-1-1-9
It is contrary to prathijna. Pradhana is not the purport of the passage because it would be contrary to the promissory statement, prathijna, of knowing everything by the knowledge of one. As pradhana can only be the cause of the insentient beings the knowledge of it will not lead to that of the sentient beings.

SUTHTRA-10 SVAPYAYAATH-1-1-10
Because of merging with the self. The text
'svapnAntham mE soumya vijanechi;yathra ethath purushah svapthinAma, sathAsowmya thadhA sampanno bhavathi; svam apeetho bhavathi,'

Learn from me about the nature of sleep. When a man sleeps he unites with 'sath' and merges into his self. In sleep there is no identity of namarupa and the self exists in its pristine form and becomes one with Brahman, its real self. Therefore the state of sleep is akin to dissolution when all beings merge in Brahman. The sruthi text mentions the state of sleep as that when

'prAjnena AthmanA samparishvaktahah na bAhyam kimchana vEdha nAntharam,(brhd.4-3-21) embraced by the sentient self he knows nothing inside and outside.' On awakening the identity of nAmarupa reassert them as per the text

'tha iha vyagro vA simhO vA vrko vA varAhO vA dhamsO vA masakO vA yadyadbhavanthi thdhAbhavanthi,'

All beings resume their identity as a tiger, lion, wolf, boar, insect or a mosquito, whatever they were before. Therefore as the merging into pradhAna in their sleep cannot happen, the word 'sath' denotes the Supreme purusha only.

SUTHRA-11 GATHISAMANYATH-1-1-11
Because of the uniformity of view several texts referring to the creation mention Brahman as the creator.

'AthmA vA idhameka Eva agra Aseeth','
this was only the self in the beginning,(aith.aran.II-4-11)

thasmath vA EthasmAth Athmana AkAsah sambhoothah, AkAsAth vayuh,vAyoragnih,agnErApah,adhhyah prthivi,(taitt.2-1)

From the Self came the space, from space, wind, from wind came fire, from fire, water and from water came the earth. In all these passages Brahman is mentioned as the cause. So even in this passage, namely 'sadheva soumya idhamgraAseeth,' the word 'sath' refers to brahman only.

SUTHRA-12 SRUTHATHVACCHA-1-1-12
Because it is directly mentioned in the scriptures. Ramanuja quotes various texts to show that
by the word 'sath, only the Supreme Self, omniscient omnipotent, support of all, of fruitful and infallible will, free from all defects etc. is referred to. In Chandogya itself it is stated by later passages that Brahman is the self of all.

'anena jeevena AthmAnam anupravisya nAmarupe vyakaravANi,
I will enter into this jeeva as its self and give name and form,

Later

'sanmoolAhsoumya imAh sarvAh prajAh sadhAyathnAh, satpravishtAh,
All these beings have 'sath' as their source, they reside in it and rest in it,' and

'EthadhAthmyam idham sarvam thatsatyam sa AthmA,
All these are ensouled by that which is truth and which is their true Self.'

Ramanuja concludes that these and other texts which specifically mention that the world has originated from the Lord NArAyaNa, the ocean of infinite auspicious qualities, the Supreme Lord, all knowing, all powerful etc.

'antharbahischa thatsarvam vyapya nArAyanassTHithah.(Mahanarayana up. 11).

Since it is established by the above sruthi texts that Brahman must be the Supreme person capable of manifesting as the world supporting all beings as their inner self, the advaita view that Brahman is undifferentiated consciousness is also set aside, says Ramanuja

**THUS ENDS THE 'EEKSHTHYADHIKARANAM'**

**ANANDHADHIKARANAM**

**SUTHRA-13-ANANDHAMAYO ABHYAsATH-1-1-13 - THE SELF CONSISTING OF BLISS BECAUSE OF REPETITION.**

In Taittreya upanishad there is a passage describing the five sheaths annamaya,prANamaya, manOmaya,vijnAnamaya and Anandhamaya kOsas.

Starting from annamayakOsa, that is, the gross body which is the outermost sheath of the individual, 'sa VA Esha purushO annarasamayah,'(Taitt.2-2-1) which is made up of food, the subtler sheaths made of prANA, vital air,manas, intellect and finally the sheath consisting of bliss are described one by one. The text talks of the bliss sheath as the innermost and the Athman, 'thasmAth vA EthasmAth vijnAnamayAth anyah antharah AthmA Anandhamayah. (Taitt.2-5-1)

Here a doubt is raised as to whether the blissful self mentioned in the passage is the individual self subjected to bondage and release or it is the Supreme self, ParmAthma. The opponent argues that it is the individual self because of the subsequent statement 'thasya Esha Eva
sArira Athmaa, of the preceding one this is the self, sArira. The word sArira means the soul in a body and the individual soul, which is connected with the body, must be meant as the blissful self.

Though Brahman is spoken of as the cause of everything in the Chandogya text, 'it willed to become many,' which has been explained in the previous suthras, it has been shown to be identical with the individual self by the statements 'anena jeevEna Athmana anupravisya, entering into this jiva as its self,' and 'thou art that.' As in the sentence 'this is that Devadatta,' the identity is established through sAmAnADhikaraNya, the principle of coordination.

The opponent explains the TaittrEya passage thus:

The passage begins with the affirmation 'brahmavidhApnOthi param, he who knows the Brahman attains the Supreme,' which shows that the real nature of the individual self is to be attained by knowing Brahman. That the jiva is devoid of acith, the insentient non-self is denoted by the next sentence 'sathyam jnAnam  anantham brahma.' moksha is thus the attainment of the real nature, as made out by the text

‘na ha vai sasarirasya sathah priyApriyayOraapahtahirasthi; asariram vA va santham na priyApriyE sprsathah,’(Chan.8-12-1)

Which means that as long as the jiva is in the body there is no freedom from pleasure and pain but they do not touch him once he gets out of embodiment So the blissful state is the recovery of the true nature of the jiva who is in no way connected with the sentient body, prana manas and the intellect but it is spoken of as being inside them all, by the principle 'sAkhAchandhranyaya. That is, in order to show the moon to someone it is pointed out to be above the branch of a tree, sAkhA, but actually it is not, and the branch serves only as an indication but it is i no way connected to the moon.Similarly, the Self of an individual is indicated by mentioning the body as the outermost sheath and prana which is inside that, and manas which is inside prana and intellect which is inside manas and the Self is indicated as that which is inside even the intellectual sheath while actually it is not in any way connected with any of these mentioned therein. It cannot be argued, says the poorvapakshin, that Brahman is different from the individual self because of the declaration 'brahma puccham rathishTA,(Taitt.II-1) Brahman is the tail that supports,' In the passages describing the other sheaths we find the words, 'prthivee puccham prathishTA, the earth is the tail that supports,' etc. it only denoted the figurative presentation with head,sides and tail specified which make one whole of a body. Similarly the word puccha is used as the supporting part of the whole.

Moreover if Brahman is other than the individual self it would have been spoken as being inside the bliss sheath as its inner self in the form 'thasmAth vA EthasmAth AnandhamayAth anyah antharah AthmA brahma.' But there is no continuation of the series perceived. Hence the poorvapakshin concludes that the individual self, which is in its real state is all bliss being free from pleasure and pain, is the self mentioned as being inside the bliss sheath, the bliss is meant to be the nature the termination 'maya' indicating all bliss and not in the sense of possession of bliss. Thus the opponent rests his argument.
SuthrakAra, says Ramanuja, refutes this by the suthra 'Anandhamayo abhyAsAth.' The self described as blissful is the Brahman because of the repetition.

The passage in TaittEya about the evaluation of the bliss starts with the joy of a man who is blessed with everything and goes on to relate that of celestial beings, devas etc multiplying each by hundred to measure the successive one ending with the bliss of Brahma, the creator and mentioning that to be a particle of the bliss of the Supreme Being, Brahman. At the end of the chapter is the text,

'yatho vacho nivarthanthe aprApya manasA saha Anandham brahmaNO vidvAn na bibhEthi kuthschana,

The enlightened man is not afraid of anything after realizing that bliss of Brahman, unable to reach that, the words turn back along with the mind. This Anandha can reside only in the Supreme Self who is free from all imperfections and possesses infinite auspicious qualities as it cannot relate to the individual self who is finite and subjected to meager happiness mixed with unlimited sorrow.

The term vijnAnamaya refers to the individual self who has vijnAna and not to the intellect because of the suffix 'mayat' which denotes abundance. The term vijnAna is also used in the figurative sense in texts like 'vijnAnam yajnam thanuthe, the intellect performs sacrifice,' where actually the performer is denoted, as there can be no agency attributed to the intellect. The text of Taittreya however does not ascribe agency to the others like pranamaya and the preceding ones as they are insentient and they mean only the prAna etc. and not the self possessing prAna.Hence that which i.e. said to be the inner self of vijAnamaya is only the Supreme Self.

The argument based on the text that describes Brahman entering into all beings as its self and the text'that thou art,' to show the identity of the jiva with Brahman is not correct, says Ramanuja because the statement that it willed to become many and created the fire will not be applicable to the individual self.Ramnuja asks,

'kaTHam vA nirastha nikhiladhoshagandhasya anavaDHika athisaya asankhyEya kalyANa guNagaNasya sakalakAraNa bhoothasya brahmaNah nAnviDHANantha duhkhAkara karmADHeena chinthithnimishithAdhi sakalpravrththijivasvarupathvam.'

This means that it is impossible for the Supreme Being, who is free from all imperfections and abode of limitless wonderful innumerable auspicious qualities, and the cause of all beings, to be identical with the individual self who is under the influence of karma and experiences infinite misery and engaged in all kinds' activities that bind him.

It may be argued that the Brahman is perceived as the individual self due to beginning less avidhya, to dispel which the study of vedanta is started. But this is contrary, says Ramanuja to the statement, 'yEna asrutham srutham bhavathi, by which what is not heard becomes heard,'
thus promising 'Ekavi\text{\textacuten}Ena sarva vi\text{\textacuten}Anam, all knowledge by the knowledge of one,' and to
the mention of the causality of Brahman by the text

'sadhEva soumya idhamagra Aseeth Ekamva advitheeyam,
thadhaikshatha bahu syAm pra\text{\textacuten}AyEya, thatthEjO asrjatha'

etc. It would be highly improbable that after showing the Brahman as one of infallible will by
the statement 'thdhaaikshatha bahu syAm' if the same Brahman is identified with the
individual self who is the experiences of infinite misery through the proclamation
'thatthvamasi.' If on the other hand it is claimed that all this (the experience of the world) is
unreal then the knowledge of all by knowledge of one will be meaningless as there is nothing
real to know.

If Brahman alone is real and everything else is unreal, the text 'yatha soumya EkEna
mrthpindEna sarvam mrnmayam vi\text{\textacuten}Atham' will not make sense because it means that when
the cause, which is real, clay, is cognized, the effects, which are also real, are understood.

The word 'thvam' refers to the jiva in the state of transmigration. The identity between jiva and
Brahman has already been refuted by the former suthras. The identity ascertained through
discarding the main meaning of the adjectives and taking only the implied meaning as in the
case of 'this is that Devadattha,' can not be accepted as shown already. The words like 'blue
lotus' denotes the blue color as well as the entity lotus.

Ramanuja gives an example to illustrate this point.

'YaTHA neelmuthpalam Anaya ithyukthe neelimaadhi visishtamEva AneeyathE,
yaThA cha vinDHHyatavyAm madhamudhithO mAthangajasThishTathi ithi padhadhvaya
avagatha viseshaNa visishta Eva arTha pratheeyathe'

That is, when someone is asked to bring the blue lotus he brings only the lotus having the
attribute of blueness and not white or red one. Similarly on hearing the words there is a mad
elephant standing in the vindhya forest we understand the meaning only with all the
qualifications such as the place, the entity and its state (madness) etc.

According to the principle of SamANadhikaraNya, coordination,

'bhinnapra\text{\textacuten}rtthi nimitthAnAm sabdhAnam Eaksmin arTHE vr\text{\textacuten}thih sAmana DHikaraNyam,'

When different words having different application are coordinated to denote the same entity.
Secondary meaning is to be resorted to only when any one of the words fail to express the entity
it qualifies through its primary meaning as in the cases of 'gourvAhikah, this vahika man is an
ox, where the words man and ox cannot denote the same entity by their primary meaning and
hence one of the words, namely, ox, is taken in the secondary sense. But here in the example
'blue lotus' there is no such need to resort to secondary meaning as the term blue denotes only
the lotus in its primary sense of colour similar to the expressions 'dhandee or kundalee,' one
with a stick or one wearing earrings. Even in the sentence 'so ayam devadatthah, this is that
Devadattah,' there is no contradiction between the person seen at
present and the same seen in the past because of the difference in the time and place. (The
identity between Brahman and the jiva is established in advaita by citing this example as seen previously.)

Ramanuja cites another example 'aruNayA EkahAyinyA pingAkshyA sO mam kreeNaAthi,', which means, he buys soma by a cow one year old, of tawny hue and yellow eyes. He refutes the view of the opponent who says that the attributes mentioned may not refer to one entity, by saying, the same entity, namely the cow is denoted as having the attributes, one year old, tawny colour and yellow eyes, which is justified by the principle of sAmanadhikaraNya. This is the similar one to the expression 'the cloth is red.' Several words put in the same case ending, nominative, may stand in coordination denoting the same entity such as 'devadatthah syamo yuvA dhandee kundalee thishTathi,' Devadattha, dark, young, carrying a staff and wearing earrings is standing.

Ramanuja shows another instance where the words not with the same case ending also illustrate the principle of sAmAnAdhikaraNya. In the sentence 'kAshTaih sTHAlyAm Odhanam pacheth' meaning, 'he will cook rice in a vessel with firewood' denote a single purport using words with different case endings, kAshTaih in instrumental and sTHAlyam in the locative case. Ramanuja even cites a more complex sentence as an example of this.

'khAdhiraih sushkaih kAshTaih samparimAnE bhANdE pAyasam salyodhanam samarTHah pAchakah pacEth.'

This means, a proficient cook (samarThah pAchakah-nominative), cooks in a vessel of even dimension (samaparimANE bhAnde-locative) rice pAyasam(accusative) with sticks of dry khadhira wood (instrumental). In this sentence the adjectives are put in different cases according to the words they qualify and yet denote the purport of the sentence by coordination.

Ramanuja takes up another objection, (of mimAmsaka) that the word denoting a quality of a thing already mentioned in the context refers to the quality only and not the entity. Ramanuja says that it is not so because neither in the scriptures nor in the worldly usage the words denoting qualities which are in coordination with the entity are seen to connote only the attribute.

lOkavEdhayOh dravyavAchipadhasamAnADHikaraNasya gunavAchinah kvachidhapi kevalaguNAbhiDHAna adarsanATH.'

For example in the sentence 'the cloth is white, patah shukalah' the word white denotes the cloth which is white whereas in the _expression 'the whiteness of the cloth, patasya shuklah' it has an independent meaning, not because the word 'patah' is mentioned first but it is due to the two words being in different case terminations. On the other hand when it is said 'patasya shuklah bhAgah' the white part of the cloth, the same case termination denotes the part of the cloth which is white.

In the vedic usage also, points out Ramanuja, in the sentence like

'aruNayA EkahAyinyA pingAkshyA sO mam kreeNaAthi,'

he buys soma with tawny-colored, one year old and yellow-eyed (cow), the words tawny,
one year old and yellow-eyed have connection only with the entity cow whom they qualify and do not denote the attribute only. This is in answer to mimaamsakas view that all words are meaningful only when they are connected with action. Hence they explain the above sentence to mean that one buys soma with one year old, with tawny colored and with yellow-eyed in which each word is connected with the verb kreeNathi, buys, independently.

Ramanuja states the siddhantha thus:

The principle of sAmanAdhikaraNya requires that the two words 'thath,' (that) and 'thvam' (thou) are to be explained to denote unity without giving up their particular attributes. Those who do not accept the view that the Supreme self without imperfections and possessing all auspicious qualities is different from the jiva who is experiencing untold suffering due to beginninless avidhya in the form of karma.

But a doubt may arise that if this view is true, the text 'thathvamasi' which mentions the oneness of jiva with Brahma would imply that Brahma will be contaminated by the imperfections of the jiva. Ramanuja replies that it is not so. The word 'thvam' should be taken to mean the real Self that is, Brahma in which case the identity is established.

Ramanuja explains the passage in Chandhogyya thus:

The word 'sath' in 'sadheva soumya idham agra Aseeth,ekamEva adhvitheeyam,' that alone, was there in the beginning one only without a second, means the Brahma who is the cause of everything created by His will and entered into everything to become the inner self. This is illustrated also in the TaittrEya text,

'idham sarvam asrjatha,yadhidham kimcha; thath srshtva thadhEva anupravisath; thadhanupravisya sath cha thyaccha abhavath.'

It means that Brahma created all this and after creation entered into everything and became 'sath' and 'thyath', that is, sentient and insentient. From the statement that Brahma entered into all beings and gave they name and form due to its presence in them, all words in their ultimate connotation mean Brahma only.

Brahman is shown to be the inner self by the Chandhoya text itself viz. 'EthadhAthmyam idham sarvam, all this is ensouled by that' meaning by Brahma. There are other texts which substantiate this such as 'anthaapravishtahsAsthjananamsarvAthma,'(Taitt.aran.2-24) entering in, he is the ruler and self of all.Similar to the passage in BrhadhAraNyaka which states that Brahma is in all elements and individual self as their inner Self,(Brhd.III-7-3to22) there is a text in Subalopanishad which begins as 'yah prthivmanthare sancharan yasya prthivee sariram, who moves within earth and to whom earth is the body,' and proceeds to show water etc, also as body of Brahma and ends as

yO aksharam anthare sancharan yasya aksharam sariram yam aksharam na vedha - esha sarvabhoothaAnthrAthma apahathapapma dhivyvo deva Eko nAraYaNah,

Who is moving inside the imperishable(that is, the individual self) to whom the imperishable is the sarira and whom it did not know-He is the divine Lord Narayana, who is the self of all
beings and uncontaminated by evil.'

Since all these texts show that Brahman is the inner self of all beings sentient and insentient, which form His body, all words denoting the insentient body etc. refer only to the sentient soul. The body and the other insentient parts of any being are its modes which have meaning only in connection with the entity of which they are modes. So all names and forms denote only the sentient soul and because Brahman is the inner Self of all beings, sentient and insentient, all words have their ultimate connotation in Brahman only.

Even when nouns are found to qualify nouns they need not be used in the possessive case, as in 'he is a dhandee kundali etc. as long as the thing exists as a mode only when it is inseparably connected with the entity to which it is the mode. As he dhanda, staff or kundala, earring are capable of existing independently but the body has no separate existence apart from the soul. Since 'i' and 'thou ' are modes of Brahman their inner self they ultimately denote Brahman only. This is the true meaning of 'that thou art.'

Hence Ramanuja concludes that the Anandhamaya, the self of Bliss is only Brahman and not the sentient self, vijAnamaya. Then Ramanuja explains the taittEya passage thus: Starting from 'thasmAth vA EthasmAthva akasah sambhoothah,'

That is, space was produced from Brahman, from space wind etc. till man is created, further showing the man to be the essence of food, the passage goes on to say that prANamaya is the self of annamaya, manomaya is the self of prANamaya, vijnAnamaya being the self of manomaya and finally the Ananadhamaya is denoted as the self of even vijnAnamaya. The Ananadhamaya is thus the highest self of which all else become the body. Ramanuja says

'atha Eva idham param brahma aDHikrthyapavrtrtham sAsthram sArirakam ithi abhiyukthaih abhiDiheeyathE.'

This is why the sAstra which has the Supreme Being as its subject matter is called by renowned persons as sAriraka sAsthra, the study of embodied self. Hence the self of Bliss is different from the individual self and denotes the Supreme Self, Brahman.

The next suthra examines another poorvapaksha view that the meaning of 'maya' can be either abundant or 'made of' in which case it could mean the individual self.

**SUTHRA-14-vikarasaabdhanNA ITHICETH NA prACHURYATh-1-1-14**

If it is said (Brahman is not referred to as anandhamaya) on account of the modification (the suffix 'mayat'), it is not so because it denotes abundance.

The argument of the opponent that the suffix 'mayat' is used in the sense of modification is set aside by the suthrkara by saying that the suffix means abundance and since abundance of bliss can be found only in Brahman the blissful self is only Brahman. The sense of modification is not applicable even in the case of prAnamaya since the self in prAnamayakOsa is so called only because prAna one of the five vital airs is found in abundance in jiva. Moreover the word abundance cannot be construed to mean mostly and hence implying that
there is some sorrow mixed with it in order to make it refer to the individual self. The individual self is of the essence of bliss which is contracted due to samsara and for the same reason it is not subjected to modification from the state of samsara to the state of bliss in the release like the clay being modified into a pot.

Finally as the bliss of Brahman is described as that of other beings several times multiplied the abundance of bliss can refer only to Brahman and hence the blissful self mentioned in the passage is Brahman only.

SUTHERA-15 THADHETHUVYAPADHESACCHA-1-1-15 AND BECAUSE IT IS DECLARED TO BE THE CAUSE OF THE BLISS OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL

The Brahman is said to be the cause of the bliss of others in the Taittreya passage

'yath thath sukrtham; rasovai sa; rasahyOvAyam labdhva Anandhee bhavathi; kO hyO vAnyAthkah prANyAth; yadhEsha Aksa AnandhO na syAth esahyo va Anandhayathi,'

This means 'that which is known as the self-creator is verily the source of joy; for one becomes happy by coming in contact with that source of joy; who indeed will inhale and who will exhale if this bliss is not there in the supreme space (within the heart). This one indeed causes bliss.'

Brahman alone is the cause of bliss of the individual soul, denoted by the act of inhaling and exhaling. He is said to be in the supreme space being the inner Self of all. That which causes bliss must have that in abundance and hence could be only Brahman.

SUTHERA-16 MANTHRAVARNIKAMEVA CHA GEEYATHE-1-1-16 AND BECAUSE THE BRAHMAN MENTIONED IN THE MANTHRA (IS ANANDHAMAYA).

The second chapter of Taittreya begins with 'brahmavidhapnothi param, one who knows Brahman attains the supreme' and goes on to say 'sathyam jnanam anantham brahma.' This same brahman is declared to be the blissful self in the end. Hence it is only the Supreme Self and not the individual self which is indicated by the word Anandhamaya. The knower of Brahman that is the jiva must be different from Brahman. The same idea is expressed in the text 'thasmAth vA EthasmAth va AkAsah sambhoothah, from this sprang space.

The opponent comes up with the argument that even tough it is granted that the meditator must be different from the meditated, but still Brahman is not different from the individual self because Brahman is the real essence of the individual self, who in his real state is undifferentiated consciousness free from impurities imagined through avidhya. The text 'sathyam jnanam anantham brahma' refers to this state of the jiva. and ' yathO vAcho nivarthanthe aprApya manasA saha, the speech returns with mind unable to reach (Brahman) only tells that in real state the jiva is Brahman beyond mind and intellect. The next suthra replies to this.

SUTHERA-17- NETHARO ANUPAPATTHESCHA NOT THE OTHER BECAUSE OF IMPROBABILITY

Ramanuja refutes the view that jiva is Brahman in its state of release by saying

'paramAtmanah itharah jivasabdhabhilapyah mukthAvasThOpi na bhavathi
The reason for this is 'thaTHAvidhasyAthmanah nirupADHika vipaschithvam na upapadhyathE.

To the jiva who is said to be identical to Brahan at the state of release cannot possess unconditioned intelligence because while in bondage it is not seen to be so.

The Brahman is mentioned as sathyasankalpa, of infallible will as shown in the text 'sO akAmayatha bahusyAm prajAyeya'

He willed to become many,' and that does not fits the description of jiva even in the state of release. The text 'Yatho vacho nivarthanthe' etc only means that they are not means of knowledge of Brahan. Since the bliss of Brahman is immeasurable the speech and mind are not capable of expressing it. The passage beginning with 'one who knows Brahan attains the supreme', describes Brahan as the cause of the world,of the nature of bliss and causing bliss in others and the controller of other divine beings like the Sun wind etc. So the words yathO vAchO nivarthanthe aprApya mansa saha
could not mean that they returned without knowing, but only means that the bliss of Brahan is beyond expression by words or thought.

**SUTHRA-18 BHEDHVAPADHESACCHA-1-1-18 BECAUSE OF THE DECLARATION OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL AND THE BLISSFUL SELF**

From the beginning with 'from that self sprang space,' and 'anyo antharah AthmA prANamayah,' (Taitt-II-1) where the Self is spoken of as something different from annamaya, prANamaya, manomaya and vijnAnamaya Athma Hence the blissful Self is not the individual self.

**SUTHRA-19-KAMACCHA NANUMANAPESKSHA-1-1-19 SINCE THE DESIRE TO CREATE IS MENTIONED, THERE IS NE NEED OF SENTIENT PRINCIPLE LIKE PRADHANA.**

The text says 'sO akAmayatha bahu syAm prajAyEya ithi; sa thapasthapthva idham sarvam asrjatha,'(Taitt.II-6) This shows that the Self of bliss created the universe without any connection with the insentient matter, pradhAna which is not possible for the individual self as it is under the influence of avidhya and hence associated with the insentient matter. So the blissful Self is only Brahan.

**SUTHRA-20-ASMIN ASYA CHA THADYOGAM SASTHI-1-1-20 THE SCRIPTURES SPEAK ABOUT THE UNION OF THE INDIVIDUAL SELF WITH BRAHMAN.**

The text 'rasO vai sah; rasm hyOvAyam labDHvA anandhee bhavathi'. The Self of bliss is the essence of existence attaining which the individual soul becomes blissful. Hence the blissful Self is the Brahan and different from the individual soul and pradhan, the insentient matter.

**THUS ENDS ANANDHADHIKARANAM.**
ANTHRADHIKARANAM -1-1-7

SUTHRA-21-ANTHAA THADHARMO PADHESATH-1-1-21 THE ONE WITHIN (THE SUN AND THE EYE IS BRAHMAN) BECAUSE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS MENTIONED THEREIN.

The opponent argues that the creation may not be possible for jivas with less merit but those with great merit like the Sun, Indra and PrajApathy (the creator Brahma) it could be possible.

The text

'ya esho anthAdvithyE purushah dhrsyathE hiraNyamasru hiraNyakesah ApraNakhAth
sarva Eva suvannah; thasya yaTHA kapyAsam pundarikam EVa akshinnee; thasya udhithi
nasa sa esha sarvebhyah pApmabhyaah udhithah.' (Chan.I-6 to 8)

This means the golden person seen inside the Sun with golden beard and hair, whose eyes are like full blown lotus and who is named 'uth,' has risen above all evil. Later the text goes on to say that rk and saman are his joints and He is the Lord of all worlds beyond the Sun and all objects desired by the gods.

The passage continues with the text ' aTha ya EshO antharakshiNi purushah dhrsyaathe, there is this purusha who is seen in the eye,' and this purusha is mentioned as the same who is seen in the Sun.

Now the doubt is whether this person is Brahman or the individual self. The poorvapakshin argues that it must be the jiva on account of being mentioned as possessing a body. When the jiva attains moksha, that is, attains brahmanhood, because the individual self is none other than Brahman, there is no embodiment in its natural state. This is substantiated by the struthi

'na ha vai sasarirasya satah priyApriyayOh apahathirasthi; asariram vA va santham na
priyApriyE sprsatthah,(Chan.VIII-12-1)

There is no relief from pleasure and pain for the jiva as long as it is in the body but once it is free from embodiment joy and sorrow do not affect it.' Though it may not be possible for a soul bound by karma to possess supreme powers like creation and mastery over the world, highly evolved souls like the sun, moon and the like may possess such powers, final evolution being unity with Brahman, which is the real state of the individual self described by 'asthoolam anaNu, neither gross nor subtle etc.

The suthra antharthaddharmopadesath refutes this. The words 'sa Esha sarvebhyahApmabhyaah udhithah' in the passage about the purusha in the Sun clearly indicates the Supreme self only as apahathapApmauthvam means free from karma which does not apply to individual soul however evolved it may be. So this denotes the attribute of Brahman only.

Ramanuja here quotes the texts to prove this

'Esha AthmA apahatha pApmAvijarO vimrthiyuh vishoko vijighathso apiipAsah sathyakAmah
sathya sankalpah, (Chan.VIII-1-5)
He is the inner self of all, free from evil, old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst, of infallible desire and will. And Subala upanishad speaks of the inner self of all as Lord Narayana.

'Esha sarvabhoottAnthrAthmA apahathApmA divyO deva EkO nArAyaNah.'

Ramanuja further says that the other characteristics mentioned in the vedic texts like 'sO akAmayatha bahu syAm prajAyeya, it desired to become many, which denotes Brahman creating by will, being sathyakAma and sathyA sankalpa, and other attributes like being the cause of fear and fearlessness, possessing transcendentinal bliss inexpressible by speech or thought, do not apply to the jiva.

The argument that because the purusha in the Sun is mentioned as having a body it must be only an individual soul is not tenable, says Ramanuja, because Brahman being sathyakAma and sathyA sankalpa can assume any body at will whereas the embodiment of the individual soul is subjected to karma and not controlled by the jiva. Moreover the argument may hold good if the sarira described is prAkRtha, made up of three guNas. But the sarira of the Lord Narayana, who is synonymous with Brahman of the upanishads, says Ramanuja, is not prAkRtha. He is the embodiment of bliss, free from all imperfections, possessing infinite auspicious qualities unparalleled and as such He takes wonderfully resplendent, beautiful, fragrant, graceful exquisite youthful forms to grace His devotees because He is the ocean of mercy, magnanimity, easy accessibility, love and other divine qualities. This is why sruthi proclaim Him to be 'ajAyamAno bahuDhA vijAyathE,' the one who manifests in many forms even though He has no birth. Ramanuja quotes profusely from the scripture to show that there are abundant sruthi texts to prove his point.

'na thasya kAryam karaNam ch vidhyathE na thathsamaschAbhyaDHikascha dhrsyathE; parAsya shakthirviviDhaiva srooyathE svAbhAvikee jnanabalakriyAcha'(SVET.6-8),

He has no action to be performed nor needs any instrument of action, there is no one equal or superior, His power is supreme and diverse and His knowledge, power and action are His inherent nature.

Smrithi texts like that of Bhagavatgita substantiate this and Ramanuja quotes from chapter IV of the Gita the following:

'ajO pi san avyayAthmA bhoothAnAm eesvarOpi san;prakrthim svAm avashtabhya sambhavAmi Athma mAyaya,

Though I am unborn and immutable and the lord of all, I assume my own nature and manifest myself through my own mAyA. This, the Lord says, He does for the protection of the good and destruction of the wicked, 'parithrANAya sAdhoonAm vinAsAyacha dushkrthAm.'

Ramanuja gives an elaborate elucidation of this passage.

'sadhavah hi upasakAh, thathparithrANAmEva uddhesyam, Anushangikasthu dushkrthAm vinAsah, sankalpaNAthrENApi thadhupapatthEh.'

The people referred to as sAdhu are his devotees and their protection is the main purpose of manifestation and the punishment of the wicked is only a natural consequence because it could
be achieved by mere will.

What has been outlined above is a beautiful offshoot of visishtadvaita doctrine. If the Lord wished to kill Hiranya kasipu or Ravana or even Kamsa He could have done it without undergoing the travails of an avathAra. But it was to protect PrahlAda he took NrsimhAvathAra, to prove the words of His devotee that the Lord existed everywhere in a pillar or a blade of grass. And also to protect the words of Brahma who is also His devotee, He had to take so much trouble in fulfilling all the conditions of the boon given to Hiranyakasipu. Similarly RamAvathAra was to provide protection to those who surrendered to Him because He could have killed Ravana from Ayodhya itself without straining Himself and going to DandakAraNya, which was mainly to promise protection to the rshis there. Likewise KrishNa incarnated as the son of vasudeva to shower His grace on His devotees, while annihilation of the wicked was ancillary.

SUTHRA-22-BHEDHAVYAPAHESACCHA ANYAH-1-1-22 IT IS DIFFERENT (FROM INDIVIDUAL SELF) BECAUSE OF THE DISTINCTION MADE.
The Supreme self is distinguished from the beings like the Sun by sruthi texts that speak of it as the inner self of all.

'ya AdhithyE thishTan AdhithyAth antharah yam AdhithyO na vedha yasya Adhithyah sariram ya Adhithyam antharo yamayathi,
He who being in the Sun is different from the Sun, whom the Sun does not know, whose sarira is the Sun, and who controls the Sun from within.' Similar expressions are found with respect to Athman, earth and other entities. Further Ramanuja quotes from subAla upanishad the following text.

'yo aksharam anthare sancharan yasya aksharam sariram yam aksharam na vedha, yO mrtlyum anther sancharan yasya mrtlyuh sariram ya mrtlyuh na vEdha, Esha sarvabhoothAnthrAthmA apahathpApmA divyo deva Eko nArAyanah,
who is moving inside the imperishable (the individual self) whose body is the imperishable, whom the imperishable did not know, who moves inside death, of whom the death is the body, whom death did not know, He is the Self of all beings, free from all evil, the divine Lord Narayana. Hence Brahman being the Self of all from HiraNyagarbha down to individual jiva, is different from them.

THUS ENDS THE ANTHARADHIKARANAM

AKASADHIKARANAM-1-1-8
SUTHRA-23-AKASTHALLINGATH-1-1-23 AKASA IS BRAHMAN BECAUSE OF ITS CHARACTERISTIC MARKS.
So far in the chapter of sribhashya first pAdha it has been shown that Brahman is the source of all beings and their inner Self and of the nature of bliss and is different from the sentient and the insentient on the basis of sruthi texts that prove all this. Now in the last part of the first pAdha it is proved that wherever there is special mention about AkAsa and other entities with respect to creation or control of the world, the words denoting these entities mean only
Brahman.

The text of chandhogyay says

‘asya lokasya ka gathih iti; AkAsa iithi hOvAcha, sarvANi ha vA imani bhoothAni AkAsadhyeva samuthpadhyanthe, AkAsam prathi astham yanthi, AkAsa Eva hi Ebhyo jyAyan Aksah parAyaNam,

what is the origin of this world? Space, replied he, all these beings originate from AkAsa and merge back into it. AkAsa is greater than them and their rest.’

There arises a doubt as to whether the word AkAsa refers to the space, which is one of the five elements or Brahman.

The poorvapakshin argues that it means only AkAsa. The reasons given for this conclusion is that when the etymological meaning of a word is relevant that meaning alone should be taken and not figurative one. When it is explicitly stated that all this sprang from AkAsa there is no need to consider the implied meaning referring to Brahman. Even the text 'Atmanah Akasah sambhoothah, (Taitt.II-1) the space was created from the Self,' the word self is to be taken to mean the subtle state of AkAsa.Hence the origin of the world as made out in the chandogyay passage starting from 'sadhEva soumya idhamagra Aseeth,' the word 'sath' refersonly to AkAsa, similar to the word Self in Taittreya.

This view is refuted by the suthra saying that the word AkAsa denotes not the element but only Brahman because of the characteristics of Brahman previously established are indicated in this text also, namely being the origin of all, being the greatest of all and into which all beings merge in the end. As the world consists of sentient beings as well, the insentient AkAsa cannot be the origin and resting place. Nor can an insentient entity can be cited as being the greatest which requires eminent qualities that apply to Brahman only.

Moreover, says Ramanuja, the denotation of the word AkAsa needs to be ascertained by other valid means of proof, to mean the space and not Brahman. By the text 'sadheva soumya idhamagraAseeth Ekameva adhvitheeyam, clearly establish Brahman as the cause of the world. So the text, stating AkAsa to be the origin.being subsequent, must be construed to mean Brahman only. While other texts like 'thadhaikshatha bahusyAm prajAyEya' declare Brahman as possessing infallible will, omniscience etc. it is not right to rely on one particular text and interpret all these texts by the etymological meaning of the word Akasa. Therefore the word AkAsa in the passage quoted is Brahman only.

To the argument that the word self can be used figuratively even to insentient things as in the _expression 'mrdhAthmako ghatah, the clay is the self of the pot,' Ramanuja says that even though this is found to be the practice occasionally the word self is always used with respect to embodiment and hence the Self in the passage referred to, means only the Universal Self, Brahman. The word AkAsa when derived as AkAsayathi iti AkAsah, make everything shine or AkAsathi, it shines, will mean Brahman only.

Thus ends the AkAsaDHikaraNam
PRANADHIKARANAM-1-1-9
SUTHRA-24-Atha eva prAnaH-1-1-24 For the same reason the vital air is Brahman.
The text in ChandhOgya which praises the prANa and being asked which is that deity it answers 'prANa iti hOvAcha, sarvANi ha imAni bhoothAni prANmEva abhisamvisanthi, prANam abhyujjihathE', it is prANa into which all beings merge and from it they arise.

Here also, as in the case of AkAsa, Brahman only is denoted by the word vital breath. Even though all beings are dependent on the vital breath, this applies only to sentient beings and not insentient like stone or wood. Moreover all things arising and merging into Brahman has already been established. The derivation of the word as prAnayathita iti prAnah, that which makes everything alive applies only to Brahman.

THUS ENDS PRANADHIKARANAM

JYOTHIRADHIKARANAM-1-1-10
SUTHRA-25-JYOTHSCHARANABHIDHAnaTH-1-1-25 The light is Brahman on account of the mention of pAdha, quarter.
The chandhogyatext
'aTHa yadhatathah parOdhiVo jyothih dheepyathE visvathah prshTEShu sarvathah prshTEShu anutthamEShu utthameEShu lokEShu, idham vA va yadhidham asmin anthah purushE jyothih,'

Describes the light that shines above in heaven, beyond all, higher than everything in the highest world, beyond which there is no other worlds, that is the same light which is within man.'(Chan.3-13-7)

Here there is a doubt raised by some that whether the light mentioned in the passage refers to well known source of light like the Sun which could have been meant to be the cause of everything, that is Brahman or it refers to the highest person, omniscient, different from all beings sentient and insentient, the supreme cause, the Brahman of infallible will.

The poorvapakshin comes out with the argument that it is the well known source of light such as the Sun because there is no indication in the passage that it is the supreme self as in those about AkAsa and prANa.

This suthra refutes the view of the opponent by saying it is Brahman only which is referred to as the light here because of the mention about charaNa, that is pAdha, feet or quarter. In a previous text it is said 'pAdhO asya sarvA bhoothAni thripAdhasyAmrtham dhivi, one quarter or padha of this consists of all beings and the other three quarters are in heaven and immortal.' So this shows that the reference is only to the highest being, that is, Brahman.

The opponent has given another reason for his conclusion that the passage refers to the well known source of light by saying that there is a mention of identity between the light with that inside the intestines, 'yadhidham asmin anthah purushE jyothi,' namely vaisvAnara. But Ramanuja refutes this saying
The reference to the fire inside the intestines is to enjoin meditation on that as Brahman. The expression 'supreme light' is enough to indicate that it is Brahman only and there is no need for any special mention of the characteristics of Brahman separately.

**SUTRA-26 CCANDHBBHI DHANA TNAIITHIC ETH NA, THATHA CHTHE TOARPA NANI DHATHA TTHAYA HIDHARSA NAM**

If it is said that the metre (Gayathri) is denoted and not Brahman, it is not so, because the meditation on Brahman is declared, as seen by the other texts.

In the previous text it is mentioned that 'gayathri va idham sarvam, Gayathri is everything whatever exists in the universe,' and hence the metre Gayathri is referred to as Brahman, says the poorvapakshin, which is refuted by this suthra. Mere metre cannot be the cause of everything and what is meant here is the meditation on gayathri as Brahman. The Gayathri though has only three feet sometimes said to have four and hence it is similar to Brahman who is also described as having four PAdhAs as mentioned in the text 'pAdho asya sarvA bhoothAni thripAdhasyAmrtham dhivi.'

**SUTRA-27 BOOTHADHI PADH AVAPADH ESA UPAPATTH ESCH EVAM BECAUSE OF THE REPRESENTATION OF BEINGS AS THE FEET.**

The text about Gaythri denote all beings, earth, body and heart as the four feet, 'saishA chathushpadha', of Gaythri, which can apply only to Brahman.

**SUTRA-28 UPADH ESABH EDH AANAIITHIC ETH NA, UBHAYASMIN API AVIRODHA T**

If it is said that the Brahman referred to in the passage about light is not that referred to here on account of difference in specification, it is not so because there is no contradiction.

In passage about Gaythri heaven is said to be the abode of Brahman, 'thripAdhasyAmrtham dhivi' while in the passage on light it is said to shine above heaven. So it is different, says the poorvapakshin but the suthra refutes this. There is no contradiction here and Ramanuja says that there is essential agreement between the two as in the statements 'the bird is perching on the top of the tree', and 'the bird is above the tree,' both of which means the same.'

ubhayasmin api upadhesearTHa svabhAva aikyEnaprathyabhijnAyAh avirODHAth, yaTHA vrkshAgrE syEnah, vrkshAtparathah syEnah ithi.'

Therefore, says Ramanuja, only the Supreme purusha is shining above the heavens as the most brilliant light 'ethAVan asya mahima,' this is the glory of Him, of whom all beings are one foot, that is, a quarter, and the three quarters are immortal in heaven. The words 'vEdhAham Etham purusham mahAntham Adhithya varnam thamsasthu pAre,' (svet.III-9) describe Him as the glorious Being of the colour of the Sun and who is beyond darkness. Hence Brahman alone is specified by the word light.

**THUS ENDS THE JYOTHIRADHIKARANAM**
PRANASTHA ANUGAMATH-1-1-29 PRANA IS BRAHMAN BECAUSE IT IS UNDERSTOOD TO BE SO.

In Kousheethaki upanishad there is the text that describes the conversation between Indra and Prathardhana where the latter asks indra to grant him the boon which is most beneficial to man. Indra said

'prANOsmi prajnAthmA tham mAm Ayuh amrtham ithi upAsya, (koush. III-1-8)
I am the prANa and the intelligent self, and you meditate on me as the life and as immortality'.

Here the doubt arises as to whether it is the individual self or Brahman on which the upAsanA is intended.

The argument that the individual self in the form of Indra is only the intention of the passage is forwarded on the basis that Indra is a well known purusha visEsha, special being, and since he was asked for a boon it might be him whom the upAsana was intended. Since what is most beneficial to mortals is the first cause as that alone can secure immortality, Indra must be denoted as the cause of the universe here and not Brahman.

This view is refuted by the suthra saying that it is the Supreme self and not the individual self which is the purport of the passage because of the mention of the qualities that apply to Brahman only, such as bliss, immortality and free from old age.

'sa Esha prANa Eva prajnAthmA Anandho ajaro amrthah,(Koush.III-1-9)
This prAna alone is the intelligent self, bliss, free from old age and immortal.

SUTHRA-30 NA VASTHURATHMOPADHESAITHI CHETH ADHYATHMA SAMBANDHAMHA BHOOMA HYASMIN

If it is said that it is not Brahman because of the intention of the speaker, it is not so as there is abundant reference to the Supreme self in the chapter.

The argument that the speaker is Indra and it may be his intention that Prathardhana should meditate on him, which is supported by the fact that there is mention of Indra's killing of Thvashta in the passage, is refuted by this suthra.

There are numerous references connected with the Supreme self. Ramanuja quotes the passage from the same upanishad

'thadhyaTHA raTHasya ArEshunemirarpithA Evam EvaithAbhoothamAthrAh prajnAmAthrasu arpithAh, prajnAmAthrAh prAnE arpithAh, sa Esha prAnEva prajnATHma Anandho ajaro amrthah.' (Koush.3-8)

The meaning of the passage is as follows:

In a chariot the rim of the wheel is connected to the spokes, the spokes to the axle. Similarly all non-sentient beings are connected to the sentient beings which are in turn connected to the prANa. The prANa is the prajna, blissful, non-aging and immortal. Being the abode of everything is the character of only the Supreme self. Besides Indra is denoted as prAna for the
sake of meditation to attain the highest goal of man, namely moksha and this can only refer to
the Supreme self. Moreover in the same passage is found the text

'Es\(\text{ha Eva sADhu karma kAra\(\text{yati tham, yamEbh\(\text{yO IOkEbh\(\text{yah unnineeshath\(\text{i}, E\(\text{s}h\(\text{a EVa asADHU karma kAra\(\text{yati thamyam a\(\text{DH}o nineeshath\(\text{i}'}

He makes those, whom He wants to raise from these worlds, do good deeds and makes those,
whom He wants to degrade from these worlds, do bad deeds. This action of prompting good
and bad deeds is the dharma, attribute of Brahman only. So as indicated by 'Es\(\text{ha lokAdhipath\(\text{i},e\(\text{sha sarvEs\(\text{a' it is only Brahman who is referred to as Indra, that is pr\(\text{ANa.

SUTHRA-31-SASTHRADHRSHTYATHOOPADHESAH VAMADEVAVATH THE INSTRUCTION
(OF INDRA TO PRATHARDHANA) IS POSSIBLE THROUGH INSIGHT INTO SCRIPTURES LIKE
VAMADEVA.

What is meant here is that though Indra told Prathardhana to meditate on him what he could
have meant is not the individual self as Indra but only the supreme self due to his insight into
the scripture as sage VA\(\text{m\(\text{adev\(\text{a has said "I was manu and the Sun.'"}

The scriptural texts such as 'anE\(\text{Na jiv\(\text{Ena Athman\(\text{A anupravisya na\(\text{AmarupE vy\(\text{Ak}arav\(\text{ANi, I
will enter in along with this self and make nama and form,' and others denoting Brahman to be
the self of all are referred to here and through the knowledge of such texts indra might have
meant only the Supreme self as himself and pr\(\text{ANa.

SUTHRA-32-JIVAMUKHYA PR\(\text{ANa LING\(\text{ATH NA ITHICETH NA,
P\(\text{ASATHRAIVIDHYAATH\(\text{ASRITHATHVATH IHATHADYO}G\(\text{ATH

If it be said (that Brahman is not meant) on account of characteristic marks of the individual
soul and the chief vital air being mentioned; no, because of the three oldness of meditation,
which, found in other places, is appropriate here also. It is argued that the individual self only is
meant in the passage mentioned because of the reference to killing of Th\(\text{av\(\text{stra and, the pr\(\text{ANa
being described as the conscious self etc. but it is refuted by this suthra.

Brahman is denoted by these terms, namely, individual soul, pr\(\text{ANa, and pr\(\text{ajn\(\text{A for the
purpose of threefold meditation

1. The texts sathyam j\(\text{n\(\text{Anam anatham brahma, Anandhambrahma denote the true nature of
Brahman,

2. Th\(\text{athsr\(\text{tva thdhEva anupr\(\text{Avisath; thadhanupr\(\text{avisya}a\(\text{asat}h cha th\(\text{ayath cha abhavath, after
creating it(Brahman) entered into that and became sath and th\(\text{ayath(asath). Sath means the
sentient souls which form the body of Brahman. Thyath denotes the insentient prak\(\text{rthi
which also constitute the body of Brahman.

Hence all the words denoting beings like HiraNyagarbha or inanimate prak\(\text{rthi have reference
only to the Supreme self when they are described as having qualities of Brahman or they mean
Brahman by coordination, sAmAnADHi\(\text{kara\(\text{Nya.

THUS ENDS INDRAPR\(\text{ANADHIKARANAM.
END OF FIRST P\(\text{ADHA OF THE FIRST a\(\text{DHYA}YA OF SRIBHA\(\text{ASYA.
In the first section of the first chapter of Sribhashya it has been shown that a person who has studied the veda comes to understand that the fruits of karma are transient, after the study of the purvamimAmsa, that is, the ritualistic part, and takes up the study of sArirakamimAmsa, the portion dealing with Brahman, in order to acquire the knowledge that will secure him release from the bondage of karma.

The vedantic texts describe the sentient and insentient beings as the body of Brahman who is their inner self, and who controls them from within. it was also shown that Brahman is the first cause and can be known only through scriptures. All vedanta texts are shown to refer only to Brahman and not insentient pradhAna or individual souls. Thus it was confirmed that the reference to AkAsa, prANa, light and Indra actually denote only the supreme self. This Supreme Self, Brahman is Narayana, possessing infinite auspicious qualities of which the world of sentient and insentient beings is the sarira.

Still there are some texts that refer to the beings inside pradhAna or individual souls. In this section the texts that have obscure reference to the individual soul are discussed while in the next direct references are taken up and in the last pAdha of the aDhyAya the texts that refer to the individual soul are shown to denote Brahman only.

SARVATHRAPRSIDDHYADHIKARAaNAM-1-2-1

SUTHRA-1-SARVATHRA PRASIDDHOPADHES ATH-1-2-1 EVERYWHERE (IT IS BRAHMAN WHO IS DENOTED) BECAUSE OF THE WELL KNOWN TEACHING.

The Chandhogyu upanishad contains a text

'aTHa khalu krathumayah purushah bhavathi tha THEthah prethya bhavathi;sa krathamkurveetha -manOmayah prANasarirah bhArupah,(chan.III-14-1,2)

Man is the creature of thought in this world and the next. So let him think (meditate) on himself as made of mind whose body is prANa and whose form is light. Here the doubt is whether the individual self having the attributes of mind etc. is to be meditated or the Supreme self. The poorvapaksha view is that it is the individual self that is denoted because the mind and prANa are the instruments of the individual self, while the Brahman is denoted as 'aprANah hyamanAh, (Mund.2-1-2) without prANa, without mind. Brahman cannot be taken as the object of upasana because in the previous sentence 'sarvam khalu idham brahma, all this is Brahman,' is mentioned and as the object of meditation in this text has specifically been mentioned as manOmayah prANasarirah. The concluding text of the passage 'Ethadbrahma, (chan.III-14-4) this is Brahman ' meaning the inner self is also the individual self mentioned as Brahman by extolling it.

This view is refuted by the above suthra. The entity referred to as manOmaya etc is Brahman because there are abundant vedantic texts that ascribe the qualities such as consisting of mind, prANa as sarira etc.

Ramanuja quotes here texts such as 'manOmayah prANAsariranethA, consists of the mind,
ruler of the subtle body,'(Mund.2-2-7), 'sa EshO antharhrdhaya akAsah;thasmin ayam
purushah manOmayah;amrthO hiraNmayah, (Tait.1-6-1) there is AKAsa within the heart and in
it is this purusha consisting of the mind, immortal and golden' and 'prANasya prANah, it is the
prANa of the prANa and so on. The expression aprANO hyamanAh only means that Brahman
does not depend on mind or prANa.

The text 'sarvamkhalu idham brahmatajjalAn iti shAntha upAseetha ', all this is Brahman,
originating from, merging into, and sustained by it; thus one should meditate with calm mind,'
can also be interpreted as being calm one should meditate on Brahman as the inner self, which
is subsequently described as having mind and prANa in the text quoted at the outset,
namely,'sa krathum kurveetha' etc.

There is a fresh doubt raised here that whether the individual self only is denoted with the word
'Brahman'. The opponent says that it is so because the word 'all' denotes everything from the
creator BrahmA to the common blade of grass, 'brahmAdhisthamba paryantham' which will
apply only to the individual soul by the principle of coordination as the self is one, seen
differently due to avidhya. This world of imperfections cannot mean Brahman. The word
brahman is used sometimes with respect to the individual soul and that is why, the opponent
declares the Brahman is termed as Parabrahman by way of distinction. The individual soul is
Brahman in the state of release and hence the text must mean only the individual self and also
the text 'tajjalan' can be interpreted to mean that the individual soul who is Brahman, enters
into various embodiment due to avidhya and realizes his true nature in the state of release.

This is refuted by the above suthra 'sarvathra prasiddhOpadesAth.'
'tajjalan' refers to Brahman as something well known. 'All this is Brahman' having Brahman as
their inner self. The causality of Brahman has been established by the text 'yathO vA imAni
bhoothAni jAyanthe,' which shows that all beings emerge from merge into and sustained by
Brahman. Also the text further continues to say

'AnandhO brahma ithi vyajAnAth AnandhAth Eva khalu imAni bhoothAni jAyanthe, (Taitt.III-
6)
bliss is brahman, from bliss all these beings originate,' and the text

'sa kAraNam karaNADHipADHipO na chAsya kaschit janithA na chADHipah,
He is the cause and the Lord of the lords of indriyas and there is no creator for Him or any one
above Him. Thus it is clearly stated that Brahman is the Lord of the individual self who is the
master of the senses and Brahman is the cause of everything. Therefore all beings originate
from, merge into and sustained by Brahman and so He is the inner self of all.

Ramanuja concludes by saying that

'athah sarvaprakAram sarvAthmabhootham param brahma shAnthah bhoothvA upAseetha iti
sruthirEva parasya brahmaNah sarvAthmakAthvam upapAdhya thasya upAsanam upadhisathi,'
Therefore, the Supreme Self, Brahman, having everything as its mode, being the Self of all
should be meditated with calm mind, is the instruction by the sruthi. Parabrahman as the cause has the sentient and the insentient in their subtle state as its sarira, which in their gross state is the effect. Hence Brahman is the inner self of all, always. Thus the attribute of Brahman as being free from imperfections and possessing auspicious qualities is not impeded in any way because the defects of the sarira does not affect the self. The individual self cannot be identified with the world because the jivas are different in different bodies and the individual soul even in the state of release is not capable of creation etc. So the word Brahman denotes only the Supreme self.

SUTHRA-2- VIVAKSHITHA GUNOPATTHESCHA-1-2-2 AND BECAUSE THE QUALITIES TO BE STATED APPLY TO BRAHMAN ONLY.

The qualities that are to be stated viz.

'manOmayah prANasarirah bhArupah sathya sankalpa AkAsAthmA sarvakarmA sarvakAmah sarvaganDHah sarvarasah sarvamidham abhyAtthO avAkyanADarah.'

Ramanuja takes up the qualities one by one and explains

1. manomayah- consists of mind. Brahman can be grasped by pure mind. 'parisuddhamanasA Ekena grAhyah.' the pure mind is acquired through the disciplines vimoka etc explained in the jinAsADhikaraNa. By this the attribute of Brahman as different from everything else, free from imperfections and possessing auspicious qualities are denoted. As impure mind will grasp only impure objects the requisite of pure mind for grasping Brahman of such qualities is emphasized.

2. prANasarirah- Having prANa as sarira. Being the sarira means to be supported by, dependent on and to be subservient to the sariri, the self.


4. sathyasankalpa - infallible will.

5. AkAsAthmA - Subtle and pure like the AkAsa. Or the self of even the AkAsa. Or shining by itself (AKAsathi) it makes everything else shine. (AkAsayathi)

6. sarvakarmA - The whole world is His doing. All actions are His.

7. SarvakAmah - All desires are His.

8. SarvaganDHah sarvarasah - To whom all supreme excellent odours and tastes belong, which are not connected with the ordinary ones, which are negated in Brahman by the words 'asabdam asparsam' etc.

9. AbhyAtthah -He makes all these qualities His own

10. avAkee - He does not speak, because, He is

11. anADHaraH - He does not care for anything being avapthasamasthakma, in full possession of everything.
All these qualities apply to brahman only

SUTHRA-3-ANUPAPATTHESTHU NA SARIRAH-1-2-3 BECAUSE THESE QUALITIES DO NOT APPLY IT IS NOT THE INDIVIDUAL SELF.

Ramanuja dismisses the view that it is the individual self which is mentioned by saying

"Thamimam guNasAgaramparyAlOchayathAm sarira sambhanDHena aparimitha duhkha sambanDHayogyasya baddhamukthavasTHasya jivasya prastutha guNa IEsas sambanDHO pi na upapadhyathaithi na asmin prakaraNESAriraparigrahashankA jAyatha ithyariTHah,"

Considering the ocean of auspicious qualities, that is, Brahman, it is clear that there cannot be even a trace of reference in this context to the individual self, who experiences limitless grief due to its connection with the body and who suffers bondage and gets released.

SUTHRA-4 KARMAKARTHRVYAPADHESACCHA-1-2-4 BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF THE ATTAINER AND THE ATTAINED

In the same chapter of ChandhOgya there is a passage that mentions the jiva attaining Brahman on death. 'Etham ithah PrethyaabhisambhavithAsmi, when I depart from hence I shall attain Him,' So the attainer and the attained being distinguished they are different. The word ' Him ' refers to the one denoted as 'manOmaya,' Brahman and the attainer is the individual self.

SUTHRA-5- SABDHAVISESHATH-1-2-5 BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE IN THE WORDS.

In the text 'Esha me AthmA antharhrdhaye' (Chan.3-15-4) the one doing the meditation is put in the genitive case (mE) and the object of meditation (AthmA) is in nominative case. So it is clear that the two are different. Ramanuja quotes here a text from sathapatha brAhmaNA (X-vi-3-2) in which this is made clear.

'vreehirvA yavO vA syAmAkO vA syAmAka thandulO vA, Evam ayam antharAthmani purushO hiraNmayah yaTHA jyothraDoomam,'

like a grain of rice, grain of barley, grain of canary or a kernel of canary seed, thus the golden purusha, who is the inner self, exists like fire without smoke.' The word denoting the individual self is in locative case while the golden purus ha is in the nominative. Therefore only Brahman is the object of meditation.

SUTHRA-6-SMRTHESCHA-1-2-6 FROM THE SMRTHI ALSO

The Brahman is mentioned as the inner self and the object of meditation in the Gita also. 'sarvasya chAham hrdhisnnivishtO, (BG.XV-15) I am inside all beings,' and

IsvarassarvabhoothaAnAm hrdhdEse arjuna thishTath; bhrAmayan sarva bhoothAniyanthrArooDAni mAyayA; thameva saraNamgaccha,

The lord, oh Arjuna, is established in the heart of all beings, driving them around through His mAyA as though mounted on a machine.' This shows the individual jiva as the meditator and Brahman as the object of meditation.

SUTHRA-7-ARBHAKOUKASTHVATH THATHVYAPADHESACCHA-1-2-7

If it is said that Brahman is not denoted because of minuteness and the smallness of abode, it
Brahman is so described for meditation and is like AkAsa. The description of the inner self as residing inside the heart, the smallest abode and as being smaller than the grain 'aNeeyAn vreehErvA yavAdhva,' it is argued that it is only the individual self and not Brahman, who is spoken of in other texts as being unlimited while the jiva is said to be 'ArAgramAthram,' size of the tip of a spiked stick.

This suthra refutes this saying that Brahman is so described for the sake of meditation and is not minute in reality. The same text says 'jyAyAn prthivyAth jyAyAn anthrikshAth jyAyAn dhivojyAyAnEvhyO lokEbhyaht it is infinite like AkAsa greater than the earth and sky etc.' The omnipresence is not affected by being described as minute because being subtler than the AkAsa its all pervasiveness is unaffected by the abode it is said to occupy.

Ramanuja explains the whole passage thus:

Beginning with 'sarvam khalu idham brahma, all this is Brahman,' it enjoins meditation on Brahman as the inner self and the cause of the world. Next it declares the attainment of Brahman through meditation and gives the characteristics of Brahman as being manOmaya, prAnasarira etc. Next mentions Brahman as abiding in the heart as the inner self. From all this it is clear that the minuteness and smallness of abode is only for the purpose of meditation.

SUTHRA-8-SAMBHOGAPRAPTHIRITHI CHETH NA VAISESHYATH-1-2-8
If it is said that being inside the body Brahman will be subjected to joy and sorrow like the individual self, it is not so because of the difference in the nature of the two. The reason for joy and sorrow is not the fact that the soul is inside the body but it is because of karma which does not apply to Brahman.

THUS ENDS SARVATHRAPRASIDDHYDHikaranam.

ATHRADHikaranam 1-2-2

SUTHRA-9-ATTHA CHARACHARAGRAHANATH-1-2-9 THE EATER IS BRAHMAN BECAUSE BOTH MOVABLE AND IMMOVABLE ARE TAKEN AS HIS FOOD.
In katOpanishad there is this text 'yasya brahma cha kshathram chObhE bhavatha Odhanah; mrthyuryasyOpasEchanam ka ithTHA vedha sah, who thus knows where He is, to whom the brAhmaNas and kshathriyas are but food and the death is the condiment?'

The doubt here is that whether the 'eater' signified by 'He' is the Brahman or the individual self. The view that it is the jiva is supported by the fact that the action of eating and enjoyment is suited only to the individual self.

The suthra refutes this by saying that the food being the whole universe of movable and immovable, signified by brAhmaNa and kshathriya, because they are the foremost beings of creation, it means the absorption of the universe and not the action of enjoying the food. Mrthyu, death is said to be the condiment because like the condiment which becomes the inducement for eating the food while itself being eaten, the death consumes everything while itself being consumed by Brahman. The same passage contains the text 'sOaDHvanah pAramApnOthi thadvishNOh paramam padham, he reaches the end of journey and that is the
the supreme abode of Vishnu,' which, says Ramanuja, shows the annihilation by Parabrahman, that is, Lord Vishnu, who is the cause of creation sustenance and annihilation. Therefore the eater is Brahman and not the individual self.

**SUTHRA-10-PRAKARANACCHA-1-2-10 BECAUSE OF THE SUBJECT OF THE CONTEXT**

The subject of the section in which the passage occurs is Brahman. 'mahAntham vibhum AthmAnam mathvA DHeerO na sochathi,' (KaTa-1-2-22) the wise one who knows the self as great and all pervading does not grieve, and 'nAyam AthmA pravachanEna labhyah na mEDHayA na bahunA sruthEna; yamaivEshvnruthE thEna labhyah,' (KaTa.1-2-23) this self cannot be gained by veda nor by intellect nor by scriptural learning; only by him whom He chooses can He be attained. Thus it is shown that Brahman can be attained only through His own grace.

There is a fresh objection that it is not the Brahman who is denoted here but only the individual self because of the later text in the same Upanishad

'rtham pibanthou sukrtthasya lokE guhAm pravishtou paramE parArDhye; cchAyAthapou brahmavidhdo vadhanthi,' (KaTa. 1-3-1)

Which means the two who enter the cave, (cavity of the heart) in the highest world, drinking the reward of their works, are called by those who know Brahman, as the light and the shadow? The two referred here must be the individual soul and prANa or the intellect, because of the mention of the fruits of karma, which cannot be enjoyed by Brahman. As buddhi or prANa are the instruments of enjoyment to the individual self, it is that which is mentioned in the passage. So to say that the subject of the context is Brahman is not appropriate. The next suthra takes up this point.

**SUTHRA 11 -GUHAMPRAVISHTOUATHMANOUHI THADDHARSANATH-1-2-11 THE TWO ENTERING THE CAVE ARE JIVATHMA AND PARAMATHMA, INDIVIDUAL SELF AND BRAHMAN BECAUSE IT IS SO SEEN.**

In this context only the individual self and Brahman are said to enter the cave (of heart)

'tham durdharsam gooDam anupravishTamguhAhitham gaharEshTam purANam aDHyAthmayOgADHigamEna dhEvam mathvA DHeerO harshasokou jahAthi.' (KATA.1-2-12)

The wise, meditating on the self realize the ancient one who, entering into everything dwells in the cave of the heart and who is difficult to be seen, become free from joy and sorrow. By this the brahman is mentioned as entering the cave and by another text,

'yA prANEa sambhavathi adhithih dhevathAmayi; guhAm pravisya thishTanthee yA boothEbhih vyajAyatha' (kAT.1-4-7)

He who knows adhithi who is one with the deities, who is born with the prANa, who entering into the heart abides therein, also describes the individual soul as entering the cave. Adhithi here means the individual soul because it eats the fruits of karma (karmaphalAn atthi ithiadiithih) and the deities are the indriyas through which the jiva enjoys the karmaphala. Hence the two entities mentioned in the passage 'rtham pibanthou' are only jiva and Brahman. Though Brahman cannot be said to enjoy the fruits of karma it is included in the term rtham
SUTHRA-12- VISESHA NACCHA-1-2-12 ALSO BECAUSE OF THE DISTINCTIVE QUALITIES

In the context mentioned the individual self and the Supreme Self are denoted in the role of meditator and meditated, attainer and the attained. The text

'brahmajajnam dhEvameedyam vidhithvA nichAyya imam shAnthim athyantham Ethi,(Kata.1-1-17)

Knowing the one who is born from Brahman to be the one to be worshipped the meditator obtains supreme peace.' Here the word brahma is the individual self originating from Brahman. The same is referred to as dhevam eedyam, deity to be worshipped because of its being ensouled by Brahman. Again

'yah sEthureejAnAm aksharam brahma yath param abhayam thitheershathAm pAram,'(kata.1-3-2)

that which is the bridge for the sacrificers, is the supreme imperishable fearless brahma who is the shore for those who want to cross over (the world), indicates Brahman to be the object of meditation. Another instance where the individual self and the Supreme self are denoted as the attainer and the attained is in the text

'athmAnam raTHinam viddhi sariram raTHamEvacha'(Kata.1-3-3-)

Which mentions the self as the one in a chariot and the sarira as the chariot, thus depicting jiva the meditator as the raThee it goes on further to say

'vijnAna sAraTHiryasthu manah pragrahvAnnarah so adhvanah pAramOthi thadvishnOh paramam padham.'(Kata. 1-3-9)

This means, the one who has intellect as his charioteer and holds the reins of the mind reaches the end of his journey which is the abode of Vishnu. From this the individual jiva is known to be the attainer and the brahman as the attained. Even in the context mentioned at the outset, the _expression cchAyAthapou, shade and light means the individual self who is devoid of knowledge and the supreme self who is omniscient.

Another doubt is raised on account of the section of the Upanishad mentioned which begins with the doubt

'yEyam prEthevichikithsA manushye astheethyEkE nAyamasteethyEke.'

When a man departs from this world some say he continues to exist and others say no. So the poorvapakshin argues that the whole section must refer only to the individual soul.

Ramanuja gives arguments to prove that it is not so. The story goes like this.

NachikEthas, a young boy seeing his father giving away useless objects like old cows to the brahmins after a sacrifice becomes worried as to the effect of this action and repeatedly asks his father to whom he (NachkEthas) is going to be given. The irritated father said "to the Lord of
death." Not wishing to prove his father false Nachikethas goes to the door of Yama who was out and waited three days for him. Yama on returning becomes worried on account of keeping a brahmin at his door for three days waiting without food wants to give him three boons.

Ramanuja after relating this episode says that

1) The first boon asked being his father's forgiveness shows that the boy was aware of the existence of the soul apart from the body.

2) The next one was the instruction in the agnividhya, knowledge of the sacrificial fire which proves that he was aware of the experience of the soul after it leaves the body and

3) the last boon is the question 'Yeyam prethe' etc. and hence it is about the state of the individual soul after it sheds the embodiment, that is, about moksha and not merely refers to leaving the body after death. Therefore the question relates to the true nature of release and of the Supreme self.

The doubt being arisen out of different schools of thought regarding the reality and Nachikethas wanted the truth from Yama direct.

Then after testing him well, Yama gave him the highest knowledge which Ramanuja outlines as follows:

\[
\text{Thrayyantha nisnAthAsthu-nikhila jagadhEka kAraNasya aseshahyeya prathyaneeka ananthajnAnAnadhaikasvarupasya svAbhAvika anavaDHika athisayaasankhyEya kalyana gunakarasya sakala itharavilakshaNasya sarvAthmabhoothasya parasya brahmaNah sarirathayA prakArbhoothasya anukoola aparicchhina jnana svarupasya paramAthmanubhavaikarasasya jivasya anAdhikarmathirOhithasvarupasya avidhyA ucchEdhapoorvaka svAbhavikaparamAthmAnubhavamEva moksham AchakshathE.}
\]

The meaning of the above passage is as follows:

Those well versed in vedanta (thrayyantha nisnAthAh-thryee denotes veda and thrayyantha is vedantha) know that Moksha is the natural experience of Brahman preceded by the removal of anAdhi avidhya due to karma by the jiva, the nature of infinite knowledge of whom is concealed by the beginning less avidhya, has for his essence the bliss rising out of the experience of the Supreme Brahman, whose sarira jiva is, and who is the cause of the universe, devoid of imperfections, possessed of infinite auspicious qualities, different from everything else and the inner self of all.

**THIS IS THE END OF ATRHADHIKARAANAM**

**ANTHARADHIKARAANAM- 1-2-3**

**SUTHRA-13- ANTHARA UPAPATTHEH- 1-2-13 THE PERSON INSIDE THE EYE IS BRAHMAN BECAUSE IT IS APPROPRIATE.**

The chandogya upanishad contains a text
'Ya Esho akshiNi purushah dhryathe esha AtmEthi ho vacha ethadhamrtham
Ethadhabhayam  ethadhbrahma.'

The person seen inside the eye is the self, immortal, fearless and Brahman. A doubt is raised as to whether the person referred to is the reflection in the eye or the individual self or the deity presiding over the eye or the Supreme self.

The poorvapakshin says it could be the person or the self reflected in the eye because of the well known reference to the person and also because it is seen. It may be the individual soul as by looking into the eye it could be ascertained whether the soul is in the body or not. Or, it could be the presiding deity of the eye as per the text of Brhadaranyaka (5-5-2) which says 'rasmibhih ESHo asmin prathishTithah,' meaning that the person seen in the Sun rests on the person seen in the eye, who could be a special divine being.

This view is refuted by the suthra 'anthara upapattheh.' The person seen inside the eye is only the Supreme self. For the text says that He is immortal and fearless which could apply only to Brahman. The text further goes on to say

'ethamsamyaghvAma ithyAchakshathE; Etham hi sarvANi vAmAnyabhisamyanthi;Esha u Eva
vAmaneeh;esha hi sarvANi vAmAni nayathi;Esha u EvabhAmaneeh;Eshahi sarvEshu IOkeshu bhAti'.

The knowers of Brahman call Him as the centre of blessings as all blessings come together in Him. He is the vehicle of blessings for He carries all blessings. He is the vehicle of lights for He shines in all regions. These qualities can be of Brahman only.

SUTHRA-14- STHANADHI VYAPADHESASCHA-1-2-14
because the abode etc. can be attributed only to Brahman
He who abides in the eye is the supreme self as shown on the passage

'ya cchakshushi thishTan chakshusha antharah------yah chakshuh antharOyamayathi Esha tha
AthmA antharyAmyamrthah'(Brhd.III-vii-18)

Who is inside the eye and controls it, He is the immortal inner self. The word seen could very well be used with respect to Brahman as the yogis are able to perceive Brahman in their meditation.

SUTHRA-15- SUKHA VISISHTABHIDHANADHEVA CHA-1-2-15
If only because of the reference to Brahman as bliss.

The subject matter of the section is only Brahman as indicated by the text 'kam brahma kham brahma,' (Chan.IV -x-5) kam is sukha and kham is AkAsa. The same Brahman is denoted as being inside the eye for the purpose of meditation and also to show the characteristic of consisting and leading all blessing as explained in the previous suthra. The word Eva in the suthra shows the needlessness of any other reason.

But an objection is raised here on account of the intervention of the passage on the agnividhya between the text 'kam brahma'(chan.IV-x-5) and the text about the person inside the eye (Chan.IV -xv-1). The context is that of Upakosala who tended the fires in the absence of his guru and the fires instructed him the agnividhya. The instruction was about the meditation on
the fires and the fruit of the meditation is mentioned as the attainment of a ripe old age and prosperity of the descendents. So due to the break in the continuity of the subject matter the person mentioned as being inside the eye cannot be connected with the Brahman mentioned in the beginning by 'kam brahma' etc.

This objection is not tenable because in both texts the word Brahman is used. The instruction by the fires is only subordinate to that of brahmavidhyā because they say that the teacher will show him the way, meaning the path to liberation as Upakosala was desirous of only that, which his guru has not imparted to him before he went away. Further the words of the fires ' Eśā soumya thē asmādvidhyā cha Athma vidhya cha,' shows that the agnīvidhyā is only subsidiary to Athmavidhyā.

The fruits of the agnīvidhyā specified are only by way of praise (arTha vAdha). As the Athmavidhyā should be properly obtained from his guru only, the fires said 'achAryasthu thē gathim vaktha, the guru will instruct you about the path.'

SUTHRA-16-atha EVa cha sa brahma-1-2-16 THEREFORE IT IS BRAHMAN

To the objection as to how it can be ascertained that the words kam brahma, kham brahma denote the Supreme self only as it could very well be like pratheecka upasana such as name is Brahman and mind is Brahman the suthra replies that the words kam and Kham inthe text do not refer to the worldly pleasures and the AKAśa as symbols but what it means is that the bliss is Brahman and the AKAśa is Brahman because of the later text where it is mentioned that what is bliss is AKAśa and what is AKAśa is bliss 'yadhEva kam thadhEva kham,' by which only Brahman is meant.

Ramanuja elucidates on this. When the fires instructed UpakOsala 'prANo brahma,kam brahma kham brahma,' he said that he could understand prANa is Brahman but not about the ka and kha being Brahman. PrANa being the body of Brahman 'prANasarirah' and as Brahman has been denoted as the controller of prANa it was easy to understand 'prANO brahma.' But the intention of the passage being not prathikOpAsana but Athmavidhyā UpakOsala fails to understand the significance of ka and kha with reference to Brahman and has a doubt whether the two has been mentioned as brahman because of their being the sarira of brahman like the prANa or to convey the bliss that is the essence of Brahman. Then the fires said to him 'yadhvA va kam thadhEva kham, yadhEva kham thadhEva kam,' The meaning is that the bliss, which is the nature of Brahman is unlimited and therefore it is Brahman who is denoted by the text 'kam brahma kham brahma' and the same Brahman is referred to later in the passage as the person inside the eye.

SUTHRA-17- sruthOPanishadhkaGathyaBhidiDHANaccha-1-2-17

Also because of the mention of the way of those who know the scriptures In Chan. IV-xv-5 it is said that the knowers of the person in the eye go through the devayANa, the path of light, by which the knowers of Brahman are said to proceed.'thē archisham Eva abhisambhavanti,' they go through the path of light. And later the path is described as 'Eśha dhEva paTHObrahmaPaTHah' this is the divine path of Brahman. So the person in the eye is Brahman only.
SUTRA-18 ANAVASTHIHE ASAMBHAVACCHNEETHARAH

Not any other because of the impossibility of permanency of abode of others. The reflexes self does not stay in the eye always but only till the person reflected stays in front. The individual self has its seat at the heart and connected with all the indhriyas and hence its residence in the eye is not correct. The text 'rasmibhih EshO asmin prathishTithah,' imply the presence of the Supreme self through the rays of illumination like the Sun in the eye and hence it is Brahman only, also because the attributes like nirupAdhika amrthathva, unconditioned immortality will apply only to brahaman.

ANTHARYAMYADHIKARANAM 1-2-4

SUTRA-19-ANTHARYAMEE,ADHI DEVDHI LOKADHISHU THADDAHARMA VYAPADHESATH-1-2-19

The internal ruler of the gods and the worlds is Brahman because of the qualities mentioned. The vAjasanEyns of kAnva as well as mADHyahnDhina branch have the following text,

'yah prthivyAm thishTan prthivyAh antharah yam prthivee na vedha yasya prthivee sariram yah prthiveem antharo yamayathi sa tha Athma antharyamyamrthah,' (Brhd.3-7-3)

This means, the inner immortal self is the one who is inside the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, who controls the earth from inside. Similar description of this inner ruler is found with respect to all elements all luminous bodies, all beings and all organs of the body including mind and intellect and each passage ends with the words 'Esha tha AthmA antharyAmyamrthah' this is the immortal inner self. In the mAndhyandhina text however there is a slight change in as much as the ruler is said to be inside all worlds, all vedas and all yajnas and the words 'ya Athmani thishTan, who is inside the individual self,' is substituted for 'ya vijnAnE thishTan, who is inside the intellect.'

Here a doubt arises as to whether this inner ruler is Brahman or the individual self because in the subsequent text at the end of all the passages depicting the inner ruler of being inside each entity are the words drashta srothA mantha vijnAth, seer, listener, thinker and knower, which applies only to the individual self.

The suthra replies to this on account of the characterestics of Brahman being mentioned that it is Brahman only. Ramanuja explains thus:

'aDHiDhaivAdhilOkAdhipadhachihnithEshu vAkyEshu srooyamANah antharyAmee apahatha pApmA paramAthma nArAyanAh.'

The inner self heard in the sentences marked with the qualities of being the Lord of tdevas and the worlds is the Supreme Lord Narayana. The characteristics of ruling over all deities, all beings and all worlds while being the One applies only to the Supreme Self.

In answer to the question of UddhAlaka as to who is the inner ruler of all beings and worlds YAjnavalkya starts with the passage quoted at the outset and establishes Brahman as the inner ruler and the self of everything. Other texts that substantiate this are,

'anthaf pravishtah sAsthA janAnAm sarvAthmA, entered inside He is the inner ruler and self of
all,' and
'thath srshtvA thadhEva anuprAvisath; thadhanupravisya saccha tyaccha abhavath,(Tait.II-6)
after creating it entered into everything and became sath and tyath.' In the subAla upanishad
also there is a passage which begins with 'naiveha kimchannAgra Aseeth. There was nothing in
the beginning,' and ends with the sentence
'sarvabhootaAnthrAthma apahathapApmA dhivyO devO ekO nArayaNah,'
Which establishes Brahman as the inner self and ruler of all which form His body. The
amrthathva, immortality is natural only for Brahman. Even the word drashtA, seer etc are
applicable to Brahman who is essentially all knowing, sarvajna, and sathyasankalpa, of
infallible will. The text from svetasvahtara upanishad confirms this by
'pasyathyachakshuh srnothyakarNah, apANipAdhO javanO grheethA,(Svet.3-9.)
He sees without eyes and hears without ears and moves fast without feet and grasps without
hands. The jiva requires the instruments of indriyas, its knowledge being obscured by karma
but the Supreme self needs no sense organs for, and His knowledge is His nature. Also the
subsequent line, mentioning drashta and srOtha quoted by the purvapakshin, is nAnyathO
asthi drahtA etc which eliminates any other seer than Brahman. The _expression ' He is your
self ' where the individual is put in the genitive and the self in the nominative clearly
distinguishes the jiva from Brahman.

SUTHRA-20-NA CHA SMARTHAM ATHADDHARMAABHILAPATH, SARIRASCHA-1-2-
NEITHER WHICH IS SAID IN THE SMRTHI NOR THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL (IS THE INNER
RULER) BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF CONTRARY ATTRIBUTES
Here smrthi referred to is that of sAnkhya and what is mentioned therein is praDHAna, the
unmanifest prakrthi, primordial nature, made up of three guNas. The qualities mentioned in
the passage such as being the seer, ruler and self of everything do not apply either to
praDHAna or to the individual soul.

SUTHRA21-UBHAYEPI HI BHEDHENA ENAM ADHEEYATHE- 1-2-21 FOR BOTH READ
THIS AS DIFFERENT
The two versions of the passage, namely, of mADHyandhina and kANva, read as 'ya athmani
thishTan,' and yO vijnAne thishTan,' refer to Brahman as being different from the individual
soul. Therefore Ramanuja concludes the aDhikaraNa by saying
'athah antharyAmee prathyagAthmanah vilakshaNah apahatha pApmA paramAthmA
nArayana ithi siddham,'
It is established that the inner ruler, different from the individual self and free from all
imperfections is the Supreme self, Narayana. There ends the antharyAmyaDhikaraNam.

ADHRSYATHVADHIGUnakADHIKARANAM-1-2-5
SUTHRA-22-ADGRSYATHVADHIGUnakADHARMAOkthEH 1-2-22 THAT WHICH
POSESSES INVISIBILITY ETC. (IS BRAHMAN BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF
ATTRIBUTES.)
The AtharvaNikas read in their text
'aTHaparA yayA thadhakshharam aDhigamyathE yath thaddhresyam agrahyam agOthram
avarNam achakshuskshothramthadhapANipAdham; nithyam vibhum sarvagatham
susookshham thadhavyayam tadh boothayOnim paripasyanthi DheerAh, (MUND.1-5,6)

now by the higher knowledge the imperishable is known, that which is invisible, ungraspable,
onoriginated, and attribute less what has neither eyes, nor cars, nor hands, nor feet; what is
eternal, all-pervading immeasurably subtle and limitless in manifestation-that imperishable
being is what the wise perceive as the source of all creation. *Further there is a mention of
'aksharAths parathah parah, He transcends even the unmanifested causal state of the universe.

Here a doubt is raised as to whether the entities described by the two texts are praDHana and
purusha of the sAnkhya or both denote the Supreme self. The opponent is of the view that the
reference is to the individual soul which is said to be higher than praDHana, the later text
clearly mentioning the unmanifested causal state which is praDHAna and the purusha is
denoted as transcending it.

The argument given in favour of this is; rupa etc are negated which are only the attributes of
manifest form of prakrthi and this points out to the unmanifest praDHAna. The entity higher to
that is the purusha. Moreover the next sloka is

'yaTHA urNa nAbhih srjathE grhNathe cha yaTHA prthivyAm OshaDHayah sambhavanthi
yaTHA sathah prushATH kEsalOmAni thaTHA akshrAth sambhavathi iha visvam.'

This world has sprung from the imperishable as the spider emits and withdraws the web, as the
herbs come out of the earth and as hair grows on the body of man effortlessly. So it points out
to pradhAna the cause of the world and the purusha as being higher.

The suthra refutes this view and says that it is the Supreme self which is denoted by both the
texts because of the attributes mentioned. The subsequent text mentions the qualities like
omniscience, all-pervading etc. *yah sarvajnah sarvavidh,* (Mund.1-1-9) which are only qualities
of Brahman. The imperishable is denoted by invisibility etc. and by 'aksharAthsambhavatheeha
visvam,' the causality is indicated and then *yah sarvajnah sarvavith* shows the omniscience
e tc. Finally the same imperishable is denoted as the highest of all. The word aakshara in the
final text quoted does not denote Brahman as nothing can be higher than that but only means
matter in its subtle state.

SUTHRA-23-VISESHA NA BHEHA VYAPADHESACCHA NETHAROU 1-2-23 THE OTHER TWO
ARE NOT REFERRED TO BECAUSE OF THE ATTRIBUTES AND DIFFERENCE BEING
MENTIONED.

The section of the upanishad quoted begins with the query 'by knowing which everything
becomes known,

kasminnu bhagavO vijnAthe sarvamidham vijnAtham bhavathi.' (Mund. 1-1-3),
in order to know the nature of Brahman. The questioner was Sounaka, a householder asking
Angiras who replied

'dhve vidhyE vedhithavyeithi haasma yadh brahmavidho vadhanthi, parAchaivaparA
cha.' (Mund.1-1-4)
That is, there are two kinds of knowledge, lower and higher. This means the indirect knowledge, parOksha, from the sasthras and the direct intuitive knowledge aparOksha, of Brahman. The parOksha jnAna,says Ramanuja, is the means of attaining the direct intuitive knowledge, which is upAsana, devout meditation. This is confirmed by the text itself which says 'yamevaivEsha vrNthE thEna labhyah,'(Mund. 3-2-3)

Brahman can be attained only by him who is chosen by Him, meaning Brahman. Knowledge is mentioned as the means of intuition while the higher knowledge is the direct through meditation by which the imperishable is said to be known.

The passage about that which is invisible etc. describes the nature of Brahman and that on spider and its web indicates that the imperishable, that is, Brahman, is the cause of the universe. Then the next chapter deals with the need for the varnASrama dharmas which have to be performed, not with the desire for fruit, but as an offering to Brahman. The last section of the upanishad instructs the aspirant to meditate on the Supreme Being, the Self of all, and higher than everything, with devotion by which he can become free from the cycle if birth and death and attain the highest goal on direct perception of the Supreme.

That the Parabrahman is different from the sentient (purusha) and the insentient (praDHAna) is shown by the text

'dhivyOhayumurthah purushahsa bAhyaAbhyantharO hyajah;aprANO hyamanAssubhrO hyaksharAth parathfparah,'
self resplendent, formless, unoriginated and pure, that all-pervading being is both within and without and without prANa and without mind He is higher than the imperishable, (unmanifest causal state of the universe)

SUTHRA-24-RUPOPANNYASACCHA-1-2-24 BECAUSE THE FORM IS MENTIONED.
'agnirmurDhA chakshushee chandrasuryou dhisasrOthrEvAgivvrthAscha vEdhAh;vAyufprANOhrdhayam visvamasyapadbhbhyAmprthrivee hi sarvabhoothAnthrAthmA.'
Fire is His head, eyes are the Moon and the Sun, His ears are the directions, vedas are his eloquence, the wind is his prANa,His heart is the whole universe and from his feet the earth has originated and he is the inner Self of all.this kind of form and the attribute of being the inner self of all apply only to Brahman.

THUS ENDS THE ADHIkarNa.

VAISVANARADHIKARANAM-1-2-6
SUTHRA-25-VAISVANARAH SADHARANASABDHAVISESHATH-1-2-25 WHAT IS REFERRED TO AS VAISVANARA IS BRAHMAN BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF THE COMMON CHARACTERISTICS.
In chAndhogya upanishad there is a passage which begins thus 'AthmAnamEva imam VaisvAnaram samprathyadHyEshi tham Eva no bruhi, (Chand.5-11-6) You only know about vaisvAnara and tell us about it ' and continue to say

'yasthvEthan Evam prAdhesamAthram abhivimAnam AthmAnam vaisvAnaram upAsthE,'
But one who thus meditates upon this vasvAnara Atman as a whole, consisting of parts and self conscious.'

The doubt is about whether this vaisvAnara is Brahman or not. The purvapakshin says that it is difficult to ascertain because the word vaisvAnara is mentioned in the sruthi texts in four different meanings viz. the intestinal fire, one of the five elements, the presiding deity of the fire and the Supreme self.

This suthra confirms that the word vaisvAnara is used here only in the meaning of Brahman. In Chandhogyat it is said that five rishis desirous of knowing about vaisvAnara self and Brahman approached UddhAlka AruNi who took them to Asvapathi, the king of Kekaya who knew about it. The query of the rishis and the answer by Asvapathi is given at the outset.

The reference is to Brahman only because of the sADHAraNasabdha visEsha, the common meaning of the word being qualified by special attributes. The rshis desired to know what Atman is and what Brahman is. Since the terms self and Brahman are used earlier and in the later texts the terms self and vaisvAnara are mentioned vaisvAnara must be Brahman. Moreover the text continues to say

'sa sarvEshu IOkEshu sarvEshubhoothEshu sarvEshu Athmasu annam aththi, He eats the food in all worlds, all beings and all souls,' and in a subsequent text, later, it is said

'thdyaiTHaisheekAthoolam agnouprOthEpradhooyEth Evamha asya sarvEpaAnah pradhooyanthE,

as the soft fibers of isheeka reed when thrown in the fire, burn out so too the sins are burnt up,' as the result of worshipping the vaisvanara Atman. Hence is only the parabrahma that is specified as vaisvanara.

SUTHRA-26-SMARYAMANAM ANUMANAM SYTH ITHI-1-2-26 THAT WHICH IS REFERRED IS THE MARK OF INFERENCE THAT IT IS ONLY BRAHMAN.

The limbs of vaisvAnara is described thus: heaven is the head the sun its eye, air is praNa,AkAsa trunk, water the lower belly and earth is its feet. This description applies only to Brahman and not the intestinal fire, or the fire which is one of the five elements or the presiding deity, agnideva, of fire.

SUTHRA-27-SADBHDHIBHYAH ANTHAH PRAVISHTANAMACCHA NETHI CETH NA THA THA DHRSHTUPADHESATH ASAMBHAvATH PURUSHAMAPI CHA ENAM ADHEEYATHE- 1-2-27

If it is said that vaisvAnara is not Brahman because of the meaning of the word and due to its abiding inside, it is not so. There are three reasons given by the suthra.

1. dhrshtupadhesAth-instruction to meditate on vaisvAnara as Brahman
2. asambhavAth-it is impossible for the intestinal fire to have the form described
3. purusham apich enam aDHeeyathE- VaisvAnara is described as a person which is not suitable in the case of intestinal fire. That the term vaisvAnara denotes only the supreme self is substantiated by smrthi also as the Lord says in the Gita
'aham vaaisvAnarO bhoothvA pachAmyannam chathurviDHHam,' (BG.XIV-15)
I digest the four types of food by being inside the body in the form of vaisvAnara.

SUTHRA-28-ATHA EVA NA dhEVATHA bhooothamcha-1-2-28
For the same reasons mentioned in the previous suthra it could not be the presiding deity at the element fire.

SUTHRA-29-SAKSHADHAPI AVIRODHAM JAIMITIHI-1-2-29
Even taken in the direct sense there is no contradiction says Jaimini. The word vaisvAnara can be derived as visvEshAm narANAm nEthA, one who leads the worlds and men and the word agni as agrE nayathi, one who leads, in which sense both words are applicable to Brahman.

SUTHRA-30-ABHIVAYAKTHIRITHYASYAMRATHYAH-1-2-30
The difficulty in reconciling the expression, 'yastvEthamEvam prAdhEsa mAthramabhivimAnam,(Chn.5-18-1) describing Brahman as occupying the limited space of the heaven earth and,akASA, that is, having heaven for his head etc in the passage, is resolved on account of manifestation, says Asmarathyah. The manifestations in different places are for upAsana.

SUTHRA-31-ANUSMRTHERBADARIH-1-2-31
For the purpose of constant remembrance says BAdhari. It is to enjoin devout meditation on Brahman.

SUTHRA-32-SAMPATTHERITHI JAIMITIHI THATHA HI DHARSAYATHI.1-2-32
Jaimini says that the description of the chest of vaisvAnara as the altar is for offering the prANa, performed by upAsakas in agnihothra sacrifice. The sins of those who make offering with the full knowledge of Brahman have their sins burnt up.

SUTHRA-33-AMANANTHI CHAINAM ASMIN
Moreover they teach vaisvAnara as being within. That is, at the time of offering the prANa in agnihothra, the Various limbs of vaisvAnara are imagined to be inside the body of the worshipper. Thus vaisvAnara mentioned in the said passage is none other than Brahman. With this the vaisvAnarADHikaraNa ends and that is the end of the second pAdha of the first aDHyA of SribhAshya.

THE END OF SECOND PADHA OF FIRST ADHYAYA

DHYUBHVAGHYADHIKARANAM - 1-3-1
SUTHRA-1-DHYUBHVADHYAYATHANAM SVASABDHATHTHE ABODE OF HEAVEN, EARTH ETC IS BRAHMAN BY THE WORD 'SELF.'
MundakOpanishad has the following text:

'Yasmin dhyouh prthivee cha antharikshamOtham manah saha prANaischa sarvaihṭhamEva Ekam jAnaTHa AthmAnam, anyA vAcho vimunchaya; amrthasyEsha sEthuh.(Mund.2-2-5)

Know that to be the Self in which heaven, earth and the sky are woven as also the mind with prAna and the senses. Give up other talk. He is the bridge of immortality.'
The opponent presents the view that the Self mentioned here as being the abode of earth, sky etc. is the individual self. The reason for this is that the individual self alone is the abode of mind, prANa and senses. The next verse speaks of the self as being like a wheel in which all the arteries are connected as spokes and he moves and become many.

'ArA iva raTHanAbou samhathA yathra nAdyah sa EshO anthascharathE bahuDhA jAyamAnah.'

The connection with the nAdis and becoming many, that is, being born in different bodies fit only the description of jiva. Also the individual self alone can be the abode of prANa and the mind.

This view is refuted because of the words 'the bridge of immortality.' Brahman alone is described as the bridge of immortality in various texts.

'ThamEVa vidhvAnamrtha iha bhavathi, nAnyafpanTHA ayanAya vidhyathE' (svet.3-8)

He alone is the means of immortality and knowing Him one becomes immortal. The word 'sethu' is from the verb sinOthi, meaning 'to bind' therefore it means that which binds the jiva with immortality, just as the bridge leads one to the other side of the river.

The purport of the word 'self ' is only Brahman who is unconditioned supreme self. 'Apnothi uthi AthmA.' That which reaches, which applies only to Brahman the pervading self because as the inner ruler it pervades all. The subsequent verse contain words 'yah sarvajnah sarvavid yasyaisha mahimAbhuvi,' He is all-knowing, all cognizing and the world is His glory. MahAnArayaNa upanishad shows Him as the abode of arteries ' santhatham sirAbhisthu lambathyAkosa sannibham' and 'thasyAssikhAya madhye paramAthma vyavasThithah,' This means, like the bud of lotus suspended in the inverted position supported by the arteries is the heart And in the flame in the middle abides the Supreme Self. He is also born in many ways as found in Purushasuktha-21, 'ajAyamAnO bahuDHA vijAyathE.' The unborn takes birth in many ways, meaning He manifests Himself as many. In bhagavat gita also we find the sloka

'ajOpi san avyayAtmA bhoothAnAm isvarOpi san prakrthim svAm aDHishTAya sambhAvAmi Athma mAyAyA,'

eventhough I am unborn, immutable and the lord of all beings I manifest Myself presiding over the prakrthi through My own mAyA.'Hence it is only Brahman which is referred to in the passage.

SUTHRA-2-MUKTHOPASRPYA VYAPADHESACCHA 1-3-2 ALSO BECAUSE BRAHMAN IS STATED TO BE ATTAINED BY THE LIBERATED.

The person mentioned as the abode of heaven, earth etc. is also referred to as the one attained by the liberated.

'yadAH pasyah pasyathE rukmavarNam karthAram isam purusham brahmayOnim;thadhA vidhvAn puNyapApE viDhooya niranjanah paramam sAmyam upaithi,' (Mund.3-1-3)

Which means that when one sees the creator of brilliant hue, the Lord whose source is Brahman then the knower casts off his merit and demerit, becomes pure and attains the
supreme unity? The wise thus becomes free of name and form and attains the supreme just as the rivers lose theirs on reaching the sea.

'yAtha nadhyah syandhamAnAh samudhraE astham gacchanthi nAmarupE vihAyathaTHA
vidhvAn nAmarupAth vimukthah parAthparam purusham upaithi nithyam.'(Mund.3-2-8)

The transmigration, samsara, is due to merit and demerit which makes man acquire nama rupa according to the karma that produces the particular embodiment. So the abode of heaven etc which is referred to as the goal to be attained by those free from puNyapApa and hence from all contact with matter and to become united with Brahman. Therefore it is the Supreme self only.

SUTHRA-3-NANUMANAM ATHADHSABDHATHPRAANA BRTH CHA 1-3-3
The abode of heaven etc. is not what is inferred (praDHAna) because there is no mention of it and also not of the (individual self) the bearer of prANa.

SUTHRA-4-BHEDHAVYAPADHESATH-1-3-4
Because of the mention of the passage oft quoted from Mundakopanishad, namely

'dhvA suparNA sayujA sakhayA saanam vrksham parishasvajAthe; thayOranyah pippalam
svAdhu atthi anasnan anyah abhichAkaseethi,'(Mund.3-1-1)

the two birds sitting on a tree out of which one eats the fruits sour and sweet, meaning experiences sorrow and joy, indicating the individual soul and the other not eating anything simply looks on, which means Brahman. They are said to be sayujA closely united and sakhayA, friendly. The next verse traces the reaction of jva by saying

'samAnE vrkshE purushO nimagNo aneesayA sochathi muhyamAnahjushtam yadhA
pasyathyayameesam asyamahimAnam ithi veetha sokah.'(Mund.3-1-2)

This means that the individual soul grieves for his inability to get free from misery, sees the other, the Lord and becomes free from dejection. by this the difference between the individual self and Brahman is known and hence the reference of the one who is the abode of heaven etc. is Brahman and not jiva.

SUTHRA-5- PRAKARANAATH-1-3-5
As shown in the suthra 'adhrsyathvAdhiguNako dharmOkthEh'(BS.1-2-21) the subject matter of the upanishad is Brahman. The same subject matter is continued throughout and the intervening vaisvAnara text has also been shown to deal with Brahman only.

SUTHRA-6- STHITHYADHANAMAHYAM CHA- 1-3-6
In the verse 'dhvA suparNA' the two birds described as one eating sour and sweet fruits and the other simply looking are the individual self and Brahman respectively and the latter, sarvajna. All-knowing, amrthasEthuh, the bridge of immortality and sarvAthma, the self of all, can only be the dhubvAyathanam, the abode of heaven etc.

THIS IS THE END OF DHYUBVADHYADHIKARANAM
BHOOMADHIKARANAM-1-3-2
SUTHRA-7-SAMPRASADHATH ADHYUPADHESATH-1-3-7
Bhooman is Brahman because of the instruction about it is there in addition to that of
Brahman.

There is this text in Chandhogy,

'yathra nAnyath pasyathi nAnyath srunOthi nAnyath vijAnAthithadhhboomA, yathra anyath pasyathi anyath srunOthi anyath vijAnAthi thadhlapam.' (Chan.VII-23-24)

which means, where one sees nothing else hears nothing else knows nothing else it is great and where one sees, hears and knows something else it is small.

Here the word bhooman means large or great, even though it is derived from the word bahu meaning many, because it is used as an antonym to the word alpam meaning small. Now a doubt is raised as to whether this entity describes as bhooman is the individual self or Brahman.

The poorvapakshin says that it is the individual self. The context is this. Sage Narada approached sanatkumara and asked him to help him to cross over his state of grief and the latter taught him several truths. He began with nama and goes higher and higher, as Narada asked him whether there is anything higher, and ends his discourse with prANa. There is nothing mentioned higher nor it is further questioned by Narada. So the discourse on the self being terminated at this stage the individual self which is accompanied with prANa is what is implied as the greatest by the word bhooman.

The poorvapakshi further argues that prANA is referred to as father and mother and any harm done to one with prANa, is mentioned as an act to be condemned. Even the example of spokes of the wheel should not be misconstrued to denote Brahman because as all insentient beings are connected to the sentient soul for its enjoyment and the individual soul being the one with prANa, it is what is denoted as bhooma.

Moreover the next section refers to the one who places prANa above all else is an athivAdhin, eloquent. He is then said to be speaking surpassingly with truth 'Eshath vA athivadhathi sa sathyEna athivadhathi.' (Chan.7-16) then, the passage on bhooman occurs and hence it is the individual self that is expressed as bhooman.

This view is refuted by the suthra saying that it is only the Supreme self and not jiva because the instruction is given about the bhooman in addition to the individual soul which is termed as samprasAdha, serenity, as known from

'aTHa ya Esha samprasAdhO asmAth sarirAth samuththAya paramjyothirupasampadhya svEna rupENa prathinishpadhyatha Esha AthmA, (Chan.8-3-4)

This serene and happy being rises up from this body and reaches the supreme light and appears in its true form.

The athivAdin mentioned in the passage on prANa is different from the one in the subsequent passage, which mentions the one who realizes the truth as the athivAdhin. It is well known that the Truth is Brahman from the text 'sathyam jnAnam anantham brahma.' As the every successive entity mentioned starting from nAma till prANa are different from the preceding one, here also the truth is different from prANa and is the same as bhooman. It is clear that from the
"Esha thu vA athivadhathi ya satyEna athivadhathi, but he really speaks surpassingly who speaks surpassingly with truth.' that, the athivAdhin regarding prANA is different from the one regarding the truth. Narada then wants to become the athivAdhin of truth. Hence Brahman is introduced as a fresh topic and later it is mentioned that Brahman is bliss 'yo vai bhooma thath sukham nAlpE sukhamasthi.' (Chan.7-23) confirming bhooman to be Brahman as the word bhooman is explained as the infinite. Then the passage quoted at the outset occurs thereby establishing the denotation of bhooman as Brahman because Brahman alone is the infinite bliss.

Ramanuja explains the passage thus:

The one who experiences the unlimited exquisite bliss in Brahman does not see anything else, because everything is the manifestation of the glory of Brahman. He sees nothing apart from Brahman whose Lordly power is due to His divine attributes and glory, and enjoys bliss unalloyed with sorrow because Brahman is essentially blissful.

To the objection as to how this world consisting of pleasure mixed with pain can be perceived as one of pure joy, Ramanuja answers that, because the individual self sees the world different from Brahman he experiences pain and pleasure due to his knowledge being obscured by his karma. Once he is freed from the nescience he sees the world as nothing but the manifestation of the Lord whose nature is of infinite joy and who possesses infinite auspicious qualities.

Ramanuja illustrates this by two examples.

A man affected with bile finds the taste of water unpleasant or moderately pleasant according to the extent of bile he suffers from. The same water tastes good for a healthy person.

Similarly a boy who does not know that a plaything can amuse him he has no liking for it but when he finds that it gives him pleasure he likes it.

So too the world, which is a plaything for the Lord and has Him as its inner self, is seen as an object of joy by the enlightened one.

The concluding sections of the passage on bhooman has this text

'sa vA Esha Evam pasyan evam manvAnah Evam vijAnan ATHMarathih Athmakreedah AthmamiThunah AthmAnandhah sa svarAt bhavathi thasya sarvEshu lokEshu kAmachAro bhavathi.' (Chan.7-25-2)

He, who sees thus, thinks thus, knows thus, loves the self, revels in the self, united with the self and delights in the self. He is the sovereign who is free to move in all the worlds. The word svarat denotes that he is not bound by karma like the normal kings. Also he who sees this does not see death, illness or grief. He, who sees this, sees everything and obtains everything.

'na pasyo mrithyum pasyathi na rOgam nOha duhkhatAm sarvam ha pasyah pasyathi sarvam ApnOthi sarvasah,' (Chan.7-26-2)

**THEREFORE THE SUBJECT OF THE PASSAGE ON BHOOMAN BEING DIFFERENT FROM pRAAna, BHOOMAN IS ONLY BHAHMAN.**
SUTRA-8-DHARMOPAPATTHIESCHA-1-3-8 THE ATTRIBUTES MENTIONED ARE SUITABLE ONLY TO BRAHMAN.
They are, immortality, 'Ethadhamrtham,' supported by its own glory, 'sva mahimni" being the self of all,'sa Eva idham sarvam,' being the cause of everything, 'Athma Eva idham sarvam.' These qualities apply only to the supreme self and hence the bhoorman is Brahman.

AKSHARADHIKARANAM-1-3-3

SUTRA-9-AKSHARAM AMBARANTHADHRTHEH-1-3-9 THE AKSHARA IS BRAHMAN BECAUSE IT SUPPORTS THAT BEYOND AKASA

In BrhadAranyaka upanishad there is a passage in the form of conversation between Yajnavalkya and Gargi in which she asks, after being told that the unmanifest AKasa pervades that above heaven and earth and what is in between, that, by which the Akasa is pervaded. He replied

'sa hovAcha Ethadhvai thadhaksharam gargibrahmanA abhivadhanthi asTHoolam anaNu ahrasvam adheerGHam alOmith asnEham acchAyam,' (Brhad.3-8-8)

That the knowers of Brahman describe it as the Absolute, neither gross nor subtle, neither short nor long neither red nor oily neither shadow nor darkness and so on. Now is it pradhAna, or jiva or brahman is the doubt.

The reason given for it being praDHAna is that in the Mundaka passage discussed earlier, the phrase 'aksharAth parathah parah' (Mund.2-1-2) shows that the word akshara is used with respect to the unmanifest prakrthi.Moreover the question which pervades even AkAsa proves that it is praDhAna because it is the cause of the element AkAsa.

This view is refuted by saying that it is only Brahman because AkAsa is referred to as the support of everything, pervasive of above the heaven and below the earth and in between them, the phrase 'yadbbhootam cha bhavath cha bhavishyath cha' meaning that the AKasa pervades all, past,present and future, which cannot be the element AkAsa but denotes only the unmanifest praDhAna. Then, the AkAsa is said to be woven like warp and hoof and the answer is given as akshara.

It may be said that akshara could be the individual self and not praDHAna because the words it is neither red nor black which eliminates praDhAna as it consists of rajas and thamas depicted as of red and black colour respectively. Further the words asthoolam etc also apply to the jivatma. Which has no form. There is scriptural authority also for the use of the word akshara to denote the individual self and in Gita we find the following words 'ksharasvAni bhoothAni kutasTHo akshara uchyathE' allbeings are perishable and the inner self is called akshara, the imperishable. The next suthra answers this.

SUTRA-10-SA CHA PRASASANATH-1-3-10 AND THIS SUPPORTING COME FROM COMMAND

The subsequent passage tells about the command of the akshara over all beings which cannot apply to the individual soul.

'Ethasya vA aksharasvam prasasanE gArgi suryAchandrmasou viDHRthou thishTathah,,'
Says YAgnavalkya meaning that under the rule of this akshara the sun and the moon are held in their post thus he mentions all beings one by one and says that they are under the control of the akshara. Hence it could only be Brahman.

Sutra-11-anythingAvayAvratthescha- 1-3-11

Because of exclusion of what is of another nature than Brahman the text

'tadhvA Ethadhaksharam gArgh adhrsatam dhrashtastrutham srOthr amatham
mantravijnAtham vijnAth; nAnyadhathO asthi dhrshtr nAnyadhathOasthi srOthr
nAnyadhathO asthi manthr nAnyadhathO asthi VijnAth; Ethasminnu khalu akshre gArgh
AkAsah OthaschA prOthascha.'

This means- the akshara is never seen but seer, never heard but hearer, never thought of but thinker.never known but knower. There is no other seer, hearer, thinker than this. In this akshara is the AkAsa woven like warp and woof. So this excludes praDHAna and also the individual self. Hence the akshara is Brahman.

EEKSHATHIKARMADHIKARANAM-1-3-4
SUTHRA-12-EESHATHIKARAMA-VYAPADHESAATHSAH-1-3-12 IT IS BRAHMAN AS HE IS MENTIONED AS THE OBJECT OF SEEING.

In prasnaupanishad there is this passage

'yah punarEtham thrimAthrENa OmithyEthEna Eva aksharENa param purusham
abhiDHHyayeetha sa thEjasi surye sampannah yaTHA pAdhodharastvachA vinirmuchyathE
EVam havaisha pApmanA vinirmukthah sa sAmabhirunneyathE brahmaLOka, sa
EthasmAth jivaGhanAth parAth param purisAya param purusham eekshathE'.

One who meditates on the Supreme self with the three syllables of "OM", reaches the light and the sun. He frees himself from sin as a snake from its skin. He is led by the saman verses to the world of Brahman where he sees the supreme person, higher than individual souls, dwelling in there. (Pras-5-2)

Here the object of meditation and that of 'seeing' is the same by the thathkratu nyAya.That is, 'yaTHAkrathurasmin IOkE purushah,' (Chan.3-14) which means,according to one's thought, is his world, and therefore what one meditates on he sees that only. The object of meditation is thus mentioned as paramapurushah, whom the upasaka sees,as dwelling, in Brahmaloka. A doubt arises on account of the usage brahmaLOka as to whether this purusha is HiraNyagarbha, that is, the four-faced Brahma or the Parabrahman. This view is supported by the mention of the one who meditates on the first mAtha of praNava returns to the mortal world, by meditating on the two mAthrhas he reaches the world of the Moon in the heavens and on meditating on all the three mAthrhas he attains brahmaLOka which is above the heavens in the preceding verse. This points out only to the world of HiraNyagarbha. The _expression 'EthasmAth jivaGHanATH paRATHparam' indicates the brahma who, being the collective self is higher and subtler than the individual soul who is described as GHana, being connected with gross matter. The qualities mentioned as ajaratva devoid of old age etc are to be
reconciled with the concept of HiraNyagarbha.

This view is refuted by the suthra because there is a clear mention of the object of seeing as the Brahman. In the concluding verse quoted by the purvakshin, it is said

'Tham onkArEna EVa ayathanEna anvEthi vidvAn yath shAnthamajaram amrtham abhayam param cha'

by the omkara the wise know him to be free from old age, immortal, fearless and the highest'

These attributes belong to Brahman only. Moreover the expression 'EthasmAth jeevaGHanAth paraTHparam,,' higher than the souls in gross form applies to the HiraNyagarbha also as he is the first creation and hence endowed with a body. By the attributes mentioned, namely ajaram amrtham etc. the dwelling place of such person seen by the meditator of praNava cannot be brahmalOka of the HiraANyagarbha but of the supreme self only. Also the place attained by one who is released from all sins cannot be the lOka of Brahma. This we know from the text thadhv ishnOfparam padham sadhA pasyanthi soorayah, (Subala.6) the wise see the abode of VishNu always.' The conclusion that the brahmaloka is above the sky is not correct because there are several worlds which intervene. So the object of 'seeing' is the Parabrahman only.

**DHAHARADHIKARANAM-1-3-5**
**SUHTHRA-13 DHAHARA UTTHAREBHYAH-1-3-5**  THE SMALL AKASA IS BRAHMAN
**BECAUSE OF THE SUBSEQUENT TEXTS.**

In Chandhogya the following passage refers to the space inside the heart,'

aTHa yadhidham asmin brahmapurE dhaharam pundarikam vEsma,
dhaharO asminnanthara AkAsah thasmin yadhanthah,
hadhanvEshtavyam;thadhvAvavijinjnAsithavyam,'(chan.8-1-1)

The meaning is, in this city of Brahman there is a mansion in the form of lotus and within that is the small AkAsa; what is within that small AkAsa is to be sought after and to be understood. Now the doubt is whether the small AkAsa within the lotus of the heart is the element Akasa or the individual self or Brahman. It is claimed to be the element Akasa because of the well known implication of the word to it only.

This view is refuted by the suthra because of what is denoted by a subsequent passage

'Esha AtmA apahatha pApma vijarO vimrthyur vishOkO vijiGhathso apipAsah sathyakamah sathyas sankalpah' (Chan.8-7-1),

The self which is free from evil, old age, death, sorrow, hunger and thirst whose desire is of truth and whose resolve is of truth,' is mentioned as that to be sought and known. These attributes, which are also found in the dhaharAkAsa, (Chan.8-1-5) prove that it is Brahman.

Moreover the comparison

'yAvan vA ayam AkAsah thAvAn EshO antharhrdhaya AkAsah,' this AkAsa within the heart is as large as the other AkAsa,meaning the bhoothAkasa, does not
make sense if the dharAkasa is the same as bhoothAkAsa. But an objection is raised that the supreme self is described as 'jyAyAn prthivya jyAyAn anthrikshAth, (Chan.3-14-3) as being larger that the earth and sky and hence it could not be compared to the AkAsa in size.

Ramanuja answers as follows:

The comparison to akAsa is given in order to dismiss the idea of smallness on account of the dhaharAkAsa being situated inside the heart, as in the expression 'ishuvath gacchathi savithA,' the sun moves like an arrow, to indicate the fastness of movement, though in fact the sun moves faster.

Another argument forwarded to show that the dhaharAkasa is not Brahman. It is not dhaharAkAsa which is intended to be sought and understood but only what is inside it. So dhaharAkaSA is distinguished from that inside it. This objection is ruled out for the following reason. The sarira of the meditator is indicated as the city in which Brahman dwells and the dhaharAKAsa denotes the omniscient, omnipotent Lord, who comes to dwell in it out of love for the devout upAsaka, with all his auspicious attributes, which is the object of meditation. That is, the Brahman who is the dhaharAkAsa is to be meditated and understood along with his attributes.

But the opponent questions the interpretation that, the dharAkAsa is Brahman and 'thath' in 'thasmin yadhantha' indicates the attributes of Brahman, and both being the object of meditation is indicated by 'thadhanvEshtavyam', to which Ramanuja replies thus:

The dharAkAsa is said to be as large as the bhoothAkAsa and then the earth, sky, sun, moon and the stars etc are said to be in it. Then it is said that all desires realized and not realized are there in it to be enjoyed and the dhaharAkAsa, though being inside the heart and thus inside the body, is not affected by old age etc. The text further denotes that the dhaharAkAsa is Brahman by the sentence 'Ethath sathyambrahma param,' meaning, this city is the reality which is the cause of all, and the qualities of Brahman have been attributed to it by 'Esha AthmA apahatha pApmA, the self free from evil,' confirming that it is Brahman by 'sathyakAmah sathya sankalpah, of true wish and infallible will, and the declaration that those who do not know these qualities of Brahman enumerated in the passage attain perishable results while those who know realize their goal and have their wishes fulfilled.

Therefore the dharakasa is Brahman while and the qualities abiding inside is both to be meditated and known.

SUTHRA-14-GATHISABDHABHYAM;THATHAHI DHRSHTAM;LINGAM CHA-1-3-14
DHARAKASA IS BRAHMAN ON ACCOUNT OF THE MENTION OF 'GOING INTO BRAHMAN' AND THE WORD BRAHMALOKA. THIS IS ALSO SEEN FROM THE OTHER TEXTS AND THERE IS AN INDICATORY SIGN.

The Chandhogyya passage

'thadhyaTHA hiraNyaniDHim nibhitham akshEthraJnA uparyupari sancharanthah na vindhEyu, EvamEva imAh prajAh ahrarahargacchanthyah Etham brahmaLOkam na vindhanthi; anrthEna hi prathyooDAh,'(Chan.8-3-2)
which means, as the people who do not know the field,(akshEtrajnA) walk over and over and do not know the gold treasure buried underneath, so do all the beings go to brahmaloka everyday but do not know it because they are covered with untruth. Here the word Etham denotes dhaharAkAsa and all beings are said to enter into it everyday in sleep but do not know it as such. So by the gathi, going and sabda, the word brahmalOka, the dhaharAkAsa is understood as Brahman. This is substantiated by other texts also.

In chandhogya

'EVAMeva khalu somya imAh sarvAh prajAh sathi sampadhy na vidhuh,sathi sampatsyAmahe ithi’ (Chan.VI-9-2)

And

'satha Agaccha na vidhuh satha acchAmaha ithi’ (Chan.VI-10-2)

The two texts mean, all this beings having gone to braHmaloka (in their sleep) do not know it and having returned from it do not know that also. Similarly the word brahmaloka is used in the sense of the abode of Brahman in the texts like 'Esha brahma lokah samrAt iti ho vacha,' (Brhd.IV 3-32) this is the world of Brahman. The mention of all beings getting merged in Brahman in the state of deep sleep as in pralaya is the sufficient inferential sign of the dhaharAkAsa being Brahman and so is the word brahmalOka denoting that of Brahman. Even if the other texts do not mention it, the moving about of all beings to the world of Brahman everyday and not knowing it, is itself the sign of dhaharAkAsa being Brahman only.

SUTHRA-15-DHRTHESCHA MAHIMNAH ASYA ASMIN UPALABDHEH-1-3-15
Because of the mention supporting the world by dhaharAkAsa, the glory which is of Brahman only 'sa sEthuhvriDhoohirEsham lOkanAm asambhEdhAya'(Chan.8-4-1) this is a bridge, limiting the worlds so that they do not mingle with each other. This quality of being a support to the worlds denote that the dhaharAkAsa is Brahman. In BrhadAraNyaka also we find the passage,

'Esha sarvEsvarah Esha bhootADhipathih Esha bhoopathpAlah Esha sEtuuh viDHaraNa EshAm lOkanAm asambhEdhAya,' (Brhd.4-4-22)

He is the LOrd of all, master of all beings and ruler of all, and He is the bridge and limit so that these worlds do not get mixed up. And

'Ethasya vA aksharasya prasAsanE gArgi suryAchandramasou viDhrthou thishTathah,'(Brhd.3-8-9)

By the rule of this imperishable one, Gargi, the sun and the moon are held in their position. Since this power of Brahman is also seen in dhaharAkAsa it is Brahman only.

SUTHRA-16-PRASIDDHESCHA-1-3-16 ALSO BECAUSE OF THE WELL KNOWN MEANING

'kO vA hyEVAyAth, kah prANyAth, yadhEsha AkAsahAnandhO na syAth, (Taitt.II-7)

Who could breath in and who will breath out if this bliss is not the AkAsa.' and

sarvANi ha imAni bhoothAni AkAsAdhEva samuthpadhyanthe.(Chan.1-9-1)

All these beings come from AkAsa only.' From this it is clear that the term AkAsa is used to
denote Brahman. The qualities like free from evil etc. emphasize this meaning of AkAsa excluding any reference to the bhoonthAkasa.

SUTHRA-17-ITHARAPARAMARSAH SA ITHI CHETH, NA, ASAMBHAVATH-1-3-17 IF IT IS SAID TO BE THE INDIVIDUAL SELF DUE TO THE MENTION OF IT SUBSEQUENTLY, IT IS NOT, BECAUSE OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SUCH ASSUMPTION.

The opponent quoting the passage

aTHa sa Esha samprasAdhaH asmAth sarirAth samuttAya param jyothisa sampadhya svena rupeNa abhinishpadhyathe,Esha Athma, ithi hOvAcha Ethath amrtham abhayam Ethath brahma,(Chan.8-3-4)

This individual self having risen from the body attains the supreme light and its true self. This self is immortal, fearless and this is Brahman.' So the dhaharAkAsa may refer to the individual self.

This view is refuted on the grounds that the qualities like apahatha pApmathva, being free from evil do not apply to the individual self.

SUTHRA-18-UTTHARATH CHETH AVIRBHOOTHASVARUPASTHU- 1-3-18

If it is said that the later passage ascribed to prajApathi speaks of individual soul only, it is only with reference to the real state of the soul

'Esha AtmA apahatha pApma vijarO vimrthyurvishOkO vijiGhathso apiAsah sathyakamah sathya sankalpah ' (Chan.8-7-1),

The self who is free from evil, old age, death, sorrow, hunger and thirst whose desire is of truth and resolve is of truth,' is mentioned as that to be sought and known. In the passage where PrajApathi gives instruction to Indra, who approached PrajApathi with the intention of knowing the true nature of the self that is to be enquired into. After describing the embodied soul in waking, dream and deep sleep states Prajapathi says

'na ha vai sasirirasya priyApriyayoh apahathirasthi asariram vA va santham na priyApriEy sprsathah,(Chan.8-12-1)

There is no freedom from joy and sorrow till one is in embodiment and once the soul rises above and frees him from the body, joy and sorrow touches him not. And further states that the soul rising above attains the light and its own nature.

aTHa sa Esha samprasAdhaH asmAth sarirAth samuttAya param jyothisa sampadhya svena rupeNa abhinishpadhyathe. (Chan.8-12-3)

Here the light is denoted as the Supreme being and attaining which the jiva is said to enjoy freedom in Brahmaloka while in the stage of samsara the jiva is like a horse tied to the yoke. So the entire chapter has been devoted to the explanation of the true nature of the individual self. Therefore the qualities like apahatha pApmma etc may well denote the self and since the same qualities are shown in the text about dhaharAkAsa it may as well be the individual self.
This is refuted by the words 'Avirbhootha svarupasthu' in the suthra which Ramanuja explains thus:

'Poorvam anrtha thirOhitha apahatha PapmathvAdhi guNakasvasvarupah paschAth vimuktha karma bandDHah sarirAth samurTHithah paramjyothishurapasmanpannah Avirbhoothasvarupah san apahathapAmamthvAdhi gunavisishtah thathra prajApathi vAkye abhiDheeyathe, dhaharavAkyE thu athirOhitha svabhAva apahatha ApmathvAdhvisishta Eva dhaharAkasah pratheeyathE'

That is, the qualities like freedom from evil etc. is attributed to the soul in the state of release, when its svarupa is no longer concealed by avidhya-karma, according to the passage referring to PrajApathi while the same qualities are mentioned with respect to dhaharAkAsa which is not under avidhya. So it means only Brahman. Moreover the description of dhaharAkAsa as the sEThu, bridge that supports the worlds and as sathya will not be appropriate in the case of individual jiva even in the state of release. This fact is proved later in the suthra 'jagathyvApAravarjam'(BS.4-4-17)

SUTHRA19-ANYARTHASCHA PARAMARSAH-1-3-19 THE REFERENCE TO THE INDIVIDUAL IS FOR DIFFERENT REASON.

The passage, 'aTHa sa Esha samprasAdhah asmAth sarirAth samutthAya param jyothishurupa sampadhyya svena rupeNa abhinishpadhyathe,' in Chandhogya chapter8, section3, with respect to dhaharAkAsa is identical to the one in chapter 8, section 12 that deals with the instruction of prajapathi. Both describe the soul rising and attaining the light and its true nature. But the latter is for the sake of meditation on the dhaharAkAsa and not to show that the individual soul is dhaharAkaAsa.

SUKTHA20-ALPASRUTHERTHI CHETH- THADHUKATHAM- 1-3-20

If it is argued that the dharAkAsa is the bhoothAkAsa because of the smallness mentioned, the reply to this has already been given in suthra1-2-7 as 'nichAyyathvAth' that is, brahman is denoted as small for the sake of meditation. Therefore, says Ramanuja, what the dhaharAkAsa refers to is only

'anAghrAtha avidyA dhoshagonalDHah svAbhAvika nirathisayajnAparishvag BanghDKaruththavishakththi thEjafprabhrthhi aparimithhA dhArAguNasAgaRAh purushOtthama Eva.'

The supreme purusha, who is untouched by defects of avidhya and who is the ocean of unlimited great qualities like knowledge, strength, sovereignty, prowess, power and radiance etc. The self denoted by the passage in section on Prajapathi is only the individual self.

SUTHRA-21-ANUKRTHESTHASYA CHA-1-3-21 DUE TO THE MENTION OF ATTAINING THE LIKENESS THAT.

AS the individual self is id to attain the supreme light by meditating on the dharAkaAsa it should be different. This is supported by the passage in Mundakopanishad

'yadhA pasyah pasyathErukamvarnam karthAram isam purusham brahma yonim; ThadhA vidhyAn puNyapApam viDHooya niranjah paramam samyam upaithi,'

When the seer sees the radiant being, who is the creator, the Lord and Supreme purusha,
he sheds all his merit and demerit and becomes like the pure Supreme self. (Mund.3-1-3)

**SUTHRA-22-API SMARYATHÆ-1-3-22 THE SMRTHI ALSO STATES THIS**

In the gita the Lord says 'idham jnÄnam upÄsríthya mama sÄdharmyam agathA, those who acquire this knowledge become like Me.'(BG.14-2)

**THUS ENDS THE DHAAHARADHIKARANAM**

**PRAMITHADHIKARANAM-1-3-6**

**SUTHRA-23-SABDHADHEVA PRAMITHAH-1-3-23 FROM THE WORD (LORD) MENTIONED IN THE TEXT, MEASURED ('BY THE SIZE OF THE THUMB.')**

In the KatOpanishad there is this text,

'angushTha maThrah purushah maDHya Athmani thishTathi, eesAnO bhoothabavyasya,na thathO vijigupsathE,'(KaTa.II-4)

'This being of thumb size stands in the middle of the self as the Lord of past and future and therefore there is no fear.' And

'angushTha maThrah purushah jyOthiriva adhoomakah eesAnO bhoothabavyasya, KaTa.I-13

this thumb sized being is like light without smoke and the Lord of past and future.' The same purusha is spoken as

'angushtamAthrah purushO antharAthmasadhA janAnAm hrdhayate sannivishtah'(KaTa.2-6-17)

the inner self situated in the heart of all people.

This person of the size of a thumb is the individual self, says the poorvapakshin. The reason given for this is that there is mention about the jiva as being of the size of a thumb in the scriptural texts. In svetasvatara upanishad the individual self is referred as such.

'prANADHipah sancharathi svakarmabhih; angushTha maThrah ravithulyarupah sankalpa ahamkArah samanvitho yah,'(Svet.5-7,8)

The lord of prANA,of the size of a thumb, brilliant as the sun, moves with his actions, and is endowed with will and ego. Further nowhere is any mention of Brahman as angushTamAthra, thumb sized.

This argument is refuted because there is the word in the passage quoted, namely, eesAnO bhoothabhayasya, Lord of past and future which applies only to Brahman and not to jiva who is under the control of his karma.

**SUTHRA-24-HRDHYAPEKSHAYATHU MANUSHYADHIKARATHVATH-1-3-24**

With reference to the heart (for upAsana for which) human beings alone are qualified (and not other creatures.) Brahman is meditated as being in the heart, which is of the size of thumb, and therefore brahman is said to be angushTamAthRA which is not inappropriate. Man alone is capable of meditation and hence Brahman being described as angushTamAthra means that he is seen in the heart as such. Other creatures like horse, snake etc. though also have heart of thumb size are excluded for this reason. The status of Brahman being angushTamatha is discussed in a later suthra.
DHEVATHADHIKARANAM-1-3-7

SUTHRA-25-THADHUPARYAPIBADHARAYANAH SAMBHAYATH-1-3-25

BadarAyaNa says that meditation is possible for beings higher than humans like dhevas because of the possibility.

Since it is said in the previous suthra that only human beings are qualified to meditate the question arises whether those higher than humans are also qualified or not.

The poorvapakshin says that they are not because they do not have prAkrtha sarira and hence cannot observe the spiritual disciplines, sADHana sapthaka like viveka and vimoka outlined in the jinjnAsAdhikaraNa. Neither the vedanta texts nor the injunctions in the puravamimamsa texts refer to the embodiment of devas.

This is refuted by the suthra. Meditation is possible for the higher beings also because they also have desires, wishes, hardships and sufferings and know that the highest bliss can only be found in Brahman, who is untouched by evil and possessed of infinite auspicious qualities.

[This can be seen in the purAnic lore where we find Indra and others facing troubles and even Brahma is said to have meditated on Narayana before starting the creation, in BhAgavatha purANa.]

The objection forwarded that they do not possess a body is not correct as prajApathi and Indhra and others are described as having body in the upanishads in the chapters on creation and meditation. All the scriptures describe four kinds of creation, deva, human, animal and plants. They occupy the places till brahmaloka according to their karma. In the section on Prajapathi giving instruction to Indra, the latter was said to have approached him along with Virochana with samith on hand and staying with him as his disciple for thirty-two years, all of which implies the embodiment of Indra and the like.

Even in the karmakanda there are manthras and arthvAdhAs (laudatory passages) which speak of the devas having bodies as could be seen in 'vajrahasthah purandharah,' Indra with vajrAyuDHa in his hand, etc. These passages cannot be ignored as laudatory because the qualities that exist alone will be praised not those which are nonexistent.

Since itihisas, puranas and dharmasasthtras also speak of devas as having embodiment they are also qualified for meditation.

SUTHRA-26-VIRODHAH KARMAI ITHI CHETH, NA,ANEKA PRATHIпатTHERDHARSAНATH-1-3-26

If it is said that if devas have bodies it makes them impossible to be present at various yajnas to accept havirbhAga simultaneously the suthra refutes it saying that they are capable of assuming several bodies through their superhuman powers. Even yogis were found to have such powers as in the case of soubari who was supposed to take several bodies to please his many wives.

SUTHRA-27-SABDHA ITHI CHETH, NA,ATHAH PRABHAVATH PRATHYAKSHANUMANABHYAM-1-3-27

If it is said that the embodiment involves contradiction with respect to words, it is not so
because beings originate from them(words) as seen from perception and inference.

This means, all the words in the veda and their meanings are eternal as accepted by all thinkers. Hence the forms and entities denoted by the vedic words like indra, varuna etc are also eternal and if the devas are said to have embodiment they will not be eternal as the bodies are subjected to destruction and their names denoted in the veda will lose their meaning being just an appellation like Devadatta.

This view is refuted by the suthra. The names like indra found in the veda are not related to a particular entity but a class. That is why the vedic words are said to be eternal. The creator, Brahma utters a word and the form comes into being. Hence the entities are created ever new and their having a corporeal body is not detrimental to the eternity of the word in the veda denoting them. There is valid proof for this through perception, inference, that is, through sruthi and smrthi.

Sruthi says

'vEdhEna rupE vyAkarothsathAsatheeprajApathih.(Taitt.Aran.2-6)

PrajApathi created the names and forms through Veda, being and nonbeing. And

'sa bhoorithi vyAharath bhoomim asrjatha; sa bhuva iti vyAharath so anhariksham asrjatha'

He uttered the word 'bhoo' and created the earth and Uttered the word 'bhuva' and created the sky.

From smrthi also we know that everything was created by Brahma through words of veda.

'anAdhi niDHanO hyEshA vAg uthsrshtA svayambhuvA,Adhou vEdhamayee dhivyA yathah sarvAhsarvApsroothayah'

In the beginning the creator gave out divine speech beginning less and endless in the form of veda from which everything originated. (MB.shanthi.231)Therefore the devas having bodies does not in any way makes the vedic words meaningless.

SUTHRA-28-ATHA EVA CHA NITHYATHVAM-1-3-28 THE ETERNITY OF THE VEDAS RESULT FROM THIS REASON ONLY.

Brahma remembers the words after each deluge and creates the devas and rshis as before and hence the eternity of the Vedic words. The rshis are called manthradrshtas, seers of manthra and not composers for the same reason. But at the time of prAkRtha pralaya, complete dissolution, Brahma himself ceases to exist and how can the creation take place based on the remembrance of the vedas as in naimithhikapralya, the intermediate dissolution, is the question raised and the next sutha answers that.

suthra29samAnanAmarupathvAthcha Avrththou api avirODHO dharsanATHsmrthEScha-1-3-29

As said in the Chandhogyaa text 'thadhaaikshatha bahusyAm prajAyEya,' etc the Lord creates everything as before and entering into all beings gives them name and form and hence the creative process happens as before starting from that of Brahma himself. This is how the veda
cme to be called apourushEyam, uncreated by any individual. The supreme person also follows the same order of the vedas as before but it happens spontaneously for Him and not through memory.

There is scriptural evidence for this as we find in svetAsvathara upanishad

'yO brahmANam vidhaDHahi poorvam yO vai vEdhAmscha prahtiNOthi thasmai,'
he who first created Brahma and gave the vedas to him. In the puraNaS like nArasimha and VarAha also we find passages to substantiate this.

'thathra supthasya dhEvasya nAbhou padhmamajAyAtha;hasmin padhmE mahAbhAga vEdhavEdhAnga pAragah; brahmOthpannah,sa thEnOkthah prajAh srja mahAmathE.' (Nara.10)

Also in vaRaha puraNa we find the text

'Evambhoothasya me dhevi nAbhipadhmE chathurmukhah;uthpannah;sa mayAchOkthah prajAAh srja mahAmathE.'

Both passages describe how Brahma came out from the naval of Narayana and was instructed on creation. So the devas also are qualified for brahmavidhya.

MADHVADHIKARANAM-1-3-8
SUTHRA-30--MADHVADHISHVASAMBHAVATH ANADHIKARAM JAIMINIHYEM DEVAS ARE NOT ENTITLED FOR MADHUVIDHYA DUE TO IMPOSSIBILITY-JAIMINI.

It was established by the previous suthras that devas are also qualified for brahmavidhya But a doubt arises as to whether they are qualified for meditations in which they themselves are the objects. Jaimini is of the opinion that they are not. In the madhuvidhya for example (Chan.3-1-1) one is instructed to meditate on some parts of the sun, called 'madhu' because certain nectar being produced as the result of certain sacrificial rites in rkveda. The fruit of such upAsana is the attainment of the position of vasus Adhithya etc. Jaimini says devas like Adithya, the sun and the vasus cannot meditate on themselves as they already enjoy the fruit of the vidhya. This and the next are suthras in the nature of poorvapaksha.

SUTHRA-31-BHAVAM THU BADHARAYANAH-1-3-32 FOR BADHARAYANA THERE IS QUALIFICATION (FOR THE DEVAS)

Badharayana thinks that even vasus, adhityas and others are qualified for madhuvidhya because of the probability that they have only achieved their present status through upasana on Brahman and they may wish to continue that in order to maintain their position in future They can meditate on Brahman in themselves. In madhuvidhya there is two parts

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one dealing with Brahman in his causal state and

Other in the state of effect

First section upto the text 'aTha thadhooordhvam udhEsya, (Chan.3-11-1) when from there he has risen up' implies the manifestation of Brahman as the effect in the form of vasus etc. and the latter part of the above text is about the meditation on causal Brahman as abiding in the sun as its inner self.

'na ha vA asmA udhEthina nimlOchathi sakrddhivA naiva asmai bhavathi ya EthAm Evam brahmOpanishadham vedha,'

For him the sun neither rises nor sets. He who knows this brahmopanishad, there is always the day. This refers to the whole of madhuvidyā as brahmOpanishad and the fruit of upasana is mentioned as the attainment of vasuhood according to the attainment of Brahman. The meditation on light enjoined for devas only emphasizes the fact that Brahman alone is to be meditated. Hence devas are qualified for madhuvidyā.

APASUDHRADHIKARANAM-1-3-9
SUTHRA-33-SHUGASYA THADHANADHARA SRAVAaNATH THADHADRAVAaNATH SOOCHYATHE HI-1-3-9 GRIEF DUE TO THE CONTEMPTUOUS TALK THAT GRIEF WAS REFERRED TO, ON JANASRUTHI APPROACHING RAIKVA

The subject under discussion here is whether sudras are also qualified for Brahmajñāna. The poorvapaksha view is that they are qualified because even though they are not expected to do the vaidhika karamas the meditation is only a mental act it does not prevent them from attaining brahmajñāna. The argument is that how can it be possible to attain brahmajñāna without studying veda of which they are prohibited,?

The poorvapakshin answers that the knowledge of Brahman can be obtained through the listening to itihāsa and purāṇa.

Also there is evidence for sudras having brahmajñāna from the example of Vidhura and the like. Even upanishads have instances of this. When Janasruthi approached Raikva for instruction on brahmavidhyā he was called sudra by Raikva. So this shows that sudras are also qualified for meditation on Brahman.

Ramanuja refutes the view because of the absence of capabilities. Without knowing the vedas and vedāṅgas the procedure of meditation and its culmination are not possible and since this vedādhyāyana is prohibited for a sudra he cannot do the upāsana. Even in itihāsa and purāṇas only those who have mastered the vedas only acquired brahmajñāṇa. Merely listening of itihāsa and purāṇa, prescribed for the sudras, are for removal of sins and not for doing upasana. People like Vidhura were well versed in vedas in their purva-janma, who acquired their sudra janma due to prarabdha.

The example of Raikva and Janasruthi where the former is heard to call the latter as sudra is to be interpreted otherwise. This is explained in the sūtra. Janasruthi on hearing the talk of two rshis in the form of swans, who, wishing to kindle the desire of knowing Brahman in him, flew
past him and while one was praising him for being a generous person and adhering to dharma the other said that unless he acquires brahmajnAna from Raikva his greatness is not worth mentioning. Then with grief for not knowing about Brahmman, he approached Raikva who called him sudra not because of his birth but because of his grief. The word sudra is derived as 'sOchathi ithi sudhrah' meaning one who grieves.

SUTHRA-34 -KSHATHRIYATHVAGATHESCHA-1-3-34 BECAUSE HIS BEING A KSHATHRIYA IS KNOWN
JAnasruthi was described in Chandhogya upanishad as bestowing gifts and food liberally and also gave Raikva several villages as gurudhakshina. So this shows him to be a king and thus a kshathriya.

SUTHRA35- UTTHARATHR CHAITHRRA THENA LINGATH -1-3-35 BECAUSE OF THE INDICATION ON BEING CONNECTED WITH THE DESCENDANT OF CHITHRARATHA, A KSHATHRIYA
In connection with this same samvidhya JAnasruthi is mentioned with AbhiprathArin, a descendent of ChitraraTHa who was a kshathriya.

SUTHRA-36-SAMSKARA PARAMSATH THADHABHAVABHILAPACCHA-1-3-36 BECAUSE OF THE PURIFICATORY RITES AND THEIR ABSENCE (IN SUDRAS)
In the scriptures the purification ceremonies like upanayana are prescribed before learning of the vedas. Since these are only prescribed for the first three varnas he fourth varna is not qualified for upasana.

SUTHRA-37-THADHABHAVANE CHA PRAVRTTHEH- 1-3-37 BECAUSE OF THE ASCERTAINMENT OF THE ABSENCE (OF SUDRAHOOD)
In Chandhogya we have the section in which the guru Gouthama imparted the Brahmavidhya to SathyakAma jAbAli after ascertaining that he was only a brahmin. He was the son of a maid servant and told the truth to the guru that he did not know who his father was. The guru said that he must be a brahmin because he spoke the truth. This shows that being a sudra does not qualify one for brahmavidhya.

SUTHRA-38- SRAVANADHYAYANARTHAPRATHISHEDHATH- 1-3-38 BECAUSE OF THE PROHIBITION ON HEARING AND STUDYING THE FOURTH VARNA IS PROHIBITED FROM HEARING AND STUDYING THE VEDAS WITHOUT WHICH BRAHMAJNANA IS IMPOSSIBLE.
SUTHRA-39-SMRTHESCHA-1-3-39
Smrthis also prohibit vedic learning to the fourth varNa.

PRAMITHADIKARANASESHAH-1-3-6CONTINUED
In the pramithADHIkaraNa-1-3-6 there are four suthras and after the first two there is a digression prompted by the second suthra 'hrdhyapEkashyA thu manushyADHIkArathvAth' which mentioned the qualification of human beings for upAsana which led to the question of devas and sudras. Now the remaining two suthras of the pramithADHIkaraNa are dealt with.

SUTHRA-40-KAMPANATH-1-3-40 THE TREMBLING DESCRIBED (OF OTHERS) DENOTES BRAHMAN.
The person thumb sized described in the text
'angushTamAthrah purushah madhya Athmani thishTathi; eesAno bhoohabhavyasya' (KaTa.2-1-12)

Is Brahman because between this and the text 'angushTa mAthrAh purushah antharAthmA'(KaTa.2-3-17) there is this passage

'yadhidham kimcha jagathsarvam prANa Ejathi nissrtham; mahadhbhayam vajram udhyatham ya Ethadhidvihuh amrthAsthE bhavanthi; bhayAdhasya agnisthapathi bhayAth thapathi suryah; bhayAdhindhrascha vAyuscha mrthyurdDHAvathi panchamah,'(KaTa.2-3-2,3)

This means, all this universe emerges and moves because there is the supreme Brahman who is a great fear like an uplifted thunderbolt; from fear of Him the fire burns sun shines, indra vAyu and death run. This declares the elements and the world as emerging from the thumb sized purusha and ruled by Him who is therefore none else than brahman. This is substantiated in the BrhadAraNyaka text

'Ethasya va aksharasya prasAsNe gargi suryAchandhrasou vidhrthou thishTathah; BheeshAdhAmAth vAthah pavathE bheeshAdhEthi suryah; bheeshAdhasmAth agnischadhrascha mrthyurDHAvathi panchamah,,'

which means almost the same.

SUTHRA-41- JYOTIRDHARSANATH-1-3-41 BECAUSE OF LIGHT BEING SEEN.

Between the two texts on the thumbsized purusha mentioned above there is another

'na thathra suryO bhAthi na chandhra thArakam nEmA vidhyuthO bhAnthi kutho ayam agnih;thamEva bhAntham anubhAthi sarvam thasya bhAsa sarvamidham vibhAthi.'

There no sun, moon or the stars or lightening shines and where could be the fire! Everything shines by and reflects His light. This idea is expressed in other upanishads also speaking about brahman. Hence the angushTa mAthrapurusha is Brahaman only.

THUS ENDS THE PRAMITHADHIKARANAM.

arthANTharATvAdhivyapadHesADHIKARANAM
1-3-10 -SUTHRA-42-AKAsO aRTHANTharADHI VYAPADHeSATh AKAsA iS BRAHMAN BECAUSE IT IS MENTIONED AS SOMETHING DIFFERENT.

The text of Chandhogya reads

'AkAsO vai nAmanAmarupayOrnirvahithA, thE yadhantharA; thadhbraham thadhamrtham sa AthmA,'

that which is called AkAsa is the revealer of name and form;that which is inside these names and forms is Brahman, the immortal the self.(Chan.8-14-1) a doubt is expressed as to whether this AkAsa is the released soul or Brahman. The poorvapakshin says it is the former because between the section teaching about the daharAkasa, which has been established as Brahman and this, the section on the individual soul intervenes in the form of the teaching of PrajApathi. The text immediately preceding this is about the soul in the state of release, which is

'asva iva rOmAni viDHooya papam chandhra iva rAhOrmukhAth pramuchya, DhoothvA
sariram akrtham krthAthmA brahmaOkam abhisambhavAmi.'

This means, "shedding off all sins like a horse sheds its hairs and Moon frees himself from Rahu I enter the brahmaOka."

This view is refuted by the suthra which says that the passage refers to AkAsa of being something different from the individual soul. The reason for this is the individual soul is not the revealer of names and forms but it is only the Brahman who is the revealer. As shown in the text 'anEna jivEna AthmanA anupravisya nAmarupE vyAkaravAni,' (Chan.6-3-2) in the released state the individual soul is not connected with the world. Hence it is only Brahman who is meant by the text as the nirvahithA of names and forms.

SUTHRA-43-SUSHUPTHYUTHKRANTHYORBHEDENA-1-3-43 ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENCE SHOWN BETWEEN DEEP SLEEP AND DEATH.

The opponent raises an objection that due to the texts thathvamasi and nEha nAnA asthikimchana which affirms unity while denying duality mean that the individual soul is not different from Brahman and hence the AkASa in the text could be the individual self in release.

This suthra refutes the argument. Both in deep sleep and death the individual self is shown to be different.

'prAjnEna AthmanAsamparishvakthah na bAhyam kimchana vedha nAntharam,'

In deep sleep being embraced by the supreme self the individual self knows nothing outside and inside. (Brhd.4-3-21) Again 'prAjnEna AthmanaanvArooDah uthsarjan yAthi,' being presided over the supreme self it departs. In both instances the individual self is denoted as something different from the supreme self. Hence the AkASa in the context is only Brahman.

SUTHRA-44-PATHYADHISABDHEBHAYAH-1-3-44 BECAUSE OF THE WORDS LIKE LORD ETC

This embracing self is denoted letter in the upanishad as 'sarvasya aDHipathih,sarvasya vasee, sarvasya eesanah,' the Lord of all, master and ruler. The qualifications mentioned namely, sarvEsvara, king of all, sarvabhoothADhipathi, master of all beings and bhoothapAlah, protector of all, sethuh, bridge etc apply only to Brahman. Therefore the AkASa in the context is only Brahman.

THIS IS THE END OF ARTHANTARTHVASDHIVYAPADHESADHIKARANAM

END OF THE THIRD PADHA OF FIRST ADHYAYA OF SRIBHASHYA.
FIRST ADHYAYA- FOURTH PADHA

ANUMANIKADHIKARANAM

SUTTRA-1-ANUMANIKAMAPI EKHSHAM ITHI CHETH NA,
SARIRARUPAKAVINYASTHAGRHEETHEHDHARSAYATHICHA-1-4-1

If it is said that what is inferred (praDhana) is the cause, it is not so because the word is referred to as the body which is explained.

Ramanuja starts the first aDHi karana of the fourth pAdha thus:

Uktham paramapurushArThalakshaNa mokshasADHanathayA jijnASyam
jagajjanmAdhikAraNam brahma achidvasthanah
praDHAAnAdhechethAaCchabaddhamukthObhAvasTHAth vilakshaNam
nirasthasamastha hEya ganDHam sarvajnam sarvashakthi sathyA
sankalpamsamasthakalyANa guNAtmakam sarvAnthrAthmabhootham
nirankusaisvaryam ithi.

So far Brahman, who is the goal of life knowledge of which leads to mOksha, who is different from insentient entities like praDHAna and sentient souls both in bondage and release, who has no trace of imperfection of any kind, omniscient, omnipotent, possessed of infallible will and infinite auspicious qualities and who is the inner self of all and unlimited glory, has been elucidated in the suthras.

Now the theory of Sankhya advocated by Kapila, in which the cause of origination of the world is said to be the unmanifest prakrthi, that is praDHana and the concept of the individual souls, purushas not having Brahman as their inner self, is refuted by the suthras that follow.

The text in katopanishad reads as follows:

‘indhriyEbhyaH parAhyarTHA arTHEbhyasthu param manah;mansasthu
parAbuddhih buddhErAthmA mahAnparah;mahathaH paramavyaktham avyakthAth
purushaH parah;purushAnnaparam kimchith sA kAshTA sA parA gathiH’
(KaTa.1-3-10,11)

The sense objects are beyond the senses, the mind is beyond the objects, the intellect is beyond the mind and the great self is beyond intellect; beyond that is the unmanifest beyond which is purusha. There is nothing beyond purusha and he is the great limit and the goal.

Here the doubt is that whether the word unmanifest, mahAn avyaktham means praDHAna of sAnkhya or not. The opponent says it is praDhAna because the unmanifest is said to be the beyond buddhi and only purusha, the individual self in sankhya, who do not hold that Brahman is the inner self of all, is said to the beyond avyaktham, the unmanifest, being the last and 25th thatthva of sankhya. From this the cause of the world is known to be the avyaktha, the unmanifest prakrthi, that is praDHAna.
This is refuted by the suthra saying that praDHAna is not what is meant by avyaktha but it is the body as it can be understood by the earlier passage

'ATHManam raTHinam viddhi sariram raTHamEva cha;uddhim thu sAraTHim viddhi manah pragrahmEva cha;indhriyANi hayAnAhuH vishayAṃstheshu gocharAm' which ends as 'sO aDHvanaH param ApnOthi thadvishnOH paramampadham.' (KaTa.1-3-3, 4)

The self is the one in a chariot, which is the body, the intellect being the charioteer and the mind is the reins. The horses are the sense organs and the sense objects are the roads. Here the one who desires to attain the vishnupadha is the individual self metaphorically referred to as the person in the chariot and the body as the chariot and the rest are the other things connected with it.

The sense objects pictured as the road is higher than the horses, the indhriyas because even a man who has controlled his horses finds it difficult once they are on the road, that is when the indhriyas are in contact with the sense objects. The mind is higher that the indhriyas because to control the mind is more difficult than controlling the senses like the reins let loose being unable to control the horses. The intellect, the charioteer is higher still because if he is efficient he can hold the reins firm. The self who is the master, rAThu, controls even the intellect to do his bidding by his will. So is the AthmA. So later what is described in the passage as avyaktha, which is said to be even higher than the individual self is the body which is the seat of all efforts made by the aspirant towards attaining the purushArThas. In the passage 'indhriyANi parANyAhuh etc. all the constituents in the metaphor of the chariot have counterparts except the body. Hence it is the avyaktha, being the only remaining constituent of the metaphor.

The one who is even higher is the supreme self indicated by the word purusha, who is the inner self of all and the goal of the journey. This is evident from the text

'purushAnna param kimchith sA kAshTA sAparAgathiH.'

Sruthi negates any other ruler by 'nAnythOsthi dhrashtA,' and;'ya Athmani thishTan,' etc.

Smrthi also confirms this by

'sarvasya chAham hrdhi sannivishto' "I am in the heart of all" and

'IsvarassarvabhothAnAm hrddhEsE arjuna thishTathi; bhrAmayan sarvabhothAni yanthrArooDAni mAyayA.'

The lord stands in the heart of all beings, whirling them around as on a machine.

Moreover the expression that the sense objects are higher than the sense etc is not compatible with the concept of sankhya according to which buddhi is identical with mahath and all others being the evolutes of that there is no question of one being higher than the other. As the passage refers only to those entities mentioned in the metaphor the purusha is the supreme self, highest of all and hence cannot be the purusha of sankhya.

The subsequent passages explain the control of each by the higher entity and finally says that the self should be restricted by the quiet self, that is, Brahman.
The avyaktha, unmanifest is the subtle body which transforms into gross body, so it deserves to be called avyaktha. But the opponent argues that in which case it could as well be the pradhAna which is also matter in subtle state. Next sutra replies to this.

The existence of subtle matter, says Ramanuja, is not denied in visishtadvaita because it is real. But what is refuted is the concept of it being independent evolving. The subtle matter is in the control of Isvara who is its inner self and whose body is the subtle matter. Both from sruthi and smrthi it is understood that prakrthi and its evolutes, that is, the insentient matter and the purusha, the sentient soul, have Brahman as their inner self. In Subala upanishad we have the text 'prthivyapsu leeyathE,' the earth merges in water, and it proceeds today that the each element merges in that subtler than itself till all the elements merge in mahath and mahath in the unmanifest which merges in the imperishable which in its turn merges in the thamas and finally the thamas becomes one with the supreme divine being. (sub.2to7) in smrthi also we have the declaration of the Lord

Earth, water fire, wind, AkAsa and the mind, intellect and the ego form my eightfold prakrthi which is the lower and other than this is my higher prakrthi. This higher prakrthi, says the lord, supports the world and

There is none else higher than Me and all this is strung on Me as the beads on a string. (BG-8-4,7) Thus the prakrthi and its evolutes along with the individual self all these are merged in the supreme self. That self, the self of all is Vishnu glorified in the vedas and vedanta.
meaning, one who meditates on that, which is without sound, touch and form and is
imperishable, without taste and smell, without beginning and end, and which is higher than
mahath and unchangeable, will conquer death and says that the pradhAna which is higher than
the mahath is what is denoted as that to be meditated on.

This suthra refutes this saying that it is only the supreme self prAjna who is denoted in the
passage as could be seen from the text

'sO aDHvanah param ApnOthi thadvishnOh paramam padham,' (KaTa.1-3-4) and
'Esha sarvEshu bhoothEshu gooDAthma na prakAsathE; dhrsyathE thvagyA
buddhyAsookshmayA sookshma dharsibhih.' (KaTa.1-3-12)

Thus the supreme self hidden in all beings is said to be seen only by the subtle intellect. By
'purushAnna param kimchith ' only brahman is indicated as purusha. The qualities mentioned
in the passage quoted by the opponent are all applied to brahman only which is made evident
from 'yath thadhadhrEsyam agrAhyam ' (Mund.1-1-6) etc. the term mahathah param is the
supreme self as the mahath is already shown to be the individual self by the term
buddhErAthmA mahAn parah, beyond the intellect is the great self, in the previous passage.

SUTHRA-6-THRAYANAM EVA CHAIvAM UPANYASCHA-1-4-6 THE MENTION
OF THREE ONLY AND THE QUESTION ON THEM (IN THE PASSAGE)
NachikEthis asked only three boons of the Lord of death, the first two being the forgiveness of
his father and the agnividhya. The third is about attaining mOksha,

'yEyam prEthE vichikithsA manushyE astheethyEkE nAyamasteethyEkE; dhrsyathE thvagyA
anuisishTasthvayA ahamvarANAmEva varasthrtheeyah.' (KaTa.1-1-20)

This refers to the departure of the soul after death, some saying he soul exists after death and
some say it does not and Nachikethas asks Yama to tell him this and says that this is the final
boon. Yama after testing his fitness to receive the instructionimparts him the Brahma vidhya

'tham dhurdharsam gooDam anupravishtam guhAhithangahvarEshTam purANAm
aDHyaThma yOgADHigamEva dhEvam mathvA DHIrO harhasokO jahAthi.' (KaTa.1-1-12)

The wise relinquishes joy and sorrow by meditating on the Self and thereby the divine, who is
difficult to be seen hidden and entered the cave (of heart), ancient and exists in the darkness.
(In the body, the seat of misery) By this the meditation on Brahman is instructed.

NachikEthis questions again on

'sakala ithara atheetha anagatha varthamAna sADhya sADHana sADHaka vilakshhana thraya',
The three things namely, the object, means and the effecting agent which are different from
everything in the past, present and future. Thereafter Yama instructs him on praNava and then
the nature of the individual self by expressions like 'na jAyathE mriyathE vA vipaschith, he is
neither born nor dies,' and the goal of attainment as the supreme self, by descriptions such as
aNOraNeeyAn, subtler than the subtle etc. Finally the upAsana on Brahman is enunciated in the form of devotion by 'nAyam AthmA pravachanEna labhyah.' etc. Next the sloka

'rtham ibanthou,' (KaTa.1-3-1) shows the unity of the devotee and the object of devotion in meditation. Finally 'asabdam asparsam', etc (KaTa 1-3-15) describes the nature of Brahman. So there was never a mention of praDHAna in the passage.

SUTHRA-7-BUDDHÈRATHMA mAHÀN PARAH-1-4-7
Since the words AthmA and mahAn are shown to be synonymous the term avyaktham is not the praDHAna of sAnkhya.

THUS ENDS ANUMANADHIKARANAM

CHAMASDHIKARANAM-1-4-2 THERE BEING NO SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS AS IN THE CASE OF BOWL.
This suthra refutes the praDHAna of sankhya being independent of Brahman but not the existence of it and of its evolutes, which has been accepted on the testimony of sruthi and smrthi. That the prakrthi and its evolutes are ensouled by Brahman is established by the suthra.

In the svethasvathara upanishad there is a passage

'ajAm EkAm lOhithashuklakrishnAm bahveeh praJAh srjamAnAm sarupaH;ajO hyEkO jushamANO anusEthE jahAthyEnAm bhukthabhOgAm ajO anyah.' (Svet.4-5)

There is one unborn of red, white and black colour produces many offspring of similar form.

One unborn associates with her and lays with her and another unborn leaves her after enjoying the pleasures. This obvious reference to prakrthi raises a doubt whether it is the one described by sankhya or the one ensouled by Brahman.

The opponent claims that it is the praDHAna of sankhya because of the term 'ajA' is used with respect to prakrthi and the reference to the independent production of many offspring similar to herself. To this the suthra replies that it is not so because there are no special characteristics mentioned to prove this. The word ajA is not sufficient evidence as the praDHAna is not the only unborn entity.

The suthraKara cites an example from the manthra

'arvAgbilaschamasa oorDHvabhugnah,'
meaning, there is a bowl which has opening below and bulging at the top, which expression is not explicit enough to understand what kind of bowl is meant here, because the derivative meaning alone cannot be taken literally without reference to the context. Later in the text it is made clear that the human head is meant by the description

'idham thchirah Esha hi arvAgbilaschamasa oorDHvabhugnah,'
the bowl which has opening below (the mouth) and bulging above (the skull) is the head. Here also the mere expression that the prakrthi is producing many offspring is not conclusive in denoting that the prakrthi creates independently. So this does not point out to the praDHAna of sankhya.
SUTHRA-9-JYOTHIRUPAKRAMATHU THATHAHYADHEEYATHA EKE-1-4-9 SOME READING HAS PRAKRTHI AS ORIGINATING FROM LIGHT.

The light is Brahman as can be seen from the texts

'tham dhEvA jothishAm jyothih, (Brhd.10-4-16),

The devas meditate on that which is the light of lights, and

'aTha yadhathah parah dhivO jyOthir dheepythe,' (Chan.3-13-7)

That light which shines above the heavens. In MahAnarayaNa upanishad the identical passage about the ajA etc is found preceded by the text

'aNOraNeeyAn mahathO maheeyAn AthmA guhAyAm nihiithOasya janthOh,' (Maha.12-1)

That which is smaller than the small, greater than the great, which means Brahman and then says 'sapthaprANAh prabhavanthi thasmAth' from Him the seven prANAS originate, thus showing Brahman as the cause of everything. So all things other than Brahman are mentioned to have Brahman as their origin and their inner self. The ajA referred to is the prakrthi which originated from Brahman giving birth to all entities like mountains and seas is enjoyed by the individual self under the influence of karma and is abandoned by the one who has acquired the knowledge of Brahman. Hence the ajA in the passage quoted at the outset should also be interpreted in accordance with this passage and means prakrthi originated and ensouled by Brahman.

The objection that if the prakrthi is created by Brahman as denoted by jyOthirupakramATH inthis suthra, how can the term ajA, unborn be applied to it. The next suthra answers it.

SUTHRA-10-KALPNOPADHESACCHA MADHVADHIVATH AIRODHAH-1-4-10 BECAUSE OF THE TEACHING OF CREATION THERE IS NO CONTRADICTION AS IN THE CASE OF MADHUVIDHYA.

The word kalpanA means creation as denoted in the text

'yaTHA sooryAchandhramasou DHAthA yaTHA poorvam akalpayath, (maha nara.1-13)

As the creator made the sun and the moon as before'. In svetasvatara upanishad also the creation of the world by Brahman is mentioned as 'asmAnmAyee srjathE visvamEthath, from that the Lord of maya created all this.' In the causal state the prakrthi remains in Brahman in the subtle state, without nama rupa and it is denoted as ajA, that is, unmanifest. As the effect, it acquires nama and rupa and divides itself into fire, water and earth, tEjObannarupa, indicated by red, white and black colours.

In madhuvidhya we find the text 'asou vA AdhithyO dheEva maDHu, this sun is the honey,' (Chan.3-1-1) which ends as 'aTHa thatha oorDHvamudhEthya niivOdhEthA nAsthamEthA Ekala Eva madhyE sThAthA.' (Chan.3-11-1) from there he rises up and he neither rises nor sets but being one, stands in the middle. As the sun in the causal state is one only but in the state of effect it is temed as madhu, honey to be enjoyed by the vasus and hence there is no contradiction, similarly there is no contradiction here also between the unborn, denoting the prakrthi in the causal state and the gross form of fire etc in the state of effect, having Brahman as its inner self in both states.
The view that the term aja refers to the three elements fire, water and earth is refuted because of the word Eka, one. Also the word ajA cannot be taken as a she-goat because the word is used again with respect to the sentient soul.

_Suthra-11-_nA Sankhyopasangrahadhapi nanabhavath athirekaccha-1-4-11_

Even the mention of numbers is not (sufficient evidence of praDHAna) because of the diversity and the excess.

_BhadAraNyaka upanishad reads_

'yasmin pancha panchajanaA AkaSacha prathishTithah thamEvamanya A hamstring vidhvAn brahmaAmrtho amrtham, (Brhd.4-4-17)'

in whom these five groups of five and AkaSa rest, Him alone I consider the Self, the immortal Brahman, knowing which I attain immortality.' Here the five groups of five totaling to 25 could be the thatthvas of sankhya, says the poorvapakshin, namely the five karmendhriyas, five jnAAnendhriyas, five thanmathras, (subtle elements) five gross elements and pradhana, mahath (buddhi), ahamkara, manas and purusha, who is the 25th thatthva.

This suthra refutes the above contention saying that the mention of numbers do not indicate the sankhyan categories because on account of diversity and excess. The expression pancha jana five 'five people' does not mean the groups of five because the individual constituents of the group are different from each other and also there is the mention of AkaSa and the self separately. Moreover all the five are said to rest in 'that' which is the self, Brahman and knower of 'that' becomes immortal. Hence the word pancha is to be interpreted as in the expression 'seven saptareshi,' which means only seven and not seven times seven.

If it is so, what could be the panchajana mentioned therein? The next suthra answers this.

_Suthra-12-PrANAdhyO vakyaseshath-1-4-12_ **It is the PrANA which is meant by the subsequent passage.**

We find the subsequent text

'prANasyaprANam utha chakshushaschakshuh srOthrasya srOthram, annasya annam, manasO yE manO vidhu thE nichikyuh brahma prANam agryam' (Brhd.4-4-18)

which means, they know for certain the prANa of the prANa, eye of the eye, ear of the ear, food of the food and the mind of the mind as Brahman, the first and ancient reality. Hence the entities that rest in and ensouled by Brahman are prANa etc.

_Suthra-13-JyOthishaikEshAm asathyannE-1-4-13_

In some texts annasya annam is added to the passage mentioned in the above suthra and in others the number five is made up of 'light' as jyothishAm jyOthih. The lights referred to are the sense organs and the light of lights is Brahman by whom they are illuminated. In the version which includes annasya annam, 'prANa' in prANasya indicates the sense of touch since it is connected with air, the eye stands for the sense of sight, ear for sound and food represents both smell and taste, which completes the number, five, denoting the five senses together with the mind. The AkaSa in the 'panchajana' text represents the elements, all of which rest in
Brahman. therefore the thatthvas of sankhya are not meant by the text.

**KAraNATHvADHIkaraNAM-1-4-4**

**SUTHRA-14-KAraNATHvENACHA AKASADHISHU YA THA VYAPADHISHTOKTHEH-1-4-14 BRAHMAN IS THE CAUSE AS IT IS DESCRIBED AS THE ORIGIN OF AKASA ETC.**

The sanKhyans try to prove the causality of PraDHAna on the basis of the sruthi passages like

\[ \text{‘asadheva idham agra Aseeth, thath sadhAseeth thath samabhavath’ (Tait.2-7-1)} \]

Only non-being was in the beginning in contrast to that in ChAndhOgya namely,

\[ \text{‘sadhEva soumya idhamgra Aseeth,’ (Chan.6-2-1)} \]

Only the sath alone was in the beginning. So they say that there is no conclusive evidence for the causality of Brahman. On the other hand there is proof for the praDHAnA being the origin of the world through texts like

\[ \text{‘thadhEdham tharhi avyAkrtham Aseeth, (Brhd.1-4-7)} \]

this was then unmanifest,' showing that the world of beings was unmanifest in the beginning as PraDHAna, the word unmanifest denoting the praDHAna., and the subsequent text

\[ \text{‘thannAmarupAbhyAm Eva vyAkriyatha, (Brhd.1-4-7)} \]

it manifested as names and forms speaks about the creation.

The terms Being and Nonbeing on account of the texts quoted can be applied to praDHAnA without contradiction while it is not possible to do so in the case of Brahman. The texts

\[ \text{‘thadhaikshatha bahusyAm prajAyEya ’ etc should be interpreted to mean the start of creation by praDHAna, says the opponent, and the words Brahman and Athman can also be applied to praDHAnA as brhathva, being great and all pervading quality of Athman, apply to it.} \]

This suthra refutes the above view because Brahman is explicitly described to be the cause of AkAsa etc. From the suthra ‘janmAdhyasaya yathah,’ it has already been shown that Brahman who is omniscient, omnipotent, of infallible will, free from imperfections and the supreme self is the origin of the world. Further the scripture confirms this by

\[ \text{‘thasmAth vA EathamAsth vA Athmanah AkAsah sambhootah,’} \]

from that self AkAsa originated, (Tait.2-1) and ‘thathEjO asrjatha, (chan.6-2-3) it created fire.’

Thus it is proved by the scriptural texts that Brahman is the cause of the world.

The poorvapakshin asks 'How can the Brahman all knowing and possessing infallible will can be the cause when it is clearly stated that nonbeing only was in the beginning?' the next suthra answers this.

**SUTHRA-15-SAMAKARSHATH-1-4-15 BASED ON THE PASSAGES ON BRAHMAN NON-BEING DOES NOT INDICATE ABSOLUTE NON-BEING.**

The passage

\[ \text{‘thasmAth va ethasmAsth vijnAnayathanyO antharah AthmA Anandhamayah,(Tait..2-5) the self within the sentient self is different from it and made of bliss,' describes Brahman as being} \]
the self of all and the next text 'sO akamayatha bahu syAm prajAyeya ithi, denotes Brahman as
the origin of all and

'idham sarvam asrjatha,yadhidham kimcha; thath srshtvAthadhEva
anuprAvisath;thadhanupravisya saccha tyaccha abhavath, (Tait.2-6)

He created all this and afterwards entered into everything and became Being and Nonbeing.
The next passage has the words 'asadhya idham agra Aseeth, only Nonbeing was in the
beginning.' The word asath refers to Brahman before creation when the names and forms did
not exist, that is the unmanifest state of Brahman. Hence there is no discrepancy. Therefore
praDHAna is not referred to as the cause of the world.

JAGADVACHITHVADHIKARANAM-1-4-5
SUTHRA-16-JAGADVACHITHVATH-1-4-16 BECAUSE IT DENOTES THE WORLD
The sankhya philosophers raise another objection now. They say that even though the
scriptures mention a sentient principle to be the cause of the world, there is no other entity to
be known other than the praDHAna and purusha of Sankhya as the cause. They quote from
Kousheethaki upanishad to show that only the purusha is said to be the cause of the world.

In Kousheethaki text we find the following passage as a conversation between BAAlaki and
A Játha sathru:

The passage begins with 'brahma thE bravANi, I will tell you about Brahman,' and goes on to say

'yO vai bAlAkE EthEshAm purushANAm karthA,yasya cha Ethath karma, sa vai
vEdhithavyah,' (Kous.4-19)
Which means, He is to be known who is the creator of these persons and whom does the work
belongs to. The poorvapakshin says that this 'maker' referred to is the individual soul because
of the phrase 'to whom this work belongs,' as the individual soul alone is connected with the
works, karma, in the form of merit and demerit. The word 'work' cannot be construed to mean
this world, in which case the sentence 'Brahma thE bravANi' will mean the Brahman. If so, the
two separate statements 'who is the maker of these persons' and 'to whom the work belongs'
will be tautology.

This view is refuted by the suthra which says that the word work means the world only. It does
not mean the individual soul, the purusha of sankhya, who is under the spell of karma that
gives rise to merit and demerit, and experiences the result of them. It means only the Brahman
who is free from all imperfections, possessor of infinite auspicious qualities and the cause of all.
If it is the individual self that is meant it is already known to Balaki and does not need special
mention. Actually Balaki misunderstood Brahman as the person abiding in the sun, moon etc.
on which A Játha sathru proceeds to instruct him that Brahman is not the person residing in
these sentient entities but He is the maker of all and the world is His work, that is, creation.
The whole world is not the creation of the individual soul and even of the works and the results
he is not the agent but acts only influenced by karma.

SUTHRA-17-JIVAMUKHYAPRANALINGANNA ITHI CHETH TADHVYA AKHYATHAM-1-4-17
Should it be argued that Brahman is not referred to because of the inferential marks of the individual soul and prAna being mentioned, this has been already explained?

The subject matter of the passage is confirmed as being Brahman from the beginning, middle and the end of the text. At the outset it is said, 'brahma the bravani, I will tell you about Brahman,' and in the middle of the passage are the words 'yasya cha Ethath karma,' which has already been explained as denoting Brahman. At the end of the passage

'sarvAn pApmanah apahathya sarvEshAm bhoothAnAm sraishTyam svArAjyam ADhipathyam paryEthi, ya Evam vEdha,

Having overcome all sins he attains excellence and rulership over all beings through this knowledge.' So the texts on prANA and the individual soul have to be interpreted accordingly.

SUTHRA-18-ANYARTHAM THU JAIMINIH PRASNA VYAKHYANABHYAM API CHA EVAM EKE-1-4-18

But Jaimini thinks that it has another purport because of question and answer and so do some others.

Ajatha sathru takes Balaki to a sleeping man to show that the soul is different from the body etc. When on being called the man does not wake up he was pushed by a stick to wake him up. Ajatha sathru asks Balaki that where was the man in his sleep and who was he.

'ika vA Ethadhabhooth, kutha EthadhAgAth.'(Kous.4-19)

Ajathasathru himself replies to the question that the man in deep sleep has become one with prana alone, which here means Brahman. In sleep the individual self merges with Brahman, free from the experiences of joy and sorrow that are present both in the waking and dreaming states. The same idea is expressed in ChandhOgya (6-8-1) as 'sathA soumya thadhA sampannO bhavathi, then (meaning, in sleep) he becomes one with the Being,' and in BrhadhAraNyaka (4-3-21) 'prAjEna AthmanA samparishvakthah na bAhym kimchana vedha nAntharam,

Embraced by the supreme self (in sleep) he did not know anything inside or outside.'

In the vAjasanEya version of the text in brahadhAraNyaka upanishad, where also this conversation occurs, reads as

'yathra Esha supthO abooth ya Esha vijnAnamayah purushah thadhEthaishAm prAnAnAm vijnAnEna vijnAnam AdhAya ya Esha antharhrdhaya AkAsah thasmin sEthe,' The meaning is this. When the sentient soul is asleep absorbing all prAna, meaning the senses and intellect, it rests in the AkAsa within the heart. The AKasa within the heart is already shown to be Brahman in dhaharadhikarana. The vijnanamaya is the individual self, thus distinguished from the supreme self.

THUS ENDS THE JAGADVACHITHVADHIKARANAM.
VAKYANVAYADHIKARANAM-1-4-6
SUTHRA-19-VAKYANVAYATH-1-4-19 SELF IN THE PASSAGE SHOWN IS BRAHMAN
BECAUSE OF THE CONNECTED MEANING.

In the BrhadhAraNyaka upanishad there is this text

'na va arE pathyuh kAmAyapathih priyO bhavathi,
The husband is loved not because of himself,' which continues to enumerate all relations and possessions in this manner finally saying that everything is loved because of the love of the Self

'na vA arE sarvasya kAmaya sarvam priyam bhavathi;Athmanasthu kAmAyasarvam priyam bhavathi.' (Brhd.IV-5, 6)
The text ends with

'Atma va arE dhrashytavyah srothavyah nidhiDhyAsthavyah;maithrEyi Athmani khalu arE
dhrshtE,sruthe mathE vijnAthe idham sarvam vidhitham,
This Self is to be seen, heard, thought of and meditated upon when all will be known.'

Here a doubt is raised by the poorvapakshin as to whether the self described therein is the individual self, the purusha of sankhya, or the supreme self. He claims that it is the former because of the reference to the individual self from the beginning to the end. At first the various individual selves like husband, wife, son etc are mentioned. In the middle it is said that the sentient soul, denoted by the term vijnAnaGhana, rises from the elements and goes back into them and when the soul departs there is nothing left.

'vijnAnaGHana Eva EthEbhyah bhoothEhyah samutthAya thAni Eva anuvinasyathi;na prethya
samjnA asthi.'(Brhd.II-4-12)
Thus the origination and the destruction of the soul is mentioned and in the end by the words

'vijnAthAram arE kEna vijAneeyath'(Brhd.II-14)
Who can know the knower the same individual self is indicated as the knower.

There may be a possible argument, says the poorvapakshin, that by the words in the text, 'amrthathvasya thu na AsA asthi viththEna, money can never arouse desire for immortality, ‘it is evident that only the Brahman who is referred to as the self. But this cannot be an objection because what is meant here is the real nature of the individual self acquired through the knowledge of the distinctness of the purusha from praDHAna and its evolutes, which makes him a freed soul. When the nature of all the released souls are known to be the same, the knowledge of all by the knowledge of the self makes sense since all beings from devas to the plants are of uniform nature and the difference is only due to the prkrthipariNAma, the intermingling of the three guNas, the constituents of prakrthi only.

This view is refuted by the suthra because the meanings of the various passage are found to be connected only when the purport of all of them are taken to mean Brahman. When YAjnavalkya told MaithrEyi who asked him the reason for his leaving all his property and going away he replied that the immortality cannot be attained through wealth. Then she wanted to know
about immortality

'yEnAham nAmrthAsyAm kimaham thEna kuryAmpydAdhEva bhagavAn vedha thadhEva mE broohi,' (Brhd.2-4-3)

Meaning, as there is no use of all the wealth he is giving her she wanted to know that which will make her immortal. Thereupon he started instructing her on brahmavidhya. The self thus taught is not the individual self but it is Brahmā, as the scriptures say that the immortality can be attained only through the knowledge of Brahmā. The texts

'thamEva vidhithvA athmirthyumEthi,and 'thamEva vidvAn amrtha iha bhavathi,' (svet.3-8)

Show this clearly. The same Brahmā is referred to in the passage 'AthmA vA are dhrashtavyah' etc Moreover the declaration that all the vedas were breathed out by the great Being,' asya mahathah bhoothasya nisvasitham Ethath yadhrgvEdha' will apply only to Brahmā, who is the cause of the universe. Also

'AthmanO vA are dharsanEna sarvam vidhitham,' (Brhd.2-4-5)

That by seeing the Athman all is known, can be true only with respect to Brahmā. What is said that by knowing one individual self all is known is not correct because it does not involve the knowledge of the sentient universe? The text mentions of different categories such as brAhmaNa, kshathriya devas and all beings and says that all this is only the Self,

'idham brhma idham kshathramimElokAh,imE dhEvAh,imAni bhoothAni idham sarvam yadhayam AthmA, ' --(Brhd.2-4-6)

This could be only Brahmā. The preceding sentence 'sarvam tham parAdhAth yO anyathra Athmanah sarvam vedha, all these mentioned leave him who sees the self elsewhere,' eliminates everything else but Brahmā from being the self. The attributes found in a later passage, 'EvaM vA are idham mahathbhootham anantham apAram vijnAnaGHna Eva,' namely, the greatness, infinity, limitlessness and essence of knowledge suit only the Supreme Self.

Ramanuja takes up next the claim of the opponent that the individual self is the subject matter of the maithreyi brAhamanA because of the connection with husband etc. He says that on the other hand the connection clearly is established only with the supreme self because the phrase 'the self is indeed to be seen, 'AthmA vA arE dhrashtavyah,' etc. which has been proved to denote Brahmā will not otherwise be in accordance with the opening text. Hence the context is as follows: all the things which are dear to man like wife son, wealth etc. are not productive of joy by themselves and hence dear, but, they are so because of the will of the Lord who is the self of all. This is known from the text in TaIttiriya 'Esha hyEva AnandhayAthi, (tait.2-7) this Supreme self makes all happy.' It is also indicated that the things by themselves are not conducive to happiness or sorrow by

'thadhEva preethyE bhoothva punarduuhkhAya jAyathE, thdhEva kopAya yathah prasAdhAya cha jAyathe; thasmAth duuhkhAthmakam nAsthi na cha kimchith sukhAthmakam,'

Meaning, that which gives pleasure turns out to be the cause of sorrow and that which angers
itself gives peace and hence there is nothing inherently joyful or painful.

The view that the word self in the beginning may denote the individual soul while the self to be seen etc may be the supreme self on account of the realization that the husband etc are not conducive to eternal happiness, is set aside by Ramanuja who says that in the section the word self is used only in the sense of the supreme self as everything is said to exist for the pleasure of the Self and the self which is to be seen are one and the same.

**SUTRA-20-PRATIJNHASIDDHERLINGAM ASMARATHYAH-1-4-20**

Asmarathyah thinks that the word indicating the individual self is the indicatory mark of proving the promissory statement. Because of the identity between Brahma and the individual self

By the statement that the self alone was existing in the beginning 'AthmA vA idham eka Eva agra Aseeth, (Aith.2-4-1-1) the oneness of the individual soul with Brahma is declared and the former being the effect of Brahma is shown by the text in mundaka upanishad which speaks of all beings produced from Brahma as sparks from the fire and merge back into Brahma in the end.

'yaTHA sudheepthAth pAvakAth visphulingAh sahasrasAh prabhavanthE saroopAh, thaTHA aksharAth vivIDHAh soumya bhAvAh prajayanthe thathra cha Eva apiyanthi.'

Hence the individual souls being the effects of Brahma they are identical with it and therefore the promissory statement of knowing one resulting in the knowledge of all is proved.

**SUTRA-21-UTHKRAMISHYATHA EVAM BHAVATH ITHI AOUDULOMI-1-4-21**

The nature of the individual soul which rises from the body denotes that it is Brahma, says Aoudulomi.

Aoudulomi does not accept the view that the promissory statement is proved through the identity of the individual soul with Brahma and by its being the effect of Brahma. He says that the soul is shown to have no origination from the text 'na jAyathe mriyathe va vipaschith, the discriminating self is not born and does not die,' If the souls are created by Brahma, the world being created according to the result of karma of the individual souls will not make sense and if they merge with Brahma like the pot becoming clay losing its identity the aspiration for moksha will not be there. Therefore as per the text

Esha samprasAdhO asmAth sarirAth samutthAya param jyOthrupasampadhya svena rupENa abhinishpadhyathE; (Chan.8-3-4)

'This serene self rising from the body reaches the highest light appears in its true form,' the individual soul possesses the characteristics of Brahma in its state of release. Hence the word denoting the individual self refers to Brahman only.

**SUTRA-22-AVASTHITHERITHI KASAKRTSNAH-1-4-22**

The words denoting the individual self refers to Brahman because it resides in the individual self, says Kasakrthsna.

The view that because the individual self becomes Brahma when it rises from the body, the word denoting it refers to Brahma in reality, is refuted by Kasakrthsna because, if the individual self is not Brahma before departure from the body due to its essential nature it can
never become Brahman. If the difference from Brahman before departure is due to a limiting adjunct, it means that the soul was Brahman even before departure but only limited by the adjunct. If it is said that the real nature is obscured while in the body, if the obscurcation is real it cannot be removed. If it is unreal it cannot obscure the soul which is self illumined in reality, being Brahman.

Therefore AchArya Kasakrthsna, says Ramanuja, states that the individual self being ensouled by Brahman, the word denoting the individual self can be taken to mean Brahman. Scriptural texts are several to show that the inner self is Brahman such as

'ya Athmani thishTan Athmanah anthatarah yamAthmA na veda yasya Athma sariram ya AthmAAnam anthatOr yamayathi sa tha AthmA anthyAmyamrthah,(Brhd.3-7-22)

He who stays inside the self whom the self does not know, whose body is the self and who rules the self from within, He is the inner self and immortal. The text in Taitthiriya (1-3-21) -- 'antha pravishta sAsthA janAmAn sarvAthmA’ The one who has entered into all beings as their self,' also confirms this.

Ramanuja clinches the argument by saying that this relationship of the individual soul and Brahman, namely the sarirasariri bhAva renders explanation of all the scriptural texts, proclaiming the characteristics of Brahman such as omniscience, blemishlessness and being the cause of the universe etc. Therefore the suthrakAra also accepts only the view of Kasa krthsna as there is no more argument presented after it.

Hence the passage in Maitreyi brAhmaNA of BrhadAranyakA upanishad is to be explained as follows:

When Maithreyi wanted to know that which will lead to immortality, Yajnavalkya explains the meditation on the highest self, Brahman, the cause and the ruler of all beings. Then he shows that the individual self of the meditator, when it departs from body is no longer limited in knowledge as the karma which made its knowledge contracted, has been destroyed. That Brahman is known only through meditation which alone is the road to immortality.

WITH THIS ENDS THE VAKYANVAYADHIKARANAM.

PRAKRTHYADHIKARANAM -1-4-7
SUTHRA23-PRAKRTHISC HA PRTHIJNA DHRSHTANTHANUPARODH ATH-1-4-23

Brahman is also the material cause as this view is not contradicting the promissory statement and the example stated therein.

The preceding suthras refuted the arguments of nirisvara sAnkhya, which does not accept Isvara above the prakrthi and purusha, and now the view of the sEsvara sAnkhya is refuted. The sEsvara sankhya known as atheistic sankhya, accepts Isvara but only as an efficient cause while they claim that the material cause of the world is PraDHAna, the primordial nature and they quote vedantha texts to prove this. For instance the svethasvathara text 'asmAnmAye srjathE visvamEthath' which means that the ruler of Maya projects this world and the following text that says 'mAyAm thu prakrthim vidhyAth mAyinam thu mahEsvaram, the nature is Maya and the supreme Lord is the controller of Maya, show that the Isvara is only
created this universe with the help of prakrthi. The smrthi also supports this as shown in Gita 'mayA aDhyakshEna prakrthih sooyathE sacharAcharam,with Me as the supervisor the prakrthi produces the world of the sentient and the insentient.'

The opponent cites the example in the world where the efficient cause and the material cause are always different like the potter and the clay, in making a pot. Therefore, claims the opponent, Brahman is only the efficient cause.

This suthra refutes the view that Isvara is only the efficient cause by saying that Brahman is also the material cause in order that there is no discrepancy between the promissory statement and the analogy given to substantiate it. The promissory statement, prathijnA, is the EkavijnAnEna sarva vijnAnam, the knowledge of all by the knowledge of one declared by 'yEna asrutham srutham bhavathi amatham matham avijnAtham vijnAtham, that is, by the knowledge of which what is unheard become heard, what is not thought of is thought and what is unknown becomes known. Then the passage is continued to illustrate the promissory statement by citing the example of clay, gold and iron,(Chan.6- 1-4) that the knowledge of the effects like pot, ornaments and instruments become known by the knowledge of their causes, namely, clay, gold and iron. Similarly by the knowledge of Brahman everything becomes known and hence Brahman is both the material and efficient cause of the universe. This is made clear by the opening text of the section, 'sadhEva soumya idhamagra ASeeth EkamEva adhvitheeyam' which prohibits any material or efficient cause other than Brahman.

The word prakrthi in the texts quoted, says Ramanuja, mean only Brahman in the KaRAnaVAStha, causal state, where everything exists in Brahman in their subtle state without name and form. That everything is Brahman is indicated by sruthi texts such as 'sarvE tham parAdhAth yO anyathra Athmanah sarvam veda,' (Brhd.II-4-6) everything leaves him who sees the self elsewhere,and 'sarvam khalu idham brahma,'(Chan.3-14-1) all this is Brahman, and 'EthadhAthmyam idham sarvam,'(Chan.vi-8- 7) all this is ensouled by Brahman,by which it is shown that Brahman is the self of all both in their causal and effective state.

Even the texts such as 'mahAn avyakthE leeyathE avyaktham akshare leeyathe, (Subala-2) the great one is merged in the unmanifest, the unmanifest in the imperishable, ' only denotes the manifest gross universe merging in the unmanifest which is the kAraNaVastha of Brahman, the imperishable. The text of Subala upanishad continues as 'aksharam thamasi leeyathe thamah parE dEva Ekee bhavathi, it is not laya, merging that is denoted but only EkeebhAva, becoming one with Brahman which is the absence of name and form that is referred to as thamas. This is also shown in the smrthi as

'Aseedhidham thamO bhaootham aprajnAthaM alakshaNam, apratharkyam avijnEyam prasupthamiva sarvathah,'(Manu-1-5)

This universe existed as darkness, unperceived, indistinct, beyond reasoning, unknowable and like one in deep sleep.

It is argued that normally the efficient and material cause are seen to be different through experience and to say that both are the same is self contradicting statement like the sentence
'sprinkle with fire.' To this Ramanuja replies

'sakalaitharvilaks hanasya parasya brahmanah sarvasakthEh sarvajnasya Eva sarvam upapadhyathE.

'It is quite appropriate for Brahman who is different from everything, all powerful and omniscient, to accomplish anything. The absence of intellect in the case of clay and the lack of power of transformation and absence of infallible will, are the reasons for the material and efficient causes being different. Hence Brahman is both the material and efficient cause.

SUTHRA-24-ABHIDHYOP ADHESAACCHA- 1-4-24 BRAHMAN IS BOTH BECAUSE OF THE TEXTS ABOUT WILLING.

In Taittiriya we have the text 'so akAmayath, bahu syAm prajAyeya,' (Tait.6-2) and in Chandhogyu 'it willed to become many,' from which it is evident that Brahman is both the material and efficient cause of the world.

SUTHRA-25-SAKSHACCH A UBHAYAMANATH- 1-4-25 BOTH BEING DIRECTLY MENTIONED

There is direct reference to Brahman being the material as well as the efficient cause in the scripture. '

kim svidvanam ka u sa vrkshaAseeth yathO dhyAvA prthivee nishTathakshuh,(Tait.2-8- 9)

What was the woods what was the tree by which the heaven and the earth was shaped and where it stood,' was the question asked to which the answer given was

'bhrma vanam brahma sa vriksha AseethyathO dhyAvApirthivee nishTathakshuh;
maneeshiNO manasA vibraveemi vO brahma aDHyathishTath buvanAni DHArayan,'
meaning that Brahman is the woods, the tree which shaped the world and which stood on Brahman, the supporter of the worlds..Thus it is directly said that Brahman created the world out of Himself.

SUTHRA26-ATHMAKRTHE -1-4-26 BECAUSE IT CREATED ITSELF

The Taittiriya text 'thadhAthmAnam svayam akurutha,' (Tait.2-7) that itself manifested itself, shows that Brahman manifested Himself as the world. Hence it is the material and efficient cause.

To the objection that if Brahman created the world out of Himself the imperfections of the world will mean that the Brahman is not as indicated by the texts 'sathyam jnAnam anantham, (Tait-Anan. 1-1) truth knowledge and infinity,' AnandhO brahma,(Tait.brg.6) brahman is bliss,' 'apahathapApmA,(Chan.8-1-2).free from evil' and 'sa vA Esha mahAnaja AthmA ajarO amarah,'etc.(Brhd.6- 4-25) The next suthra answers this.

SUTHRA-27-PARINAMATH- 1-4-27 BECAUSE OF MODIFICATION IT IS POSSIBLE.

This is explained by Ramanuja in his own special way as follows:

'asEsha hEya prathyaneekakalyANa ika thAnam svEtharasamastha vasthuvilakshaNam sarvajnam sathya sankalpam avAptha samasthakAm anavaDHikAthisayAna ndham svaleelA upakaraNabhootha samastha chcidhachitvasthuja thesarirathayA
What this long passage means is this:

Brahman who is free from imperfections, abode of auspicious qualities, unparalleled, omniscient, of infallible will, of the nature of infinite bliss, is the self of the sentient and the insentient, which are His sarira, used for His sport. When this entire world was absorbed in Him what remained was darkness, so called because of its highly subtle state not distinguishable by name and form, inseparable from Brahman being its sarira, becomes one with Brahman. Then Brahman willing to become many gives forth the world of name and form in the reverse order in which the involution took place. This is shown by the texts in BrahadhAraNyaka upanishad which mentions Brahman as the inner self and controller of all, enumerating earth, and other elements and indhriyas etc. one by one, and finally mentioning the individual self. In Subala upanishad the process of involution is described as the earth merging in water, water in fire, fire in wind, wind in AkAsa, AkAsa in indhriyas, indhriyas in thammAthras, which merge in their turn in the elements which merge in mahath, which merges in avyaktha while avyaktha merges in akshara and akshara in thamas which merges in the supreme divinity, that is Brahman.

But even though brahman Himself became the world as stated in Taittiriya anandhavalli text

'thath srshtvA thadhEva anuprAvisath, thadhEva anupravisya sathcha thyath cha abhavath.
(Tait.6-3)

Having created it He entered into it and became real and unreal.' This means that the supreme self who remained as the Self of all in the causal state, became the world in the state of effect. But even though Brahman Himself became the world, the imperfections of the world do not adhere to Brahman who remains in the the same unlimited nature of bliss, for whom the creation is a matter of play. All the sentient and the insentient being His modes, neither the defects of the sentient soul nor the changes of the insentient matter touch Him as they are the modifications of the body only, of which He is the inner self.

SUTHRA-28-YONISCHA HI GEEYATHE-1-4- 28 BECAUSE BRAHMAN IS CALLED THE ORIGIN

Brahman is mentioned as the source of all by the sruthi texts such as

'karthAram Isam purusham brahmayOnim,'(Mund.3-1- 3) meaning, He is the creator and the source, 'yadhbhoothayOnim paripasyanthi dheerAh,' (Subal.1-1-7) whom the wise see as the origin of the world,and 'yathA oornanAbhih srjathE grhnathe cha,(Mund.1-1-7) as a spider creates and absorbs,etc.
Therefore Brahman is the material and efficient cause.

**THUS ENDS THE PRAKRTHYADHikaraNAM.**

**SARVAVyAkhYANADHika rANAM-1-4- 8**

**SUThRA-29-EthENA sarVE vyAkhYAthAVyAkhYAth AH- 1-4-29** By this all texts are explained.

In the four pAdhAs of the chapter all vedanta texts that refer to the origin of the world are explained to denote only the Brahman who is chEthanAchEthana vilakshaNah, different from sentient and insentient beings, sarvajna sarvashakthi, omiscient and omnipotent.

**THE END OF THE FIRST ADHYAYA OF SRIBHASHYA OF RAMANUJA**
SRIBHASHYA-SECOND ADHYAYA

FIRST PADHA

SMRTHYA DHIKARANAM- 2-1-1

In the first chapter it has been shown that Brahman is the subject matter of all Vedanta texts and that Brahman is different from the insentient matter known from perception and other means of cognition and also from the sentient soul, while inand in. Brahman, who is free from imperfections and possessor of infinite auspicious qualities, has been understood as the cause of the world of sentient and insentient beings and the inner soul of all. Now chapter has begun in order to refute all arguments against this. First the view of sankhya is taken up and refuted.

SUTHRA-1-

If it is claimed that there would be no scope for certain smrthis (like of sankhya) it is not so as otherwise some others will be having no scope.

The opponent argues that the smrthi texts serve the purpose of elucidating the sruthi texts and the sankhyan smrthi by sage Kapila clearly shows that prADHAAna, the primordial nature is the material cause of the world. It is true that if the smrthi is contrary to the sruthi it has to be set aside. But this view can be true only when there is no ambiguity in the meaning of the sruthi passages. Here the meaning of the vedantha texts is not explicit and hence the Kapila smrthi which explains the thatthvas has to taken as authoritative. The possible objection that in the smrthis like that of Manu there are arguments in favour of the causality of Brahman is set aside by the opponent by saying that the main purport of these smrthis is dharma and hence has relevance to karamkAnada only whereas Kapilasmrthi deals with the metaphysical and shows the path to happiness. As otherwise the Kapilasmrthi will be meaningless the vedantha texts have to be interpreted according to it.

This view is refuted by the suthra. The smrthis like that of Manu do teach that Brahman is the cause of the world and to accept the smrthi of Kapila will result in their being rendered obsolete. We find in Manusmrthi the following passage: Beginning with the words ‘Aseedhidham thamO bhootham, this world existed in the form of darkness,’ and continues to say

‘thathah svayambhoorbhagavAn avyakthO vyanyajan idham; mahAbhoothAdhi vrtthoujAh prADhurAseeth thamOnudhah sOmiDHya cha sarirAth svAthsisrkshuh viviDHAh prajAh, apa Eva sasarja Adhou thAsu veeryam apAsrjath.’ (Manu. 1-5-8)

This means, the Lord, self originated and unmanifest, made this entire manifest. The great and others came from the darkness and the Lord created from His body all these beings, first creating the waters and placing His seed in them.

In Bhagavath Gita also we have the declaration ‘aham sarvasya prabhavah matthah sarvam
pravarthathE’, (BG. 7-6) meaning “I am the source of everything and from Me everything proceeds”. In Mahabharatha Bhishma was asked, from where is this universe of movable and immovable objects are created and in whom all this merges back at the time of annihilation and he answers ‘nArAyaNO jaganmoorthirananth AthmA sanAthanah’, that it is Narayana, the eternal and infinite, who manifests as the world further it is said that from Him the unmanifest prakrthi constituted of three gunas. If Kapila smrthi is taken as authoritative these smrthis will be of no validity.

Ramanuja says that it is true that the meaning of vedanta texts are not understood by those with limited knowledge because the subject matter of those texts, being Brahman, is beyond perception and other means of cognition. But there are many smrthis composed by competent and reliable persons elucidating the purport of the vedantic texts and there is no need to resort to the works such as Kapilasmrthi which are opposed to the vedantic view.

Even the smrthis like that of Manu which are said to deal with the karmakanda they inculcate all the works only as the worship of the Supreme self. ‘yathah pravrthibhoothAnAm yEna sarvam idham thatham svakarmaNA tham abhyarchya siddhim vindhathi mAnavah,’ (BG. 18-46) which means, man achieves the highest by worshipping Him, from whom all beings originate and by whom all are pervaded, through his own actions. In vishnupurana the following text ‘yaih svakarmaparah nATHa narairArADHithO bhavAn, thE tharanthyakhilAm EthAm mAyAm AthmavimukthayE,’ meaning, by those who worship you, Oh Lord, with their own works this maya is transcended. So even the smrthis which enjoin the various works for getting result in this and other world, actually emphasize the performance of the same works as an offering to the supreme self.

Ramanuja concludes by saying “yadhuktam ‘rshim prasootham kapilam’ ithi kapilasyaApthathayA samkirthanAth thathamSrthyanusArEN a vEdhAnthArThavyavasTHApanam nyAyyam ithi--thadhasath; brhaspathEh sruthismrthishu sarvEshAm athisayitha jnAnAnAm nidharsanavetra samkirthanAth thathpraNeethEna IOkAyathEna sruthyarThavyavasTHApana prasakthEh ithi”

What the passage means is this: If the smrthi of Kapila is to be accepted as being authoritative on the basis of his being mentioned as competent in the svethasvathara upanishad and the vedanta texts have to be interpreted in accordance with it, then, it would follow that Brahaspathi being mentioned as the most competent and wise person, the atheistic and materialistic view of the smrthi composed by him should be held as being authoritative as well. What Ramanuja means is that just as the materialistic and atheistic view, that of the ChArvAkas, cannot be accepted as being opposed to the vedas, similarly the Kapila smrthi also cannot be accepted. But the opponent says since Kapila by his yogic perception had intuited the truth, his view must be true. The next suthra answers this.

SUTHRA-2-ITHRESHAM CHA ANUPALABDHEH- 2-1-2
BECAUSE OF THE NON PERCEPTION OF OTHERS OF THE VIEW
Manu and others also had yogic perception but they did not come to the same conclusion as Kapila. Hence, Ramanuja concludes that the theory of Kapila is based on misconception.
This is the end of smrthyaDHikaraNam

YOgaprathyukthyaDHi karaNam
Suthra-3-EthaNa YoGAh PrathyukthaH- 2-1-3
Here by the yoga is refuted

The doubt that even though the sankhya smrthi may be rejected, the yoga smrthi can be taken to be authoritative in as much as it recognizes Isvara, as the one who directs pradhAna and also because it was propounded by Hiranyagarbha and proclaimed to be in accordance with the vedantic texts.

This view is refuted by the suthra as this smrthi is also based on error. Ramanuja gives the following reasons for rejecting the yoga smrthi.

1. The praDHAna and not Brahman is mentioned as the cause of the world.
2. Isvara is cited only as the efficient cause.
3. The yoga of meditation on the self and the Isvara as outlined in the yoga smrthi is avidhic, contrary to vedas, because the self is not brhmAthmaka, ensouled by Brahman, and the Isvara who is only the efficient cause is not the Brahman of vedanta, endowed with infinite auspicious qualities and the cause of the world.
4. The one who expounded the smrthi, namely Hiranyagrbha is himself a created being and liable to the influence of rajas and thamas.

Hence, yoga, which is also based on error, cannot be used to support the vedanthic texts. Thus ends the yOgaprathyukthyaDHi karaNam.

VilakshanaNathyaDHika raNam- 2-1-3
Suthra-4-na VilakshanaNathaH vyath asya thaTHaHVam cha sabdhATH- 2-1-4
World being of contrary nature to it, Brahman cannot be the cause and this is known from the scriptures also.

This suthra and the next are poorvapaksha suthras. Here the opponent to tharka, reasoning, to prove that Brahman is not the cause of the world. The reason given for this is that the world is full of sorrow, insentient, impure and contrary to, who, to the vedantin, is omniscient, omnipotent, free from imperfections and possessed of infinite auspicious qualities. This difference is not only known through perception but also from the scriptural texts like

‘samAnE vrkshE purushah nimagnO aneesayA sochathi muhyamAnah, (Svet. 4-7)

In the same tree the individual self immersed in sorrow grieves, being overpowered by his own helplessness. ‘and’aneeasachAthmA baDhyathE bhOkthrbhAvAth, the individual soul, not beingmaster of itself, gets bound, with the concept of being anenjoyer. (Svet. 1-8) As it has been shown through experience that the cause is not different from the effect in nature by the example of pot and clay, gold and ornaments etc. Therefore the cause of the world can only be praDHAna of sankhya.
Further the poorvapakshin says that though the scripture is said to be independent of any other pramāṇa because of its content being something beyond the sense experience, it has to be explained in accordance with tharka. He quotes from Manusmrthi ‘yastharkena anusanḍhataḥ dharma vedha netharah’, only who investigates dharma by means of reasoning, understands it and none else. (Actually this is only half the verse and Ramanuja quotes the full verse in a later sūtra in reply to this). Moreover the sāstra, verbal testimony, as a valid means of cognition requires three conditions, namely, Akṣaṇa, expectancy, sannidhi, proximity and yoṣya, compatibility and hence these are to be proved by tharka.

Now it requires a little explanation as to what these three conditions mean. There are three valid means of cognition, namely, Perception-prathyakṣa, Inference-anumāna and Sabda-verbal testimony which generally means the Veda, accepted by both sāṁkhya and visiṣṭadvaita, though advaita cites three more, namely, upamāna, comparison, arthāpatthi, presumption and anupalabdhī, noncognition. Of these, the sabdhapramāṇa requires the above mentioned conditions for validity. Akṣaṇa, expectancy is the inability of a word to convey the meaning of a sentence without other words. Example, ‘a cow, a horse, a man,’ is not a meaningful sentence without some other word denoting their connection. Sannidhi is juxtaposition which means that a sentence will be meaningful only when the words are uttered in quick succession and not with long intervals. Yoṣya is compatibility in the meaning of the words. For instance, the sentence ‘sprinkles with fire’ is not valid because of the incompatibility between the words ‘sprinkling’ and ‘fire.’

The opponent presupposes an argument by the vedantin that the causality of Brahman being determined on the basis of sruti texts sentience must be present in the world, which is the effect, and hence saying that the world being insentient it cannot be the effect of Brahman is not correct. Even in the case of pot etc., sentience is present but as in the case of deep sleep and swoon it is not manifest and this is the difference between sentient and insentient beings. To this the poorvapakshin answers that when something is always absent it only proves its nonexistence. Since the sentience is not present in the inanimate objects it proves that they are not sentient. To have potency which is never exhibited is like the procreative power of a barren woman. T say that just because the causality of Brahman is established through the sruti the sentience present in inanimate things and because it is present it proves the causality of Brahman, is based on mutual dependence which cannot be ascertained. It is not possible to show the relationship of cause and effect between two things which are basically different.

Of course there cannot be similarity of all the characteristics between the cause and the effect in which case the effect will not differ from the cause but the essential characteristic persists in the cause and effect which distinguishes it from other things as clay is distinct from gold. It cannot be argued that the sattha, existence is the characteristic that persists in Brahman the cause and the world, the effect, because the essential characteristics’ of Brahman such as being free from defects, having knowledge and bliss as His nature and the Lordship are all not found in the world and hence brahman cannot be the material cause.
It may be argued that the relationship of cause and effect is seen in the world between things of different nature as in the case of the hair and nails, which are insentient, coming out of the sentient being, or the scorpion originating from cow dung or from the sentient spider the insentient web coming out. But poorvapakshin disagrees, saying that even in these cases only the insentient part of the cause persists in the effect.

There is a fresh objection to the view of sankhya put forward now. In the scriptures it is seen that sentiency is attributed to the insentient things as in the texts such as ‘tham prthivee abraveeth’ the earth said to him, ‘ApO vA akAm ayantha,’ the waters desired, etc. To this the next suthra replies.

SUTHRA-5-ABHIMANIVY APADHESASTHU VISESHANUGATHIBHYAM -2-1-5
But the reference is to the presiding deities.

It is found in the scripture passages such as ‘hanthAham imA thisrO dhEvathAh,’ (Chan. 6-3-2) where fire, water and earth are denoted as deities which means the presiding deities of these elements. Also in AithrEya AranyakA

‘AgnirvAg bhoothvA mukham prAvisath, Adhityaschkhshurbho othvA akshinee prAvisath, vAyurprAN ObhoothvA nAsikE prAvisath,

Fire became speech and entered the mouth, the sun became the sight and entered the eyes and the wind became the vital air and entered the nostrils, where the fire, sun and the wind are the presiding deities of the sense organs.

The opponent concludes by saying that since the world consists of insentient beings Brahman cannot be the cause of it, which has been proved from the scripture and reasoning and hence praDHAna is the material cause.

SUTHRA-6-DHRSYATHE THU-2-1-6
BUT IT IS SEEN TO BE SO.

The argument that Brahman cannot be the cause of the world because it is different from Brahman is not correct. In the world there are examples of the cause and effect being different as worms is seen to originate from honey and the scorpion from cow dung. The explanation that the insentient part in both only has the relationship of cause and effect is wrong. As per the contention of the opponent the characteristic which distinguishes the cause from others must be present in the effect. But it is not so in the examples cited. So the world, even if it is assumed to be different from Brahman, could have originated from Brahman.

SUTHRA-7-ASADHITHI CHETH, NA, PRATHISHEDFHAMATHRA THVAETH-2- 1-7
If the effect is said to be nonexistent in the cause, no, it is only denial of similarity and not of oneness.
If the world and the Brahman, though different related as cause and effect it would mean that the effect was not existent in the cause, says the opponent. But this suthra refutes it saying that, it is only the similarity between the two is denied as an essential requisite and not the oneness of the cause and effect. Brahman is the cause which is modified into the effect, the world, which is not different from Brahman in reality.

SUTHRA-8-APEETHOU THADVATH PRASANGATH ASAMANJASAM- 2-1-8
Since at the time of dissolution the cause becomes the effect the causality of Brahman is not admissible. In dissolution the effect becomes the cause and if Brahman is the cause it becomes one with the effect. In that case all the imperfections of the world will adhere to Brahman. Then all the vedantha vakyas like ‘yassarvajnah sarvavith’, ‘apahathapApmA, vijarO vimrthyuh’, etc will become meaningless, says the opponent. This difficulty, he says, cannot be got rid of by claiming the body- soul relationship between Brahman and the world and explaining that as the imperfections of the body do not affect the soul, those of the world do not touch Brahman, because, the very relationship is untenable. If it is assumed to be so, the defects of the world, as the body of Brahman will affect Brahman also. Moreover sarira is the result of karmaphala while Brahman is free from karma. Vedanta texts also clearly describe Brahman as not having a body ‘apANipAdhO javanO grheethApasyathyach akshuh srnOthyakarNah, (Svet. -3-19) He moves and grasps without feet and hands, sees, hears without eyes and ears. Since He has no indhriyas to enjoy any experience He cannot have a body which is the seat of enjoyment.

Nor can it be said that the body is that which is subservient and controlled by the will of the sentient soul and exists for its use, (that is seshathva) says the poorvapakshin. The body which is injured or dead does not obey the will of the soul inside and the puppets which are controlled by a sentient being do not constitute his body.

Hence the sarira sariri bhava cannot be accepted and if it is accepted the imperfections of the world will find a place in Brahman.

SUTHRA-9-NA THU DHRSHTANTHABHAVATH- 2-1-9
NOT SO. BECAUSE OF EXAMPLES.
The imperfections of the world do not affect Brahman and the contention that the vedanta texts are not valid in proving the causality of Brahman is not correct. It is seen that the imperfections of the body do not adhere to the soul and the same entity can remain with and without defects in two different states. The defects of the body like old age, disease etc are not found in the self and the attributes like joy and sorrow are not found in the body. Such as the state of childhood, youth etc belong only to the body, the imperfections of the world do not belong to Brahman who is the inner self. When Brahman expands and contracts by creation and dissolution, these changes are only with respect to the world of sentient and insentient beings and do not affect Brahman.

To say that the sarira-sariri bhava of brahman and the world is not appropriate, says Ramanuja, is only a kutharka, malicious reasoning on the part of those who do not understand the real significance of the scriptural texts which are substantiated by logical reasoning. There are
enough evidence in the scriptures to prove the sarira-sariri bhava. In BrhadAraNyaka upanishad the passages beginning from

‘yah prthivyAm thishTan — Yasya prthivee sariram, (Brhd. 3-7)

Hewho is in earth as its inner self, ‘(Brhd. 3-7-12) and ending with ‘yah Athmani thishTan——
yasya Athma sariram, who is in the individual soul as its inner self and of whom the individual
soul is the body, enumerates each sentient and insentient entity and declares the sarira-sariri
bhava of Brahman. In Subakla upanishad also similar passage is found ending with

‘Esha sarvabhoothAntharAt hmA apahathapApmA dhivyO dhEva Eko nArAyaNah, (Subal. 7),

This is the divine Lord Narayana who is free from evil and the inner self of all.

The definition of body as the instrument enjoyment of the fruit of actions as given by the
opponent is not correct, says Ramanuja. The declaration of earth etc as the sarira of Isvara does
does not satisfy this definition. The sarira of the released souls also fall outside the scope of this
definition since there is no karma for them. The body assumed by the supreme self in His
manifestations is not made of elements and hence the body cannot be said to be a combination
of five elements to cite pradhAna as the cause. Again the body can neither be defined as that of
which the five vital breaths are the source of life because in the case of the, though they have
life, the five vital breaths have no place in them. Nor is the body the abode of indhriyas or cause
of joy and sorrow always, as can be seen in the case of body of stone or wood acquired through
curse like that of Ahalya and others.

Therefore the body is to be defined as a substance which is in subordinate relation to a sentient
soul, to be used for the purpose of that soul and controlled by it. In the injured body the power
of control is obstructed as heat of fire etc. are obstructed by external agents. A dead body is not
fit to be called as such since the soul has left and it is only a congregation of matter. Hence the
whole universe of sentient and insentient beings constitutes the sarira of the Lord, who controls
and supports it for His purposes and which is totally subservient to Him.

SUTHRA-10-SVAPKSHAD HOSHACCHA- 2-1-10
ALSO BECAUSE OF DEFECTS OF THE POORVPAPKSHA VIEW
This suthra points out the discrepancy in the view of sankhya that the praDhAna is the cause of the
world. PraDHAna, that is, prakrthi, is said to create the world by the mere proximity of
purusha, who in his turn gets bound due to the superimposition of the gunas of prakrthi on
him, while purusha is said to be chinmAthra, pure intelligence free from all changes. Now,
Ramanuja asks, ‘nirvikArasya chinmAthra rupasya prakrthi dharmAdhyAs ahethubhootham
prakrthisannidhAnam kim rupam ithi vivechaneeayam.’ This means, it has to be made clear
what exactly causes the superimposition of the attributes of prakrthi on the changeless
purusha. Is it the very existence of prakrthi or any modifications in it or in purusha. It could not
be due to changes in purusha who is changeless. The prakrthi is said to undergo modifications
and create the world due to the superimposition on the purusha and therefore it is the effect of
the changes and hence cannot cause them. If on the other hand it is the mere existence of
prakrthi and its proximity that causes the superimposition, there would be no question of release because of the permanent existence of prakrthi near purusha. Hence the sankhyan view is not rational.

**SUTHRA-11—THARKAPRA THISHTANADHAPI- 2-1-11**

**BECAUSE OF DEFECTIVE REASONING (OF SANKHYA AND OTHERS)**

Brahman is the cause of the world as established by sruthi because the reasoning of sankhya is defective. The arguments of all the other schools like nyayaiseshika, buddhists, jaina and sankhya are mutually conflicting and have to be set aside.

**SUTHRA-12—ANYATHAANUMEYAM ITHI CHETHEVALM API ANIRMOKSHAPRASANGAH -2-1-12**

**EVEN IF IT IS SAID THAT THE DISCREPANCIES CAN BE RESOLVED BY DIFFERENT ARGUMENTS THE DIFFICULTY CANNOT BE SURMOUNTED.**

The opponent claims that the criticisms of other schools could be quashed by adopting a different way of argumentation but this sutra refutes this. Any theory dependent on reasoning ability can always be outdone by a cleverer opponent. In matters which transcend the sensory perception only the sasthra can be authoritative. Ramanuja here quotes from Manusmrithi which says ‘Arsham DharmOpadhesam chavedhasAsthra aviroDHinA, yas tharkENa anusanDHatthE sa dharmam vedha nEtharah’, (the same text partly quoted at the outset by the poorvapakshin) he alone knows dharma, who can support the teachings of the rshis on it, in accordance with the scriptures.’ Hence, concludes Ramanuja, the praDHANakAraNavadha of sankhya is to be dismissed being contrary to the scriptures.

**THUS ENDS VIKAJSHANATHVADHIKA RANAM.**

**SISHTAPARIGRAHADHIK ARANAM-2- 1-4**

**SUTHRA-13—ETHENA SISHTAPARIGRAHAPI VYAKHYATHAH 2-1-13**

**BY THIS THE REMAINING SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY ARE ALSO EXPLAINED.**

All the other schools, namely, nyAya, buddhism, jainism etc are also refuted by the argument that mere reasoning cannot establish any theory against that of the vedas. Although these are against sankhya, being based on the causality of atoms, the nature of atoms and the process of creation are different in each and hence all are refuted being contrary to the vedas.

**BHOKTHRAPATHYADHIKARANAM-2-1- 5**

**SUTHRA-14—GOTHRAPATHEH AVIBHAGASCHETH- -SYALLOKAVATH- 2-1-14**

**IF IT IS SAID THAT BEING THE ENJOYER WILL MAKE BRAHMAN NON-DIFFERENT FROM THE INDIVIDUAL SELF, NO. AS CAN BE SEEN IN THE WORLD.**

The argument of the opponent is that if Brahman has the sentient and the insentient as His bodyhe will be embodied like the individual soul and will be the enjoyer of joy and sorrow. If it is said that this has already been answered in the earlier sutra ‘sambhOgaprApthirit hi chenna
visEshyAth, ‘(BS. 1-2-8) it was only with reference to Brahman meditated as being with in the heart. But Brahman having a body like the jiva the contingency of experiencing joy and sorrow will arise as in the case of the individual self. This has been confirmed by the sruthi also saying ‘na ha vai sasarirasya sathah priyApriyayOh apahathirasthi, asariram vA va santhamna priyApriye sprsathah,’ that as long as the soul is in the body there is no escape from joy and sorrow but when he leaves the body there is no contact with joy and sorrow. Brahman being the material cause, the nature of cause and effect being the same, as in the case of mud and clay or gold and ornaments, the imperfections of the world will affect Brahman also. Therefore the theory of causality of pradhAna of sankhya alone is valid.
This view is refuted by the suthra saying that there is difference between the individual soul and Brahman as we can see from the experience in the ordinary life. The joy and sorrow are caused by merit and demerit and not due to the embodiment alone. Since Brahman has no karma and hence no bondage resulting from karma even though having the subtle and gross universe as His body, He is not the enjoyer of sukha and duhkha. We see that in ordinary life, the king is not affected by the punishment meted out to his subjects though he is also embodied like them. Like wise the Lord also being the dispenser of the fruit of actions to all, is not affected by them.

Ramanuja quotes from DharmidabhAshyakAra to illustrate this point.

‘yaTHAloke rAjaPrachuradhantha sookE GHOrE anarTha sankatE api pradhEsEvarthamAnah vyajanAdhyavaDHooth adhEhah,’

just as a prince staying in an uncomfortable infested with mosquitoes etc does not feel the discomfort being fanned and given all comforts by his attendants, so too the Lord is not touched by the defects of the world, His power acting as the fan, ‘thaTHA asou lOkesvaah bhramathsAmarthya chAmarah dhOshairna sprsyathe.’ As the sruthi vakyasthat brahman is free from imperfections and changes the comparison with clay and gold is not applicable. Thus ends the bhokthrApathyADHika raNam.

ARAMBHA NA DHIKA R A NAM -2-1-6
SUTHRA-15-THADHANAN YATHVAM ARAMBHA NA SABDHADHIBHYAH- 2-1-15
THE NON-DIFFERENCE IS KNOWN FROM THE TEXTS BEGINNING WITH THE WORD ‘ARAMBHA NAM.’

After answering the criticism of sankhya of the causality of Brahman and establishing that Brahman is the material and efficient cause of the world, now the view of Naiyayika, logicians, is taken up.

According to the naiyayaikas the cause is totally different from the effect and hence this school is diagonally opposite to that of sankhya. The arguments to show that the effect is different from its cause are given as follows:

1. BuddhibhEdha the cause and the effect are two different concepts.
2. SabdhabEdha -the cause, thanthu, the thread and the effect, pata the cloth are called by different names. So are the clay and the pot etc.
3. kAryabhEdha- the purpose is different for both. Water is not carried by clay nor the hut is constructed by pot.
4. kAlabhEdha- the cause belongs to the past and the effect to the present.
5. AkAra bhEdha -the form is also different.
6. sankhyAbhEdha- difference in numbers, the lump of clay being one and the pots are many and the cloth is one while the threads are many.
7. KAraka vyApara vyarThyam- If the cause and effect are one then there is no need of the process of transformation of the cause into effect.

If the effect which is eternally existent in the cause requires a causal operation to make it manifest, then as manifestation requires another manifestation it will run into infinite regress or if the effect is independent of manifestation it will be perceived eternally. In simple terms what this means is that if the effect exists in the cause then it must be perceived without the causal operation, the need of which proves that the effect is something produced anew. To the argument that if the causal operation is for producing something which did not exist before then the process of weaving can produce a pot, naiyayika replies that it is not so. The cause has the potentiality to produce only that effect which it is capable of. What they mean is this. The potency of producing a pot exists in the clay but the pot produced, that is, the effect, is something new and not a mere transformation of the cause.

Advaitin here interrupts and says that there is identity between the cause and the effect because the cause alone is true as claimed in the text

‘vAchArambhaNam vikArah nAmadDHEyam mrtthikEthyEva sathyam,’ (Chan. 6-1- 4) because the effect is only an appearance due to avidhya. As the clay alone is real and the pot etc. is only names and forms, similarly, the attribute less Brahman alone is real and the effect, the world is unreal. It cannot be said that while in the case of shell-silver and rope-snake which are proved to be unreal by later sublation the things of the world are not sublated. Since it is only the clay etc which persists throughout while the effects like pot are destroyed, it is said to be real. Similarly the cause, Brahman alone is real and the effect the world is unreal. But it is not unreal in the sense of a non-existing thing like the horn of a hare and hence it is said to be sadhasadhvilakshana, or anirvachaneeya, indefinable.

Advaitin further says that only to show that the cause alone is real it is said that clay etc are only real and the effects, pot etc. are unreal but strictly speaking even the causal substances in the world are unreal as Brahman alone is real. This is confirmed by the texts such as

‘EthadhAthmyam idham sarvam thathsathyam, (Chan. 6-8-7)
all this has that as self and that is true,

‘nEha nAnAsthi kimchana, (Brhd. 4-4-19)
there is no plurality,’

‘Yathra hi dvaithamEva bhavathi thadhitharaitharam pasyathi, yathra thu asya sarvam Athmaiva abhooth thath kEna kam pasyEth. (Brhd. 2-4-13)
Where there is plurality there one sees another, but when all became the self how one will see and whom?’

It could not be argued that the perception denies this because the sruthi is the stronger means of cognition of the two. The perception of the world does not make the individual soul also unreal because it is identical with Brahman as could be seen by texts such as
‘anEna AthmanA anupravisya nAma rupe vyAkaravAni(Chan. 6-3)
will enter with this self and make name and form, ’

‘Eko dhevassarvabhoothEs hu goodah sarvavyApee sarva bhoothA nthrAthmA, (Svet. 6-11)
That self is hidden in all beings, pervading all and the self of all

‘nAnyathO asthi dhrashtA, ’ (Brhd. 3-3-23) there is no other seer.
The opponent of advaitin, here, naiyayika, says that if Brahman is the self of all, the joy and sorrow of any one embodied being will be experienced by all and besides there will not be any distinction between the teacher and student and released and bound souls etc.

This is explained away by the advaitin saying that the individual souls are only the reflections of Brahman as the faces reflected in the mirror. As the defects of the mirror seem to adhere to the face reflected, the joy and sorrow, pain and pleasure etc. only belong to the reflection on account of the reflecting medium, namely avidhya. In reality the individual self is not different from Brahman and not different from each other and free from impurities but seem to be so because of the limiting adjuncts due to avidhya.

Advaitin is questioned whether the illusion of the difference and the imperfections of the reflection is due to the avidhya or to the individual self or Brahman. It cannot be avidhya which is insentient. It cannot be the individual soul as the existence of the individuality of the soul is itself the effect of avidhya. If it is Brahman then it would be the abode of avidhya, which is contrary to the sruthis. Moreover to say that Brahman, which is pure, non-differentiated and self-illumined, is affected by avidhya and sees plurality in itself is contrary to all valid means of knowledge. There can be no valid argument to contradict that the cause is different from the effect on the basis of the unreality of the effect.

The argument that the cause alone is real because it persists while the effect is unreal because it is perceived and destructible is not sound, says the naiyayika. It has been proved earlier that the absence in one place and time does not preclude the presence of the object elsewhere at different time. And, the quality of being perceived and destructible not the criterion for proving that it is unreal but it only shows its being not permanent. A thing is unreal only if it is sublated at the same place and time and hence the pots and other things as well as the individual self are real only.

If everything else except Brahman is unreal then even the scriptural learning is futile as the scriptures also belong to the realm of avidhya and all endeavors to attain release will also be in vain as it is based on the knowledge of the scriptures. So is all the reasoning, put forth prove that Brahman is undifferentiated, as it is based on avidhya. The vedic declarations claimed to be true on the basis of the absence of any sublation but that alone cannot prove the validity because if there is a later declaration by some authority that everything is a void, that will be taken to be true in the absence of any later sublation. Hence the conclusion is that the effect is real and different from the cause and, the world, the effect is real and different from Brahman, its cause.
Thus the poorvapakshin rests his argument and the refutation of it by the suthra is explained by Ramanuja.

The suthra refers to the passages beginning with the word ‘ArambhaNa,’ namely ‘vAchArambhaNam vikArah nAmadhEyam mrtthikWEthyEva sathyam,’ followed by ‘sadhEva soumya idhamagra Aseeth, EkamEva adhvittheeyam,’ the Being only was at the beginning, one only without a second’ and ‘thadhaikshatha bahusyAm parajAyEya thatthEjo asrjatha, it willed to become many and created fire,’ and ‘anEna rupEna AthmanA anupravisya nAmaruPE vyAkaravANi, I will enter along with this individual self and make names and forms,’ and the passage ends with ‘EthadhAthmyam idham sarvam thath sathyam thathvamasi svEtha kethO, all this is ensouled by Brahman is the truth that thou art svEtha kethu.’ These texts confirm the non-difference of Brahman from the world which exists in the relation of body and soul Brahman.

This is the purport of the whole passage beginning with the question whether Svethakethu has learnt all that is to be learnt and when he answered in the negative, the father instructs him, saying that by knowing that everything is known as by knowing the clay all its effects like pots are known etc., thus showing that Brahman is the cause of the world and also non-different from the world, its effect.

For the sake of activities such as fetching water etc the clay attains a new name and form but the substance persists as clay only. Therefore it is said that the clay alone is true even as it persists even when the name and form is lost. Ramanuja says that the statement ‘mrtthikEthyEva sathyam’ means ‘pramANEa upalabhyatha ıthyarTHah, na thu dravyAntharathvEna; athah thasyaiva mrdhiraNydadhEh dhravyasya samsTHaNantharabhAv athvamAthrEna buddhisabdhanthrAdh ayah upapadhyanthE, yaTHaikasyEva dhevadhatthasya avasTHA bhedhaiah bAlah, yuvA, sTHavira h ithi buddhisabdhanthrAdhayah kAryAvisEshAscha dhryanthE.

This means as follows:

The clay or gold alone is known to be truevalid means of cognition because the pots, ornaments etc are not differentaltogether but only another state of existence of the causal substanceas the same individual Devadattha is seen to change into different forms such as a boy, youth, old man etc according to different stages in life.

When the pot is destroyed only the particular form is destroyed and not the substance, as it exists as potsherds and other forms but the clay persists in all stages and hence the argument that origination and destruction makes the effect a new substance is not correct. To say that if the effect pre-existed in the cause then its origination is meaningless, says Ramanuja, is the argument of the one who has no knowledge of origination and destruction. What originates is only a different form of the cause and that alone is destroyed. Hence the sathkAryavAdha, that is the effect is real and non-different from the cause, is not affected. It is not also correct to say that if a nonexisting form of the cause is originated it is asathkAryavAdha because the same substance is cognised as existing through out as when the clay becomes pot it gives up its previous form only and again when broken assumes the form of potsherds.
Then Ramanuja proceeds to explain the passage beginning with ‘sadhEvA soumya idham agra
Aseeth, EkamEvA adhvitheeyam, sath alone was in the beginning one only without a second.’
This means that the world of sentient and nonsentient beings was in the beginning one only
without names and forms. One only without a second shows that Brahman which is denoted as
‘sath’ is the material as well as the efficient cause. This and the next statement it willed to
become many,’ proves that the world is non-different from Brahman. Then ‘anEna jivEna
AthmanA anupravisya nAmarupE yvAkaravAni, denotes that Brahmanis the self of all. This is
also stated in the text ‘thath srshtvA thadhEvA anuprAvisath thadhanupravisya saccha thyaccha
abhavath,’ (Tait. 3-2)

Brahman being the self of all the whole world of sentient and insentient beings constitutes the
body of Brahman and hence the imperfections of the body cannot adhere to the soul, that is
Brahman who is free form evil and the abode of all divine attributes. Ramanuja quotes from
other scriptural texts also to prove the non-difference between Brahman and the world, that is,
between the cause and the effect- ‘sarvam khalu idham brahma,’ (Chan. 3-14-1) all this is
brahman ‘nEha nAnasthi kimchana’ (Brhd. 4-4-19) there is no plurality here, ‘yathra hi
dvaitham iha bhavathi thadhfithara itharam pasyathi, yathrathvasya sarvam Athmaiva abhoot
thath kEna kam pasyEth,’ (Brhd. 2-4-13) where there is plurality one sees another but when all
has become his self what he will see, by whom? That is, non-difference is only real.

Thus all words denote Brahman only as the sentient and insentient beings are His modes being
His sarira, says Ramanuja, ‘chidhachitvasthu sarirathayA thatprakAram brahmaivasarvadhA
sarvasabdhAbhiDHEyam.’ When the sentient and the insentient are in subtle state non-
distinguishable by name and form is the causal state, kAraNAvasTHA and when they are in
gross state cognisable by name and form it is the state of effect, kAryAvasThA. Hence the
world is not different from Brahman.

Ramanuja dismisses the theory of unreality of the world saying that in that case the non-
difference between the cause and effect cannot be established. Like wise he sets aside the views
of bhEdhAbhEdhAvAdhin also as being in conflict with the declarations of sruthi smrthi and
purANas.

All sruthi along with smrthi and puraNa proclaim in one voice that the Lord of Lords, all-
knowing all -powerful, of infallible will, free of blemish, not conditioned by place, time or
entity, ofunlimited transcendental bliss, as the one supreme cause.

Ramanuja quotes from several texts to prove the above declaration especially from
Mahanarayana upanishad

‘EkO ha vai nAryaNa Aseeth na brahmA nesAnO nEmE dhyAvaprthivee na nakshatrAni
nApOnAgnirna sOmO na sooryah,’

There was no other deity than Narayana in the beginning, as Brahman and narayana are
synonymous in visishtadvaita. Ithihasa and purana also confirm this, says Ramanuja, quoting
from Manu the text beginning with ‘thathah svayamboorbhagavAn, the self manifested Lord,’
and continuing to say, ‘apa EVa sasarjAdho thEshu veeryam apAsrjath, He created waters and planted His seed into it.’

To the possible objection that the effects are known to be different on account of the different terms and ideasas such they cannot be merely different states of the same entity. This is answered by the next suthra.

**SUTHRA-16-bhAvE cha upalabDHEh-2- 1-16**
**BECAUSE THE CAUSE IS SEEN IN THE EFFECT**
In the ornaments of gold, the cause, that is gold, is recognized and not any other cause such as clay. Therefore as in the case of Devadatta, who is recognized in all his different stages of childhood, youth and old age, the cause itself exists as the effect in a different state. Even the naiyayika who claims that the effect is different, acknowledges the different state of the effect as compared to the cause, which alone accounts for the difference in name and form and hence there is no need to assume that the effect is a new substance.

Ramanuja refutes the view that the similarity of the cause and the effect is due to the jati, that is the generic property or due to the inherent cause, the samavayi karana, because both disprove the origination of an effect. While it is said that scorpion etc are perceived to emerge from cow dung in which the opponent sees no continuation of the causal substance, Ramanuja says that it is the earthen element which persists as the body of the worms or scorpion. Then the opponent comes up with the argument that in smoke there is no presence of fire to which Ramanuja replies that it is the contact with wet fuel that is the cause of smoke, which is recognized to persist in the smoke through smell, and not fire. Therefore it is proved that the cause and the effect are not different.

**SUTHRA-17-satTHVAth cha aparasya-2-1- 17**
**BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE EFFECT IN THE CAUSE**
The effect exists in the cause as proved by such statements as ‘all these pots were clay in the morning.’ Similarly it is said that satth alone was in the beginning.

**SUTHRA-18-asadvyaPA dhEsAtH na ithi chETH na; dhRMAnrEna; vAkYAsEshAtH yukThEh sAbdHAnhrAccha**
It cannot be said that the effect was non-existent in the cause on account of the declaration ‘asadhEva idham Aseeth ‘nonexistence was in the beginning because it was due to another attribute, from another subsequent text, by reasoning and by other texts.

The attribute of being the world of nama and rupa was alone nonexistent in the beginning, as the pot was nonexistent as such, before its creation and by its name. From the subsequent passage that the nonexistent created, willing to become, ‘thadhhasdhEva samabhavOakurutha syAm ithi,’ it is proved. Reasoning also makes us say that the pot exists when it is seen in the particular shape and that it does not exist before its creation when it is present in the form of
clay or when it is broken into pot shreds. Also from another text which says ‘kuthasthu khalu soumya Evam syAth, how can this come about,’ thus dismissing the asath as the cause and establishing that the existence only was there, ‘sadhEva soumya idhmagra Aseeth.’

SUTHRA-19- PATAVACCHA-2- 1-19
AND LIKE THE PIECE OF CLOTH.
As the threads alone bear the name of a cloth in their state of effect Brahman becomes the world in its kAryAvasthA.

SUTHRA-20 YATHA CHA prANAAdhih-2- 1-20
LIKE prANA etc’
Just as the same life breath assumes different names like prANA APana etc within the body, Brahmanone only manifests as the variegated world. Therefore, concludes Ramanuja, ‘paramakAraNath paramAsth brahmaNah ananyathvajagathah siddham, the world is not different from the supreme cause, namely the supreme Brahman.

Thus ends Arambhanadhikaranam.

ITHARAVYAPADHIesAdhi kARANam-2- 1-7
SUTHRA21-ITHARAVYAP ADHESATH HITHAKARANADHIDHOSH APRASAKTHIH- 2-1-21
The ‘other’ (individual soul) being stated (as non different from Brahman) the defects of not doing what is beneficial will accrue (to Brahman).

This suthra is of the nature of poorvapaksha. An objection is raised on the basis of the texts such as ‘thathvamasi’, ‘ayam Athma brahma, ‘etc. declaring identity of the individual soul with Brahman. The opponent says that if the soul is identical with Brahman, the latter would be responsible in creating a world not conducive to welfare to its own self as the world contains the thApathraya, namely, Adhidaivika, Adhibouthika and AdhyAtmaika, the three ills arising out of destiny, elements and own attitude and actions.

The sruthi texts denoting the difference have been relinquished by those who profess identity. (This criticism seems to be directed against advaitin.) If it is said that the difference is due to adjuncts, upADHi, which is denoted by the differential texts while the natural identity (the view of the bhEdhAbhdhavAdhin) is stressed by the texts of identity, the opponent puts a question. If Brahman is aware of the identity it could not have created the world full of suffering for itself and if Brahman is unaware, it will be against the sarvajnathva, omniscient nature of Brahman. If the difference is due to ajnAna, ignorance, it should be real difference if the soul is the abode of ajnAna, andajnana cannot rest with Brahman, who is self-illumined, the light of which concealed by ajnana will result in self destruction of Brahman who is of the nature of light.

The next suthra answers this objection.
BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE STATED BRAHMAN IS SOMETHING MORE

The sruthi refers to brahman as being something more than the individual soul by texts such as ‘ya Athmani thishTan Athmanah antharah yam AthmA na vedha yasya AthmA sariram ya AthmA anam antharO yamayathi sa tha AthmA antharyAmyamrthah, (Brhd. 3-7-22) He who is in the Atman and whom Athma did not know etc. and in the passage ‘dvAsuparNA’it is said ‘thayOh Ekah pippalam svAdhu atthi,’ of the two birds, Brahman and the individual self, the latter eats sour and sweet fruit, meaning that it experiences joy and sorrow while the other, Brahman looks on, without being affected. Hence Brahman is different from the individual self.

IDENTITY IS IMPOSSIBLE AS IN THE CASE OF STONES ETC.

Just as the stones, logs and other inanimate things are different from Brahman in the same way the individual self is also different. The nature of Brahman, says Ramanuja, is ‘niravadhya- nirvikAra- nikhilahEyaprathyan eeka-kalyAnaikat hAna-svEtharasam sthavasthuvilaks haNa-ananthajnAn Anandhaikasvarup a- nAnAvidha anantha mahAvibhooti brahmasvarupa,’

Faultless, changeless, free from all evil, abode of auspiciousness, of infinite bliss and has multifarious glory as His svarupa.

Both the objects and the sentient souls are different from Brahman because of, the imperfections of the insentient and joy and sorrow experienced by the sentient soul. The non-difference of the cause and effect is true in respect of Brahman and the world, on account of the world, devoid of names and forms existing instate, which is denoted by the causal state of Brahman, the same when manifested in gross state with names and forms is Brahman in the state of effect. This is what is expressed by the sathkAryavAdha by the passage beginning with ‘sadhEva soumya idham agra Aseeth.

Thus ends the itharavyapadhEsADHi karaNam

If it is said that Brahman cannot create without external aid, it is not so, as can be seen in the case of milk.

After establishing that Brahman, the inner self of all, having the chit and achit as His body is not in any way hampers His omniscience, infallible will and being different from everything, now, this suthra shows that the creation by mere will is not in any way inappropriate.

The opponent says that in the world it is always seen that the agent of production, who represents the efficient cause, is able to produce anything only with the help of external materials such as clay, gold etc. The material cause is always different from the efficient cause and hence Brahman cannot be both material and efficient cause.
The sūtra refutes this by citing the example of milk. It is seen that the milk changes into curd without any extraneous material. Similarly water turns into ice without any external aid. Any substance that is added to milk for instance to make curd out of it is only to hasten the process. Likewise Brahman becomes the world, by itself.

**Sūtra-25**

DHĒVADVHĪV ADHAPI LOKĒ-2-1-25

Even like devas in their own worlds.

As the devas create by their will in their own worlds Brahman can also create through his will.

**Sūtra-26**

KRTHSNAPRAKṚTTHYĀDHAIKARANAM- 2-1-9

EVEN LIKE DEVAS IN THEIR OWN WORLDS.

As the devas create by their will in their own worlds Brahman can also create through his will.

**Sūtra-27**

SRUTHÊSTHUSABDHAMOOLATHVATH- 2-1-27

There is no discrepancy because of the powers of Brahman declared in the scriptures.

Brahman is declared by scriptures to be without parts and also of possessing wonderful powers. So it cannot be generalized on the basis of worldly experience because the case of matters beyond the sensory perception scripture alone is the authority.

**Sūtra-28**

ATHMANICH AIVAM VICHITRAŚCCH HI-2-1-28

The self also has different properties that the insentient matter.

It is seen in the world that fire and water have special characteristics different from each other and so is the sentient self is different from the matter and possesses special powers. Similarly Brahman has supreme powers.

In Vishnupurana answers the question,

‘nirgunaSyaApraṃEyasa yā suddhasyāpyaṃalathm anah kaTHam sargAdhi karthrthvam brahmaNObhypagamya thE’,
How can the creation attributed to Brahman who is attribute less, immeasurable and pure, as follows

“sakthayah sarva bhAvAnAm achinthyajnAna gOcharah, yathO athO brahmaNah thAsthu sargAdhyA bhAvA sakthayah, bhavanthi thapathAm sreshTa pAvakasya yaTHOshNathA”.

The numerous powers of Brahman beyond all thought are the nature of Brahman as the heat is to the fire which makes the actions like creation possible.

The sruthi also says, ‘kim svidvanam ka u sa vrkhsha Aseeth yathah dhyAvAprthivee nishtathakshuh,’ which is the woods, what is the tree which the heaven and earth were created and supplies the answer as ‘brahma vanam brahma sa vrksha AseedhyathodhyAvApr thivee nishtathakshuh,’ Brahman is the woods and the tree from which the heaven and earth were fashioned. Hence the general observations do not hold good in the case of Brahman whose power is supreme and different from all else.

SUTHRA-29-SVAPAKSHA DHOSHAChA- 2-1-29
Brahman as the cause is indisputable because of the defects of the view of the opponent also.

The objection that Brahman cannot be the cause of the world because of being devoid of parts holds good on the part of the opponents also. PraDHAna of sankhya and the atoms of naiyayika are also without parts. This difficulty cannot be surmounted by the sankhyan that the three guNas are the parts that combine to produce the world, says Ramanuja, because if the gunas are constituents of praDHAna they must be included under the thathvas giving rise to evolution, but they are not specified so, and if praDHAna is the effect of the guNas then the claim that praDHAna is the primal cause will be disproved.

SUTHRA-30-SARVOPETH A CHA THADDHARSANATH- 2-1-30
Brahman is denoted as being endowed with all powers.

The powers of Brahman are confirmed by the sruthi texts such as

‘para asya sakthih viviDhaiva srooyathE svAbhAvikee jnanabalakriyAcha,
His powers are supreme and His knowledge, might and action are spontaneous.’ (Svet. 6- 8)

and Brahman differs in nature from all else is denoted by the text

‘apahathapApmA vijarOvimirthuhy vishOKO vijiGHathsO apipAsah,
Free from evil, oldage, death, grief, hunger and thirst,’ and then

‘sathyakAmah sathyasankalpah,
Of infallible will and wish,’ which shows His supreme power. (Chan. 8-1-5)

SUTHRA-31-VIKARANAT HVATH NA ITHI CHETH THADHUkTHAM 1-2-31
IF IT IS OBJECTED ON ACCOUNT OF BEING WITHOUT ORGANS, IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED.
The objection is raised based on the declaration
'na thasya kAryam karaNam cha vidhyathE, there is no effect nor any instrument for Him,’ and Ramanuja says that the answer has been already given in the suthra ‘sruthEsthu sabdamoolathvAth,’ (BS. 2-1-27) the power of Brahman being based on the sruthi which shows the difference of Brahman from all else. The text ‘pasyathyachakshuh srNothyakarNah,’ proves that Brahman has no need for sense organs being omniscient and omnipotent.

This is the end of krthsnapraskthyaDHi karaNam

PRAYOJANATHVADHIKAR aNAM-2-1-10
SUTHRA-32-NA PRYOJANAVATHVATH- 2-1-32
Brahman is not the cause of the absence of motive

This suthra is of poorvapaksha. The opponent says that even though Brahman may be endowed with supreme powers there is no motive for His creating the world, being Himself avApathasamastha kAma, one who has no unfulfilled desire. Usually things are produced in the world either for one's own use or for that of others. The first alternative is shown to be absent because Brahman is avApathasamasthakAma and the second also can be disproved. If Brahman creates for others it must be as an anugraha or for showering grace in which case He would not have created this world full of sorrow, as He is full of mercy. The next suthra replies to this.

SUTHRA-33- LOKAVATTHU LEELAKAIVALYAM- 2-1-33
THE CREATION IS A LEELA, A SPORT AS IN THE WORLD.
A king who has everything undertakes some action as a mere sport, so also Brahman creates sustains and annihilates this world as a mere sport.

SUTHRA-34-VAISHAMYA NAIRGRNYE NA, SAPEKSHATHVATH THATHA HI DHARSAYATHI- 2-1-34
Partiality and cruelty cannot be, considering other reasons, also declared by sruthi

An objection is raised based on the previous suthra that if the creation is a mere sport for Brahman He will be charged with partiality and cruelty in creating a world full of inequalities and making the beings suffer. But the scripture declares that Brahman takes into consideration the karmas of the souls in creating the different conditions of the beings in the world.

‘sAdhukAree sAdhurEva bhavathi pApakAree pApo bhavathi,
‘A man becomes good by good work and bad by bad work.’ (Brhd. 3-2-13)

SUTHRA-35-NA KARMA AVIBHAGATH ITHI CHETH NA, ANADHITHVATH UPAPADHYATHECHA APYPALABAHYATHE CHA-2-1-35
If it is said that there was no karma in the beginning, it is not so because karm is anAdhi, beginning less, which is reasonable and according to scriptures’.

The objection that in the beginning only Brahman alone existed and hence no karma can be
attributed to the first being created is answered that the individual souls and their karma are beginningless. The sruthi confirms this by saying ‘na jAyathE mriyathE va vipschith. The sentient soul is neither born nor dies,’ (KatO. 1-2-18) and ‘sooryAchandhramaso u DHAtha yaTHA poorvam alkapayath’, (Brhd. 3-4-7) the creator created the sun and the moon as before. In the Bhagavatgita we find the verse ‘prkrt him purusham chaiva viddhyanAdhee ubou api’, know that the prakrthi, sentient nature and purusha, the sentient self to be beginningless.

Ramanuja concludes the argument by saying,

‘ athah sarvavilakshaNathvA th sarvasakthithvAth leelaika prayOjanathvAth kshEthrajnakarmAnug uNyEna vichithrasrshtiYoGAt brahmaiva jagathkAraNam.’

That is, Brahman alone is the cause of the world, because of being different from all, being all powerful, having sport as the sole purpose and created the world in accordance with the karma of the individual souls.

**SUTHRA-36-SARVADHAR mOPAPATTHESCHA- 2-1-36**

Because all the attributes are proved in Brahman

Since all the attributes essential for being the cause of the world are proved in Brahman which are shown as being absent in praDHAna or atoms, Brahman is the cause of the world of the sentient and the insentient.

Thus ends the prayojanathvADHikar aNam

The end of the first pAdha of the second aaDhyAya of sribhAshya

**PADHA2**

**RACHANANUPAPATTHI ADHIKARANAM 2-2-1**

**RACHANANUPAPATTHESC HA NANUMANAM PRAVRTTHESCHA- 2-2-1**

That which is inferred cannot be the cause because of the impossibility of construction and the activity.

In the previous sections the objections raised against the causality of Brahman were refuted and the cause of the world of the sentient and the insentient has been established as being Brahman only. Now the theories of the non-vedantic schools are examined and refuted in order to establish firmly the view that Brahman is the only cause of the world.

Ramanuja gives the reason for demolishing the views of others whose theories are nonconforming to that set out in the scriptures as otherwise through clever reasoning it might lead some dull witted persons to believe that these views are authoritative.

First the theory of sankhya is taken up which, Ramanuja says, is in accordance with the sathkAryavAdha of the scriptures and hence may lead to misconceptions.
Ramanuja quotes from Sankhya kArika of Isvarakrishna, which is at present the basic authority on Sankhya philosophy.

moolaprakrthih avikrthih mahadhAdhyAh prakrthivikrthayah saptha shodasakascha viKArO na prakrthirnavikrthir purushah (SK. kArika-3)

The meaning of the karika is as follows: the moolaprakrthi, primordial nature, which is changeless, is the cause and not the effect of anything. There are seven entities which are both evolvents and evolutes. Namely, mahath, aham kara, and the five thanmathras, while the indhriyas, eleven in number and the five gross elements are only evolutes, totaling to sixteen

and the purusa, the sentient soul is neither an evolvent nor an evolute.

The pradhana of sankhya is constituted of three gunas, satthva, rajas and thamas, which are of the nature of light, action and delusion respectively. The three attributes are in a state of equilibrium before creation and the purusha has no action or attributes. The prakrthi by the sheer nearness of the purusha starts the creation which results in the intermingling of the gunas which are otherwise in equilibrium. From the moola prakrthi the mahat or buddhi is produced and from that the ahamkara. According to the three gunas the ahamkara is of three kinds sathvik, rajasik and thamasik. From the sathvik ahamkara, the five jnanendhriyas and the five karmendhriyas and the manas are created. From the thamasik ahamkara the five thanmathras,
that is, the five elements in their subtle form are created which in their turn produce the five gross elements. The rajasika ahamkara only assisting the other two being the fountainhead of activity.

Purusha is the sentient soul different in each sarira. Due to ignorance the attributes of prakrthi are superimposed on the purusha who imagines himself as the doer and enjoyer identifying himself with the three gunas of prakrthi. Just as the crystal appears red due to the nearness of a red flower the activity of prakrthi is identified with purusha, whose sentiency is superimposed on prakrthi in its turn. By the knowledge of the prakrthi and its evolutes the purusha understands that he is different from it and this is the apavarga, release of Sankhya. The causality of pradhana is based on anumana, inference and by demolishing of the reasoning of Sankhya thus dismisses the whole theory of the causality of pradhana. This adhikarana of first padha of the second chapter of the Brahmasuthra sets out to accomplish just that.

The argument of the sankhyas to prove that pradhana is the cause of the world is as follows:

There must be one primal cause for as otherwise there will be infinite regress because a causal substance producing an effect through its parts is itself created from its parts which in turn from their parts etc. The does not end even in the case of atoms which also must have parts to combine. So primal cause such as pradhana which has for its constituents the three gunas in equilibrium will have the power to produce this variegated world by the combination of the gunas. This is shown in the karika

bhEdhAnAm parimAnathsamnvayAth sakthithah pravrththEschakAraNa kArya vibhAghAth avibhAghAth vaisva roopyasya, kAraNam asthi avyaktham (SK. karika-15, 16)

The unmanifest cause (prakrthi) exists because of the finite nature of special objects, homogeneity, evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause, the differentiation between the cause and effect and the merging of the whole world of effects in the cause in dissolution.

The world being an effect it must have a cause which is similar to its nature and hence the unmanifest prakrthi constituted of the three gunas must be the cause, as everything in the world is made up of three gunas. Sankhya justifies this by saying that it is always seen the the effect is of the nature of cause as in the case of pots and ornaments. since the thathvas like mahath and ahamkara are also finite it points out to a cause which is unmanifest with gunas in equilibrium, that is, before their combining to produce the finite world.

This suthra refutes the argument of sankhya by saying that the pradhana of sankhya, referred to as ‘that which is inferred’ is not the cause because of the impossibility of construction and of the activity.

Pradhana being sentient cannot be the cause of the world as it is seen that any causal activity involves a sentient being. Wood and other materials cannot transform themselves into palaces or chariots without the operation of a sentient soul. The three gunas, sathva rajas and thamas are only the causes of light, action or inertia and they cannot produce effects. The whiteness of a cow is not its cause but a quality. Similarly sathva rajas and thamas are also qualities and not substances. And that is why they are called gunas.
The contention that there must be only one cause is also disproved by their own theory that the world is created from the three gunas and not one. The gunas are also said to be unlimited and hence being all pervading they cannot become less or more to combine and create the world.

**SUTRA2-PAYOMBUVA C HETH THATHRAPI-2-2-2**

*IF IT IS SAID THAT IT IS LIKE MILK OR WATER THERE ALSO.*

Sankhya answers to the above objection that it needs a sentient principle to create, that in the case of milk and water it is seen to transform without any aid of sentient principle. That is, the milk becomes curd and the water which is of same taste being discharged from the clouds, when taken in by the plants, is transformed into juices of different tastes in coconuts, palm, wood apple and other fruits. Similarly the pradhana also, though of homogeneous before creation changes into different objects due to the disturbance in the equilibrium of the gunas. This is indicated in the sankhya karika as ‘pariNAmathah salilavath prathiprathiguNAsra yavisheshAth’ (SK-16) the pradhana changes according to the gunas like water. Therefore, pradhana is capable of creation unaided by a sentient principle.

This is refuted by the suthra. Even on the case of milk and water there is no creational activity without the intelligent agent, meaning that even the plants need some one to take care of them and milk does not become curd without someone adding curd into it. Moreover, that there is a sentient principle even in inanimate things has already been shown by the scriptural texts such as those which say that it is Brahman who is inside earth and other entities as their inner controller and self. Even the suthra ‘upasamhAra dharsanAth na ithichETh na ksheeravath’ (BS. -2-1-24) where it is said that Brahman does not need any external aid like milk turning into curd is only to denote the supreme power of Brahman and not to dismiss the presence of sentient principle as Brahman is the sentient principle required for creational activity.

**SUTRA3- VYATHIREKANAVASTHIT HEH CHA ANPEKSHATHVAM- 2-2-3**

Pradhana being independent of any guiding sentient principle there will always be creation and no possibility of pralaya at all. So pradhana must be controlled by brahman and hence cannot be the sole cause of the world. But the opponent says that if Brahman who is described as aAPthasamasthakAma, with no desire, of nature of bliss etc. is the cause of the world the defects like cruelty and partiality will accrue to Brahman. But, says Ramanuja, which the creation is like sport and the inequalities are due to the karma of the individual souls, is already explained in the earlier suthra.

The opponent now comes with the question, if the state of bondage and release and the inequalities in various beings are all due to karma then what is the function of Brahman in creation and annihilation? On the other hand it is pradhana which acquires different forms and states according to the karma of the individual self which explains the differences in experiences and hence pradhana is fit to be the cause of the world.

To this Ramanuja says, the opponent is ignorant of the nature of merit and demerit, puNya and
pApa, which are responsible for the karmaphala. This cannot be understood unless one learns the sathras. It is said in the scriptures that the puNya and pApa consists of the actions like worship etc which please the LOrd and the actions that displease Him are pApa. His grace and retribution are the fruits of action resulting in joy and sorrow.

‘Paramapurusha aArAdhana rupEkarmaNee puNyApuNyE; thadhanu grahanigrahAyatt hE cha thathphale sukah duhkE’

Hence the Lord who has infallible will, with no desires, omniscient omnipotent and of the nature of bliss etc. is the dispenser of the fruits of actions and bestows on all beings the body and other instruments to work out their karma, as effortlessly as a sport. There is no question of cruelty or partiality in administrating justice. As the punishment for a crime is to check the tendency of evil, so too His retribution is for redemption, as it is said in the Bhagavat Gita,

‘thEshAm sathatha yukthAnAm bajathAm preethipurvakam dhadhami buddhiyogam tham yEna mAm upayAnthi thE;thesham EvAnukampArTHam aham ajnAnajam thamah nAsayAmyAthmabhAvas THah jnANadhEEna bhAsvathA. ’ (BG. X-10-11)

The lord says that He gives jnana to those who resort to Him with devotion by destroying their darkness of ignorance out of compassion by the light of wisdom. Therefore pradhana cannot be the cause of the world. The opponent argues that pradhana can transform itself without a sentient principle like grass and water changes into milk in a cow. The next suthra answers this.

**SUTHRA-4-ANYATHRAAB HAVACCHA THRNA DHIVATH- 2-2-4**
**NOT LIKE GRASS ETC BECAUSE MILK DOES NOT EXIST OTHER THAN COW.**
The example is not correct as the grass etc does not turn into milk when eaten by a bull or when not eaten at all. It is the sentient agent, the cow which turns the grass into milk.

**SUTHRA-5-PURASMAVAT H ITHI CHETH THA THAPI-2-2- 5**
**IF IT IS SAID LIKE MAN AND THE STONE THAT ALSO**
It is argued by the opponent that even though the pradhana is insentient and the purusha is actionless, the creation takes place by the mere proximity of purusha which induces the pradhana to create. it is commonly found in the world also as a blind man who could not see is able to move about with the help of a lame person whom he carries on his shoulders. Similarly the magnetic stone, though actionless attracts the iron by its mere proximity. In the sankhykarika it is said--

‘purushasya dharsanArTHam kaivalyArTHam thaTHA praDHAnasya, pangvanDHavath ubhayOrapi samyogah thathkrthassargah.’

In order that the individual self, purusha may perceive pradhana and (knowing himself different from it) obtain his release the two are connected like a lame and a blind persons would and hence the creation.
The suthra refutes this also as being inappropriate. The examples cited do not prove the point. The lame and the blind persons are both sentient souls, one is able to guide and the other is able to move. In the case of the magnetic stone and the iron they need to be brought close by someone in order that attraction will result. Moreover the pradhana and purusha being always near to each other there will always be creation which will be eternal and no release. If the purusha is ever free there will not be any creation at all.

SUTHRA-6-ANGITHVA ANUPAPATHESCHA- 2-2-6
THE RELATIONSHIP OF PRINCIPAL AND SUBORDINATE IS NOT APPROPRIATE.
It is maintained by the opponent that the creation takes place by the overpowering of one guna of the others resulting in the variegated world. But in pralaya all the three gunas are in equilibrium and hence creation cannot take place. If there is inequality even then there will be creation always. So the pradhana cannot create without a sentient principle.

SUTHRA-7-ANYATHA ANUMITHOU CHA JNA SAKTHI VIRODHATH-2- 2-7
ANY OTHER INFERENCE IS FUTILE AS PRADHAN IS INSENTIENT
This suthra dismisses all reasoning to establish the causality of pradhana by saying that since pradhana can never be the cogniser, that is, not sentient, it cannot be the cause.

SUTHRA-8-ABHYUPAGAM E API ARTHABHAVATH- 2-2-8
EVEN SO BECAUSE OF ABSENCE OF PURPOSE
The purpose pradhana as being working for the enjoyment and release of the purusha is inadmissible. Purusha actionless, pure intelligence, immutable and pure. Thus it is not possible for him to get bound to get released. If it is due to the nearness of pradhana, its being always near, there will never be release for the purusha.

SUTHRA-9-VIPRATHISH EDHATH ASAMANJASAM- 2-2-9
SANKHYAN THEORY IS BECAUSE OF CONTRADICTIONS
The theory of sankhya is summarily dismissed by this suthra as being full of contradictions.

1. Purusha who is pure intelligence, free in reality, actionless and changeless is said to get bound by the gunas of prakrthi which is the cause of both the bondage and release of purusha.

‘sanGHAta parArTHaThvAth thriguNAadhiviparyay aaDHIsTanATH
purushoaasthi bhOtkhrbhAvAth kaivalyArTHapravrtt hEScha’ (SK. 17)
The purusha exists because the the aggregates of the gunas are created for the sake of another, that is purusha, who is free from the gunas and is the controlling agency of the gunas and their enjoyer and who aspires for release.

2. The prakrthi alone is said to be bound and released and not purusha.

‘ThasmAnna baDHyathE asou na muchyathE nApisamsaratthi kaschith, samsarathi
As mentioned earlier the prakrthi and purusha are connected like the lame and the blind where the prakrthi creates for the sake of enjoyment of purusha and for his release, while the purusha who is indifferent becomes the doer due to mutual superimposition of the gunas of prakrthi and the sentiency of purusha.

Ramanuja now explains the discrepancies in the theory of sankkhya

1. The doership etc due to superimposition cannot happen with respect to purusha due to his being changeless and indifferent because even the illusion of superimposition is a change also cannot be the doer and enjoyer because it is insentient.

2. Purusha being changeless, mere proximity of the prakrthi will not result in superimposition as, if it happens, it will be permanent on account of the prakrthi being always proximate.

3. The prakrthi is said to be benevolent, and acts for the good of the purusha in many ways with her three gunas while purusha is devoid of attributes and does not confer any benefits on prakrthi, that is he is indifferent.

Ramanuja asks, if the prakrthi alone is bound and released (vide kArikA62) then why is the prakrthi said to be helping purusha who is ever free?

4. The prakrthi, as a dancer after exhibiting herself on the stage for the sake of purusha withdraws as the dancer would after she has been seen.

Therefore concludes Ramanuja that due to all these discrepancies the theory of causation of the sankhyas is refuted. This is the end of rachanAnupapathyaDH ikaraNam.

Even so the theory of big and long produced from short and atomic (of the nyaya vaiseshikas) is untenable.

The theory of causation of sankhya has been on the basis of being fallacious and now the causality of atoms are taken up for refutation. The school of Nyaya vaiseshika claim that the atoms are the cause of the world and the atom is invisible and indivisible and are the ultimate cause which creates the world by combining into dyads and triads. Two atoms combine and...
become a dyad which is also invisible and denoted by the term ‘hrasva, short’ three dyads combine to make a thrayaNuka or thrasarENu which stage it becomes perceivable and acquires magnitude and hence referred to as dheerGHa and mahath, long and big. In this manner gross elements are created and the process goes on till the world of objects is produced.

The suthra refutes the theory of atoms itself and hence the view of Nyayavaiseshika that the world has originated from atoms. They say that the atoms have no dimension and no parts in which case they cannot combine and even if they do, since atoms do not have dimension there would not be any question of short, long etc. Ramanuja explains this as follows:

The things consisting of parts like threads combine in all their six sides with each other to produce a piece of cloth. So also the atoms must have parts in order to combine to become dyads etc. Otherwise the atoms being without dimension even a thousand atoms combining would not produce any magnitude of long, short etc. If on the other hand it is admitted that they have parts, then those parts must have originated from other parts and thus will result in infinite regress.

Vaiseshika may object that since this would mean the atoms having infinite parts there would not be any difference between a mustard seed and a mountain to which Ramanuja replies that the atoms having no dimension the very idea of a mustard seed or a mountain itself is impossible as nothing bigger than a paramanu can be produced. Then the vaiseshika asks ‘what is the solution,’ to which Ramanuja replies ‘vaidhikah pakshah parigrhyathAm!’ meaning, they have no alternative than to accept the view of the vedanta that Brahman is the cause of the world.

SUTHRA-11- UBHAYATHAHAPI NA KARMATHAH THADHABHAVAH- 2-2-11
ON BOTH ASSUMPTIONS THERE CAN BE NO MOTION AND HENCE NO CREATION.
The atoms are supposed to be set in motion by adhrshta or unseen principle which must abide either in the atoms or in the individual soul and this suthra says that both assumptions are untenable.

Adhrshta, the unseen principle is the effect of karma on the part of the individuals which is causal for the creation and this cannot abide in the atoms. Adhrshta abiding in the individual cannot be responsible for the motion in atoms. If it is due to the contact of the atoms with the individual soul, the adhrshta being beginningless there will be always creation. But the opponent may say that since the fruition of karma differs in respect of time there cannot be creation forever. This presents a difficulty as the pralaya cannot be explained as all the karma of all the souls cannot fructify at the same time for the creation to stop. The will of the Lord also cannot be cited as the cause of this because the Isvara of Nyayavaiseshika is inferred, and cannot be proved, as already shown in the suthra ‘sAsthraonithvath’ (BS. 1-1-3) Therefore the causality of atoms is disproved.
Samavaya or inherence is one of the seven categories, padhArTh as of nyayaiseshikas. Categories are the classification of everything in the world which falls into one of the seven, namely, substance, quality, action, genarality, peculiarity, inherence and non-existence. Out of these, samavaya, inherence, is a concept peculiar to the system of Nyayaiseshika. It is explained thus. Samavaya, inherence, is the eternal relation between two things inseparable as the substance and quality, motion and moving object, genus, jati and the individual belonging to the jati, etc.

The suthra refutes the concept of samavaya on the basis of infinite regress. As samavaya explains the relation between two things inseparable the relation of samavaya to the things that are made inseparable by its presence must be also by samavaya and thus it results in infinite regress, anavasTHA. If it is said that the inseparable connection is the nature of samavaya and hence does not need another connection to explain it, Ramanuja argues that the same nature of connection can be attributed to the two things which are inseparable by nature.

According to the nyayaiseshikas samavaya is eternal and if the connection is eternal the things connected are also eternal and hence the world will be eternal.

The atoms of four kinds are said to create the world, namely those of air, fire, water and earth, which possess the peculiar characteristics of the four elements, that is, touch, colour, taste and smell. And the atoms are claimed to be eternal and partless. If they possess the characteristics of colour etc they cease to be eternal and partless as all the things that have these qualities are found to be non-eternal and have parts. This is contradictory to the concept of atoms professed by the nyayaiseshakas.

On the other hand if the atoms do not have colour and other qualities they cannot be the cause of earth and other elements. So either way the theory of atoms being the cause of the world is refuted.

The theory of sankhyas advocated by KAPILA, is accepted partly by the followers of the Vedas because of its sathkaryavAdha, though it has been proved to be contrary to the vedic concepts.
But the theory of atoms, expounded by KaNadha, the founder of vaiseshika, is totally rejected. Thus ends the mahaddheerGhADHikar aNam.

SAMUDHAYADHIKARANAM -2-2-3
SUTHRA-17-SAMUDHAYA UBHAYAHETHUKERE THADHAPRAPTHIH- 2-2-17
EVEN WITH THE AGGREGATE WITH TWO CAUSES IT IS UNESTABLISHED.

After refuting the atomic theory of the nyayavaiseshika the Buddhist realist school who also believe that the atoms are the cause of the world is taken up. There are four schools of Buddhism first two being realists and the other two being idealists and nihilists. The realists belong to the hinayana sect of Buddhism while the other two belong to the mahayana school. The realist theory is taken up now and refuted.

Ramanuja himself classifies the four schools of Buddhism by saying,
‘the chatthurviDhAh; kechith pArthiva Apya thaijasa vAyaveeya paramAnusangGHAthar upAn bhoothabouthikAnchitthachaaittharup Amscha abhyantarAn arTHAn prathyaksha anumAna siddhAnabhyupayanthi’.

They are of four kinds.

Some hold the view that all external things, elements and their products, and all internal like mind and the mental experiences are all made up of the four atoms of earth, water, fire and air and they are perceptible and inferrable and real. (vibhAshikas)

‘anyE thu bAhyAn arTHAn sarvAnprthivyAdheen vijnAna anumEyAn vadhAnthi.’

Others say that the external things like earth etc. are also only inferred. (sauthrAnt hikas)

‘aparE thu-arTHa sunyam vijnAnamEva paramARTHa sath, bAhyArTHAsThu svapnArTHa kalpAh ithyAhuh.’

Yet others say that the reality is only ideas with no corresponding things outward which are all like things seen in a dream. (vijnAnavAdhis or yOgAchAras)

‘ThrayOpyEthe svApyupagatham vasthu kshaNikam AchcchakshathE’

All three of them hold the view that all things experienced are momentary. That is, they do not accept a permanent soul or any permanent entity like AkAsa.

The fourth school, says, Ramanuja, consider everything as non-existent ‘sarvasunyam’. (mADhyamikas or sunyavAdhins)

The suthra refutes the view of the first two, sarvAstivAdhins, the realists who consider everything as the product of the aggregates of atoms and real.

According to the realist schools, there are four kinds of atoms corresponding to that of earth possessing the qualities of smell, taste, colour and touch, of water which has all the qualities except smell, of fire which has got only colour and touch, of air with touch alone. These atoms join in aggregates and produce the four elements which further forming aggregates to become
bodies, sense organs and sense objects. The self is only the flow of ideas, imagined as the agent of action and enjoyment. This is how the empirical world is created.

The suthra refutes this theory saying that the theory of the aggregates of the atoms forms the elements and the aggregates of the latter forming the bodies, sense organs etc., both are untenable. As everything has only momentary existence it is impossible for the atoms to combine to form an aggregate. Similarly the elements being momentary cannot form aggregates. Even the ideas being imagined as the knower, is not possible as the known is lost in a moment and so is the knower, and the one who perceives is not the one who knows, as both are momentary. Even if it is said the flow of ideas are continuous the idea that exists this moment is not the one that appears in the next moment. That is, the cogniser and the experiencer are not the same.

SUTHRA-18-ITHARETHA RA PRATHYAYATHVATH UPAPANNAM ITHI CHETH NA, SANGHATHA BHAVA ANIMITTHATHVATH- 2-2-18
IF IT IS SAID THAT THIS COULD BE EXPLAINED THROUGH SUCCESSIVE CAUSALITY, NO, BECAUSE THEY CANNOT BE THE CAUSE OF AGGREGATION
It is argued by the opponent that though all things are momentary avidhya or nescience is the cause of everything.

Avidhya consists in the wrong notion of permanence in things that are momentary. From this avidhya springs the samskaras which are mental impressions like raga and dvesha.

From these arise vijnAna or consciousness provocation of the mind and from this chittha, mind and chaiththa, mental, the name and form like earth and other elements possessing rupa, rasa, ganda and sparsa, colour, taste, smell and touch and from these the shadAyathana or sense organs from which the body called sparsa and from that vEdhana or feelings arise. This is how Ramanuja explains the theory of the wheel of causation of the buddhists called pratheethya samuthpAdha. According to Ramanuja from feelings, vEdhana, the cycle of samsara starts again with avidhya. But the buddhista add five more to the cycle, thrishNA, desire. upAdhAna, clinging towards the object of desire, bhAva, beginning of existence, which causes janma, birth, succeeded by jarAmaraNa, old age and death. All these cannot happen without the aggregates and hence the theory of aggregates is proved.

The suthra refutes this saying that the concept of successive causality cannot be the cause of aggregation. Avidhya causing the sense of permanency in things that are not, and the subsequent causes of avidhya cannot be responsible for forming of aggregates, no more that the misconception of the shell as silver can cause the formation of aggregates of shell. Moreover the perceiver of the momentary things as permanent, is himself and there is no permanent subject to whom the avidhya and its effects like samskaras, such as desire etc will belong. Ramanuja says that those who do not accept a permanent abode of samskaras have no right to assume the permanency of samskaras, 'samskArAsrayam sTHiramEkam dhravyam anabhyupagacchathAm samskArAnuvritthira pi na sakyam kalpayithum. '
SUTHRA-19-UTTHAROTH PADHE CHA POORVANIRODHATH- 2-2-19
BECAUSE OF THE CESSATION OF THE PREVIOUS ONE AT THE ORIGINATION OF THE NEXT
The preceding existence being momentary ceases to exist when the subsequent existence arises and hence cannot be the cause of the first. Otherwise if the origination comes about from non-existence anything may be the cause of anything else, like the pot having momentary existence can give rise to a cow etc. Even if it is said that the momentarily existing thing can be the cause of only something belonging to the same species, then the pot that exists momentarily will be the cause of all subsequent pots. Moreover the thing perceived being momentarily no cognition is possible in the next moment when the thing no longer exists.

SUTHRA-20-ASATHI PRATHIJNA UPARODHOU YOUGAPADHYAM ANYATHA-2-2-20
IF THE CAUSE IS NONEXISTENT IT WILL BE CONTRARY TO THE PROPOSITION.
OTHERWISE THERE WILL BE SIMULTANEITY.
The difficulty cannot be surmounted by saying that the effect could be produced without the cause. According to the sauthranthika school of buddhism perpetual cognition is said to result from four kinds of causes, Alambanapraathyaya, aDHipathi prathyaya, sahakAri prathyaya and samananthara prathyaya.

Alambanapraathyaya- In the cognition of the object the object should be present.
aDHipathi prathyaya- The sense organ should be in contact with the sense object.
sahakAri prathyaya- The light which illuminates the object
samananthara prathyaya-The impression of earlier perception to recognise the object.

Ramanuja says that if there can be effect without a cause everything may originate from everything else and everywhere and always. Further the proposition of the four causes will also be contradicted. The principle of aDHipathi prathyaya requires that the sense organ should perceive the object which is momentary. If the effect comes into being before the cause is destroyed in order that it is perceived it would result in simultaneity of the cause and effect, which does not happen as they are not perceived simultaneously and the concept of momentariness should be given up. If the momentariness of objects is retained then the contact of the sense organ and the cognition must be simultaneous.

SUTHRA-21-PRATHISAN KHYA APRATHISANKHYA NIRDHA APRAPTHIHI
AVICCHEDHA- 2-2-21
PRATHISANKHYA IS NOT ESTABLISHED BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF INTERRUPTION.
The theory of origination of the Buddhists has been refuted in the foregoing suthras and now their theory of destruction is shown to be untenable.

According to Buddhism the destruction is of two kinds, prathisankhyaNirODHa and aprathisankhyaNirOD Ha.
The former is the destruction which is perceived such as when the pot is broken by a hammer. The second is that which is not perceived because of the momentariness of things.

That is, an object is destroyed every moment and another originated in its place but the destruction is not seen and hence appears to be continuous like the flame of a lamp.

The suthra refutes this because of the impossibility of such destruction. Ramanuja says that the impossible of complete destruction has been proved the suthra ‘thadhanyathvam’ (BS. 2-1-14) it was shown that the origination and destruction is only different states of one and the same permanent substance which proves the oneness of cause and effect. When a pot is smashed it exists as potsherds etc. in another form. Even in the case of flame the light extinguished exists in another form but being too subtle, is not perceived.

SUTHRA-22-UBHAYATHA CHA DHOSHATH-2-2-22
IN BOTH CASES IT IS DEFECTIVE.
Neither origination from nothing nor destruction into nothing can be proved. If the effect originates from nothing it will also be nothing as the effects like pots and ornaments are seen to be of the same nature of their causes. If the destruction is absolute, the world when destroyed will pass into nothingness and the origination of the world again will be impossible and even if it is possible a world out of nothingness will not be real. So in either case the theory of the sauthranthika Buddhism is untenable.

SUTHRA-23-AKASE CHA AVISESHATH-2-23
IN THE CASE OF AKASA ALSO NOT BEING DIFFERENT FROM OTHERS
AkAsa is not a separate element according to Buddhism. This is refuted by the suthra saying that AkAsa is also proved to be a positive entity as like earth and other elements the cognition of AkAsa is not sublated and is real. By the expressions ‘there flies the eagle, there flies the hawk’ etc denotes the difference in spaces in the AkAsa.

Akasa cannot be mere non-existence of earth and other things because the non-existence, abhAva must be antecedent, prAgabhAva or subsequent, praDHvamsAbhAva or mutual, anyOnyAbhAva or absolute, athyanthAbhAva. The first is the non-existence of a thing before its origination and the second is its non-existence after destruction. The mutual nonexistence is when we say ‘a pot is not a cloth’ the last one is the non-existence of a thing in the past, future and present

Akasa cannot be the antecedent nonexistence of things like earth etc. because when they come into existence there would not be any space at all on the absence of AkAsa. Neither can it be subsequent non-existence for the same reason as the whole world will be without space. Mutual nonexistence is also impossible in which case there should not be any space between two things, but there is. Absolute non-existence is not AkAsa as the earth and other things are not non-existing absolutely. Moreover the non-existence of a thing is the counter correlate of a thing which exists.
SUTHRA-24-Anusmrthē scha-2-2- 24
Because of recognition

The theory of momentariness is rejected because of recognition. A thing seen is remembered and it is recognised as such when perceived again. It cannot be said that as in the case of a flame the recognition is due to similarity. In the perception of a flame, it is known to be momentary and different through valid means of cognition but a pot is not cognised as such. Moreover for the Buddhists even the perceiver is momentary and if so, a thing perceived by one person cannot be recognised by another. Those who claim that the recognition is due to similarity must necessarily accept a perceiver who is not momentary.

The opponent may say that the momentariness is proved by perception and inference in as much as the thing seen a present moment is different from the one seen in the past moment as the two have had existence in different times. Moreover, says the Buddhist, the momentariness can be proved through and purposefulness. What does not exist and not purposeful like the horn of the hare is not momentary on account of non-existence.

But Ramanuja says that the very arguments given to support the momentariness serve only to prove the contrary. That which exists and serves a purpose is permanent while those which are not so like the horn of a hare are not permanent because they do not exist. Also the perception does not prove the difference of the present object from the past but only that of the time.

"Melkote Udayavar"

Further the purposefulness will only disprove the momentariness as the thing which perishes in a moment cannot serve any purpose. When it is seen that at the last moment of existence of an object like pot, the destruction is due to a visible cause such as hammer, it means that the object continues to exist till that moment. Also the destruction is not total but only a change of the state of existence. Therefore the theory of momentariness cannot explain the recognition, more so because the cogniser is different from the recogniser, both being momentary. Ramanuja clinches the argument by saying that the opponent cannot prove his theory at all because the speaker himself is momentary!
SUTHRA-25-NA SATHO ADHRSHTATHVATH- 2-2-25
NOT FROM NON ENTITY AS THIS IS NOT SEEN

The theory of momentariness is common to both vaibhAsikas and sauthranthikas for whom the external things are real. But to the latter the reality is not perceived due to momentariness but inferred. They now come with an argument that even though a thing perishes it leaves its impression behind, causes cognition as in the case of the cognition of blueness continues even after the blue thing perishes. They argue that the prior state of knowledge is not always necessary for the subsequent knowledge as otherwise the knowledge of yellowness will not arise after that of blueness. So the knowledge of external objects are through inference which can arise even when the object is non-existent at the moment of cognition.

This view is refuted by the suthra saying that cognition cannot arise from non-existence because it is not perceived. Ramanuja explains this as follows: It is not the common experience that a thing, when it ceases to exist, leaves its attributes on another. Even a reflection lasts only as long as the image remains in front.

SUTHRA-26-UDHASEENA NAM API CHAIVAM SIDDHIH-2-2- 26
AND THUS THERE WILL BE ATTAINMENT WITHOUT EFFORT

This suthra refutes both the realistic schools of buddhism by saying that if everything is momentary, the result would be attained without effort as the one who experiences the result would be different from the one who acts. Therefore the doctrines of these two schools are untenable. Thus ends the samudhAyADHikaraNam.

UPALABDHYADHIKARANA M-2-2-4
SUTHRA-27-NABHAVA UPALABDHEH-2- 2-27
Non-existence is not true because of experience

The two hinayAna schools of buddhism have been refuted by the foregoing adhikaranam. Now the yOgachAras or vijnAnaAdhins, one of the two schools of mahayAna buddhism is refuted by this suthra. Both the two branches of buddhism are similar as far as the theory of momentariness is concerned but to the hinaYana buddhists the external things are real while for the mahAyAna schools they are not. While the mADHymikas or sunyavadhins follow the middle path the yOgAchAras declare that no external objects exist in reality and all that exists is consciousness. Ramanuja calls them vijnAnamAthraasthit hvavAdhins and starts refuting their view in this suthra which says that the non-existence of external things is not accepted because they are experienced.

Ramanuja says that it is not possible to deny the existence of the external objects because they are experienced. The cognition in the form of “I know the pot” serves as a means to realise the object in the practical sense. It is ridiculous, says Ramanuja, to claim that the knowledge alone is real when the very verb ‘jna’, to know, is related to a subject and an object. This fact is also confirmed in the worldly experience. Here Ramanuja equates the buddhistic view with that of advaitin, whom he callspracchanna baadvh, buddhist in disguise, though he appears to support the veda and says that the claim that only consciousness is real has been refuted.
already in the criticism of advaita.

Further, Ramanuja declares that the contention of the vijnAnAdhin that the sahOpalamBHa or the simultaneous perception of the object and its knowledge implies that they are one which disproves his own statement.

The external objects according to the vijnAnAdhin appear as real being illuminated by the light of knowledge because, he says, the knowledge always shines in the form of object only. That is, the knowledge is objective. But we are always conscious of the object along with the cognition of it. In other words the idea of an object and the object are one and the same and hence the idea alone is real which appears as though it is external. This is what Ramanuja criticises by saying that by this the buddhist has his own statement since two things being together only means that they are real and different. So it is meaningless to say that the cognition of a thing is not different from that thing itself.

Contention that the cognition of external objects arises from a ceaseless flow of mental impressions is not acceptable because the continuity of mental impressions cannot be established. The theory of momentariness means that the knowledge is also momentary and hence undergoes continuous destruction. Therefore the knowledge existing at the previous moment cannot produce that of the subsequent moment. This shows that the variety in knowledge can only be due to the variety of externally existent objects.

SUTHRA-28-vaiDHrmyA ccha na svapnAdhivath- 2-2-28
BECAUSE OF DIFFERENCE IN NATURE, NOT LIKE DREAM
Buddhist says that the reality of objects is not proved by perception. As the object in dream appear to be real to the dreamer so also the objects in the waking state appear as real but they are not. This view is refuted by the suthra.

Commenting on this suthra Ramanuja says that the knowledge of the things in the waking state is different from that in the dream because the latter is sublated in the waking state. The knowledge is inferred by the Buddhist to be devoid of objects because it is knowledge, but Ramanuja points out that even this inference is knowledge and it has an object. So it cannot be concluded that the knowledge has no object in general.

SUTHRA-29-na bhAvA anupalabDHEh- 2-2-29
THE EXISTENCE IS NOT ON ACCOUNT OF NON-PERCEPTION
The existence of mere cognition devoid of objects is never perceived. Moreover such knowledge will never be cognised as even in the dream the knowledge exists only with a subject and an object. Thus the view of the yOgachAra or vijnAnAdhin is refuted. This is the end of upalabDhyadhikaranA m.

SARVATHA anupapattthyADHikara Nam2-2-5
SUTHRA-30-sARVATHA anupapatthEscha- 2-2-30
BECAUSE IT IS NOT PROVED IN ANY WAY
The nihilist, mADHyamika comes forward to present his view that everything is a void. He professes that this is the true meaning of Buddha’s teachings and the theory of momentariness which implies the reality of external things were admitted in order to suit the limited intellect of his disciples. Since Buddha said that the world has no beginning and no end, the mADHyamika argues that it has no middle either. In other words this world is non-existent. Causality is only an illusion because creation is not possible either from existence or from non-existence.

The mADHyamika’s theory of causation that nothing is created because a thing cannot be created anywhere out of itself or out of another thing or from itself as well as another nor can it be causeless. This is explained as follows:

A pot cannot be produced from mud unless it is destroyed and also production is not possible from a non-existent cause.

A thing cannot be produced from itself since it already exists in the cause and needs no further action to produce it.

If a thing cannot be produced from an entirely different cause as in that case anything may be produced from anything else. So everything is sunya.

Ramanuja proceeds to examine the arguments of the mADHyamika in order to refute them in accordance with the above suthra ‘sarvaTHA anupapathEscha. That is, the view is unproved in all ways.

Ramanuja does not agree with the view that sunya is the only reality. Saying everything is sunya, ‘sarvam sunyam’ they disprove their own theory because the word sarvam, all, denotes the existence of things only. In worldly experience, the like existence, non-existence and the respective knowledge regarding them are all related to the different conditions of existent things only.

Sudarsanasuri elucidates this point further in his commentary to sribhashaya by saying that potness is existent with respect to pot but non-existent with respect to potsherds and vice versa.

Ramanuja concludes by saying that the sunyavada cannot be proved by any pramAna as this would mean accepting the existence of the pramAna which goes against the theory that everything is non-existent, sunya. So, he says, the view of the mADHyamika is summarily rejected.

Thus ends the sarvaTHAanupapatthy aDHikaraNam and with it the refutation of Buddhist theories of causation.

EKASMIN ASAMBHAVADHIKARANAM -2-2-6
SUTHRA-31-NAIKASMIN ASAMBHAVATH- 2-2-31
Jaina theory is refuted because of impossibility of contrary attributes being in same place.

After the refutation of the Buddhist theory of causation the Jaina view taken up next as they too
believe in atoms being the cause of the world.

The Jaina theory of causation is based on their concept of jiva, individual soul and pudgala, matter and the interaction between the two. The universe is made up of jivas and ajivas. Pudgala or matter is the material cause and the different bhAvakarmas or thought processes are the efficient cause of the world. As jivas are sentient beings they cause the bhAvakarmas. As a result of interaction between the souls and matter the creation takes place. The world consisting of jiva and ajiva, sentient and insentient, is without Isvara and consists of six components, namely, jiva, ajiva, dharma, adharma, pudgala, and AkAsa.

The jivas are classified as baddha, bound, yOgasiddha, perfect through yOga and muktha, released. Dharma is the all-pervading substance which is the cause of motion while adharma is that which causes rest. Pudgala is the matter consisting of substances with attributes of colour, taste, smell and touch. It is of two kinds, paramANurupa, in the form of atoms and sanGHatarupa, in the form of the four elements and bodies of living creatures etc. Time, kAla is also atomic and the cause of the concept of past, future and present. AkAsa is one occupying infinite space.

The substances other than those that are atomic are called asthikAyas and five in number, namely, jiva, dharma, adharma, pudgala and AKAsa. These are called astikayas because they have form and occupy several parts of space.

The unity of the matter and soul is the cause of bondage. The process of bondage and liberation is as follows. It is termed as ‘jivAjivAsravabandh a nirjarasamvar mokshAh’ to quote Ramanuja. The attitude of the mind resulting in the four passions of krOdha, anger, IObha, greed, mAna, pride and mAyA, delusion is the bhAvabhanDha, and the actual influx of karma into the soul is called dravyabanDha. This state when the kArmic particles flow to the soul through the passions is known as Asrava, and when they actually bind the soul it is called banDha. By following right faith and right conduct acquiring right knowledge it is possible to stop the fresh karma from flowing in, which stage is called samvAra and exhausting the already existing karma is nirjara. When the last particle of karma is exhausted and the soul becomes separated from matter and shines in its pristine nature of infinite knowledge and bliss. These five stages together with jiva and ajiva are described as the seven thatthvas of Jainism.

The atoms are not distinct belonging to the four elements as in vaiseshaika doctrine but all are of the same nature and the particular characteristics of the elements like smell, taste etc. are through pariNAmA, modification.

The concept of reality according to jainas is based on anaikAntha vAdha or syAthvAdha as it is called because they believe in viewing a thing from many of its aspects. The picture of complete reality, according to them, is presented only when all the view-points are taken as a whole like so many threads woven into a cloth.

The syAtvAdha consists of seven propositions which point out different aspects of an entity.

1. SyAdhasthi - a thing exists.
A thing exists from a particular point of view. For example a pot exists as a substance at a particular time and place.

2. syannasthi- a thing does not exist.

It is nonexistent from another point of view for example a pot does not exist as a cloth.

3. syAdhasthi cha nAsthi cha-a thing exist and does not exists.

Considering the positive and negative aspects of an entity together (ie. 2and3)

4. SyAdhavakthavyam-a thing is inexpressible.

When the aspects 2and 3 taken together simultaneously.

5. SyAdhasthiacha avakthavyam-a thing exists and is inexpressible.

Combination of 1 and 4

6. syAnnAsthi cha acakthavyam- a thing does not exists and is inexpressible. Combination of 2 and 4

7. SyAdhasthi cha nAsthi cha avakthavyam- a thing exists and does not exist and is inexpressible, a combination of 3 and 4.

This is also known as the sapthabhanginyAya.

Ramanuja criticises the syAthvAdha saying that contradictory qualities like existence and nonexistence cannot be found to co-exist in one place because they are like light and shadow which cannot be together. A substance which is qualified by one attribute cannot possibly be associated with an opposite attribute. Ramanuja further says that this point has been explained already on the refutation of the view of bhEdhAbhEdhavAdhin when it is said that the difference and non-difference cannot exist simultaneously. The difference and non-difference claimed to existin one entity is actually that of the subsatance and its mode which are different and not identical. But two contradictory attributes cannot co-exist in one substance.

Next Ramanuja criticises the jaa concept of kAla, time. It is not an independent substance, says Ramanuja, just as, the generic quality, jati cannot be an independent substance. Atomic nature of kAla is also not acceptable. It is eternal and all -pervading and is only an adjunct of substances.

Jaina comes with an objection that according to vedantin one Brahman is the self of all in which case the difference between the jivas and Brahman or between the jivas cannot be explained. Ramanuja replies that the relationship between Brahman and the jivas being one of body and soul this can be explained easily as the body and the soul are of different nature and Brahman who is omniscient etc is different from the sentient and the insentient which form His body. Ramanuja concludes by saying that the same objections advanced against the theory of atoms can also be applicable here.
SUTHRA-32-EVAM CHA ATHMAKARTHSNYAM- 2-2-32
AND NON ENTIRETY OF THE SOUL

The jainas say that the soul is of the size of the body it occupies. If so, the soul of an elephant will not have sufficient space when it is born as an ant in next life. Similarly that of an ant will not be able to fill the body of an elephant in next birth. If it is said that the soul contracts and expands accordingly it is refuted in the next suthra.

SUTHRA-33 - NA CHA PARYAYADHAPI AVIRODHVAHIKARADHYAH 2-2-33
NOR CONSISTENCY BECAUSE OF CHANGE

If the soul goes on changing it will be no different than other things like pot and will to be superior to them.

SUTHRA-34-ANTHYAVASTHITHTEH CHA UBHAYANITHYATHVATH AVISESHA-2-2-34
THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE IN THE SIZE BECAUSE OF PERMANENCY AND AND ETERNITY.

The soul is said to be eternal and to attain permanency at the time of release and hence there cannot be any difference in the state of bondage.

Thus ends EkasminnasambhavADHIkaraNam and the refutation of jaina theory of causation.

PASUPATHYADHIKARANAM 2-2-7
SUTHRA-35-PATHYURASA MANJASYATH

The views of pAsupathas are discarded owing to inconsistency.

The Pasupathas accept Isvara but only as the efficient cause and cite pradhana as the material cause and hence their theory of causation is refuted in this suthra.

Ramanuja classified the schools of Sankhya, buddhism, vaiseshika and jaina as vedabAhyas, being outside the pale of the vedas and refuted their theories of causation, following the suthras of BAdharAyaNa, in accordance with the tenets of visishtadvaita. Now he says that the system of pAsupatha is also contrary to the vedas because ‘sarvE cha EthE vEdhaviruddhAm thatthvapriyAm aihika Amushmika nissrEyasa sAdhankalpanAscha kalpayanthi,’ because all of them invent various means of attaining happiness in this life and the next which are against the teachings of the vedas about reality and hence their views are taken up by this suthra and refuted.

Pasupathas are fourfold, namely, kApAlas, kAlAmukhas, pAsupathas and saivas. The practices of the different sects are mutually contradicting. Their, practices of meditation and their forms of devotion which follow their own Agamas are in conflict with the vedas.

The upanishads declare that the supreme reality, Brahman can be known only through the Vedanta texts and not by any other authority. The Vedanta texts clearly show that Brahman is both material and the efficient cause. As it can be seen from the exposition on the suthra ‘janmAdhysaya yathah,’ the terms sath, Brahman and Athman are synonymous and so are the
epithets like Siva or sambhu. Ramanuja quotes profusely from the upanishads to show that the term Brahman denotes only Narayana.

SUTHRA-36-ADHISHTAN A ANUPAPATTHESCHA- 2-2-36
BECAUSE OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RULERSHIP
The concept of Isvara as only the efficient cause is supported by arguments based on inference, which according to Ramanuja, is fictitious. If it is contended that Pasupathi is the efficient cause like a potter then he must have a body and creates the world from pradhAna as the potter creates the pot from mud. But to them Pasupathi is asarira as embodiment cannot be attributed to Isvara in which case He will be finite.

SUTHRA-37-KARANAVAC CHETH NA BHOGADHIBHYAH- 2-2-37
IT IS NOT AS JIVA RULES THE BODY AND SENSES FROM WITHIN, BECAUSE OF THE ENJOYMENT ETC.
If it is said that the Lord rules over pradhAna as the soul rules over the body and the senses, it is not so, because the soul gets embodiment due to adhrshta as a result of karma and the same cannot apply to Isvara.

SUTHRA-38-ANTHAVATH VAM ASARVAJNATHAVA- 2-2-38
Isvara will be subject to dissolution and will not be omniscient.
The pAsupatha theory of causation is discarded being inconsistent. Thus ends the pasupthyaDHikaraNam.

PANCHARATHRADHIKARANAM-2-2-8
SUTHRA-39-UTHPATTHA SAMBHAVATH- 2-2-39
ORIGINATION BEING IMPOSSIBLE
Since PAsupatha system was refuted on account of being contrary to the vedas because it is based on their own Agama the opponent may argue that even the pAncharAthra, held to be authoritative the visishtadvaitin cannot be authoritative. This aDhikarana is started to remove such doubts and to establish the authority of pAncharathra system. the first two suthras are of the nature of poorvapaksha while the other two refutes the poorvapaksha view and proves that the pAnchrAthra system is authoritative.

This suthra points out that even though the pAncharAthra system accepts the Vedic concept of Brahman being both material and efficient cause there are other aspects in it which are objectionable.

THE THEORY OF BHAGAVATHAS CLAIM THAT
‘paramkAraNath prabrahmabhoothavas udEath sankarshaNah nAma jivO jAyathe sankarshaNath pradhymnasajnam manO jAyathE thasmAth aniruddhasajnO ahamkArO jAyathe,’
From the supreme cause, the Brahman who is vasudeva, sankarshaNa the jiva is born; from him pradhyumna the mind and from him aniruddha the ego.

Now the opponent says that the jiva is said to be unborn by the sruthi ‘najAyathE mriyathE vA vипasчिथх, (Kato. II-18) the sentient being is never born nor dies.’ so this statement that sankarshana, the jiva is born from Vasudeva, Brahman is contrary to the vedas.

SUTHRA-40-NA CHA KARTHUH KARANAM-2-2-40
No origination of the intrument from the doer.
Pradhyumna, the mind is said to be born from sankarshaNa, the jiva, but the mind being the instrument of cognition cannot originate from the jiva, the doer.

SUTHRA-41-VIJNANADH IBHAVE VA THADHAPRATHISHEDHAH -2-2-41
There is no contradiction if they all are the nature of intelligence, that is, Brahman.
Ramanuja says that the criticism of bhagavath doctrine is made by those who do not understand it properly. Brahman Himself who is vAsudeva, out of kindness, comes to reside in four forms as vasudeva, sankarshaNa, pradhyumna and aniruddha, which are called His vyuhas. It is said in Poushkarasamhitha

‘KarthavyathvEna vai yathra chAthurAthmyam upAsyathE; kramAgath aih sva sajnAbhih brAhmAaNairAgamam thu thath,’

This is the authoritative doctrine which brahmanas are enjoined to worship of that which is the four fold nature of the self. The worship of the four forms of vAsudeva etc is the worship of that Brahman who is called vAsudeva, says sAthvatha samhitha also.

The Brahman who is complete with the six qualities that go to signify the meaning of BhagavAn, namely, aisvarya, rulership, tejas, brilliance, veerya, prowess, shakthi, power, bala, might and jnAna knowledge, is worshiped by the devotees according to their capacity as subtle, sukshma, vibhava, incarnations and vyuha, the fourfold manifestation.

It is said that by worshipping the Lord in His vibhava form, the devotee reaches the vyuha form, worshipping which he reaches the subtle form of vAsudeva. Of these, vibhavas are the incarnations like Rama and Krishna. Vyuhas are the four forms, vAsudeva, sankarshaNa, pradhyumna and aniruddha. The subtle form is the Brahman known as vAsudeva, with six qualities.

Therefore the vyuha forms like sankarshaNa are also the manifestations of Brahman by His own will and hence there is no contradiction with sruthi texts which declare clearly ‘ajAyamAno bahuDhA vijayathE.’ These are assumed through boundless love towards devotees.

The sankarshaNa and the others are termed as jiva, mind and ahankAra in the same way Brahman is denoted by the words AkAsa and prANa.
SUTHRA-42-VIPRATHIS HEDHACCHA- 2-2-42
AND BECAUSE OF DENIAL OF THE ORIGINATION OF JIVA

Ramanuja says that in pAncharAthara as well as in all other Agamas the origination of the individual soul, jiva is denied. Therefore the objection on account of the origination of the soul is dismissed.

Another objection is put forth that the pAncharA thra Agama was said to have been taught to sAndilya, who did not get the knowledge from the vedas. This is opposed to the vedas and hence the agama cannot be held authoritative. But Ramanuja replies that it is like the utterance of Narada that he has learnt all the vedas withangas, ithihasas and puraNas but yet came to grief and was taught bhumAvidhya. That was not to undermine the vedas but to extoll bhumAvidhya. Similarly here also it is to praise the system of pAncharAthra through which one can understand the meaning of reality as declared in the vedas easily. It is for this purpose the Lord Narayana out of compassion taught the essence of vedas in the form of pAncharAthra Agama. Hence it is not vedaviruddha, opposed to vedas.

RAMANUJA CLAIMS THE AUTHORITY OF PANCHRATRA IN HIS OWN STYLE THUS:

‘athah sa bhagavAnvedhaaikave dhyahparabrahmAb hiDhanah vasudevo nikhilahEya prathyaneeka kalyANa gunaika thana ananthajnanAnandhAd hyaparimitha udhAra gunasAgarah sathyasankalpah chAthurvarnya chAthurAramayavyav asThayA vyavasTHithAn dharmArThakAma mOkshAkhya purushArThAbhimukhA n bhakthAn avalokya apAra kAruNyA souseelya vathsalya oudhArya mahOdhaDHih svavBhoothi thadharArAdhana thathphalayArTHAtm ya avaboDHinah vedAn rkyajussAmATharva bhedhabinnAnaparimi tha shAkhan viDhyarTHavAdhamant hrarupAn svEthan sakala suranara duravagAhAn cha avaDHArtya thadharTHa yATHAsthmyAvaboDHi panchrAthrAsthram svayamEva niramimetha ithi niravadhyyam. ’

The meaning of the long passage is as follows:

The Lord Vasudeva, who is Brahman, known only through the vedas, who is free from evil, possessor of auspicious qualities, the ocean of limitless generous attributes, of infinite knowledge and bliss, of infallible will, seeing his devotees engaged in the duties of varanasrama and pursuing the four purusharthas, out of compassion, being the ocean of love, and other qualities, taught the pancharathra, the essence of the vedas, to those who were bent on worshipping his glorious forms and who were incapable of comprehending the teaching of the vedas.

Ramanuja says that Vyasa, the author of brahmasuthras, the codifier of vedas the pAnchrAthrA system in mahabharatha and ends with

‘idham mahOpanishadham chathurvedasamanvit ham;AnkhyaOGak rthAnthEna panchrAthrAnusabdh itham.’,

Meaning, this great Upanishad comprising of the four vedas, Sankhya and yOga is called pAncharAthrA. Further he extolls the Agama as

‘idhamsrEyaM idham brahma idham hithamanutthamam; rgyajussAmabhirjush tam
aTharvAngirasaistha THA.’

It means that this agama is the best, this is Brahman and this is the most beneficial and is in accordance with the four Vedas. Here he terms Sankhya and Yoga do not mean the respective systems but they refer to jnanayoga and karmayoga as mentioned in the Gita, jnAnayOgEna sAnkhyAnAm karmayOgEna yOginAm.

Ramanuja concludes the chapter on the refutation of the non-vedantaic schools of philosophy by saying that the other systems being expounded by humans are liable to be contradictory and with limitations. But the pAncharAthrA is taught by Narayana Himself, who is professed as Brahman by all the scriptural texts and hence it is indisputable.

Finally Ramanuja says that the sAriraka sAsthra does not deny the systems of Sankhya, yoga, vaiseshika and pasupatha in toto, as it does with respect to Buddhism and Jainism but refutes only their of causation and concept of reality. Sankhyan principles like the 24 thathvas and the techniques of yoga are accepted as well as the argumentative techniques and the means of cognition etc of the viseshikas and the concept of pasupati is not rejected. These systems do not accept Brahman as the sole cause of the universe and the inner self of all and only these points are criticised. Thus ends the pAncharAthrADhikara Nam.

This is the end of the second padha of the second aDhyAya.

PADHA- 3
VIYADHADHIKARANAM- 2-3-1
SUTHRA-1-NA VIYADHASRUTHEH- 2-3-1
AkAsa is not created because it is not so stated in the sruthi.

In the first adhyaya it was shown that all scriptural texts denote Brahman as the only cause of the world and in the first padha of the second adhyaya all the objections raised against this view are refuted. In the second padha of the second adhyaya the theories of causation by the nonvedantic schools are refuted.

Now the next two padhas the possible discrepencies that may be cited from the scriptures regarding the theory of creation are examined and the objections based on them are refuted.

A doubt is raised in the above suthra by the poorvapakshinas to whether the AkAsa is created or not. The opponent says that it is not -na viyadh- because it is not stated so in the scriptures- asruthEh. They quote the Chandhogyaa text which says ‘thadhailkshatha bahusyAm prajAyEya thathEjO asrjatha’ (Chan. 6-2-3) it willed to become many and created fire and goes on to mention the creation of other elements but the AjkAsa was not mentioned. AkAsa being all-pervading and without parts like the individual selfnot have been created. But there is discrepancy when it is said in the taittiriya text ‘thasmAth VA EthasmAth Athmanah AkAsah sambhoohath,’ (Taitt. 2-1) from that self AkAsa was created and it goes on to say that from AkAsa vAyuu was produced etc. this the next suthra replies.
SUTHRA-2-ASTHI THU-2-3-2
BUT THERE IS.
There is scriptural reference to the creation of AkAsa. Sruthi which deals with matters beyond
the perception through the senses are capable of validating the creation of AkAsa which cannot
be proved by any pramANa. The fact that AkAsa is without parts is not sufficient to contradict
the declaration of its creation by the sruthi because even in the case of the individual self its
unorigination is not based on its being without parts, which point will be made clear later, says
Ramanuja.

SUTHRA-3-GOUNYASAMBHAVATH SABDHACCHA-2-3-3
The creation of AkAsa is to be taken in secondary sense because of the impossibility and also
from the texts.

The poorvapakshin now says that the texts referring to the creation of AkAsa must be taken in
the secondary sense because there are texts declaring that AkAsa is eternal such as
‘vAyusChAnthrIkksham chaithadhamrtham’ (Brhd. 2-3-3) vayu and AkAsa both are eternal.

SUTHRA-4-SYATH CHAIKASYA BRAHMASABDHAVATH-2-3-4
THERE MAY BE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY MEANING FOR A WORD AS IN THE CASE OF
BRAHMAN.
The opponent anticipates the objection that in the statement ‘from the self AkAsa originated
and from Akasa, vayu etc. the origination of AkAsa alone cannot be taken in the secondary
sense while that of vayu etc is in the primary sense.

It is possible, he says, as in the sentence ‘thasmAth Ethadh brahma nAmarupam annam cha
jAyathE, (Mund. 1-1-9) from Him is born brahma, name form and matter, ‘where the word
brahma is used to denote the creator Hiranyakartha while in the previous text
‘thapasAcheeyathE brahma, meaning the Brahman swells by knowledge,’ the word brahma is
used in the primary sense.

SUTHRA-5- PRATIJNAHANIH AVYATHIREKATH-2-3-5
NON-ABANDONMENT OF THE PROMISSORY STATEMENT ONLY FROM NON-DIFFERENCE
This sutra refutes the objection expressed in the previous two sutras. Secondary meaning
cannot be assumed for the Chandhogya text because the promissory statement that by knowing
one everything else becomes known will be true only if the AkAsa is the effect of Brahman.

SUTHRA-6-SABDHEBHYAH-2-3-6
FROM TEXTS
Chandhogya declaration that the sath alone was in the beginning and that it is the self of
everything denotes that AkAsa, as everything else, is the effect of and non-different from
Brahman. Moreover the statement ‘it created fire’ is not sufficient to disprove the origination of
AkAsa mentioned in other texts.
SUTHRA-7-YAVATHVIKA RAMTHUVIB AGO LOKAVATH-2-3-7

THE ORIGINATION EXTENDS TO ALL AS IN THE WORLD.

All being said to be the effect of Brahma\n; it includes the origination of Aksa also as in the
world when we say all these men are the sons of Devadattha, similar to ‘EthadhAthmyam
idham sarvam’, all these have Brahma as their self. The statement that AkAsa is immortal or
vAyu is immortal is used in the same sense as devas are immortal whereas they are also created
by Brahma, meaning only that they exist for longer duration as compared to the mortals.

SUTHRA-8-ETHENA MA\r
THRISVVA VYAKHYATHAH- 2-3-8

BY THIS THE AIR IS ALSO EXPLAINED.

The origination of the air is also explained in the similar manner.

SUTHRA-9-ASAMBHAVAS THU SATHAH ANUPAPATTHEH- 2-3-9

UNORIGINATION PERTAINS TO BRAHMAN ONLY.

All the rest are the effects of Brahma. The origination of AkAsa and air are to illustrate the
general truth. This is the end of viyad\dhikaraNam.

THEJODHIKARANAM 2-3-2

SUTHRA-10-THEJO ATHAH THATHA AHA-2-3-10

SRUTHI DECLARES THAT FIRE IS PRODUCED.

It is said that everything originated from Brahma. But from the statement such as
‘vAyoragnih’, etc. a doubt arises whether the subsequent effects are produced from the
precedent ones or from Brahma directly. The poorvapakshin claims that in the above
statement ‘from air fire’ (originated) it shows that fire is the effect of air.

SUTHRA-11-APA\r
H- 2-3-11

WATER FROM FIRE

From the text ‘agnEh Apah, water from fire, the fire is the cause of water.

SUTHRA-12-PRTHIVEE- 2-3-12

EARTH FROM WATER

From the texts ‘adhbhyah prthivee’, ‘thA annam asrjantha’, (Chand. 6-2- 3) meaning, the waters
created (food) earth, and is shown that water is the cause of earth.

SUTHRA13-ADHIKARARU PASABDHANTHREBHY AH-2-3-13

BY FOOD, EARTH IS MEANT FROM SUBJECT MATTER, FORM AND OTHER SRUTHI TEXTS.

The word food means earth for the following reasons:

1. ‘adhanee\nyasya sarvasya prthiveevikArathvAt h kAra\r
NE’ -As all that is eaten is a modification
dealth of earth, the term denoting the effect is applied to the cause.
2. The subsequent passage to that referring to the creation of prthivee from water mentioning the colours respective to fire, water and earth, refers to earth as annam.

‘yadhagnErOhitham rupam, thEjasasthdhr upam, yacchuklam thadhapAm, yadhkrsnam thadhannasya’, (6-4-6)

In fire, what appears red belongs to fire the white colour belongs to water and what is black belongs to earth and earth is referred to as Annam, food.

The poorvapakshin says that as the evolution from mahath etc happens from the preceding principle only the elements are described as each being originated from the preceding one.

**SUTHRA-14**

THADHABHI DHYANADHEVA THU THALLINGATH SAH-2-3-14
HE IS KNOWN (TO BE THE CAUSE OF EVERYTHING) FROM THE INDICATORY MARK, THAT IS, REFLECTION.

In all the effects Brahman is the inherent cause and this is known through the indicatory mark supplied by reflection. The word reflection means the phrase ‘bahu syam’ repeated in the passage on creation. From ‘thadhaikshatha bahusyAm prajAyEya, (Chan. 6-2-3) it willed to become many, meaning Brahman, in describing the creation of each element proceeding from the preceding one such as ‘thattEja aikshatha bahusyAm prajAyeya, fire willed to become many,’ and ‘thA Apa aikshantha bahusyAma prajAyEmahi the waters willed to become many’ etc. the phrase is repeated. So the act of willing denotes it is Brahman only, which is the cause of everything. Moreover Brahman is mentioned as the inner self of all in BrhadhAraNyaka upanishad, ‘yah prthivyAm thishTan, yasthEja si thishTan, yO vayou thishTan, ya AkAsE thishTan and so on’ (Brhd. 3-7- 3) which also shows that everything is the effect of Brahman only.

**SUTHRA-15**

VIPARYAYE NA THU KRAMO ATHA UPAPADHYATH ECHA- 2-3-15
THE REVERSE ORDER OF CREATION IS POSSIBLE ONLY IF THE EFFECTS PROCEED FROM BRAHMAN.

In Mundaka Upanishad the order of creation is quite the reverse of that found in the Taittiriya text quoted by the poorvapakshin. (Taitt. 2- 1) the Mundaka text ‘EthasmAth jAyathe prANO manssarvEndhriyANi cha, kham vAyurjyothirApahprt hvee sarvasya DHArNee, from Him are born prANa, mind, senses, AkAsa, air, fire, waterand earth which bears all. So unless Brahman is the direct cause both the texts would be conflicting each other.

**SUTHRA16**

ANTHARA VIJNANAMANASEE KRAMENA THALLINGATH ITHI CHETH NA, AVISESHATH 2- 3-16
IF IT IS SAID IT IS THE SAME ORDER ONLY WITH INDHRIYAS AND MIND IN BETWEEN, IT IS NOT SO BECAUSE OF NON-DIFFERENCE.

It argued by the opponent that the vijnAna, knowledge which is denoted by the term indhriyas, being the instruments of knowledge, and the mind found in between prANa and the are in the
same order of creation presented elsewhere, only prAna and other things are added and hence there is no reverse order.

The suthra refutes this view saying that the words ‘EthasmaAth jAyathE prAnah manas sarvEndhriyANi etc only denotes that everything originated from Brahman and not the order of creation. But the opponent objects that to say that everything is denoted by Brahman only is contrary to their separate connotations to which the next suthra gives the reply.

**SUTHRA17-CHARACHARA VYAPASRAYASTHU SYATH THADHVYAPADHESAH BHAKTHASTHADHBHAVAB HAVITHVATH- 2-3-17**
The words denoting the moving and immobile things are not secondary because they depend on Brahman for their denoting power.

The view of the opponent is the words fire etc can denote Brahman only in the secondary sense since their primary meaning is to denote their individual entity. This is refuted by this suthra, saying that their denotation is based on Brahman only as shown in the text ‘anEna rupEna anupravisya nAmrupe vyAkaravANi. ‘(Chan. 6-3-2) thus ends the thEjODhikaraNam.

**ATHMA DHIKARANAM- 2-3-3**
**SUTHRA-18-NATMA STRUTEH NITHYATHVACCHA THABHYAH-2-3- 18**
NOT SELF BECAUSE OF SCRIPTURAL TEXTS AND THE ETERNITY FROM THEM.

After confirming the creation of AkAsa and others from Brahman now the question is about the individual self. The poorvapakshin says that it is originated, as known from the texts such as ‘sanmoolAh soumya imAh sarvAhpraJayAh sadhAyathanAh satprathishTAh, (Chan. VI-8-6) all these beings, have their root in ‘sath’, abide in it and rest in it, and ‘yathO vA imAni bhoothAni jAyanthe, (Tait. 3-1-1) from whom all these beings originate,’ etc. they say that the texts such as ‘that thou art’ professing the unity of the Atman with Brahman cannot be taken to mean that the Atman is eternal since Brahman is so, because from the texts such as ‘EthadhAtmyam idham sarvam, all this is ensouled by Brahman’ and ‘sarvam khalu idham brahma, all this is Brahman,’ it would mean that everything is eternal and hence unoriginated. Therefore the individual self is created.

The suthra refutes this saying that the individual self is not originated as could be shown from the sruthi. The texts such as ‘na jAyathE mriyathE vA vipaschith, (KatO. 1-2-18) the intelligent selfis neither born nor dies’, and ‘ajO nithyam sAsvathO ayam purANah na hanyathE hanyamAnE sarirE’, this self is unborn, eternal, ever existent and ancient who is not killed when the body is destroyed. (KatO. 1-2-18)

The opponent asks that if the soul is nothowpromissory statement EkavijAnEna sarvavijnAnam can be true. Ramanuja replies that the soul also being the effect, the non-difference between the cause and effect is indicated by the promissory statement. But being an effect does not mean that the soul is originated because the effect is only avasTHAnthara or another state of the causal substance. This avasTHAnthara of the individual self is different from that of AkAsa etc. Because the state of being the effect consists in the intelligence becoming expanded with
respect to the individual self whereas it is a change of essential nature in the case of AkAsa etc.

In the causal state Brahman has the sentient and the insentient in their subtle form as its sarira while in the state of effect the insentient changes in its essential nature attaining name and form and becomes the object of enjoyment and the sentient soul attains an expansion of intelligence enabling it to experience the fruit of actions. The texts that speak of origination of soul only mean its embodiment and not origination while those which deny the origination declare that there is no change in the essential nature of the soul. Thus the soul is also the effect of Brahman and it is not contradictory to the promissory statement. Thus ends AtMADHikaraNam.

JNADHIKARANAM- 2-3-4
THEREFORE THE KNOWER

Now the nature of the soul is examined. Buddhists and sankhyans hold the view that the soul is pure consciousness while for the vaisheshikas it is inert having knowledge as its adventitious quality. The opponent who holds the former view quotes from sruthi texts such as 'vijnAnam yajnam thanuthE, karmANi thanuthEpi cha, (Taitt. 2-5-1) the knowledge performs sacrifice and the actions.

Others say that knowledge is only an adventitious quality as there is no intelligence present in the state of deep sleep etc. The knowledge, they say, is present only when the soul is connected with the body, as the sruthi also declares that ‘na prEthya sajnA asthi, there is no consciousness when he soul leaves the body.’

The suthra refutes this by saying that the self is of the nature of knower and not mere knowledge nor inert. This is proved from the sruthi itself. In ChAndhOgya text in the section where prajApathi describes the released and unreleased souls by saying ‘aTHa yo vedha jiGHarNeethi sa AthmA, one who knows “I smell” he is the self. Similarly in BrhadhAraNyaka it is said as a reply to the question ‘kathama AthmA, who is the self, ’ that ‘yO ayam vijnAnamayah prANEshu hrdhyanthryothiripurushah, (Brhd. 4-3-7) he who is consisting of knowledge is the light within the heart in the prAnas.’ and ‘Esha hi dhrashtA srothA GHrAtha rasayithA manthA bOdDHA karthA vijnAnAthmA purushah’, (Pras. IV-9)this person is the seer, hearer smeller, taster thinker knower doer and the knowing self.

To the objection that if the self is a knower, it being infinite and all pervading, there will always be cognition everywhere the next suthra replies.

SUTHRA-20-UTHKRANTH IGATHYAGATHEENAM -2-3-20
Because of passing out, going and returning, the self is atomic.

The sruthi mentions the soul going out, and coming in etc. which is not possible if it is all pervading. In BrhadhAraNyaka upanishad’

‘Esha AthmanishkrAmathi chakshushO VA murDHnO vAanyEbhyO VA sariradhEsebhyah’, (Brhad. 4- 4-2)
This self departs through the eyes or the skull or any other part of the body, and the return likewise ‘thasmAth lokAth punarEthi asmai IOkaya karmaNE, from those worlds, returns to this world for karma’.

**SUTHRA-21-svATHMANA CHA UTTHARAYOH-2- 3-21**
AND AS THE GOING AND COMING BEING EFFECTED DIRECTLY BY THE SELF IT IS ATOMIC.
Passing out of the body, meaning separation from the body, is applicable even if the soul is infinite but going and coming indicates that it is atomic.

**SUTHRA-22-NA ANUH ATHATHSRUTHEH ITHI CHETH NA ITHARADHIKARATH- 2-3-22**
IF IT IS SAID THAT IT IS NOT ATOMIC BECAUSE OF SCRIPTURAL STATEMENT AS OTHERWISE, IT IS NOT SO, AS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THOSE TEXTS IS BRAHMAN.

“SrI Ramanujar and Sri Kuratthazhvan went together to Kashmiram (Mission Sribhashyam)”

The opponent quotes the text ‘sa vA Esha mahAn aja AthmA, (Brhd. 4-4-22) that self is infinite and unborn,’ to prove that it is not atomic but this suthra refutes the view saying that it is Brahman who is referred to in those texts as can be understood from the text ‘yasya anuvitthah prathbuddha Athma, he who knows the sentient self,’ meaning Brahman, which was the topic introduced in the section.
Because the very word Anu is used

‘EshO aNurAthmA chEthsAvedhithavyah’, (Mund. 3-1-9)

This atomic self should be known, and

‘ArAgramAthrOhyvarO pi dhrshtah, (Svet. 5-8)

The lower one, (meaning the individual self) is seen to be of the measure of the tip of the goad, show that the self is atomic.

Like the sandalpaste, no contradiction.
The self though atomic is able to pervade the whole body like the sandal paste that creates coolness for the whole body though applied in one place.

If it is due to particular position the analogy is said to be inappropiate, not so because the heart is accepted as the seat of the soul.
The sruthi text ‘yO ayam vijnAnamayah prANEshu hrdhanthrjyothih, ‘(Brhd. 4-3-7) shows that the self is found in the heart.

As the light placed in one corner lights up the whole room so does the AtmA in the heart spreads consciousness all over.

To the objection that if the essence of self is knowledge how can it be the quality of the self.
The reply is given that, as the smell is the quality of the earth yet inseparable from it, so too knowledge is the quality of the self.

The text ‘na thu vijnAthuh vijnAthEh viparilOpO vidhyathE, (Brhd. 4-3-30) there is no absence of knowing on the part of the knower, `shows the distinction between the knower, the self and the knowledge.

There is distinction as in the case of smell as shown by the sruthi.

The reply is given that, as the smell is the quality of the earth yet inseparable from it, so too knowledge is the quality of the self.
THE DECLARATION IS DUE TO KNOWLEDGE BEING THE ESSENTIAL QUALITY AS BRAHMAN IS SAID TO BE KNOWLEDGE.

As the text ‘sathyam jnAnam anantham Brahma,’ denotes Brahman as truth, knowledge and infinity on account of the fact that these are His essential qualities.

SUTHRA-30-YAVATH ATHMABHAVITHVATH CHA NA dhOSHAH THADDHARSANATH- 2-3-30
THERE IS NO DEFECT SO LONG AS THE SOUL EXISTS BECAUSE IT IS SO SEEN.

As knowledge is the quality that persists through out life there is nothing wrong in denoting the soul by it. Ramanuja says that a cow with broken horns is still called a cow because the cowness persists even if the parts of the body are lost. Moreover the self also like knowledge is self illumined and hence it is depicted as self. The objection that knowledge is not an inseparable quality of the soul as it is not seen to exist in deep sleep etc. is replied by the next suthra.

SUTHRA-31-PUMSvADHI VATHVASYA SATAH ABHIVYAKTHIYOGATH- 2-3-31
BECAUSE MANIFESTATION IS POSSIBLE ONLY IF IT EXISTS IN DEEP SLEEP LIKE VIRILITY ETC

As virility which is potential in a male child manifests only on youth, similarly knowledge existing in the deep sleep only manifests in the waking state. Otherwise it cannot manifest on waking up. Therefore the self is knower and is of atomic size. The text ‘na prEthasya samijnA asthi’ (Brhd. 2-4-12) only means that in release, the self does not experience birth, death and pain as in the bound state and does not mean that the self has no knowledge.

SUTHRA32-NITHYAUPAL ABDHIMPRASANG AHANYATHARANIYAM AH VA ANYATHA-2-3-32
OTHERWISE THERE WILL BE PERPETUAL PERCEPTION OR NONPERCEPTION OR LIMITATIONS OF EITHER OF THE TWO.

The self being omnipresent and all knowledge as some assume there will be permanent perception or nonperception. But experience proves otherwise as there is perception at times and non-perception at other times. If the self is omnipresent there will be ‘I’ consciousness always everywhere. Hence to avoid these difficulties the self iis taken as atomic and has knowledge for its quality. Thus ends jnADhikaraNam.

KARThrADhIKARANAM- 2-3-5
SUTHRA-33-KARTHA SASTHRARThVATH- 2-3-33
THE INDIVIDUAL SELF IS AN AGENT ACCORDING TO SASTHRA

The self has been shown as the knower and now the question is whether it is the doer also. The opponent says it is not, as the self has been shown to be action less and the actions are said to be only pertaining to the gunas. In Kathopanishad while describing the self as having no birth
and death ‘na jAyathE mriyathE vA vipaschith,’ the acts of killing and get killed etc. are denied of the self.

‘hanthA cheth manyathE hanthum hathaschEth manyathE hatham, ubou thou na vijAnethou nAyam hanthi na hanyathE.’ (Kata. I-2-19),

meaning, one who thinks that the self kills or get killed do not know the truth because the self neither kills nor gets killed Even in the Gita it is said

‘prakrthEh kriyamANAni guNairkarmANi sarvasah, ahamAravimooDAthmA karthAham ithi manyathE, (BG. 3-27)

All actions are done by the gunas and the one who is deluded by ego thinks that he is the doer.’

This suthra refutes the above view. Only the self is the kartha and not gunas. This is in accordance with the sasthras. It is found in the sruthi texts like ‘yajEtha svargAkAmah, one desirous of heaven should perform sacrifice’ and ‘mumukshurbrahma upAsetha, one aspiring for release should meditate on Brahman,’ that the agency of action is ascribed only to the individual self. The word sasthra means scriptural injunction originated from the word sAsana, command. Sasthras induce action by giving certain instructions and it is possible only in the case of a sentient soul and not insentient pradhana that is the gunas. That is why the purvamimamsa declares ‘sAsthraphalam prayokthari, the fruit of the injunctions is only to the agent.’ (III-7-18)

Ramanuja clarifies the point by saying that the text about the self not killing or getting killed etc. is to show that it is eternal and not to deny the agency. Similarly the sloka quoted from Gita only means that the activity during the state of bondage is induced by the gunas and not natural to the self as it is mentioned there itself ‘kAraNam gunasangOasya sadhasath yOnijanmasu, the cause of the embodiment in good and evil wombs is the association of the self with the gunas.’ (BG. 18-21)

SUTHRA-34-UPADHANAT H VIHAROPADHESACCHA- 2-3-34
BECAUSE OF THE TEACHING OF THE SELF TAKINGSENSES AND WANDERING ABOUT.
IN BRHADHARANYAKA UPANISHAD THERE IS A PASSAGE
‘yaTHA maharAjah jAnapadhAn grheethva sve janapadhe yaTHA kAmam parivarthaEthE, Evam Eva EthathprANAn grheethvA sve sarEva yaTHA kAmamaparivarthathE, (Brhd. 2-1-18)
This means, as a king will take his subjects and wander around in his kingdom, so too, the self taking the pranas (sense organs) wander around in the body.

SUTHRA-35-VYAPADHES ATH CHA KRIYAYAM NA CHETH NIRDHESAVIPARYAYAH- 2-3-35
THE SELF MENTIONED AS THE AGENT IN SCRIPTURES AND IF NOT SO IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT.
The self has been definitely mentioned as the agent in texts such as

‘vijnAnam yajnam thanuthE karmAni thanuthEpicha.’ (Tait. 2-5).
Meaning that the self denoted as vijnAnam is the performer of sacrifice and actions. If it is said that the word vijnAna means the intellect, it being the instrument of action and not the agent, text would have been ‘vijAnEna ’ by the intellect and not ‘vijnAnam,’ the intellect.

SUTHRA-36- UPALABDHIVATH ANIYAMAH-2-3- 36
THERE WILL BE NO DEFINITE RULE AS IN THE CASE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
If the self is not the doer then the same difficulty as mentioned in the case of consciousness (vide. suthra- 2-3-32) will result. That is, if the agency of action is ascribed to pradhana, all souls being equally associated with it, all actions will result in the enjoyment of all. If the souls are omnipresent no internal organ will be exclusive to one soul and hence distribution of different results to difference souls will not be possible.

SUTHRA-37-SHAKTHIVI PARYAYATH- 2-3-37
ON ACCOUNT OF INVERSION OF POWER
If the intellect is the agent it must also be the enjoyer as both the doer and enjoyer of an action must be the same, in which case there will not be any proof for the existence of the individual self, contrary to the statement ‘purusho asthi bhOkthrbhAvAth, (SK. 17) the soul exists because there must be some experience.

SUTHRA-38-SAMADHYAB HAVACCCHA- 2-3-38
BECAUSE OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF SAMADHI
If intellect is the agent of action it will be so even in samADHi which is the state prior to release, in which, the knowledge of the difference of the soul from the prakrthi dawns. As the intellect is itself a product of prakrthi, this will not happen.

SUTHRA-39-YATHA CHA THAKSHOBHAYATHA- 2-3-39
AND EVEN AS A CARPENTER ARE BOTH.
This suthra is in reply to the objection that if the soul is the doer, the instruments of action being always present there will be perpetual action. It is replied that like a carpenter who has the will to use his instruments or not, the soul also, being sentient, has the power to act or not to act. Onthe other hand only if the intellect is the doer, there will be action always as it lacks the power of discrimination being insentient. Thus ends the karthraDHikaraNam.

PARAYATTHADHIKARANA M-2-3-6
SUTHRA-40-PARATTHU THACHHRUTHEH- 2-3-40
FROM THE HIGHEST ONLY AS DECLARED IN THE SCRIPTURES.
The question raised is that whether the agency of action on the part of the individual self is independent or dependent on the supreme self. The opponent says that it is independent as otherwise the injunctions and prohibitions by the scriptures will be meaningless if the individual self is not free to act by itself.
The suthra refutes this by saying that only the supreme self is the cause of all actions as declared by the sruthi ‘anthah pravishtah sAsthA janAAnAm sarvAsthmA, He is the ruler of all entering inside as their inner self,’ and the passage in BrhadAranyaka which mentions Brahma as the inner ruler and self of all etc by enumerating each category ending with ‘yah Atmani thishTan atmanah antharaham AthmA na vedha yasya AthmA sariram ya AthmA antharO yamayathi sa tha AthmA antharyAmyamrthah,’ who dwelling in the Self is different from the Self, whom the Self does not know, whose body the Self is, who rules the Self from within, He is thy Self, the inward ruler, the immortal one.’

Even in Bhagavatgita the Lord declares, ‘sarvasya chAham hrdhi sannivishtO, I am in the heart of all,’ and says that He is whirling them with action by His MAya, as though mounted on a machine, ‘bhrAmayan sarvabhootAni yanthrArOOAni mAyayA.’

SUTHRA-41-KRTHAPRAY ATNAPAEKSHASTHU VIHITHAPRATHISHIDDHA AVAIYARTHYADHIBHYAH -2-3-41

Since the effort is taken by the individual soul the injunctions and prohibitions are relevant.

The objection that if the soul is not independent the injunctions and prohibitions will have no value it is replied in this suthra that the effort is taken only by the individual self but it cannot act without the sanction of the supreme self, who is the anumantha, one who gives permission to act. If the soul does good karma the Lord bestows His grace and if indulges in evil deeds He gives punishment. That this does not indicate that He is merciless has been already proved, says Ramanuja, while explaining doctrine of sankhya.

The opponent comes with an objection that the text in Kouseetaki upanishad which says ‘Esha hyEva sAdhukarma kArayathi tham yamEbhyO IOkEshu unnineeshathi, Esha Eva asAdhu karma kArayathi tham yam aDHo nineeshathi,’

He makes those whom He wishes to raise to the higher worlds to do good deeds and whom He wishes to send down from these worlds He makes them do bad deeds,’ means that only the Lord Himself makes one to do good and bad deeds and this goes contrary to the independent effort of the individual self. Ramanuja replies that this does not apply to all beings but only means that when one chooses to proceed along the path approved by the Lord, He helps the soul to rise further and when one pursues the path that leads away from the Lord, He makes the soul descend further so that the propensity for evil will be exhausted. In the Gita the Lord says

‘thEshAm sathatha yukthAnAm bajathAm preethipoorvakam dhadhAmi buddhiyOgam tham yEna mAmpAyAnthi thE.’

It means that the Lord gives the wisdom to those who worship Him with love so that they can attain Him. And He hurls those who are evil, He says, into demonical wombs in perpetual transmigration,

‘thAn aham dvishadhah kroorAn samsArEshu narAdhamAn, kshipAmi ajasram ashubAnAm
Thus ends the parAyathADHikaraNam.

The individual self is a part of Brahman as the difference declared otherwise mention of fisherman, slave etc.

The foregoing Śāstras have declared that the individual soul is an agent, and as such dependent on the supreme self. Now the question is, whether the individual self is absolutely different from Brahman or Brahman itself under the influence of avidhya or Brahman determined by a limiting adjunct (upĀdhi) or is it a part (amsa) of Brahman.

The texts that speak of absolute difference are ‘jna ajnou dvou eesa aneesou, (Svet. 1-9) the two, one knowing the other not knowing, both unborn one the master the other servile.’ Those who hold this view say that the knower and ignorant are entirely different and to ascribe any unity between them involves contradiction like saying ‘sprinkle with fire. So the texts that speak of unity should be interpreted as conveying secondary meaning. This is the contention of the dualist, dvaitha school. Nondualist view is that the jiva is Brahman deluded by avidhya and imagines. They quote the texts like ‘ayam AthmA brahma, this self is Brahman,’ and ‘thathvamasi’ etc.

The third view is that the jiva is Brahman limited by adjuncts.

The suthra refutes all these views and says that jiva is a part of Brahman since there is declaration of both difference and unity. Some texts speak of Brahman and the individual self as having the relationship of the creator and created, ruler and the ruled, omniscient and ignorant, independent and dependent, pure and impure, possessing auspicious qualities and the opposite of it, master and the servant etc. Other texts like thathvamasi etc declare unity. There is yet another text ‘Brahman are the slaves, Brahman are these fishermen,’ and so on, implying the all pervading quality of Brahman. To both types of texts to be true the jiva must be accepted as an amsa, part of Brahman.

Neither the texts that describe the individual soul being the creation of, under the control of, belonging to, being the sarira of, supported, protected and annihilate by, Brahman nor being a devotee through which the jiva obtains,, by the grace of Brahman, the purushArTHas and moksha ultimately, all of which declare the difference between the jiva and Brahman can be denied. In the same manner the texts that describe the ‘willing’ of Brahman to become many and after creating the world entering into everything as the indwelling soul cannot be dismissed as illusion. From the above it also becomes clear that the jiva cannot be Brahman conditioned by adjuncts. Therefore to reconcile the both kinds of texts the jiva is the amsa of Brahman.
SUTHRA-43-MANTHRAVA RΝATH-2-3- 43
ALSO FROM THE WORDS OF MANTHRA
In chandOgya upanishad it is declared

‘pAdhOasyavisvAbhoo thAni thripAdhasyAmrtham dhivi, (Chan. 3-12- 6)
All beings and the world constitute one part (quarter) of the supreme self and the rest of the three quarters are immortal in heaven.’ The word pAdha denotes amsa. The plural term bhoothani, is used as souls are many.

SUTHRA-44-API SMARYATHE-2- 3-44
IT IS ALSO STATED IN THE SMRTHI.
In Bhagavatgita the Lord declares

‘mamaivAmsO jivalOkE jivabhoothah sanathanah’, (BG. 15-7)
an eternal part of Myself has become the individual soul.

An objection is raised that if the soul is part of Brahman all imperfections of the soul will be of Brahman too. The next SUtRA answers that.

SUTHRA-45-PRAKASADH IVATTHU NAIVAM PARAH-2-3-45
AS IN THE CASE OF LIGHT IT IS NOT SO
As the light of a luminous body, the generic character(jati) of an entity and the colour of an object, though being part of the object they qualify are different from it so also Brahman is different from the individual self which forms its mode. A visEshaNa, attribute and the visEshya the object having the attribute are inseparable yet different. The declarations of identity and difference denote the two aspects, the inseparability of the substance and its attribute and the distinctness of the substance and the attribute, respectively.

SUTHRA-46-SMARANTHI CHA-2-3-46
THE SMRTHIS ALSO STATE THIS.
In VishnupurANa ParAsara states

‘EkadhEsasTHithasyA gnEh jyothsnA visthAriNee yaTHA, parsyabrahmaN ah sakthih thTHEdham akhilam jagath, (VP. 1-22-56)
Just as the light of a luminous body that exists in one place spreads around, the power of Brahman pervades the whole world. Also the individual self is declared to be the body of the Lord. ‘thasyasrjyasya sambhoothou thath sarvE vai harEsthanuh,’ all these created are the body of Hari.

To the objection that if all souls are the amsa of the Lord why should there be inequality such as some are qualified to study the vedas and some are not etc. The next suthra answers.
SUTHRA-47-anujNAPAR ihAraoudhehasamb ahDHath jyothirAdhivath- 2-3-47
Permission and exclusion is due to the connection with the body.
Like the fire which is from the household of a brahmana is accepted while that from cremation
ground is not, though the fire is the same everywhere, the difference in qualification is due to
the purity or otherwise of the body the soul occupies.

SUTHRA-48-asanthath Eh cha avyathikaraH- 2-3-48
Because of non-connection there is no confusion.
Even though all souls are part of Brahman they being atomic and different from each other the
result of the karma is different for each. This would not have been possible, says Ramanuja if
the individual soul is identical with but under the influence of ignorance or conditioned by
upADhis.

SUTHRA-49-abhaSa Eva cha-2-3-49
The arguments (of others) are fallacious.
Since Brahman is self illumined if it does not shine because of avidhya it will result in the
destruction of the svarupa of Brahman as already shown in the arguments against the advaita
view. And it is against sruthi also, as indicated by the’ cha ‘kAra in the suthra, as the texts
‘prthagAthmAnam prErithAram cha mathvA,’ (Svet. 1-6)
thinking himself to be different from the ruler, and
‘thayOranyah pippalam svAdhu atthi anasnan anyah parichAkaseethi, (Svet. 4-6)
Of the two, one eats the fruits sweet and sour and the other looks on without eating, ’ clearly
show that the individual self is different from Brahman.

SUTHRA-50-adhrsHTA aniyamATH-2- 3-50
Because of non-determination of adhrsHTas
The opponent, bhEdhAbhedhavAdhin says that this difficulty can be surmounted if the
upAdhis are real and the differences are taken to be the cause of beginning less adhrshta,
unseen principle, which cause upAdhis.
But this suthra refutes it by saying that since thehave their substratum as Brahman, who
appears as though different from the jiva due to upADHis, there can be no rule that a particular
adhrshta acts for the particular soul and hence there will be confusion.

SUTHRA-51-abhisanDH yAdhishvapi chaivam-2-3- 51
Similarly there can be no restriction in the case of purpose etc.
Neither can there be any definite rule regarding the case of adhrsHTas.

SUTHRA-52-pradhEsaB hEdhAth ithi cheth na, antharbhaAvAth- 2-3-52
IF IT IS CLAIMED THAT PLURALITY OF upADHî IS DUE TO DIFFERENCE OF PLACE IT IS NOT SO, BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL WITHIN.

Brahman being limited by upADHîs which occupy different places the difference of experience is possible, says the opponent who is refuted by the sūtra saying that the upADHîs move here and there and also Brahman being one, the suffering in one place will affect the whole.

The last three sūtras refute the view of those who profess the absolute unity of the soul with Brahman. Thus ends amsADHikaraNam.

THE END OF THE THIRD pADHA OF THE SECOND ADHYAYA OF SRIBHASHYA

PADHA4
PRANOTHPATHTHYADHika rANAM-2-4-1
SUTHRA-1-THATHA prANAH-2-4-1
LIKEWISE THE ORGANS

Here the word prAna refers to the vital airs and the senses. After discussing the origination of the insentient world and the individual self now the the creation of vital breath and the sense organs are taken up in this pAdha.

The opponent quotes the text,
‘asadhvA idhamagra Aseeth; thadhAhuh kim thadhAseeth ith;rshayO vAva thE agrE Aseeth; thadhAhuh ke thE rshayah ithi;prANA vAva rshayah, ‘(sathapatha brAhmaNa VI-i-1-1-)

Meaning, non-being was at the beginning; rshis are the non-being said to be present in the beginning; the rshis are the prANas, and says that it shows that the senses existed before creation. The word prANAs used in plural denotes all the sense organs as well. This cannot be construed to mean the long duration of existence as in the case of air and AkAsa as explained in the previous section because the sentence asadhvA idhamagra Aseeth clearly denotes the time before creation.

This suthra refutes the above view saying that like the AkAsa etc. the prANas are also created as declared by the texts such as ‘sadhEva soumya idhamagra Aseeth EkamEva adhvitEEyam,’ (Chan. 6-2-1) which declare that the Self, Brahman only was at the beginning, one only without a second, and ‘EhasmAth jAyathE prAnah manah sarvendhriyANi cha, (Mund. 2-3-1) from this vital airs, mind and senses are created, ’ which specifically mention the origination of these. Moreover there is no mention of eternity for the senses as in the case of the individual soul. In the the passage quoted at the outset, only Brahman is denoted by the word prANa because it has been used in the same sense elsewhere also as in ‘sarvANi ha imAni bhoothAni prANamEva abhisamvisanthi prANama bhyujjihvath E, (Chan. 1-11-5) all these beings merge in prANa and emerge from that, which could beonly Brahman, and also the word rshi used in the passage quoted denotes only Brahman because of the meaning ‘all-knowing’ attributed to the rshis.
SUTHRA-2-GOUNYASAMB HAVATH THATHPRAKRTSRUTHESC HA-2-4-2
THE PLURAL IS TO BE TAKEN IN THE SECONDARY SENSE BECAUSE OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY AND THE EARLIER DECLARATION.
Since it has been mentioned that sath alone existed, the plural form of the word prANa is to be taken in the secondary sense.

SUTHRA-3-THATHPOORV AKATHVATH VACHAH-2-4-3
BECAUSE OF SPEECH HAVING FOR ITS ANTECEDENT THE CREATION OF THE SENSES
There is an additional reason to know that the senses were created, says this suthra. The text ‘thddhedham tharhi avyAkrttham Aseeth thannAmarupAbhyam vyAkriyatha, this world was then unmanifested and then was differentiated by names and forms. So, as there was no function to perform before differentiation into name and form, they were created.

THUS ENDS THE PRANOPTHPATHYADHIKAR aNAM.

SAPTHAGATHYADHIKARA Nam-2-4-2
SUTHRA-1-SAPTHAGATH EH CVISESHITHATHVACCHA 2-4-1
The organs are seen in number as known from their going with the soul at death and from being specified so.

The senses are usually counted as eleven, five jnAnendhriyas, five karmEndhriyas and the mind. But the opponent comes with an argument that they are only seven as given in the sruthi. He quotes the text ‘saptha imE lOkA Eshu haranthi prAnA guhAsayA nihithAh saptha saptha, (Mund. 2-1-8) (fromHim) these seven worlds (Seats of sense life) are born seven and seven where placed in the cave (of heart) the prANas move.’ The word seven and seven does not mean fourteen but the repetition to indicate the plurality of souls. the prANas are also mentioned as moving in the text

‘yadhA panchAvathishTanthE jnAnAni mansA saha, buddhischa na vichEshtitha thAmAhuh paramAmgathim,
When the five instruments of knowledge along with mind rest and the buddhi also does not act that they call the highest state.’

The highest state means the state of release. This shows that the jnAnendhriyas, eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin, (that is the power behind them and not the gross organs,) mind and intellect moving with the soul when it departs from the body. The next suthra answers this.

SUTHRA-5-HASTHADHAY ASTHU STHITHE ATHAH NAIVAM-2-4-5
IT IS NOT SO ON ACCOUNT OF HANDS AND FEET ETC ASSIST THE SOUL RESIDING IN THE BODY.
Indhriyas are eleven only which are the five jnAnEndhriyas and five karmEndhriyas and manas, the mind, because the karmendhriyas, hands, feet, organ of speech and the organs of reproduction and excretion are also assisting the soul residing in the body. The text ‘dasEmE
purushE prANAh Athma EkAdhasa, (Brhd. 2-4-2) these are the ten organs in man and the self is the eleventh,’ confirm this. The view that the karmEndhriyas are referred to as prAnas only in the secondary sense is not correct and on the other hand the inclusion of buddhi, chittha and ahamkAra are all different states of mind only, says Ramanuja, ‘adhyavasAyAbhimAna chinthabuddhibhEdhA th mana EvebuddhyahankArach ittha sadbhaihvatapadhisya tha,’ according to the functions of the mind, namely, deciding, egoistic and thinking. Even in the smrthi it is said ‘indhriyANi dhasaikancha (BG. XIII-5) the ten indhriyas and the one. Where more number is mentioned it is to denote the functions of the mind and where less number is given it refers to the particular aspects such as accompanying the soul etc. 

THUS ENDS THE SAPTHAGATHYADHIKARA NAM

PRANANUThvADHIKARAN AM-2-4-3
SUTHRA-6-ANAVASCHA- 2-4-6
AND THEY ARE ATOMIC.

From the text ‘tha EthE sarva cha Eva samAh sarvE ananthAh,’ (Brhd. 1-5-13) which says all these (speech, mind and prAna) are equal and infinite,’ it looks as though they are all pervading but this suthra confirms that they are atomic. This is known from ‘prANam anoothkrAmantham sarvE prANA anoothkrAmanthi, when the vital breath passes out of the body all the organs depart with it,’ the first prana meaning the vital air and the latter meaning the organs. The mention of infinite character is for the sake of meditation as shown by ‘aTHa yO hyEthAnananthAn upAsthE, he who mediates on them as infinite.

SUTHRA-7-sRESHTASCHA
AND THE BEST

The opponent holds the view that thevital air, prANA is not created as stated in the sruthi, ‘AneedhavAtham svaDHaya thadhEkam, by its own law it was alone breathing without wind.’ (Rk. V. X-129- 2) Since the word breathing refers to the mukhyaprANa, as indicated by ‘prANO vai jyEshTascha srEshTascha,’ (Brhd. 6-1) the passage quoted shows that the prANA existed before creation.

This suthra refutes the view the evidence of sruthi that the prANA was created. In MundakOpanishad it is specifically mentioned that the prANA was created from Brahman. ‘EthasmATH jAyathE prANah, from this the prANA was born.’ Hence the reference to the one breathing without wind is to Brahman, who only existed in the beginning.

VAYUKRIYADHIKARANAM 2-4-4
SUTHRA-8-NA vAYUKRIYE prTHAGUPADHESATH- 2-4-8
NEITHER AIR NOR FUNCTION.

A doubt is raised regarding prAna as to whether it is only air, the element or the motion of air or is it some specific condition of air. The poorvapakshin states that it is air as known from the text ‘yah prANah sa vAyuh, prANA is air.’ Or as the word breath is adopted to indicate prAna
and it is the motion of inhalation and exhalation it could be the motion of air.

Both these views are refuted by the suthra on the basis of separate statement of the scriptures that the breath and air are two different things. ‘Ethaṃstath jAyathE prANah mansasarvEndhriyANi cha, kham vAyuh, (Mund. 2-1-3) from HIm prAna originated, mind and the sense organs and AkAsa and VAyu,’ The text prANa is air does not mean that breath is identical with air but only that it has assumed a special form and not altogether different from air like any other substance like fire. Also the breath is not only motion but a substance having motion.

SUTHRA-9-CHAKSHURAD HIVATTHU THATHSAHASISHTYADHU BHYAH-2-4- 9
BUT LIKE THE EYE AND THE REST, BEING TAUGHT WITH THEM AND OTHER REASONS.
Breath is not a boothavisesha, a special element but like other senses like the eye it is also an instrument of the soul. This is shown by the text which mentions it along with the other organs, ‘Ethaṃstath jAyathE prAnah mansasarvEndhriyANi cha,’ the phrase ‘for other reasons’ refer to the mention of sense organs as prANas and the vital breath as mukhyaprANa.

To the objection that if the prANa is also helpful to the soul like the sense organs then there must be some function ascribed to it but it is not so, the next suthra gives a reply.

SUTHRA-10-AKARANATH VATH CHANA DHOSHAH THATHA HI DHARSAYATHI- 2-4-10
IT IS NO DEFECT AS SHOWN IN THE SCRIPTURE.
The word akaraNathva denotes akriyathva, absence of action. The objection that the prANa has no function is not correct as the scripture mentions the action of prANa as supporting the soul. In Chandogya upanishad there is an account of a dispute among the senses, mind and prANa as to who is the superior among them and when each one departed from the body the body remained active though without that particular faculty but when the vital air started to leave it pulled all the others with it and they had to accept that prANa is the best among them. Therefore prANa, like the other organs into the soul and hence instrumental like eye and other organs.

SUTHRA-11-PANCHVRRTT HIRMANOVATH VYAPADHISYATHE- 2-4-11
IT IS SAID TO HAVE FIVE FUNCTIONS LIKE THE MIND
The desire etc though different in their functions is not different from mind,

‘kAmasankalpO vichikithsA sraddha asraddha dhrthiradhrthih hreerdheerbheeerith yEvam sarvam mana Eva, (Brhd. 1-7-3)

desire, will, doubt, faith, faithlessness, courage and the lack of it, shyness, wisdom and fear all are of mind only.’ Similarly the five prANas, namely, prANa, apANa, udana, vyana and samana are only five functions of the same breath. Thus ends the vAyukriyADHikaraNam.

SRESHTANUTHVADHIKAR ANAM-2-4- 5
SUTHRA-12-ANUSCHA- 2-4-12
PrANa is also atomic like the sense organs as shown from the text ‘thamuthkrAmantham prANO anukrAmathi, (Brhd. 4-4-2) the prANa follows the soul when it goes out.’ The view that it is all pervading according to the texts like ‘sarvamheedham prANENa Avrtham, all these are covered with prANa, ’ are only to indicate that all life depends on it. Thus ends the srEshtANuthvADGikar aNam.

JYOTHRADHYADHISHTAN ADHIKARANAM2- 4-6
SUTHRA-13-JYOTHIRADHISHTANAM THU THADHAMANATH PRANAVATHA SABDHATH-2-4- 13
Ruling over the senses by fire and others and of the soul is due to the will of the supreme self.

In a previous suthra ‘abhimANivyapadhEsa sthu visEshAnugathibhyAm,’ (BS. II-1-5) it has been shown that the fire and other deities rule over the sense organs and the rule of the soul over the senses is known from the text

‘EvamEva Esha EthAn prANAn grheethvA svE sarirE yaTHA kAmam parivarthathe, (Brhd. 2-1-18) taking these prANas he moves within the body as he wishes.’

The doubt is that whether the ruling by the presiding deities and by the soul is by their own independent power or depends on some other higher authority. The opponent says that they are independent which the suthra refutes on the basis of the scriptural declaration that it depends on the will of the supremeself. ‘yO vAyou thishTAn’, ‘ya AdhithyE thishTan’, ‘ya Athmani thishTAn’ etc. (Brhd. II- 1-18) which declare the supreme self to be the inner ruler and the self of all. Also the text, ‘BheeshA asmAth vAthah pavathe, bheeshAdhEt hi suryah, bheeshASmAth agnischendhrascha mrthyurdhAvathi panchamah,’ (Taitt. II-8- 1) which means thatof fear from Him the air the Sun, fire, Moon and the Lord of death discharge their duties. In BrhadAraNyaka upanishadwe have the following text, ‘Ethasya vA aksharasya prasAsanE gArgi suryAchandhrasou viDHrthou thishTathah, (Brhd. III-8- 9) by the command of this, the imperishable, the sun and the moon stand, held apart.’

SUTHRA-14-THASYA CHA NITHYATHVATH- 2-4-14
THE RULING OF ALL BY THE SUPREME SELF IS PERMANENT.

The sruthi texts like ‘thathsrshtvA thadhEva anuprAvisath, (Tait. 2-6) after creating the world He entered into it,’ and of smrithi also ‘vishtabhyaAham idham krtsnam EkAmsEna sThithO jagath, (BG. 10-42) where the Lord declares that He pervades the whole world by apart of Himself, all show that ruling by the supreme self is permanent and His essential nature.

INDHRIYADHIKARANAM- 2-4-7
SUTHRA-15-THA INDHRIYANI THADHVYAPADHESATH ANYATHRA SRESHTATH-2- 4-15
With the exception of the sreshTa, (the mukhyaprANa) all the others denoted by the word prANa are the organs because they are so mentioned.
As declared in the BrhadAraNyaka text ‘thasmAth Etha EthEṇa AkhyAyantHē prANA ithi (Brhd. 1-5-21) therefore they are all called by its name as prANA,’ the senses are denoted by the name prANAH. This sūtra differentiates the mukhyaprANa from the others saying that except the srEṣṭa, as prANa is so called in the passage; all the others are organs, that is, instruments of cognition. This is confirmed by the smṛthi also as ‘indhriyANi dhasaikam cha pancha chEndhriyagOcharAh, the indhriyas are ten with the mind as the eleventh.’

SUTHRA-16-bHEDHSRUT hEH VAILAKSHA NYACCHA- 2-4-16
BECAUSE OF STATEMENT OF DIFFERENCE AND THE DIFFERENCE IN CHARACTERISTICS THE TEXT
‘EthasmAth jAyathE prANO manssarEndhriyAni cha, from this (Brahman) prANa, mind and all indhriyas are born’, (Mund. 2-1-3) mentions prANa separately from indhriyas and the mind. But the mind has been included among the indhriyas elsewhere. ‘manas shashTaneendhriyANi’, says the Gītā. (BG. 15-7) The function of the indhriyas and manas is to act as instruments of cognition while that of prANa is to support the body and senses, which is why the indhriyas are denoted by the term prANAH. Hence by specific mention and function the prANa is different from others. Thus ends the indhriyADHikaraNam.

SOUTHRA-17-SAJECTHYKLRPHTHYA DHikaraNam- 2-4-8
SOUTHRA-17-SAJECTHYKLRPHTHISTHU THRIVRTHKURVATHA UPADHESATH-2- 4-17
The creation of names and forms are by the one who effects the tripartite because scripture says so. To the question that whether the names and forms created by the supreme self or by Hīranyagarbha who stands for the collective aggregate of individual selves, the sūtra answers that it is only the supreme self. The One only without a second who willed to become many and created fire etc. is said to enter into all beings and gave them names and forms says the śruti. ‘anEna jivEna AthmanA anupravisya nAmarupe vyAkaravANi, (Chan. 6-3-2) I will enter along with the soul as the inner self and give names and forms.’

The opponent claims that the designation of names and forms is by the Hīranyagarbha only because anEna jeevEna indicates the agency of the jīva which means that the supreme self did not do the differentiation of name and form by itself but through the jīva only. But on account of this first person singular used in the passage, namely vyAkaraṇa (let me differentiate) is not to be taken in the secondary sense as in the case of a king functioning through his spies who represent him because, the two are distinct whereas in this case the jīva is a part of Brahman and the first person singular can be taken literally.

But this view is refuted by the sūtra saying that the differentiation of names and form can be ascribed only to the one who effected the tripartite as shown in the text

‘sEyam dhEvathaikshatha hanthAham imASthisrah dhEvathA anEna jivEna AthmanA anupravisya nAmarupe vyAkaraṇi; thAsAm thrivrtham thivrthamEkaikAm karavANi, (Chan. 6-3-2)
that divinity thought, let me, having entered these three beings with this lself, differentiate names and forms; let me make each of these three tripartite.’
The tripartition each means this. Of the three elements mentioned as being created, in each, the one which is the primary constituent dominates while the other two remain as secondary. For instance the gross element fire consists of half and rest made up of water and earths each forming a quarter. Similarly in the other two the primary element forming one half of it and other two a quarter each. This can be the action of the supremeself only and not the Hiranyagarbha because he himself resides inside the cosmic egg made up of the three elements. Hence the word Athma in the passage means only Brahman having the individual self as His body.

**SUTHRA-18-MAAMSADHI BOUMAM YATHASABDAM ITHARAYOOSCHA- 2-4-18**

**FLESH ETC ARE OF EARTHY NATURE AND SO ARE THE OTHER TWO ACCORDING TO THE TEXTS.**

The opponent comes up with an objection that though the differentiation into names and forms and the tripartition may be the act of one agent it need not necessarily be the supreme self but could be Hiranyagarbha as there is evidence from sruthi that therupa were evolved first and then the tripartite creation came about. In the text quoted in the previous suthra it clearly shows that this was the order of creation because the nAmarupa vyAkarNam is mentioned before the thrivrthkaraNam. Since the texts refer to a tripartete process with respect to the food taken by an individual which cannot be prior to the differentiation into name and form. The text quoted by the opponent is from ChAndhOgya passage ‘annam asitham thrEDHA viDHeeyathE, the food deaten becomes threefold.’ similarly the other two, water and fire are referred to in this manner.

The suthra refutes this saying that tripartite process described in the passage is only a description of the transformation of the three elements into different parts of human body and has nothing to do with the tripartition explained earlier regarding the creation.

**SUTHRA-19-VAISESHYA STHU THADHVADHASTHADHVAD HAH-2-4-19**

**THE DESIGNATION OF THE ELEMENTS AS SUCH IS DUE TO THE PREPONDERANCE OF THAT PARTICULAR ELEMENT.**

Though all the three elements mentioned are present on each of the three they are called by the name of that element which is predominant. This is the end of sajnAmurthyKrprthya DhikaraNam.

**END OF THE SECOND CHAPTER OF SRIBHASHYA OF RAMANuja.**